I’m quite the fan of George Megalogenis’ journalism, for a number of reasons. Unlike too much of the instant analysis which passes for political commentary which almost always sticks to a singular press gallery script, Megalogenis has an eye both for longer term political trends, and a desire to connect psephological and political observation with social research. My caveat would be that his matching of census data with electorate level voting patterns is methodologically flawed in two ways. Correlation doesn’t imply causation, and the selection of particular variations doesn’t make them necessarily independent or even intervening variables. But, nevertheless, Megalogenis does two things which are praiseworthy - he tries to tell a bigger story than the horse race, and tries to relate the horse race to bigger changes. That’s actually something Paul Kelly used to do well, albeit with a big dash of neoliberal orthodoxy colouring his interpretations. These days Kelly appears to have well passed his use by date, so it’s good to see Megalogenis has taken the step from newspaper punditry to book level analysis.
But for all that, if you’ve already read his The Longest Decade, I wouldn’t recommend spending another 30 bucks for the revised edition, which promises to take the story up to the Rudd victory. You could save your pennies and click this link, because the essence of the few chapters Megalogenis has tacked on to the end of his story of the rivalry between Howardian and Keatingite versions of Australia is summed up in one relatively short blog post.
But there is one insight in the new bits of The Longest Decade that Megalogenis hasn’t excerpted in the shorter short version, which is a pity because I think it’s key to the difference between politics John Howard style and politics Kevin Rudd style.
Megalogenis discusses two backlashes which swung the pendulum away from Howard (and incidentally his claim that the rejection of Howard by the electorate was of similar importance to Keating’s rejection despite the 9 extra net seats the ALP lost in 1996 is well argued). Aside from the key role of WorkChoices in dramatising Howard’s trashing of the battlers on whom he’d relied for his victories, Megalogenis also points to the “unnecessary fights” Howard picked with “immigrants, single mothers, indigenous people and the under-35s”.
The Howard government had explicitly rejected the nation’s outsiders, and they returned the compliment.
Again, I’d note the deficiencies in Megalogenis’ methodology, but I’d also observe that leaked Liberal polling has demonstrated that the welfare changes which targeted single parents played a big role in losing them seats like Mal Brough’s and others which were demographically similar. The polling also suggests that women - who’d swung away from Latham in 2004 - swung heavily towards Rudd Labor. But I do think there’s something in Megalogenis’ conclusion:
Australians grew weary of the excessive partisanship that had pitted voter against voter… Howard always did a better job when he was looking to see what people thought, rather than when he was trying to squeeze public opinion into […] narrow boxes…
Kevin Rudd, I think, would agree. It’s here that Nicholas Gruen’s point about contrasting styles of political leadership comes into play - Rudd really is a uniter, whereas Howard was the great divider. That might be taken as a pejorative, but it’s also a reasonably objective analysis of Howard’s modus operandi as a politician - which was very close to Karl Rove’s strategy - split part of your opponent’s base off, energise your own base, and find points of division to do both. As with Bush in 2004, what this aims for, and what it produces if it works, is a small majority. A divisive leadership style is never going to lead to a landslide, and the point’s proven by the Keating defeat in 1996, when Howard played uniter to Keating’s divider, compared to Howard’s subsequent two narrow margins of victory (Megalogenis agrees with my analysis that a lot of the fat in the Coalition’s margin in 2004 can be explained by leadership - and the Latham factor appears to have turned women towards the Coalition in particular). Gruen also makes the important point that Howard, except for some relatively short periods, often presided over a party vote that was behind that of the ALP in 2PP voting intentions, something somewhat masked by the preferred PM vote which again points to the importance of Rudd’s personal contribution to Labor’s victory as a plausible and non-threatening alternative Prime Minister.
So here I think Megalogenis is wrong in saying that Howard picked some unnecessary fights. They certainly proved in the end to be counter-productive ones for him, but they were characteristic of politics Howard style.
That leads me to two conclusions which I think follow from all this, and I want here also to point to the importance of Megalogenis’ argument that the “culture wars” were always fairly distant from the electoral action.
The first point is that Rudd’s desire to maintain as large an electoral coalition as possible reflects his style of governance - pragmatic problem solving with a dash of symbolism, designed to unify rather than divide.
The second is that Rudd will probably maintain his current levels of approval and the Labor party maintain its vote for quite some time. Rudd and Labor are much better positioned at this point of the cycle than John Howard was in his first term. Possum, returning from his own honeymoon period, has the numbers. Rather than expecting the budget to bring things back to a “normal” level of “contestability” between the two parties, I think we’re much more likely to see something characteristic of the recent dynamic in state politics - an initial Labor win as people take the plunge with some reservations, converted quickly into a handsome lead, which will most likely lead to a bigger win at the end of the first term. State politics has largely been de-ideologised, and I think Rudd is trying to do something similar with federal politics. That’s his plan, anyway. It may not work. But I think most of the analysis that’s currently around misses some fundamental points.
