It was ninety years ago today III

Orlando Figesâ?? narrative of the February Revolution continues, as the Tsar makes a fatal misjudgment and the soldiers join their â??fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, and bridesâ?? in the streets of Petrograd.

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The officers were finding it increasingly difficult to get their men to obey orders. Colonel Khodnev, a commander of the Finland Reserve Regiment, complained bitterly about the Cossacks. They were â??extremely slack and indecisiveâ?? and their â??inaction was particularly apparent when they formed an individual patrol or platoon under the command of a young sergeant or a junior lieutenant. More than once I heard them say: â??This isnâ??t 1905. We wonâ??t carry whips. We wonâ??t move against our own kind, against the peopleâ??.â?? True, there were some soldiers who were still prepared â?? usually on their own initiative or on the orders of a junior officer when scared or provoked â?? to take violent measures against the crowd. A platoon of dragoons opened fire near a row of shops at the Gostiny Dvor, killing three and wounding ten, while near the city Duma nine more demonstrators were shot dead. But a growing proportion of the soldiers were either refusing to obey orders to fire, or were deliberately shooting over the heads of the people in the street. Some were even joining them against the police. In one incident on Znamenskaya Square the Cossacks intervened to rescue the crowd when the mounted police, having been frustrated in their efforts to capture a red banner, threatened to charge the people down. The Cossacks, sabers drawn, rode into the crowd and began to attack the mounted police, who then galloped away pursued by the crowd throwing stones. Meanwhile the police commander lay dead on the ground, his body covered with wounds from the Cossacksâ?? sabers and revolver shots.

Even at this point, on the evening of the 25th [February], the authorities could still have contained the situation, despite the growing self-assertion of the crowd. The important thing, as the Council of Ministers seemed to sense at its midnight meeting, was to hold back from open conflict with the crowd, which would merely pour fuel on the flames and run the risk of a mutiny among the soldiers in the garrison. There was still some reason to suppose â?? or at least to act upon the assumption â?? that the anger of the demonstrators was mainly focused on the shortages of bread and that once this problem had been solved they would become tired of protests and return to work. That had been the outcome of several bread riots in the recent past and, although this one was more ominous, there was no real reason yet to believe that it would end any differently. This was certainly the assumption of the socialist leaders in the capital. Nikolai Sukhanov, perhaps the revolutionâ??s most famous memoirist, thought that so far there had only been â??â??disordersâ?? â?? there was still no revolutionâ??. Shliapnikov, the leading Bolshevik in the capital, scoffed at the idea that this was the start of a revolution. â??What revolution?â?? he asked a local meeting of the party leaders on the 25th. â??Give the workers a pound of bread and the movement will peter outâ??.

But whatever chance there might have been of containing the disorders were destroyed that evening by the Tsar. Having been informed of the situation at his headquarters in Mogilev, he sent a cable to General Khabalov, Chief of the Petrograd Military District, ordering him to use military force to â??put down the disorders by tomorrowâ??. There could be no better illustration of the extent to which the Tsar had lost touch with reality. Nor could there be any better guarantee of a revolution. To be fair, Nicholas had been badly advised from the start. He had left the capital for Mogilev on 22 February, after being assured by Protopopov that he had nothing to worry about. Since then the police and Khabalov had played down the seriousness of the situation in their reports to Nicholas; it was embarrassing for them to have to admit that it might be getting out of their control. The Tsar had thus little real idea of the finely balanced nature of the situation, or of the risks involved in using force, when he sent his fatal order to Khabalov. But then it was his job to know â?? and the job of his advisers to inform him â?? what was going on in the capital. Only the Tsar could issue the final order to use force against the crowds, and once that order had been issued none of his advisers could challenge it. In other words, if the regime fell because of a breakdown in communications, then one can only say that it deserved to fall.

