I’ve just finished reading Gwynne Dyer’s The Mess They Made: The Middle East after Iraq:
As Gwynne Dyer argues in The Mess They Made, the Middle East is about to change fundamentally, and everything is now up for grabs: regimes, ethnic pecking-orders within states, even national borders themselves are liable to change without notice. Five years from now there could be an Islamic Republic of Arabia, an independent Kurdistan, a Muslim cold war between Sunnis and Shias, almost anything you care to imagine.
Dyer’s book is important because it’s one of the few books on the topic I’ve read (and I’ve read a lot) to really make the effort to place the current conflicts in their long term historical perspective, and to speculate on a future beyond the immediate political and strategic context (although he nevertheless documents the now familiar litany of disasters that has characterised the Iraq War). He does, however, extrapolate from that context to a conclusion which I think is becoming inescapable – much as the Democrats, either through lack of courage or political calculation, might be prepared to maintain US forces in Iraq until the 2008 election, it’s almost certain that the “implosion of public support” for the war will see troops leave when a new President, of either party, is sworn in. Dyer adds his voice to those scholars and analysts who’ve seen the US war in Iraq as a monument to its decline, not a sign of its growing power. Further, he argues that it’s likely that the US will walk away from the Middle East in toto, and he suggests that may not be an undesirable outcome.
To those who would claim that oil is a sine qua non of a continued American presence, he counters that given the state of the economy and the nature of the oil market, producers from states of whatever nature will have little alternative other than to keep supply lines open. Where Dyer is particularly astute is in seeing the movements under the sands which are fracturing the borders drawn up after the Great War by Western powers, and under the regimes largely frozen in place through forty years of American hegemony.
His contention is that the removal of American power implies a gradual lessening of the forces contributing to the terrorist threat, and also, importantly, the end of neo-colonialism may produce regimes over time likely to be more stable and more responsive to their populations. If that’s not the case, he contends, it’s not our business anyway. As for Israel, he suggests that its military strength and national determination would see it survive a withdrawal of the West.
It’s an interesting, and a provocative thesis, though not necessarily one I’d fully endorse. But there is no doubt that one result of leaving the Middle East alone would be to deprive domestic Western culture warriors of much ammunition for their clash of civilisations rhetoric. And that can only be a good thing.
NB: There’s an interesting review in The Age by Jeff Sparrow.
Me thinks poor old Jeff Sparrow needs a few lesons in the history of Islamic terrorism if he thinks it only started after the collapse of the Soviet Union!
It’s difficult to see the US military abandoning the Middle East altogether.
This would only be likely if we saw the rise of a South America Union (in the EU sense), and troops were sent in to ‘democratise’ the Venezualans.
Much as I’d welcome the event, they ain’t leaving – ever. With their litle feet in the Green Zone the only thing that’s going to chase them out is the ayatollahs all got together and bombed them out. But with 2-3 aircraft carriers worth of kapow just offshore this is not going to happen soon. Plus with the resurrected partner for peace the racist regime in Israel has in Abbas, why this can only be a good thing for the “peace process” no? Ethnic cleansing unabated for the Gaza jail keepers. And my, don’t they just look good doing it – civilised ethnic cleansing. They should invent a new word for it – rhymes with chutzpah.
It should be recognised that domestic politics in the US are by far the most important determinant of the nature of the political settlement in Iraq and the wider Middle East.
Military adventures like Operation Iraqi Freedom create their own domestic political momentum in the US.
Having made an enormous financial, military and diplomatic commitment to effecting an outcome in Iraq, the governing classes of the US, regardless of party affiliation, will find it difficult to withdraw with credit from Iraq.
The accusation that will hang over them like a black cloud is: “Who lost Iraq?” The blameworthy party will suffer severe political penalties.
The process of renegotiation of the US presence in Iraq and in the rest of the Middle East is made still more difficult by virtue of the fact that it is quite unclear who will sit on the other side of the table to the US to sign whatever “peace with honour” document that may be confected for the occasion.
No “honour”, no withdrawal. Indeed, no “honour”, no major renegotiation of the nature of the US presence.
