The legal justification for America’s military presence in Iraq is UN resolution 1770, which expires in August. Negotiations for a “Status of Forces Agreement”, which would provide continuing legitimacy to the US presence, have hit a major snag with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki insisting that any timetable contain a timetable for American withdrawal. There’s some good analysis from Juan Cole, who observes:
McCain increasingly looks like he is stuck in 2007 with regard to Iraq policy, and Obama looks more and more like the man of the future.
Crooks and Liars notes that John McCain was asked about what would occur in the eventuality of an Iraqi request for a withdrawal in 2004:
Question: “What would or should we do if, in the post-June 30th period, a so-called sovereign Iraqi government asks us to leave, even if we are unhappy about the security situation there?”
McCain’s Answer: “Well, if that scenario evolves than I think it’s obvious that we would have to leave because — if it was an elected government of Iraq, and we’ve been asked to leave other places in the world. If it were an extremist government then I think we would have other challenges, but I don’t see how we could stay when our whole emphasis and policy has been based on turning the Iraqi government over to the Iraqi people.”
McCain, of course, has been hammering Obama for supporting a phased withdrawal, which is precisely what Al-Maliki is calling for.
The US will never completely withdraw from Iraq. They have huge permanent bases there.
They will only have the right to have bases if they can succesfully negotiate a SOFA, silkworm.
“There’s some good analysis from Juan Cole, who observes:
‘McCain increasingly looks like he is stuck in 2007 with regard to Iraq policy, and Obama looks more and more like the man of the future.’”
Well one thing’s certain: Juan Cole is the man of the tape loop. (I’d say ‘broken record,’ but what with the kids these days and their crazy ipods, then I’d look like the man of the past.)
Let me see if I got this straight. The man of the future, in just the recent past, opposed the surge strategy which has been clearly responsible for the modest but noticeable (and in any event preferable) improvements of the present. So the man of the future could not see accurately even a short distance into the actual future, whereas the man of the past was among the architects of the present situation which now forms the basis for the future, going forwards (albeit on eggshells), with measured optimism. Juan Cole has some delightfully interesting notions about ‘past’ and ‘future.’ HG Wells and TS Eliot might be amused by him; military planners, not so much.
If this is what passes for “good analysis” these days, I’d hate to see what “bad analysis” is. Oh wait, I can find scads of that stuff, right on Obama’s website.
Mark, would it be fair to say that your opposition to the war is categorical in nature? (I think that that’s a perfectly honorable position, by the way, and I’m prepared to consider you may be right, but personally I’m just not fully convinced an unconditional withdrawal will yield the best and most humane results.) It seems to me that most sane and sincere ‘total’ opponents of the war derive their guidance system from their justifiable moral outrage at the thing: that they believe (and not wrongly) it never should have happened in the first place… and that therefore, the best thing to do now under any circumstances is to make the thing come to an abrupt stop, by whatever means necessary. (Obama keeps saying that he will categorically ‘end this war,’ rather than saying he will win it, or achieve an optimal outcome, within a morally acceptable framework.) Again, an honorable position, and events may yet prove it to be the best position; but of this I am again not fully convinced. Whatever else we can do to improve things, the war has now happened, and our remaining options are formed by that fact.
In this sense I believe that Obama is stuck way back in 2002-03, (not even 2007), because I think his plan is fundamentally based on his categorical opposition to the thing, and his recent utterances driven merely by a need to seem presidential.
I ask you this because I think your post here is partisan in a way that frames things in an oversimplified and maybe even inaccurate light. (You have a perfect right to be partisan, of course, it’s just that I’m taking issue.)
For instance, you quote McCain back in 2004 — that is both four years ago, and when he was not actively a presidential candidate. Here’s what McCain said on the subject quite recently, though:
“”The Iraqis have made it very clear, including the meetings I had with the president and foreign minister of Iraq, that it is based on conditions on the ground,” McCain said in an interview with MSNBC.
“I have always said we will come home with honor and with victory and not through a set timetable,” he said, adding that Iraqis would act in their national interest and the United States would act in its own interests.* “We will withdraw, but … the victory we have achieved so far is fragile and (the redeployment) has to be dictated by events and on the ground…”
That is a sober and realistic (if debatable) view of things, not a recipe for endless war, as Obama and the MSM try to spin it. Given the shape-shifting nature of warfare in the region, it would be a questionable tactic to telegraph to your enemies when precisely you intend to quit the field. Then all they have to do is circle the very next day afterwards in their weekly planners. Of course, if you have a moral and categorical view of the war as a thing that must absolutely halt right now, this does of course seem like a tenable position, maybe the only position, and adverse consequences can then be bracketed, to be dealt with another day. It’s just that there are more ways to legitimately view things than only this way.