By Sunday morning, 26 February, the centre of Petrograd had been turned into a militarized camp. Soldiersâ?? pickets and armed policemen stood at the major intersections and strategic buildings; mounted patrols rode through the streets; officers communicated by field telephone; machine-guns, set up in Palace Square, pointed down the Nevsky Prospekt; and in the side streets were military ambulances standing by. During the morning everything was quiet; it was Sunday and people slept in late. But around midday huge crowds of workers once again assembled in the suburbs and marched towards the city centre. As they converged on the Nevsky Prospekt, the police and soldiers fired upon tem from several different points. At the junction of the Nevsky and Vladimir Prospekts the Semenovsky Regiment â?? which had put down the Moscow uprising in 1905 â?? shot dead several marchers. On the Nevsky, near the Gostiny Dvor, a training detachment of the Pavlovsky Regiment shot a round of blanks and then opened fire on the crowd. The people scattered behind buildings and into shops, re-emerging moments later to throw bricks and pieces of ice at the troops. Dozens of people were wounded or killed. The bloodiest incident took place on Znamenskaya Square, where more than fifty people were shot dead by a training detachment of the Volynsky Regiment. It was a terrible atrocity. An officer, who had been unable to get his young and obviously nervous soldiers to shoot at the demonstrators, grabbed a rifle from one of his men and began to fire wildly at the crowd. Among the dead bodies, which were later piled up around the â??Hippopotamusâ??, were two soldiers from the regiment who had gone over to the side of the people.

This shedding of blood â?? Russiaâ??s second Bloody Sunday â?? proved a critical turning point. From this moment on the demonstrators knew that they were involved in a life-or-death struggle against the regime. Paradoxically, now that the worst had happened and some of their comrades were killed, they were less afraid for their own lives. As for the soldiers they were now confronted with a choice between their moral duty to the people and their oath of allegiance to the Tsar. If they followed the former, a full-scale revolution would occur. But if they stuck to their oath of allegiance, then the regime might still manage to survive, as it had done in 1905-1906.

After the shooting on the Nevsky Prospekt an angry crowd of demonstrators broke into the barracks of the Pavlovsky Regiment near the Mars Field and shouted at the soldiers that some of their trainees had been firing at the people. Visibly shaken by the news, the 4th Company of the Pavlovskys resolved to march to the Nevsky at once in order to stop the massacre. â??They are shooting at our mothers and our sisters!â?? was their rallying cry as they mutinied. About a hundred soldiers broke into the arsenal of the barracks and, taking thirty rifles, began to march towards the Nevsky. Almost immediately, they ran into a mounted police patrol on the bank of the Griboyedov Canal. They fired at them, killing one policeman, until they ran out of cartridges, whereupon they decided to return to barracks to bring o the rest of the men. But Khabalovâ??s troops were waiting for them there and, upon the mutineersâ?? arrival, disarmed them and confined them to barracks. Nineteen ringleaders were arrested and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress. They were to be its last prisoners â?? at least under the Tsarist regime.

But it was too late for repression by this stage. All the prisons in Russia could not have contained the revolutionaries on the streets. The training detachment of the Volynsky Regiment which had been involved in the shooting on Znamenskaya Square had, like their comrades in the Pavlovsky, returned to their barracks in the evening full of doubts and remorse about what they had done. One of the soldiers claimed to have recognised his own mother amongst the people they had killed. All these teenage conscripts were badly shaken by the massacre ad it did not take much for their young sergeant, [a peasant] called Sergei Kirpichnikov, to talk them into a protest of their own. â??I told themâ??, Kirpichnikov recalled:

That it would be better to die with honour than to obey any further orders to shoot at the crowds: â??Our fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, and brides are begging for bread,â?? I said. â??Are we going to kill them? Did you see the blood on the streets today? I say we shouldnâ??t take up our positions tomorrow. I myself refuse to go.â?? And, as one, the soldiers cried out: â??We shall stay with you!â??

Having sworn their allegiance to Kirpichnikov, the soldiers were determined to defy their commanding officer when, once again, he ordered them to march against the demonstrators the following morning. At this stage the soldiers did not intend a full-scale mutiny, only a vocal and abusive protest against their officers for having ordered them to fire on the crowds, and a refusal to obey his commands. But when the officer found himself confronted by his angry men he made the fatal error of walking away â?? and then, even worse, of starting to run across the barracks yard. Sensing their power over him, the soldiers pointed their rifles towards him, and one of them shot him in the back. Suddenly the soldiers were mutineers. They scattered through the barracks, in panic as much as revolutionary fervour, calling on the other soldiers to join their mutiny. Relatively few from the Volynsky joined them but there were many more who were willing in the neighbouring barracks of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, the Lithuanian Regiment and the mutineers stormed the regimental arsenals, killer several of their officers and spilled in their thousands on to the streets, where they spread out in all directions, some moving towards the centre of the city, others crossing over to the Vyborg side in order to raise the Moscow Regiment and link up with the workers.