The bottom line is that unless there is a significant upsurge in popular outrage in the US, even the congressional forces pining for withdrawal will be too timid to challenge current commitments.
Ironically, of course, powerful groups in Iraq also like the current quagmire.
1. For al Qaeda it means a ready supply of Americans to kill, thereby vouchsafing their status as heroes of Islamism.
2. For the pro-Iranian Shiites, the Quagmire represents a huge diplomatic and propaganda victory for Iran.
3. For the Kurds, the US presence represents survival and an opportunity to press nationalist and separatist aspirations.
Only Sadrist and Baathist forces oppose the US presence. It is unlikely that they could ever form a governing coalition in Iraq.
It looks like the absurd bloodletting will continue for some time yet, unless, that is, the people of the US take to the streets.
They might not want to leave, but then the Brits didn’t want to leave other. Circumstances however, dictated otherwise.
The departure of external meddlers from the ME can only be a good thing in the long run.
“…the end of neo-colonialism may produce regimes over time likely to be more stable and more responsive to their populations.”
The key words there are “over time”. In the short term, what a horrific mess it may be to watch borders re-align along Sunni/Shia divisions, not just within Iraq, but over the region entirely. Supporting the status quo at least has the arguably moral aim of preventing greater short term suffering. But yes, it may be at the cost of delaying really permanent re-alignments which might be the only long term solution.
Of course, they can only fight each other if they have weapons, but one can have little confidence in Europe’s role with regard to that, even if the US decided to end all arms support to all Middle East (Muslim) nations. In any case, honestly, you get the feeling if they didn’t have guns and mortars they would ride off and fight among themselves on camelback with swords. See, I can maintain an attitude of cultural superiority not matter what is considered!
Also, as America is never likely to abandon Israel, greater instability in the region is not going to resolve that motive for terrorist action.
One wonders at what point industry and politics in the US will conduct a cost/benefit analysis of military involvement in the Middle East and decide that it’s more in their interests to invest more heavily in alternative energy. A green military-industrial complex, perhaps? And one that’s less interestsed in Middle Eastern affairs?
I should point out that he doesn’t discount other scenarios – only that he thinks disengagement the most likely on balance. In particular he notes that Bush has little restraining him from starting a war on Iran which would certainly throw the cat among the pigeons.
He goes back to the reasons for the invasion of Iraq and argues that Iraq was picked because it was the lowest common denominator needed to unify the two anti-multilaterist foreign policy factions of the Republican right – the “nationalists” (ie Cheney, Rumsfeld) and the NeoCons. He argues fairly convincingly that the former are really more concerned about China over the longer term but wanted a display of force to redeem America’s “prestige” and threat credibility after Somalia and the Balkans (which PNAC argued was botched). It’s a bit of an Occam’s Razor explanation – in the sense that it provides a rational explanation for the obsession with invading Iraq. He doesn’t think the NeoCons are likely to make a comback and while the muscular nationalists may, he thinks their attention is focussed elsewhere.
Didn’t it get a real kickstart with the help of CIA/ISI funding and support during the Afghan war?
No, Chav, they were freedom fighters, who just happened to be a little on the fundamentalist side. They may have been sons of bitches, but they were our sons of bitches.
Like the Afghan and Pakistani warlords currently getting money and arms thrown at them by the CIA.
JG might conceivably be either referring to things like Libyan sponsored terrorism in the mid 80s when there were many more recorded terrorist incidents than post 2001 or the terrorism which was one of the tactics in the Algerian War of Independence, but neither really has the same motivations or organisational structure as Islamist non-state terrorism.
Oh, D’oh! Of course HR, how could I have forgotten that!?
Define “withdrawal”.
It’s almost impossible to see, given the peculiarities of the US attitude to Israel, to see Israel lose its access to the best of the American arms bazaar at knockdown prices.
While they retain that – not to mention their nuclear deterrent – they remain perfectly secure from conventional military attack.