Given that events have begun to conduce (though it’s not a done deal) towards success and stability for a peaceful Iraqi regime, it’s not clear that Maliki is the most reliable expert on what is to be done. (He may be correct of course, but the thing requires more careful consideration than the likes of Juan Cole are prepared to give it.) It would remain of course to persuade him, and that’s part of the ballgame. This is all a very tricky dance, and most of the steps aren’t covered or even seen in the MSM.
It’s for this reason that a categorical and unconditionally scheduled and phased withdrawal is not exactly evidence of Solomonic wisdom. As a tactic in the presidential race (as opposed to a tactic in the war) it’s not at all clear that Obama looks wiser than McCain on this point.
Maliki has a specific position on the board, and his obligations are to his own people (his obligations aren’t even just primarily to Iraq, they are solely to Iraq, and for good reason). Things are more complicated for the US position, which must take into account both a legitimate aim for the well-being of the Iraqi people, as well as the securing of its own war aims. I quite agree that the US should never have begun all this, but now that that’s a part of history, the US does have a very complex obligation to not lose, if that can be done within a moral framework.
You say: “McCain, of course, has been hammering Obama for supporting a phased withdrawal, which is precisely what Al-Maliki is calling for.”
This is greatly oversimplified, since the starting positions of Obama, McCain, and Maliki are so wildly different. I’d elaborate, but I think I’ve gone on way too long already. Sorry for the length.
* — I was going to make a side point here, but this is a long comment so I’ll skip it unless thread-interest travels along these lines. Maybe the discussion will go a completely different way…
This statement reveals McCain’s ignorance about the conditions under which the US occupies Iraq.
When the UN mandate expires, absent an agreement with the Iraqi government, the US is legally required to withdraw.
The only way that the US occupation of Iraq could be prolonged is if the US declared war on Iraq (AGAIN!). Presumably, the Congress would be less craven about ANOTHER declaration of war on Iraq in 2008.
McCain appears to be unaware of all of these matters.
“This statement reveals McCain’s ignorance about the conditions under which the US occupies Iraq. …McCain appears to be unaware of all of these matters.”
Well, one is certainly no cheerleader for McCain’s intelligence, but it’s highly doubtful that he is ignorant or unaware of the conditions, legal and otherwise, for massive military deployments. All of this sounds rather like negotiating postures, certainly for the candidates; al-Maliki and his group may in fact mean what they say, or they may be shrewd camel traders, holding out for the best possible deal, and in the process strengthening their grip on sovereignty by wielding it.
FWIW, here’s a somewhat fuller explication of McCain’s position, via NRO/The Corner (hardly a catechism, but fun and provocative reading, much like LP):
“[from an Andy McCarthy post] Here… is what McCain’s spokesman said regarding the ongoing negotiations with the Iraqi government over a status of forces agreement […]: “We are dealing with a sovereign government, … If that sovereign government asks us to leave, we will leave. And if that sovereign government wants to continue to work cooperatively with us until they are able to provide their own security, we will stay. What we will not do is set an arbitrary timeline to withdraw irregardless of conditions on the ground or agreement with the sovereign Iraqi government.”
It seems to me like the McCain camp is making a distinction between geo-politics between nations, and letting military disposition of one’s forces be dictated by an outside entity. For instance, say the US agrees to a 16-month phased withdrawal, and the al-Maliki government is toppled or replaced in month 10. Does the agreement still hold? It probably depends how legitimate the switchover is. But who makes that call? If a sovereign Iraqi voice were to state quite bluntly and unconditionally that they wanted US forces out, the US would have very little wiggle room indeed. Perhaps that is what will happen, we’ll see.
It’s curious that McCain and Obama are weighing in on an agreement that must be negotiated or expire in August, when neither will be close to executive power.
As to the bearing all this has on the electoral ‘narrative’ of one or the other candidate (the original topic), I’d call it something of a draw: Obama gets points for good judgment on his initial opposition to the war, but gets demerits for his tactical and philosophical thinking once the war was inescapably underway, whereas McCain gets essentially the reverse. Which thing you might place greater store by, is a variable.
Indeed. j_p_z aapears to have missed the point. The paradox for the US is that their mission to establish a new Iraqi state leads to their withdrawal at the behest of that state. The idea of staying the course or not cutting and running or peace with honour is not present as a legal principle. j_p_z’s lengthy piece fails to deal with the reality that if the US is ordered to leave the the territory of a properly constituted state it must do so or be in breach. If course that’s never stopped it in the past.