In all these mutinies the decisive role was played by the junior officers, most of whom came from lower-class backgrounds or had democratic sympathies. Fedor Linde (1881-1917), a sergeant in the Finland Regiment, was typical in this respect. He played an unsung but crucial role in turning the tide of the February Revolution. Tall, blond and handsome, Linde was the son of a German chemist and a Polish peasant-woman who had grown up on a small farm near St Petersburg on the Gulf of Finland. There his mother ran a little inn which was popular with the capitalâ??s revolutionaries when they wanted to escape the gaze of the police. And it was by socializing with the hotel guests that the teenage Linde, who was by nature a romantic idealist, first became involved in the revolutionary underground. In 1899 he enrolled in the mathematics Faculty of St Petersburg University, and immediately became a leading light in the student protest movement. During the 1905 Revolution Linde worked alongside the Social Democrats in the capital, and organized the students in an â??academic legionâ?? to spread propaganda to the working class. He was arrested and imprisoned in the Kresty jail, and then forced to go into exile in Europe, before being allowed to return to Russia under the amnesty of 1913 to celebrate the Romanov Tercentenary. The next year he was mobilized by the Finland Regiment, where his courageous leadership of the soldiers soon saw him promoted to sergeant. It was precisely this same quality which distinguished Linde in the mutiny of the February Days. In a letter to the Socialist Revolutionary Boris Sokolov, written in the spring of 1917, Linde recalled how he persuaded the 5,000 soldiers of the Preobrazhensky regiment, in whose barracks near the Tauride Palace he was staying at the time, to join the mutiny:

I donâ??t know what happened to me. I was lying on a couch in the barracks and reading a book by Haldane. I was so absorbed in it that I didnâ??t hear shouts and roars coming from the street. A wild bullet broke the window near my couchâ?¦ The Cossacks were firing on defenceless and unarmed crowds, striking people with their whips crushing the fallen with their horses. And then I saw a young girl trying to evade the galloping horse of a Cossack officer. She was too slow. A severe blow on her head brought her down under the horseâ??s feet. She screamed. It was her inhuman, penetrating scream that caused something in me to snap. I jumped to the table and cried out wildly: â??Friends! Friends! Long live the revolution! To arms! To arms! They are killing innocent people, our brothers and sisters!â??

Later they said there was something in my voice that made it impossible to resist my callâ?¦ They followed me without realizing where or in the name of what cause they wentâ?¦ They all joined me in the attack against the Cossacks and police. We killed a few of them. The rest retreated. By night the fight was over. The revolution had become a realityâ?¦ And I, well I returned that same night to my book by Haldane.

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The mutiny of the Petrograd garrison turned the disorders of the previous four days into a full-scale revolution. The tsarist authorities were virtually deprived of military power in the capital. â??It had now become clear to meâ??, Balk later wrote of the 27th, â??that we had lost all authorityâ??. The spilling of the soldiers onto the streets, moreover, gave a military strength and organization to the revolutionary crowds. Instead of vague and aimless protest they focused on the capture of strategic targets and the armed struggle against the regime. Soldiers and workers fought together for the capture of the Arsenal, where they armed themselves with 40,000 rifles and 30,000 revolvers, followed by the major weapons factories, where at least another 100,000 guns fell into their hands. They occupied the Artillery department, the telephone exchange and some (though not all) of the railway stations. They spread the mutiny to the remaining barracks (Linde himself led a guard of soldiers from the Preobrazhensky and Lithuanian Regiments to bring out his own Finland Regiment). Thanks to the soldiers and officers like Linde, the first signs of real organization â?? armed pickets on the bridges and major intersections, barricades, field-telephones and structures of command â?? began to appear on the streets. Many of the soldiers were also kept busy by the task of arresting â?? and sometimes beating up or even murdering â?? their commanding officers. This was a revolution in the ranks.

But the main attention of the insurgents was now focused on the bloody street war against the police. There were hundreds of police snipers hidden on the flat roofs of the buildings, some of them armed with machine guns, who were firing at the crowds below and at anyone who showed themselves in the windows opposite. Other police snipers had positioned themselves in the belfries of the churches, hoping that the peopleâ??s respect for religion would prevent them from firing back. The snipers deliberately used smokeless ammunition so the people could not easily tell where the shooting had come from. Suddenly there would be a crack of gunfire, and the crowds would run for cover, leaving little heaps of wounded and dead bodies lying in the streets. Workers and soldiers â??would begin to shoot wildlyâ?? at the house from where they thought the firing had come, recalls Viktor Shklovsky, who led a group of fighters against the police, but this usually proved counter-productive. â??The dust rising from where our bullets hit the plaster was taken for return fire,â?? setting off more shooting and confusion. Many people were killed by â??our own bulletsâ?? bouncing off the buildings or by falling masonry.