Again, he does make the point that one of the strongest forces for a continued US presence post the end of Soviet Communism (which is the point at which he thinks that the Middle East obsession became contrary to American interests) were the combination of the power of arms manufacturers and the momentum of the military/industrial complex in needing some sort of bogeyman to justify huge defence budgets.
He also thinks, given the force of Israel’s nuclear deterrent, the US would be doing Israel a favour if Israel were compelled to seek peace.
In the SMH today there is an article of news reporting that China is getting to be more unpopular amongst Europeans and the U.S.A. and while that is occuring seen as more benevolent in Africa. Sudan has come under the gaze of Rice lately. I think they will find it hard to depart Iraq ,because,the U.S.A. is trying to save face..A uniquely,apparently Asian attitude…much quoted as such,now the U.S.A.s. Perhaps the old maxim you become more like those you hate is working now. Yet, I have noticed some of the coal fired electricity stations being built in China are American built stations,so maybe,people are confused and want to plummett both China ,and,the U.S.A. Accept for those Americans who regularly have holidays at The Bohemia Club,and are known to not vote or be members of the Party that dad endorsed,where Anglers are aplenty.
I think they will find it hard to depart Iraq ,because,the U.S.A. is trying to save face..A uniquely,apparently Asian attitude…much quoted as such,now the U.S.A.s.
Bush certainly is. Whether his successor will want to start a new Presidential term with such a legacy is another matter entirely.
mark says:
The US power decline is coming, PRC or not. It occurred to me not long after the Iraq-war started to go sour (around day 2) that Iraq was to the USA as Afghanistan was to the USSR, a client state intervention too far. Both began when a former client started to make waves for the hegemon, both started with impressive displays of military force projection and both eventually failed due to the wearing effects of relentless guerilla and civil war on the hegemon’s martial and political offices.
I predict that, not long after the US withdraws from Iraq, it will begin a long period of retrenching its military bases from both Northern Europe and Southern Asia. No way can it afford the hawks warfare state and pay for the geezers welfare state.
It will apply the Monroe Doctrine to ensure a favourable balance of power in its own hemisphere. It will develop super-space weapons to deal with the PRC, and special forces to deal with terrorists. As per Eisenhower/Kennedy strategy to deal with Second World commies and Third World insurgents.
mark says:
The US’s invasions of the ME have been “all about oil” and Israel, but not in the sense of the simplistic slogan of “Move On”. The US’s interest in ME oil has, since the mid-seventies anyway, been more about denying the use of ME oil revenues to enemy states rather than accessing the use of ME oil revenues to friendly companies. The US war planners do not want a hostile state, whether Arab or European, controlling “the Prize” and using the oil monopoly to build up a military superpower (as the both the Nazis and Soviets wanted to do with Russian oil).
That is a major reason why the US went to DEFCOM III when Arabs looked like they would overrun Israel with Soviet support. Balance of Power in a region of vital interest. Likewise the US efforts to contain both Iran and Iraq from menacing Saudi oil fields. (Reagan codicil to the Carter Doctrine.)
mark says:
Wrong. False. Opposite of the truth, again.
THe “Clash of Civilizations” is a clash within, not between, both the South and North. It is between secular moderates and sectarian militants in both jurisdictions. The Wahhabists and Likudniks would have to invent each other if they did not exist.
Regionalism, rather than religionism is the dividing line in most cultural conficts. The clash is between the “femmo”, urban, civic nationalists and the “macho”, rural, ethnic tribalists. cf Beirut for a lesson in “Demographics as Destiny”.
If mark thinks the Culture Wars will subside when military forces withdraw he is deluding himself (“banisch-verse”?) again. Culture Wars are raging ever stronger in those European states who are the least likely to militarily provoke Arab nations, eg France and the Nordic states. This is because of their bad immigration (lax selection and mad settlement) policies. Too many of the wrong type of people.
And the emergence of home-grown terrorists amongst ethnic enclaves (merrily following multi-culti prescriptions) in the North will ensure that we will have loads of culture warring to do long after the last USMC chopper has lifted off from the Green Zone. Check out London-istan and Leeds-istan.