Cross-posted at PollieGraph.
… should refer to the Coalition, yes?
I think so! I’ve taken the liberty of fixing it.
What was amusing for me on the Insiders today was the segment where they were complaining about “….a budget in search of a narrative” - on this Meganomics and the others weighed in heavily but I think they were off the mark.
I’d suggest that this extends to Labour and Rudd as a whole amongst the press gallery and media commentator types, Rudd’s de-ideology is giving them fits as they try to place everything Labor does in the usual neat boxes they have used in the past to “brand” a party and it’s modus operandi…..it makes making shit up so much easier.
Of course I think the “non ideological pragmatic problem solving unifier” narrative isn’t quite what they’re looking for, it’s too dammed reasonable and gives them nothing to write about, even though that’s exactly what the voters want, and judging by the polling, are seeing.
I’m betting the narrative they will fall back on is “scattershot”, or “standing for nothing” because, well they’re unable to think outside of their little boxes.
I think you’re right, Phil!
Mark says:
Its nor surprising to see the history of the Howard years being diligently flushed down the memory hole. Before the air-brushing is complete I would like to scratch a few facts on my Culture War prison cell wall for those who will inhabit it later: Howard fought two elections running on culture war politics, 1996 (”special interests v mainstream”) and 2001 (Tampa-911) see below.
The 1996 election was a landslide alright. There is no comparison of 1996 to 2007. In the former ONE NATION gave a massive right wing push to the ideological spectrum. In the latter the GREENs vote barely moved and the indigenous intervention was mandated.
The 2007 2PP preferred margin was, as I predicted, about two and a half per cent in favour of ALP. That is an average margin in post-war federal election contests. So unless you want to define, lake woebegone-style, an average victory as a landslide you cant read too much change into it.
Mark says:
Megalogenis and Bahnisch should get some correct psephological predictions on the board before they set-about agreeing with themselves. A two-person epistemological universe is not quite solipsism but it will do until the real thing comes along.
Neither correctly predicted the 2004 election any significant distance out from the poll. I correctly predicted Howard’s election victory about 18 months out, prior to Latham’s ascendancy. Analysts who make successful predictions are more credible interpreters. Those who failed in that respect should listen in respectful silence.
The LN/P won the 2004 election because of the property-mineral boom. Latham’s final vote was about the same as Crean’s poll numbers averaged over his term as Opposition leader. His leadership had very little to do with the ALP loss. Leadership is something that obsesses the commentariat and party faithful (much the same thing these days) but which generally does not move votes.
Mark says:
I see that the Left-liberal commentariat, in the wake of the 2020 summit, is now pretty much co-opted into the federal ALP’s political apparatus, going by the series of love letters to Rudd published that are flying back and forth accross the aether. He listens to you and, hey presto, you are eating out of his hands. Pretty cheap date.
HOward was a machiavellian statesman. His politics were divisive but his policies were unifying. That is why simple minded morality playwrights, who are mainly interested in identifying with the guy wearing the white hat, find him so difficult to analyse.
Political tone is a question of style and symbolism. In this area Howard and Rudd are miles apart. Rudd is the quintessential softly-softly diplomat who abhors damaging conflict. So if you want your political discourse mealy-mouthed and smooth-talked then Rudd is the man for you.
Public policy is a question of substance and pragmatism. Here there was still very little daylight to be seen b/w Howard and Rudd. Me-tooism on monetary policy, fiscal policy, national security, border protection, immigration, gay marriage. Even the supposed big policy differences, Iraq and Climate Change, dont look so big now. Rudd is keeping troops in Iraq and will do nothing about King Coal.
The one exception was Work Choices, which is the main policy reason Howard lost the election, as I predicted (thankyou Rajat). It lost him a large portion of the crucial lower middle-class and working class voters who had supported him up until then. (Single mothers will never be a crucial LN/P demographic.)
Of course the main political reason why Rudd the election was the recession of the electoral pendulum. But that factor is kind of boring and does not fill column space, a pressing need for the Megalgenis and Bahnisch’s of this world.
However you need a narrative to keep the public onside.
Piffle as usual from Jack Strocchi.
The Coalition got a swing on primaries of +3% to it in 1996. The ALP got a primary swing of +5.7%.
And the margin of the win isn’t the margin above 50% but the 2PP margin over the other party. I can’t find 2PP figures for 1996 which is why I’m pointing out the higher primary swing to Labor in 07 compared to the swing to the Coalition in 96.