Patrick B — um, no, not really. From what I understand, these are still negotiations. The sort of thing where you ask for more than what you want, in order to get more than you expected. And you keep your bottom line hidden until the last possible moment. When the negotiations are concluded and the ink is dry on what the Iraqis finally decide, then that will be the next phase. Maybe at that point you’ll be proven right, maybe not. Til then, here’s to a successful outcome for the peace and security of Iraq, whatever sort of hairdo it has.
The US would then have the choice of refusing to recognise the new regime. This refusal is not in itself an act of bellicosity, but there are many roads to bellicosity from the situation described by j_p_z.
One likely outcome of j_p_z’s scenario would be for the US to depose the regime that deposed al Maliki, but then to replace it not with al Maliki or with supporters of the old sovereignty.
Rather, the US could install its own puppet. This would be a return to the desired result of Bush in 2003, which was stymied by Ayatollah Sistani.
My question is, does the US have any more stomach in 2008 than it did in 2003 to face down and confront a Sistani-led resistence to US occupation? I think the answer to my question is a resounding “NO”.
And, just for neatness, let me observe that the option described above returns us to 1954 and the unlamented Diem regime of South Vietnam.
In the hypothetical situation described by j_p_z, I believe that the only options open to the US would be withdrawal or a restoration of the al Maliki government and withdrawal.
As I have observed before: zugzwang.
j_p_z, yes, I categorically oppose the war. But I also don’t believe the continued presence of US troops does anyone much good, taken in toto.
“From what I understand, these are still negotiations.”
What would these negotiations be about then and who with? Can’t be with the sovereign nation of Iraq otherwise they could just ask the US to leave, no need to negotiate, and if it didn’t it would be in breach. If the US doesn’t recognise the Iraqi government it can leave on it’s own terms when it sees fit, as there is no state. Bit of a bind eh j_p_z? Achieve what you say you set out to do and all that expenditure of blood and treasure is put at risk. Perhaps the US so altruistic that it will obey the will of the Iraqi nation. Anyone willing to take odds?
“um …”
You appear unsure of yourself.
Mark — does that mean you think the surge policy hasn’t had a net ameliorating effect? [I tend to think it’s one of the very conditions that make it possible for al-Maliki to play his hand aggressively, but perhaps that’s mistaken.] I can fully understand a categorical opposition, but your second sentence sounds like a critique specifically of this latest phase of developments. Without getting into a big task, I’d be interested if you care to expand on your thoughts in that regard.
A kooky thought just occurred to me. Let’s say the Bush and al-Maliki teams are at genuine deal-breaker point over a fixed-schedule withdrawal. al-Maliki says, We simply can’t cooperate further without that. Bush says, We’ll leave right away if you really tell us to, but we can’t agree to a fixed schedule divorced from practical conditions, it would put our people in unforseeable dangers. Maliki says Fine, we’re not budging, so bugger off right now.
Bush then, against all expectation, really keeps his word: withdraws ASAP and declares an effective victory on points (”Our work here is done, you heard Maliki himself say so”), thus essentially ending the American hand in the war by August, a full three months before the election… and thus depriving Obama of a central raison d’etre for his candidacy and following.
Talk about Texas hold-’em.
That would be rational, j_p_z, and I’m not sure that’s Dubya’s thing.
As to your question, I don’t have time to answer it at length, but to me the situation at the moment arises from:
(a) Al-Maliki’s break with the Sadrists and his co-optation of a more nationalist political position;
(b) The Sadrists’ wait and see posture;
(c) The co-optation of various Sunni elements by the US and turning them against Al-Qaeda.
Note that the common thread here is a greater sense of nationalism.
More broadly, what we have at the moment is “frozen peace” - a situation artificially maintained by a large force of foreign troops who can’t “win” - who are their enemies? - but who have sufficient strength to maintain a situation where the opportunity costs of other forces attempting to win are quite high.
It’s highly possible that there’s a lot more political maturity among the players left standing than Western observers usually credit, and that in the absence of occupying forces, a deal of some sort could proceed - which incidentally would probably be one that Tehran approves - but then that’s the (unintended) result of the US’ game plan anyway. I don’t accept that the whole show would descend into chaos as a result of a US withdrawal but nor do I think that the “political conditions” of the surge strategy have all that much meaning, or for that matter, influence on what outcomes will result in the future.
Anyway, it’s always interesting to see the reality of Iraqi politics intrude on US political calculations - usually the actual desires and strategies of the various Iraqi factions are studiously ignored by Americans in their public rhetoric if not in the considerations of the administration.
Anyway, gotta dash.
As Mark says, a rational course of action.
But let’s continue the thought experiment:
Between August and election day, the real power in Iraq — Shiite theocrats — mount an Iranian-style coup and oust all opponents from government. Ethnic clansing of Sunni and others resumes, this time with armaments thoughtfully provided by Uncle Sam.