The fighting on the ethnic front of the Culture Wars will only subside if both sides politico-culturally disconnect ie the North does not willy-nilly invade the ME and the ME does not willy-nilly invite itself in to the North. The Culture Wars will continue to flare up, much as “violence in the ME” does, so long as the Cultural Left is addicted to multiculturalism to recruit new voters to support its ailing ideological agenda and stack its rotten boroughs.
Dyer points out that the US can do that with its Navy in the Persian Gulf quite adequately.
I was quite struck by the way in which he argued that “oil” was quite an illogical answer to the conundrum of why the US stays around in the ME and in particular why it invaded Iraq.
This is a fallacy of narration.
The “it” referred to here is the United States.
The United States doesn’t go to war until the President calls for war and the Congress agrees.
When the President calls for war in his presentation to Congress he may or may not be voicing his actual motives for going to war (vide the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.)
Therefore the crucial decision so far as an adequate narration is concerned is the actual decision to ask Congress to declare war.
The decision to invade Iraq came down to the decision and signature of one man, George W. Bush.
As Woodward documented quite brilliantly, despite the fact that Bush was surrounded by a swirling mass of advisors in the days before the decision to invade all giving him different and often contradictory advice, Bush himself appeared to be quite disengaged from the process.
Simply put, there is no way of saying for sure, unless Bush comes clean (and even then perhaps not), what finally motivated Bush to put his signature on the paper to invade Iraq.
Given Bush’s affinity with the oil industry, oil is as likely a motive as any other.
Mark
My very first posts on this blog covered this in a way that even Kim recently has started to realise as being spot on.
Not necessarily, Katz, for two reasons – first that American engagement in the Middle East is much deeper and of much longer standing than war, and there is strategic continuity, and secondly because “the President” isn’t the only actor in practice in making these decisions – something that should be particularly obvious with Bush.
Dyer also believes that given that much discussion and decision making won’t have been documented, the “true reasons” will never be known for certain. However, unless Bush is entirely irrational, which I don’t believe, then I think he makes a good case that “oil” doesn’t cut the mustard as a motive.
Anyway, people should probably read the book! It’s much more worth your $27 than a lot of books on the topic.
Chav/Kim
Actually, I was thinking more of 1920s Palestine, Armenia in 1915, and throughout the 7th and 8th centuries in the Middle East.
http://larvatusprodeo.net/2007/06/26/at-least-it-wasnt-albrechtsen-or-devine/#comment-380570
It’s true that the president isn’t the only actor. He is, however, the crucial actor.
Bob Woodward is, for the time being, the best source on the decision making process for war.
Were Woodward to have depicted Bush as thoroughly engaged in the debates for and against, and if so how, then clearly it would be necessary for the historian to tease out very carefully the influence of (say) the neocons in helping Bush form his decision.
But the evidence so far suggests strongly that this would not assist us to explain Bush’s motives, even though it may help us to understand perfectly the neocons’ motives.
It might be argued that Bush was reckless and negligent in his decision making modes. But recklessness and negligence should be distinguished from “irrationality”. One may be reckless and negligent without being irrational.
It is true that Bush did appear to perceive a strategic continuity in his approach to the Middle East. It dates back to the Carter Doctrine which attempted to quarantine the Middle East from strategic influence inimical to US interests. These interests revolved around oil. The Carter Doctrine conceived of “our bastards” running the Middle East, regardless of their odiousness, so long as they were sustainable.
Bush rejected that pragmatism. His motives for doing that are the subject of this discussion.
John, I suspect this is a category mistake:
But it would be easier to work out whether it is if you’d argue your view rather than assert it.
Katz, point taken about the Carter Doctrine but I still don’t think it’s a sufficient answer for the question of why Iraq was invaded. Dyer posits a strategically rational answer (even if you disagree with that rationality) but if it’s just a matter of strategic continuity, then I think you’d have to posit inertia and the momentum of that strategy rather than “oil” as a reductive cause.
Neither do I.
I tend to be more sceptical than Dyer. Oil may be in the mix, and then again, it may not.