Remarkable really for a party that had yet to come into existence. Pauline Hanson was a Liberal on the ballot paper in 1996, and only disendorsed shortly before the election.
# 7 Kim May 4th, 2008 at 9:17 pm
Primary voting is not a useful measure in AUS elections. But since you mentioned it, its worth recalling how badly, relatively speaking, the ALP did on this measure in the 1996 election compared to the LN/P in 2007.
In 1996 the ALP primary vote was 38.80%, the lowest recorded by the party since 1934, versus the LN/P’s primary vote of 47.65% - an 8.65% difference. It lost 31 seats.
In 2007, by contrast, the LN/Ps primary vote was 42.20% versus the ALP’s primary vote of 43.38% - a 1.20% difference. It lost 22 seats.
So in terms of primary vote and in seats the LN/Ps 2007 performance was vastly better than the ALP’s 1996 performance.
Kim, we know you cant predict elections. Now it appears you cant even retrodict them properly. Perhaps you should quit whilst you are not too far behind?
Kim says:
I stand terminologically corrected. By “margin” I meant 2pp difference in excess of 50%. Tha differential is not always one half of the margin due to the vagaries of local electorates, hence the artificial assumption of “uniform swings”.
Still, my substantial point remains true. In 1996 the LN/P achieved a 2pp advantage of 3.63%. In 2007 the ALP achieved a 2pp advantage of 2.70%. So the LN/Ps 2pp performance in 1996 was better by a ratio of one third on the ALP’s 2pp performance in 2007. Thats a big number given the power of preferential allocations.
The ALP’s 2007 2pp performance was impressive but not outstanding. Since WWII there have been 24 elections contested by the current partisan regime. Of these the victor has won 10 have with a 2pp advantage of 2.7%. So the ALP’s 2pp advantage of 2.7% is just above average for our current arrangements, especially as swings tend to be pronounced against long-term incumbents.
If you want a correct psephologic analogy to the ALP victory in 2007 election it would be the ALP victory in 1983. But you dont have to go back that far to see an even better performance by a party. The LN/P in 2004 got just as big a 2pp advantage and also won the Senate.
The worm can turn pretty rapidly in AUS politics. So ALP camp followers should beware of premature triumphalism.
Kim says:
I stand typographically corrected. Of course Hanson’s victory portended the immanent shift to the Cultural Right, expressed in ONE NATIONS spectacular success over the next couple of years.
But my substantial point remains valid. The 1996 election exposed a cultural sea-change in the electorate, after which it has been all downhill for the Wets.
So give Kim full marks for nit-picking. But a miserable failure for actually figuring things out.
Jack you’re talking rubbish. Noone heard of Hanson before her maiden speech (the famous “in danger of being swamped by Asians” speech). Hanson entered parliament as an unlikely candidate in a safe Labor seat which was one of the ‘bonus’ seats that the Liberals did not target but won anyway (Oxley). Had the Liberals actually targeted that seat and felt it was at all winnable, I am betting they’d have put serious candidate there, and history would be different.
The Liberals won 1996 in a me-too strategy, not a culture war strategy. Just the same as Rudd did last year. Rudd out-Howarded Howard.
Regarding the Rudd-as-unifier narritive peddled here… after seeing the 2020 summit you can bet he wont be a leader of cultural conciliation and unity forever. The 2020 Summit was a summit of conciliation and unity of centre-left and far left academics and elites, you don’t cobble together something like that, and engineer policy recommendations like that if you intend to avoid the culture war and be a unifier forever.
… which would explain the presence and enthusiasm of media execs and proprietors, CEOs, and business interest group leaders, how? And please name anyone who attended who could objectively be identified with “the far left”.
There’s also the fact that the substantive shift of the conversation from arguing about issues (ie climate change, the republic, taxation) to working out how to fix them fits in with Rudd’s aim to reorient the whole field of politics towards the managerial ground of pragmatism and away from culture wars style ideological stoushes. It may not have worked perfectly, but the micro-analysing of it was forgotten before it started - it’s only of interest to the sorts of political junkies who comment on blogs for instance! For most people, it will have produced an impression of unity and purpose through tv grabs, and opposition always risks sounding like negative carping.
I mean would you call the CEO of News Limited or Lachlan Murdoch or Heather Ridout or Saul Eslake (etc, etc) a “centre left” figure? Elites to be sure, but you’ve missed the point if you think that the elites invited (and included) within Rudd’s tent are just Cate Blanchett et al - he’s managed to corral an awful lot of media and business elites.
Like the people Megalogenis takes aim at, you’re working to an outdated Howard era script. Rudd’s not perfect, but he’s very good at reframing things. That’s one of the big things that helped him win the election, and it’s going to be one of the things that really solidifies Labor support and marginalises opposition, as the post argues.
