I’ve been reading Jerry F. Hough’s Changing Party Coalitions: The Mystery of the Red State-Blue State Alignment on and off over the weekend, after it arrived from Amazon on Friday. I’d been wanting to have a read for a while - after I saw this review. Part of what Hough - a long time Sovietologist and comparative politics scholar - is trying to do is to expose some of the myths that we tend to create about past political patterns and partisan alignments - based on our present understanding of voter motivation and party image. He makes the point - not in itself an unusual one but rarely developed to its full analytical potential - that the Democrats and Republicans have effectively swapped ideological sides several times, though his analysis of the Jacksonian-Jeffersonian mythos of the Democratic Party suggests that the Donkeys were never actually to the left of the GOP before FDR. It’s also highly relevant to note that Adlai Stevenson was the first “New Democrat” - adopting a “suburban strategy” that effectively turned its back on the New Deal’s economic agenda, and that JFK, although his ideas on foreign policy were quite distinct from Adlai’s, shared his economic conservatism and was effectively a do-nothing President in the domestic policy field. The fact that “left” and “right” or “liberal” and conservative” have shifted ground from the New Deal party system to a cultural focus, and that McGovernite cultural liberalism was a big part of that shift, obscures for instance the truth that Richard Nixon was arguably a moderate liberal domestically, while McGovern’s economics had more in common with Goldwater than Johnson.
Hough’s also fascinating on the contingency of racial and national identity, and although some of his own commitments are shaped by a relatively conservative developmentalist political science ideology of modernisation, his injection of a long historical perspective and a sociological toolkit into political analysis of the American scene is a very valuable contribution. Changing Party Coalitions was written in 2005, but his discussion of the dynamics of the recent “Red State-Blue State Alignment” is quite prescient - and very useful for thinking about what Barack Obama’s biggest political challenge might be, and why Hillary Clinton was able to do well as a very unlikely standard bearer of the white working class.
Although Hough doesn’t mention Thomas Frank, his book is really a more sophisticated refutation of what’s exaggerated in What’s the Matter with Kansas? than most of the critiques on offer. Frank famously argued that the Republicans had somehow mystified lower income white voters into voting against their economic interests, with the God, country and guns package the key. But Frank was never able all that satisfactorily to explain how that might have occurred, and there’s a fair bit of disdain for those voters in his writing at one level or another. Hough quite convincingly argues that such voters have little choice. The Democrats - in appealling to the “suburban” and “middle class” voters Bill Clinton supposedly targeted - have actually, under the influence of a highly educated activist base whose own influence is heightened by the nominating process, flicked the switch to an economic policy which overwhelmingly suits the interests of the upper middle class. Hough is careful to warn that Bush’s economic approach was built on a house of cards, and again he’s quite prescient about what has actually come to pass with the collapse of the various bubbles which sustained the illusion of prosperity, but he has a point that rationally lower and middle income voters had more to gain - in the short term - from the Republicans than from Gore or Kerry. His overall point, though, and he’s got good survey and polling evidence to back it up, is that neither party is at all responsive to any voters who fall outside the top income brackets, and that voting “values” may be a most reluctant choice, and in fact one that’s less determinative of voting behaviour than normally argued (just as the religious right’s influence is inflated).
If Hough is right about all this, where does it leave Obama? Although in some ways McCain is a weak opponent (though not as weak as some claim), a Gore/Kerry blue state strategy is highly risky - particularly if Obama actually aims to achieve anything resembling the scope of change he has argued for. But if Obama’s strategy is basically a turnout one - as was the case in the primaries - maximising the participation of both black voters and upscale educated voters (particularly younger ones who are usually electorally disengaged), it’s also risky - in that it’s probably necessary but not sufficient for a win. Given the electoral geometry imposed on the contest by the electoral college, and the appeal McCain may have on cultural grounds to key demographics, Obama needs to offer something actually different on economic policy - and that may be the reason why Clinton, even though, as I said, she was a very unlikely vehicle for expressing economic alienation, did so well. Surrounding himself with Rubin-esque Princeton and Harvard economic policy wonks might get Obama good marks with The Economist, but it’s counter-productive with the voters Obama probably needs. That’s not to say that he should denounce NAFTA five times a week, or whatever Hillary thought she was doing, but if he can’t come up with something substantive and appealling on the economy, he may be in trouble. And because the Democrats, just like the Republicans, have eschewed anything resembling a redistributionist policy or even an effective welfare policy, except under the influence of the Depression, it may be a bridge too far, particularly since he needs to retain elite support as well in all likelihood.