I do believe, however, in line with our agreement about the importance of the Carter Doctrine, oil was a necessary, though not sufficient condition for invasion.
Yes, but that doesn’t take us much closer – which is why I think Dyer’s hypothesis is interesting, based as it is on a careful reading of PNAC types’ statements prior to Bush taking office.
Since this is an Iraq thread, btw, whatever happened to the Last Superpower? They haven’t been seen around these parts for some time.
One of the neo-cons (I can’t recall which) and advocates of the Iraq War, supported the war on the grounds that it would rectify what he called 40 years of “terrible stability” in the ME. He seemed to see advantages in the break-up of larger states like Iraq into smaller and theorectially less powerful statelets. Similiar throughts on Iran are apparant.
Mark; I would be happy to debate current events in the Middle East with you and others here at LP but you were going to get back to me over the fundamentals of the issue and then…
If Bush had signed a bit of paper authorising an attack on the UK it wouldn’t have happened.
If Bush’s mind is unknowable we can still ask why an invasion of Iraq was politically feasible. Why did most US politicians vote thru the necessary $ etc
Was it an evangelical urge to spread the message of American Freedom; was it borne of the terrible fear of the fabled mushroom cloud blooming over an American city.
Each politician voted on different grounds and emotions. One word answers will never satisfy, but if the answer had to best expressed in 3 letters only – OIL floats to the top.
The historical basis for US interest in the region was oil; in recent decades the strategic value of the region in the contest with the USSR was oil; in the future struggle with China over depleting global reserves the prize/the economic imperative is still oil.
Countries will of course sell and consume their oil – but they will choose carefully with whom they trade. Enemies do no get good terms. Oil is a very tightly government controlled commodity. And so oil importing countries like America, China, India (and Australia) have to be vigilant in making sure they get a place in the queue. The USA is maybe just a little more vigilant than most.
The West will leave the Middle East alone when its main exports are dates, rugs, copperware and racing camels.
As it pretty much did until WW1 made everyone realise oil-powered militaries and economies were the way of the future.
Name more than two ME countries now that existed before WW1.
“Oil may be in the mix, and then again, it may not.”
Only when an agreement on the Hydrocarbon Law (oil law) has been reached by the factions that make up the Iraqi Parliament will there ever be any “downsizing� of US forces in Iraq.
I feel there will be an American military presence in and around Iraq for many years to come; because US troops will be needed to protect the supply of Iraqi oil to the West.
The US will not be reducing its forces in Iraq until the current Iraqi Government, the next one or the one after passes the “oil law�.
A law that will give major western oil corporations complete control over Iraq’s oil guaranteeing them 70% of the profits for the next 30 years!
Eventually the“Big Oil�companies will get what V.P. Dick Cheney had promised them prior to the invasion; but the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia are still squabbling over the remaining 30% of profits. This is the main stumbling point at the moment which is delaying the completion to this deal.
Of course the invasion of Iraq was about the oil, what else was it for … “Freedom and Democracyâ€??
Pres. Bush and his cronies in the oil business couldn’t let the Russians, French or the Chinese get their hands on Iraq’s oil after the UN sanctions were lifted on Saddam’s Iraq.
The invasion of Iraq was all about who would control Iraqi oil and and at what price it will be sold for. Bear in mind that the cost of getting Iraqi oil out of the ground is around $5 a barrel,as opposed to $20-$25 a barrel average from other sources.
Besides the relatively low extraction costs from existing fields in Iraq ,huge oil fields in Western Iraq have yet to be developed. So the potential profits from existing fields and from future developments will be astronomical for oil companies.
It’s a pity that so many people have to die so that oil companies can make a profit.
So it goes.
It’s not just about making profits from oil, however. It is access to timely supply of the oil. Doesn’t matter about the oil profits themselves. It’s what you use the oil for that is vital to industrialized economies. We simply cannot afford to have supply disrupted. We will pay good money for it but we want hard guarantees on supply.
Imagine if we imported electricity from the Middle East.
