A number of issues - the situation in Northern Ireland, the Palestinian intifada, anarchism and most prominently the Negri/Windschuttle affair - have prompted some recent discussion and reflection in the blogosphere on the question of violence and politics. I’ve probably made my views clear enough on Tim Dunlop’s thread and at Troppo, but a quick reflection based on political theory here might be in order. Violence and politics is, after all, one focus of my Doctoral work. And violence and politics seem to be strangely intertwined and difficult to separate.
Often overlooked, and it’s a point made by thinkers as various as Max Weber, Eric Hobsbawm, Carl Schmitt and Jacques Derrida, is that “founding moments” in any regime - but also in liberal democratic regimes which disavow violence (at least internally - war is also violence) and attempt to monopolise its use by the State, as in Weber’s famous aphorism and criminalise private violence - are inevitably violent. The French Revolution and the American War of Independence, not to mention the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution of 1688 were all moments were constitutional states were born in violence, disorder and strife. Indeed, “terrorism” is usually traced to the French revolution as a political tactic. Schmitt and Derrida argue that constitutional States disavow their founding moment - their constitutionality has to be seen to rest on an extra-historical basis because the violence of its institution must be unacknowledged. Similarly, there is something in the definition and structure of sovereignty which means that States often routinely use violence (for instance torture and other infractions of civil and personal liberties) to safeguard their security.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty argued in Sense and Non-Sense that living in unsettled times placed an additional responsibility on citizens to act to reshape their future (his reference was the French resistance and the fight against fascism but his point broader) and hard decisions must be made by otherwise peaceful people. My point here is that we need to be judicious in evaluating these structural features of politics and the State, and that we need also to be ever more vigilant about preserving the liberties of citizens’ bodies and their thoughts against intrusions and violent interventions which States of all political stripes seem to regularly be tempted into at the same time as they proclaim their peaceful and lawful nature…
One mans terrorist is simply anothers freedom fighter. It’s all relative to the strain of politics holding sway at any particular point in history. Current world circumstances and the political responses are prime examples.
I think the American constitutional state, rather than disavowing the violence of its founding, tends to celebrate it. The revolution is fundamental to its teaching of history, and the national anthem of the US commemmorates a battle. So I think that the idea that “their constitutionality has to be seen to rest on an extra-historical basis because the violence of its institution must be unacknowledged” does not apply in this case.
However, I agree with your general thesis that violence and the state are inextricably entwined. The successful state is one which can channel this violence in a way that benefits the majority of people — by, for instance, using it against violent criminals or competing states. I think that modern democracy has so far demonstrated an excellent ability to balance violence, survival and individual rights — though as always, it is capable of improvement.
I’m not too far from agreeing with your last paragraph, EP!
I should clarify my point in relation to your first para though - the violent revolution in America was illegal and illegitimate at the time as far as the British State was concerned. Does that make my point that you’ve quoted clearer?
It is true that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter but it is not a matter of relativism, it is a matter of the kind of political order that they intend to establish. Kim will be disappointed if there is no input from Popper on this topic, and these are some of his views on the way that violence can be legitimate to dispose of a tyrant and to defend democracy.
http://badanalysis.com/catallaxy/index.php?p=672
“It is true that one man‚Äôs terrorist is another man‚Äôs freedom fighter but it is not a matter of relativism, it is a matter of the kind of political order that they intend to establish.”
I feel obliged to disagree, Rafe. Terrorism, IMHO, is the deliberate targeting, by an individual or group (or a state, absent a condition of declared war), of non-combatant civilians with the clear and conscious objective of killing and maiming as many of them as possible, not to achieve a tactical military objective, but to either (1) create a climate of fear, confusion and dfeatism in the targeted community, hopefully resulting in an act of surrender by the state; or (2) for the purpose of maximising publicity for his, her or their cause, and thereby, among other things, attracting more adherents; or (3) both of the above.
The precise nature of the political order they seek to establish is surely irrelevant. It is the nature of their actions that is determinant.
Mark, the Glorious Revolution was NOT violent. Indeed, is that not why it was called ‘glorious’ - because it achieved regime change in England without violence. And the English Civil War was not an example of a state being born out of violence. Cromwell’s victory was followed a period of rigid autocracy, an attempt to establish a republican dynasty (in the form of Richard Cromwell), and the speedy restoration of the monarchy. It’s perhaps worth pointing out that at that stage the ‘constitutional state’ known as Britain did not even exist - the Act of Union with Scotland was decades away - so it could hardly have been brought into existence by either revolution.