There’s no question that the economy is the central issue in this year’s race. The Iraq War and foreign policy aren’t unimportant, but they’re far more important to the relatively upscale voters Obama already has in his tent than the ones he needs to bring in - some of whom will be actively hostile to him on cultural and nationalist grounds unless he sells them on the hip pocket. Whatever happens, and my bet at this stage would be a narrow win for Obama and a rather disappointing start in office, this will be an interesting election. But for genuine change to occur, the Red State-Blue State dichotomy needs to be overcome. Obama knows that - because the speech that drew him so much attention in 2004 centred on it - but it also has a lot of inertia behind it, and Democratic activists, the “netroots” and campaign consultants, let alone powerful economic interests, are - sometimes unwittingly - part of that inertia.
NB: As mentioned, there’s a review of Hough’s book here which covers many of the aspects I’ve chosen to skip over in this post.
Good work as usual, Mark.
Via Possum, the Obama campaign strategy. On the upside, Obama is skipping the Blue State strategy, trying to expand everywhere, and relying on Democrat turnout (and lack of the same from the Republicans). On the downside, there are no issues mentioned whatsoever in the document - no economic populism, no liberalism, nothing to distinguish himself from McCain, nada. That is a worry!
I hope Obama has some “Textor-Crosby” analysis lying somewhere, and it is yet to be leaked.
Yes,
Good to see the review given an airing here, and a good article Mark. The book contains some very important insights, and is worth reading by anybody who is interested in the current (disastrous) position of the US working class in relation to both economic and social power. The issue now is who is going to bear the costs of the economic repairs needed after two decades of falling real wages, and an almost complete dismantlling of social protection in the US?
Obama must placate the Economist and the rest of the economic establishment, by reasuring the rich and powerful that it will be business as usual when it comes to paying the costs of restoring profits and profit share. We can all be sure of that.
The real question is, is his campaign, and the ‘promise’ of something better, capable of unleashing sufficient political and social mobilisation, to ‘permit’ him room to manoeuvre, once he is elected?
It has been a very long time since the powerful believed they had anything to fear from the debt burdened and overwhelmed working and middle classes in the US. It will take quite a bit of mobilisation to turn that around.
The Clintons, despite Hills’, brave impersonation of a well dressed ‘Norma Rae’ are simply more of the same. Democrat money is Entertainment industry advertising/marketing, and the ‘new technology’ financing industry. The repugs are more traditional. Oil (energy) and real estate in the South and South West. There is not a skerrick between them in reality. But hopes and expectations can move mountains when poeple are sufficiently aroused. Sometimes. it will be interesting to see if this one of those times.
In the end, what I read from this is that even the well educated American progressives overestimate the intelligence of the crackers, and underestimate the vulnerability of these to manipulation or teh right’s capacity as to this phenomena.
Sh-t, we could almost be living in Australia.
Will add no comments about Pax Americana, the de facto ruler of the world dependent on the ritual assent of old and geographically-meaningless pleb phratries from the heartland via the old rituals of bread and circuses; for such as these are the rest of us the world over disenfranchised, in the most meaningful of senses.
” .. relatively conservative developmentalist political science ideology of modernisation … ”
What does this mean in plain English?
If I understand Mark correctly, he is referring to an ideology of modernisation within political science. Mark is suggesting that this ideology is conservative, and that it belongs to a particular type of political science - ie ‘developmentalist’ political science. In so doing he is questioning some of the assumptions Hough makes, and attributing those assumptions to his intellectual framework.
Interesting post, Mark, great stuff. Here’s a (potentially dumb) question: do you personally give a lot of credence or weight to the Red/Blue thing as a genuine phenomenon or organizing principle that can really be observed in the world as a constant? (Meaning beyond the simple fact that there are certain states that historically usually land a particular way.) I’m tempted to view it as more of a sort of meme for the press and pol professional classes, a kind of E-Z-Duz-It Pundit’s Friend, but you surely know much more about the overall hard data on the subject. Does it hold up?