Even less effective were the motor-cars that went hurtling about the streets filled with soldiers waving flags and shooting wildly into the air. Virtually every car and lorry had been requisitioned by the crowds, no matter to whom it might belong. Linde and his men commandeered a lorry, upon which they hung a banner with the words: â??The First Revolutionary Flying Squadâ??. The Grand Duke Gavril Konstantinovich even had his Rolls-Royce requisitioned. It was later seen cruising down the Nevsky Prospekt, with two soldiers lying on the front bonnet, several others riding on the sides, and two with a machine gun mounted on the roof, although this proved to be of little use since the car was swerving too much for it to be held still and fired properly. Smaller cars, bristling with bayonets, presented an even stranger image. Gorky compared them to â??huge hedgehogs running amokâ??. Much of the fighting was done from these cars: this was the first revolution on wheels. The vehicles would speed through the streets, pull up alongside a building from which the police were thought to be firing, and start to shoot in the direction of the roof. But since the snipers could see and hear the vehicles coming â?? what with their horns sounding and their red flags waving â?? they had plenty of time to conceal themselves. In the end, the only way to defeat them was to climb up and fight them on the roofs. Many snipers were thrown off the roofs â?? to the cheers of the crowds below. As for the motor-cars, most of them were crashed, since their drivers had no idea how to drive and in any case they were usually drunk. The streets â??resoundedâ?? to the noise of car crashes, recalls Shklovsky. â??I donâ??t know how many collisions I saw during those days. Later on the city was jammed with automobiles left by the waysideâ??.

Much of the crowdsâ?? destructive violence was directed against the institutions of the police regime. Armed crowds attacked police stations, setting fire to the buildings and making sure to destroy the police records. Sometimes the contents of the buildings were burned in bonfires on the streets. Gorky, who was charged with the seizure of the Police Headquarters on Kronversky Prospekt, arrived to find it vandalized and most of its records taken or destroyed. Court buildings were similarly targeted by the crowd. Gorky found a crowd of people watching the Palace of Justice go up in flames:

The roof had already fallen in, the fire crackled between the walls, and red and yellow wisps like wool were creeping out of the windows, throwing a sheaf of paper ashes into the black sky of the night. No one made any attempt to extinguish the fireâ?¦ a tall stooping man in a shaggy sheepskin hat was walking about like a sentinel. He stopped and asked in a dull voice: â??Well â?? it means that all justice is to be abolished, doesnâ??t it? Punishments all done away with, is that it?â?? No one answered him.

Last but not least the crowd turned its destructive anger on the prisons, bashing down the gates, opening the cells, and, together with the released prisoners, vandalizing and sometimes burning down the buildings. The destruction of the prisons had a powerful symbolic significance for the revolutionary crowd: it was a sign that the old regime was dead, that the longed-for days of liberty â?? â??prisonless and crimelessâ?? â?? were about to come.

No prison was more symbolic than the Peter and Paul Fortress. The crowds were convinced that the fortress was still full of â??politicalsâ??, heroes of the revolutionary struggle languishing in its dark and dingy cells; that, after all, was the well-established myth of the revolutionariesâ?? propaganda. There were also rumours that the fortress was being used as a military base by the tsarist military forces (Balk did propose this). On the 28th a huge and angry crowd threatened to storm this â??Russian Bastilleâ??. They brought up lorries with heavy mounted guns ready to fire at its thick stone walls. The fortress commandant telephoned the Duma appealing for help, and Shulgin (for the Duma) and Skobelev (for the Soviet) were sent to negotiate with him. They returned to report that the prison was completely empty â?? apart from the nineteen mutinous soldiers of the Pavlovsky Regiment who had been imprisoned in it on the 26th â?? and proposed to calm the crowds by allowing them to send representatives to inspect its cells. But even this was not sufficient to convince the crowds that the fortress was â??for the revolutionâ??. Some of the mutinous soldiers accused Shulgin of working for the counter-revolution. There was some fighting between hem and the fortress guards. And then, finally, the red flag was raised above this bastion of the old regime.