As for your other citations, we’ve disagreed on the French and American examples over at Troppo so I won’t reprise those arguments here.
Peace, brother.
Rob,
Terrorism doesn’t always target non-combatants. It’s usually directed at official representatives of the opposing state. e.g. soldiers, police, judiciary, civil servants. The targeting of non-combatants is often deliberate, but just as often dictated by military realities, i.e. the relative military weakness of the terrorist.
Moreover, the targeting of non-combatants is not unique to terrorists: history abounds with state violence against civilians. Mark would note the bombing of Dresden by the RAF as meeting your definition of “terrorism” precisely.
The Glorious Revolution was indeed violent, just not so much in England. The forces of William III and James II had a couple of nasty stoushes in Scotland and, in particular, Ireland. One of those battles, the Battle of the Boyne, is commemorated today by the Orangemen of Northern Ireland.
Rob wrote “The precise nature of the political order they seek to establish is surely irrelevant. It is the nature of their actions that is determinant.”
Point taken. However I also want to focus attention on the kind of political order that people are seeking to establish, so that critics of minimum state liberalism will be obliged to engage with reality rather than a variety of straw dummies that they have created.
Fyodor, I don’t regard the targeting of the military or the police as terrorism (no doubt they would disagree), as they are (generally) armed instruments of the state they serve, and able to defend themselves. Judges, civil servants, etc. are indeed non-combatants, because they are not equipped or trained to defend themselves with lethal force. that makes them helpless when they are themselves confronted with armed force. That’s terrorism. And, contra your argument, the armed terrorist attacking a helpless civilian is in a position of enormous military strength. Not to mention the magnitude of the moral infamy involved. It really is just murder - for political ends. Again, that’s what terrorism is.
And Dresden, or the London Blitz, or the fire-bombing of Tokyo, even Horoshima and Nagasaki, does not, under the tentative definition I offered, constitute terrorism. Note that I said, quite deliberately, “or a state, absent a condition of declared war”. Terrible things are done in war; there’s no getting away from it. But until quite recently - the first Gulf War, if I’m not mistaken, when the use of precision weapons started to change the way the military thought about such things - terrorising the civilian population in order to break their morale was (and military experts can corect me on this if I’m wrong) was regarded as a legitimate means to an end. But only in a declared war. I’m not saying it’s not horrible; but I am saying it’s not terrorism. The category of offence to think about in these contexts is ‘war crimes’, not terrorism.
Finally, the Glorious Revolution was celebrated as such because it involved, not a violent insurrection, but an invitation by leading figures in England to William of Orange to come over and assume the throne in the face of James II’s aggressive Catholicism. He did so, many prominent Englishment/women supported him, and he proceeded in triumph while James fled. James’ flight was treated as an abdication and so William became - peacefully - the new monarch. True, there was violence in Ireland before and afterwards but that is not germane to understanding the real nature and ‘gloriousness’ of the 1688 revolution.
Can’t remember where I saw the reference, Rob, but I saw a fairly persuasive argument that US soldiers are subject to terrorism in the sense that they can’t distinguish between combatants and non-combatants easily and therefore aren’t practically able to defend themselves - ie if a person dressed in civilian clothes might pose a threat, but can’t be distinguished from others similarly attired, and can’t be engaged with until it’s too late, then it’s terrorism and given that one of the def’n’s of terrorism is usually that its goal is to inspire fear and weaken morale - it seems to fit.
Rob,
Thanks for clarifying your definition. However, if attacks against soldiers and police are not terrorism, then does that mean that PIRA attacks against the RUC or British army are not terrorist? Or that Al Qaeda attacks on US navy vessels or embassies are not terrorist? It’s a definition that does not match common perceptions.
You misread my comment on “relative military weakness”. I did not imply that terrorists attack noncombatants because terrorists are weaker than their noncombatant targets, but because terrorists are militarily weaker than alternative military targets. I’m arguing they often choose softer targets because they are easier to hit.
On state terrorism, I had missed the phrase “or a state, absent a condition of declared war”, which would eliminate Dresden, Hiroshima etc. Of course, the problem then arises when war is occurring, but not declared. The USA never declared war on North Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia, but certainly bombed non-combatant targets in those countries. There is also a definitional issue when state violence is applied to civilians within the state, whether it be extra-judicial assassinations, ethnic cleansing or other forms of repression. Is intra-state violence perpetrated by the state terrorism according to your definition?