Mark says:
Its good to see Mark finally sticking his neck out to make a cautious prediction. But i’ve already beaten him to the punch and naturally I think I can one-up him by going out on a limb. In May 08 I predicted that “the GOP will lose the next US election by a landslide - whoever the DEM candidate is.” I stand by that.
This implies that Obama will win the 2008 election in a 53%+ majority, assuming no Nader spoiler. My prediction will be refuted if Obama loses outright or only makes a narrow victory. This may happen if the race card comes up trumps, which I doubt.
The identity of the DEM’s candidate is not that important. But I argue Obama’s identity, to the extent it is important, will be a net positive for him (contra-mumbles and pro-John Derbyshire). Racially Obama may be African, but culturally he is Anglican ie a genteel Ivy league milquetoast, thats the sort of stuff that white people like in their black friends.
Conversely, McCain is a poor candidate. His Bush me-too “invade the world-invite the world-indebted to the world” program will not mobilise the GOP base.
The “its the economy and military, stupid” peace and bread model of US politics is the best predictor of US presidential contests. The recession downturn in the business cycle is enough to finish off the GOP. Iraq and Afghan war-fatigue makes a GOP victory go from unlikely to impossible.
I argue those models underpredict voter dis-affection with the GOP. The populist majority regard Bush’s regressive policies as making a bad situation worse. And Bush’s gratuitous militarism (”bring ‘em on”) is neither forgotten nor fogiven.
Also, “its the incumbency, stupid” is critical. The electoral pendulum invariably swings back, no matter what. Hence Obama’s harping on the policy substance-less but stylish formality of “change” (Rudd was the same).
I argue the incumbency factor underpredicts voter fatigue with the GOP. The populist majority regard Halliburton-affiliated GOP as the party of corrupt rich people. Time to kick the bums out.
Looking beyond cyclical swings there are secular trends that favour the DEMs, although not necc Left-liberal DEMs. So far as the US fed polity is concerned, party-psephological trends have favoured the DEMS for most of the post-Cold War era.
Fundamentally this DEM-ward shift is driven by demographic change: increased diversity though more DEM-leaning colored minority households and reduced fertility of GOP-leaning white majority households.
The GOP can only beat this demographic trend by getting out the vote of its white, family-valuing, god-fearing, flag-waving majority base, based on cultural identity and national security issues. The Bush I presidency leaned heavily on the Culture War. The Bush II presidency leaned heavily on the Civilizational Clash. aint gonna happen this time.
This does not necc imply we are in for a Left-liberal policy-ideological change. Obama’s hands will be full cleaning up Bush’s many messes. There wont be much political capital in reserve for make-the-world-over social reformation programs.
Its time for a “change you can believe in” - but only if you are the credulous type.
I’d steer a middle course between strocchi and Mark, but on even more simple-minded grounds…
Look at it this way. I don’t think there’s practically anybody who genuinely WANTS McCain to be president; insofar as he has any realistic support (kind of a big if really), it’s just among people who a) would prefer a GOP pres to a Dem anyway, and/or b) are just plain scared that Obama will turn out to be a crackpot, or else a guy who’s too inexperienced and arrogant and so really doesn’t know what he’s doing. Obama has for support his zany true believers, sane people who are just plain really sick of Bush, people who want free stuff from the government instead of wacky tax cuts, and (my pet theory) a lot of people who will just prefer to have a young, well-spoken, energetic president with a natural aura of authority, than a mumbley grouchy old man. Obama may be wrong about a whole slew of things, but he simply stands for the future in a way that McCain doesn’t and can’t.
So the swing I think will be not in specific policy issues (except insofar as they are seen or spun as crackpot policies), but just in how afraid you are (or aren’t) that Obama will turn out to be a crackpot. (And also, –seriously– the aesthetic issue of whether or not you will really be able to stomach four whole years of the ludicrous pro-BHO propaganda the MSM is continually drooling out; after 8 years of Bush I’d like an invisible president, not the most visible man in the country… [sorry, Ralph Ellison]) And even if it turns out he isn’t personally a crackpot, he’s still going to owe lots of favors to the real McCoy, and this alone is worrisome. That’ll be interesting, to see how he handles that.