The last month of the McCain/Obama stoush revolves round the theme “Who lost Iraq?”
The answer is — Bush!.
Checkmate McCain.
Btw, j_p_z, before dissing Juan Cole, you should follow the link and read the entire post, which is a pretty good assessment of the current political play in Iraq. I saw him and a former Iraqi ambassador to the US interviewed yesterday on the PBS Newshour (which is on here on SBS on weekday afternoons) and he definitely knows a lot more about Iraqi politics than most commentators, whatever you think of his own political commitments and positions.
Patrick B — I think you’re viewing the situation with a sort of pristine 2-D axiomatic way of thinking, instead of the incredibly messy viewpoint of 3-D negotiation and hard-ball politics.
“What would these negotiations be about then and who with?”
They’re with the al-Maliki regime in Iraq, and they’re about the future disposition –or not– of the US forces, as well as presumably all sorts of other sticky things, of which there are bound to be a million, considering the size of the mess there. Look at it this way. Let’s say there’s all sorts of concessions which the US would like to get from Maliki (the location and continued existence of particular fortified bases as insurance against Iran, for instance), but which the Iraqis would prefer not to give in to (this is assuming there’d be other concessions they wouldn’t mind granting). What gives them leverage to refuse on point A or X or Z? They could always demand an immediate full withdrawal, but since I don’t think that’s actually what’s on the table, maybe they think it’s not in their interests. What else is there?
Well for one thing, they know the US public is sick of the war and that Bush’s chief opponent, Obama, wants a scheduled withdrawal. They also know that many US commanders in the field, as well as the Bush people, think this is a militarily dangerous and impractical idea, one which they will resist strenuously. Aha: leverage! Clever and hard-nosed negotiation on other points, using the withdrawal issue as a fulcrum, gets them other stuff they want, saves them face in the Arab world by strong-arming Uncle Sam, cements their bona-fides as a working government for same reason, and then in the end by bargaining away that chip, they still get the free US military support to prop up their regime anyway, which they use as leverage against their internal enemies. Sounds like a deal.
On the other hand, Maliki may just simply mean what he says, there’d be good reasons for that, too, and we’ll find out soon enough. The point is we’re not there yet.
Mark — thanks, interesting, I’ll have to chew on that.
Katz — Hmmm. Maybe, but on the other hand it could also go down like this: as Revolutionary Guards swarm unopposed over the Iraqi border, the big question is not “Who lost Iraq?” (what’s done is done) but rather, Who do you want for a President now that the enemy is bigger and stronger and madder than before — an experienced military man, or a guy who once said with a straight face that he thought the mullahs would be inclined to see things his way, simply because he has a darker complexion and a name that sounds familiar to them.
The guy *must* be a genius. After all, I hear he wrote a book.
Pfft, we just want a President that can read one.
Reanimated Sadrists! I’m glad someone is finally taking the zombie threat seriously.
I suppose that is a remote possibility. But why would Iran do such a thing now that their confederates are so close to power in Baghdad?
If Iran had expansionist ambitions in Iraq, then post GWI Saddam would have been the perfect target. Yet Iran desisted.
Could it be that Iranian decisionmakers are … intelligent?
Oh, dear.
Craig Mc seems to believe that the Sadrists are the only Shiite theocrats in Iraq.
Craig Mc seems to have missed the fact that not only is al-Maliki’s party strongly Shiite theocrat, but that al-Maliki’s Dawa Party is more closely confederated with the Iranian regime than Sadr.
Some catch-up reading for Craig Mc
The article Mark links to points out it is going to be tied to the provinces being handed over and that will be measured in years not months. It also acknowledges that is in essence a withrawal based on the conditions on the ground.
I think this is just the typical argy bargy of negotiating. The US wants it to be conditions based whilst Al Maliki probably does too but acknowledges the political importance of being able to report a defined final exit date also.
The other thing to remember is whilst the IA and INP have improved in leaps and bounds in last 12 months or so Iraq has no air force to speak of, it will not want the US out until that is a fully functioning force. That will take years, it doesn’t even have the jets yet only some helicopters. Iran has admittedly aged Tomcats but in the absence of any Iraqi Airforce those tomcats would enable Iran to invade Iraq at its own discretion and the Iraqi leadership both military and civilian are acutely aware of this.
There is no possibility of a full and complete US withdrawal from Iraq inside of 16 months of Obama taking the White House and even he is hedging on this now. If any final withdrawal date is agreed to by the US and Iraq it will be 5 years minimum. To my mind that is far more up the McCain end of the spectrum.