On the Glorious Revolution, I think you’re being evasive. James II did not abdicate and contested William’s accession, in most violent terms. The fact that the violence did not occur in England does not make the revolution any less violent. There were battles in Scotland and Ireland, which were part of the realm claimed by both James and William. The term “Glorious” also refers to the victory of the protestant cause, not just its bloodless nature in England.
I’ve remembered the reference for the point in my last comment:
John A. Lynn’s Battle: A History of Combat and Culture.
Fyodor, unconventional as it might seem, I would not regard attacks by Al Queda on military targets like the USS Cole to be acts of terrorism. Nor would I regard attacks by the IRA against the RUC to be such. If a group declares itself as determined to use violence against a state to achieve its objectives, the state is on notice that it will be attacked, and should take the neceessary steps to protect itself - indeed, is obligated to use its professionals to that end. But it defends itself by the instruments (in Mark’s temrs) of its own appropriateition of violence. Civiians are not those insturments, and therefore it it illegitimate, and totally immoral, to make them the targets - since they do not represent the state, except by self-serving and self-exculpating logics, which terrorists are pretty good at.
I accept your point on ‘relative military weakness’ and had thought of correcting my comment, but was confident someone would challenge me on it anyway. Nonetheless, I find the final sentence of your paragraph difficult to stomach on moral grounds. Yes, some targetsare hard. A ‘freedom fighter’ worth the name would find a more effective way of getting to them than attacking the always available soft targets. It is the latter that constitutes the moral infamy that underpins genuine terrorism.
On the conflict in south-east Asia, your point is good also. However, political realities of the late 20th century have been such that ‘declared war’ is an inadequate or incomplete frame to put around a conflict such as Vietnam. I have seen - and this is in the way pre-internet days, so cannot provide any links - military analysts talking about ‘undeclared but understood ‘ wars. I’m comfortable with that - to the exent it’s possible to be, anyway - and would apply the same ‘war crimes’ criterion to excesses done under its name.
On the Glorious Revolution, my comment was directed at what I thought was a patently ahistorical remark of Mark’s. You say, “James II did not abdicate and contested William‚Äôs accession, in most violent terms.” This is true; but the point I was trying to make was that the actual transfer of monarchy, that is, the transformation in the nature of state power, occurrred without the need for bloodshed. Of course James objected to it , and so did the Jacobites. The victimes of palace coups always feel like that. This is germane to the wider historical debate, but not to Mark’s point: that the British state came into existence out of violence. I think that contention does not hold up to scrutiny.
If I sound heated it’s for this reason: we should never, ever ignore the centuries-old tradition of warfare, dating back to Augustine, that distinguishes between combatants and non-combatants. To war cominals and terrorists the distinction is meaningless. Both deserve our absolute condemnation and opporobrium.
And Mark, a tiny OT comment: can you re-position the ’submit comment’ BELOW the ‘live comment preview’ window? I several times nearly prematurely submitted this comment by (almost) just hitting ‘enter’.
Rob, perhaps I would have made myself clearer if I’d said that the current liberal regime in Britain had its origins in the Glorious Revolution - and I’m among those who see it as the culmination of political struggles throughout the seventeenth century that reached their height in the Civil War. The same issues about religion and parliament vs. monarchy were being debated under Charles II who was able to hold things in rough balance, but came to a head again under James II.
I don’t have the same problem with the comments you do - what browser are you using?
Couldn’t have put it better myself. Also thought your comment on Troppo was spot on.
Surely the definition of power is the legitiamte use of violence.
Yep, Hammy - Max Weber wrote this about the State in ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in 1918:
Rob,
I think I’m getting to the nub of the problem here. You desire to define terrorism by the nature of its target, whereas the reality is that it is typically defined by its perpetrator. Politically motivated violence by the state is “legitimate”. Politically motivated violence by non-state actors is “terrorism”. You may disagree with this definition, but this is how it usually breaks down.
I share your disgust at the targeting of non-combatants, but your claim about the historical (i.e. “since Augustine”) distinction between combatants and non-combatants, is deeply ahistorical. The exemption of non-combatants from political violence is a distinctly modern concept, and unfortunately more observed in the breach than the rule. I’ll disgust you a little further and state that there is nothing inherently illegitimate or immoral about targeting non-combatants. These are moral judgements that we apply to political violence, not moral views that are necessarily universal.
You’ve stated that the British state was not born from violence. I think you’re absolutely wrong on this issue: the modern British state evolved from the primacy of parliament, won by force of arms in the Civil War and Glorious Revolution. The Glorious Revolution was not a bloodless palace coup - it was a war and a revolution, involving considerable violence. Likewise for the Civil War. I suggest it’s your position on this point that does not hold up to scrutiny.