So I think if Obama can in the next few months make himself seem like a genuinely, believably, non-crazy, non-hard-leftist, non-racial/racist partisan, and non-utter-neophyte (and that’s all somewhat of a big if), then he’ll win with a comfortable margin just on the strength of being young and charismatic and optimistic. (If his idea of trying to look more presidential really is stuff like re-designing the presidential seal, well, we’ve got a big worry on our hands.)
If he can’t strongly convince undecided people that he’s not a nut, it’ll be close, and he’ll either win or lose by a hair.
Of course, all the Dems really had to do this time around was find someone fairly smart and generally non-controversial whose name wasn’t George Bush, and they woulda won with no worries at all. But noooo! They have to do everything the hard way…
Thanks, Klaus.
Not a lot, based on my reading of Hough, j_p_z.
His argument is also that the amount of value dissensus in the electorate doesn’t reflect the amount between the extremes among both parties’ activists. And he points to:
(a) A number of “red” states won by Clinton once or twice;
(b) The fact that as recently as the 1990s, the current pattern wouldn’t have been forseeable easily, but it’s been entrenched as a given and as a guide to the future by conventional wisdom when it’s neither.
Oh, and he thinks a lot of the “alignment” comes from poor candidate choice from the Dems in 2000 and 2004 and poor strategy. Which is right I think!
Actually, I think that’s his problem, because while his white friends might like it, Hillary’s don’t! With the lower income voters, he really needs to make sure economics trumps identity.
As to McCain, I thought this from the Guardian’s American editor was interesting:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jun/30/johnmccain.barackobama
Mark:
(a) A number of “red” states won by Clinton once or twice;
(b) The fact that as recently as the 1990s, the current pattern wouldn’t have been forseeable easily, but it’s been entrenched as a given and as a guide to the future by conventional wisdom when it’s neither.
One of the disadvantages of a pseudonym is that one can’t take demonstrate past successes, but I pretty much predicted the current line-up in the mid 90s or possibly as far back as 88 (can’t remember for sure). I don’t think this was a major achievement, it was pretty obvious. Obvious not that we’d have two elections this close, which I certainly didn’t predict, but the trend of which states the democrats were most likely to win.
Take a look at the states Dukakis won in 88. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988_Us_Presidential_Election
They’re the core of the current blue states, except for West Virginia. Most of the states Gore and Kerry have added are the ones Dukakis lost by small margins, such as Illinois and Pennsylvania, which largely reflect a national swing.
The other blue states of recent years have been places like Maine and Conneticut, which while Dukakis fell well short, have been trending Democrat for quite a while and it wasn’t too hard to project they’d favour them some time.
Basically since Nixon’s Southern strategy turned the south away from the Democrats other states have moved in the other direction for balance. You would expect the ones to do this to be the ones that have least in common with the south - New England and the North-West in particular, and that is what has happened. Add in Democrat-leaning demogrpahics moving into southern Florida and eastern Virginia and there are only a few outliers to a predictable pattern.
Most of the red states that Clinton won were a simple product of going further up the pendulum - score 6 and 9% more than your main opponents and you’re going to get some of their states - combined with him coming from Arkansas and picking up a home state advantage there and nearby.
That’s not to say the alignment can’t be broken. It will presumably pass as have so many before. However, I’d be surprised if it will break in one election.
Obama may win a lot of red states, but only if he’s pulling 54%+ of the national vote. Otherwise victory will be about holding onto most of the stats Gore and Kerry won and picking up a few where they weren’t far off.
Feral, what’s distinct about the Red State-Blue State pattern is not just which states are counted on both sides but the presumed difficulty of breaking into the opposition’s ground - that is to say, the argument that the divide is somehow reflective of huge cultural differences which make America a 50/50 nation. I may not have been clear enough, but what I’m suggesting, following Hough, is that whole package of assumptions is what’s relatively recent and which is actually quite contingent. I agree that Obama probably won’t get beyond it without a big win, but what’s more interesting to me is the preconditions of such a win - a genuine response to the economic deprivation that shapes voting behaviour in many of the “red” counties.