It’s like that.
http://internationaltrade.suite101.com/article.cfm/top_ten_oil_countries
The most interesting oil list is the list of importers. It is a growing list. The exporters list is shrinking. You do not need to compete to sell oil; you name your price. The price of oil tripled in the three years between 2003 and 2006.
Of some of the countries with reserves:
Iraq is being fought over
Iran is on hold/under sanctions
Canada sells to it’s neighbour
Venezuela has a leader who likes giving the stuff away to friends in Cuba etc
Libya – well, they’ve been welcomed back into the fold
Nigeria – has a problem with indigenous insurgents
Producers are not hard up for customers. Buyers come knocking. See the Chinese in Sudan; the Americans in Iraq.
And not to mention too WBB how the fastest growing energy consumers like China and India are now bypassing the oil spot market (set up to loosen OPEC’s ballclench) in favour of long term contracts.
And Australia, for all its talk of the US alliance, is quite happy to play footsie here with the Middle Kingdom.
31% of OECD imports come from Persian Gulf countries, including Iran, according to the US government.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Persian_Gulf/Background.html
The US would be far better off leaving them alone than trying to throw their weight around if it’s all about oil.
These are the sources of US oil imports:
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m.htm
“The US would be far better off leaving them alone than trying to throw their weight around if it’s all about oil.”
I’d agree. But occasions such as 1973 and 1979 leave deep impressions. Some types (eg Cheney) don’t like leaving these things in the laps of the gods.
Carter’s SOTU in whichever yr it was – made no bones about the fact that the US would throw its weight around if it felt the chips weren’t falling its way in the global oil market. And he’s not even a hawk.
No, but Brzezinski, his National Security Advisor, was.
Interestingly, he’s recently written a critique of Bush II’s foreign policy, about which the NY Review of Books said:
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20251
That’s a good read, Mark. I fondly remember only a very few yrs ago now, one was roundly condemned with being – now how did it go – ah yes – with being anti-American – for holding these types of views.
Now it’s ho-hum. Of course there’s still the small matter of a country in ruins.
Yep.
This statement contains a truth and an oversimplification.
The market in oil is one of the most liquid markets in the world. It is traded openly on several commodities exchanges. It is in the interests of oil companies to sell their product for the highest profit margin, regardless of location. Moreover, a huge fleet of underutilised tankers exist to transport the oil to wherever it is required.
But how does this oil get to these markets?
The market for oil breaks down at a more fundamental level. Politics intrudes when oil companies and sovereign governments haggle over the nature of the contract to extract oil.
Governments claim that they are protecting the patrimony of their people when they demand maximum control over where, how and when oil is to be pumped and how much and how that right is to be paid for, and for how long.
Oil companies and host governments haggle over their share of the profits.
Oil majors (Shell, etc.) would prefer to have compliant governments everywhere, but they know that this is impossible. So they take a patient, strategic view and accept the rough with the smooth, knowing that times cange and that consumers will demand oil regardless of the price.
Oil minors don’t have the same luxury. Their margins are to be made when changes in regimes produce low-hanging fruit. The still pending Iraq oil law offers the possibiity of enormous profits for any companies that can sign on favourable terms. The oil majors see this as an opportunity. The oil minors recognise it to be a once in a lifetime bonanza.
Bush’s closest affinities are with the oil minors concentrated in Houston, Texas.
This is quite true, as far as it goes. The political feasibility of invading Iraq for these legislators doesn’t necessarily revolve around knowledge of how the market in oil works, or even in supporting the commercial aspirations of Texas oil minors. Rather, the spectacle of control of oil, the most important strategic commodity, is rusted on to American self-image. Oil signifies the American way of life. A plurality of Americans would be distressed to discover that they are as subject to the world market price in oil as anyone else.
These same Americans assume that if the Texas oil minors happen to score favourable terms under any Iraqi oil legislation, then cheap oil wll flood into the US.
This assumption is quite false. This cheap oil will flood on to the world market. Some Texas oil men and their backers and employees will get rich.
But often in democratic politics emotion trumps reason.
And oil is a powerful driver of emotion.
PS, Nabs’ point about state-to-state negotiations threatens to change the rule of the game considerably.