Well the Culture Warriors can’t have it both ways. If, as they argued for years, Howard’s serial victories were some massive zeitgeist-y endorsement of Howard’s cultural agenda, then it’s intellectually dishonest to now argue that Howard’s loss was anything but a crushing repudiation of that same agenda…
Mark, while I too enjoy Mega’s astute analyses, everybody can have an off day, and I think the excerpt you referred to is one of them. Mega is at his strongest when he is applying census data to electoral results, even if he sometimes adds a little more post-hoc rationalisation than is warranted.
But as soon as he strays from the trusty census spreadsheets, his compass seems as prone to misdirection as the rest of us mere mortals. For example:
WTF? Last time I checked, there was no census question about householders’ support for ‘market-based solutions for the environment’, and I think Mega, in an effort to achieve some nice rhetorical symmetry in his argument, has badly overestimated the vote-changing effect of that point.
At any rate, I stand by my blitzkrieg analysis of the Culture War from last week, and it is in that context that I respectfully disagree with the overall sentiment of your post that Rudd is a ‘uniter’. I think he presents a policy direction and set of values with which us progressive lefties are more comfortable - but that does not him a ‘uniter’ make…
That depends on the degree that he can take others with him, Mercurius, and if you look at the polling on, say, the apology, that’s a pretty long way indeed.
It’s a Beattie manoeuvre. Do good by stealth. And change the terms of the debate to make your position mainstream.
“but you’ve missed the point if you think that the elites invited (and included) within Rudd’s tent are just Cate Blanchett et al - he’s managed to corral an awful lot of media and business elites.”
yippee
still, i luved Cate’s performance in THE AVIATOR.
Watching moguls live out their DREAMS & AMBITIONS is so so facinating.
Go Kev…& he scores!!! Another potentially cup winning performance…looking good for 2010. What’s this?…the Opposition have come out for the second half wearing the same colours…hard to tell them apart ladies & gentlemen…apart from their habit of mocking Cap Rudd & attempting to bribe the Ref. Will someone remove that old fella w/ the “Workchoices or die!” sign from the field now please.
Ok, on w/ THE GAME.
Gillard’s just let one rip…& Abbott’s on the ground…
All the so-called culture warriors overplay the importance of the actual culture conflict.
In 1996, many Australians believed that the Keating Government’s focus was not around “kitchen table” issues. Keating talked about Aboriginal rights, the Republic, the Arts, and other issues of a similar theme. Many Australians wanted Keating not to talk much at all, but act on the economy. Howard said he wouldn’t treat those “other issues” as importantly as Keating did, and he won.
Rudd is of course going to try and include more people - he wants to be loved by everyone. Howard didn’t. It’s easier to be liked by more people when you are doing less, because almost all government decisions that have a benefit to one person have a negative effect for another person. Doing little means less immediate harm. It will take years for this government’s inaction on real issues to impact middle Australia, but it will happen, just like it is happening in New South Wales at the moment.
The definition of a polarising election is presumably one in which different social groups go in different ways. There is more evidence of this under Howard, in 1996 and 2004 the move against Labor was uniform across social classes and ethnic groups (with the small exception of public sector professionals in 2004), but in 1998 and 2001 groups went in different ways. Under Labor it was states, rather than social groups, that went in different ways Tasmania and Queensland.
Correct me if I’m wrong, Geoff, but didn’t Labor pick up 4 seats in Victoria in 1996?
You can’t include a handful of token centre-right delegates and some businessmen who inevitably just go with the prevailing winds because thats how to make more money, and claim it was a broad tent, or a broad cross section of society. The republican vote was prime evidence, 98 for, 1 against and one abstention. And the abtention was from a former governor general who probably supports the motion but doesnt think it prudent to say so.
Then theres the subsequent reports from delegates who’ve said many things that made it into the final reports were not even discussed within the streams, and many suggestions were dissmissed outright.
I also have trouble beleiving anyone invites Philip Adams to a summit if they are trying to avoid the culture wars.
“Correct me if I’m wrong, Geoff, but didn’t Labor pick up 4 seats in Victoria in 1996?”
Just the one, Bruce, held by Liberal Julian Beale, son of Menzies minister Sir Howard Beale, and father in law of Rudd Parliamentary Secretary Bill Shorten.
One of the interesting criticisms of the Rudd government since it has come to power has been that it has actually implemented the promises it took to the electorate. While I didn’t agree with many of the positions that the Rudd opposition presented prior to the last election, the argument that a government should not expect to implement its promises is a sad indictment of the state of play of Australian politics.
One of the possibilities that this does open for Rudd is the potential for serious reform in a second term with key promises for balanced implementation that will (from experience) be believed by the electorate. These could include more opportunities in areas like health, education and law reform.