On a couple of reports on tonight’s tv news, I saw a citizen of Mumbai being interviewed who demanded the Indian government go to war with Pakistan. That set me to wondering what such a war – and God forbid one is launched – would solve. War, increasingly, has lost its (perhaps always somewhat illusory) ability to resolve conflict after intensifying it. There are a lot of factors operating here – but one aspect of the globalist discourse that doesn’t receive as much attention as it should (and it’s one aspect that clashes with the more ideological aspects of neo-liberal globalisation talk, and maybe there’s a connection there) – is the inability of states to monopolise the use of violence on their own territory. That capacity, was of course, the key aspect of Max Weber’s classical sociological definition of the state. And, as other sociologists such as Norbert Elias have demonstrated, it’s not either an abstract conceptual nicety or an ahistorical effect, but rather something that has developed over time. Indeed, it can, and no doubt has been argued that the United States is not a modern state at all because it’s never taken seriously one of the core things modern states do – that is, to disarm their own populace. (The better to govern them, among other reasons, and that’s why you get the strong cultural link between guns and liberty.)
In 1999, the celebrated historian Eric Hobsbawm participated in a range of conversations with Italian writer Antonio Polito, subsequently published as On The Edge of The New Century. One of the most striking points Hobsbawm made was that the secular trend of the increasing ability of states to prevent non-state violence on their own territory went into reverse in the 1970s. That’s not the sort of declining power of the state that globalists normally talk of (preferring to see the state as losing power to the market), but it’s at the centre of a lot of what is happening in today’s world, and what is happening to make it a far less safe place. One could hardly imagine that a hypothetical Indian victory in war over Pakistan would render either that territory governable or India’s less violent. As well as assymetry in warfare, we’re also seeing the fruits of a deterritorialisation of identifications which can be pushed to the ultimate limit of death, and the state is also presenting itself as something far more akin to what “public” authority was in pre-modern history – a competing power centre among many. These shifts demand far more thinking through – because in many respects far too many of our political and social currents are still shaped by the concepts of a modernity now partially in ruins. One sociological thinker who’s been doing this hard work is Saskia Sassen, long one of the most interesting writers on globalisation, and she has an important article in Open Democracy on the implications of warfare over the space of the city, prompted by the Mumbai terror attacks.
There is a deeper transformation afoot. It is still rare but it is more frequently becoming visible. It is as if the centre no longer holds. Cities seem to be losing the capacity they have long had to triage conflict – through commerce, through civic activity. The national state, confronted with a similar conflict, has historically chosen to go to war. In my new research project – on cities and war – I am studying whether cities are losing this capacity and are becoming sites for a range of new types of violence.Further, the new asymmetric wars have the effect of urbanising war. This brings with it a nasty twist: when national states go to war in the name of national security, nowadays major cities are likely to become a key frontline space. In older conventional wars, large armies needed large open fields or oceans to meet and fight, and these were the frontline spaces.
Today the search for national security may well become a source for urban insecurity.
The whole article can be read here.
Elsewhere: At the Global Sociology Blog, there’s a complementary post from SocProf where she also takes a look at Sassen’s work in the context of Mumbai as a space of globalisation.
i hope this dont start the War of the worlds
What would an Indian-Pakistani war “solve”? I think it’s result would actually end up favouring the jihadis (I can’t say through design). Pakistan government is already exceedingly weak and getting weaker. A confrontation on two sides (Afghan and Indian) would deliver it into the hand of the radicals – either because the government self-destructs and the radicals are the last faction standing, or through a desperate but deliberate alliance, having no other options left.
I think I can see the line of thought about the rise of conflict in the cities, but I tend to think the next century will result in the rise of the national state again, however the borders will be redrawn in some places, particularly in places like the north west of old British India. Conceptually the relation between city and state will evolve even further, probably through the forces you’re describing.
Very thought-provoking idea you’ve raised though Mark, but too late in the evening for more thought about it from me though … must go to sleep.
Hey, at least the attackers were from there. Better than some other recent WOTs I could name.
But seriously – who’d want to be an occupying power in Pakistan? Not India, thats for sure. Doesn’t rule out renewed offensives in Kashmir, of course.
I read the the Fin Review today that some Indian Muslims are applying for Dalit status to improve their economic status. Untouchables get special government payments, you see.
What happened to ‘nuclear deterrence’? old hat? Just awfully 1950’s?? No need to “administer” Pakistan (or India) if key areas are fused, radioactive sand.
Unresolved grievance + knowledge of the theory and practice of people’s war + hundreds of millions of AK-47s in circulation = Hobsbawm’s increasing inability of states “to prevent non-state violence on their own territory”.
The era of successful statecraft by means of war is over.
Congratulations on a profoundly important post, Mark.
Katz: and yet states are equipped to wage war, states train persons in the arts of war, states engage in war…. Why are they wasting blood and treasure, in a doomed quest?? Simply stupid? The inertia of past practice? The hope of defeating “people’s war”??
Yes, its an interesting post Mark – and perhaps we can look to the Indonesian state, which has is courting the disaffected ‘post-nationals’ to bring them back in to the centre, rather than trying to use the old policing tricks they still employ in places like West Papua.
They appear to be doing it rather more successfully than the TNI in the Eastern archipelago is managing their old-school war on self-determination.
A thought-provoking post, Mark. And thanks for the links, too.
The death of what? Locally-bound identities? I think there is good evidence that, outside a few cosmopolitan states, ethnic nationalism is still real. Here’s an excellent article arguing against the theory that internationalism has been the dominant post-WWII paradigm.
If the state is the strongest of the power centres, but could theoretically be overwhelmed by a combination of them — well, that sounds like the definition of (Oakeshott-style) liberalism to me.
You all have just forgotten what war means.
One does not have to wage war on a state. One can wage war on a people – until there are all dead if necessary. While that is a horrific thought, it is possible that is the meaning aimed at by the vox pop Indians.
After all, wars ability to solve conflict has been about removing one party to the conflict. Terrorist and freedom fighters aside, genocide can still do that.
And with the West’s power at its lowest ebb in some time, we can no longer be sure of our ability to enforce international rules to prevent such horrors (for instance, if both China and India decided it was a good idea).
We may be less able to control acts of non-state violence that are acts of war (presumably terrorist). However, when it comes to “ordinary” urban violence, ie street crime,road rage etc., apart from the presence of an organised police force and other emergency services, we’re not really much more effective than we were in the late 18c. Or is this simply a matter of being gulled by a sensationalist media?
In respect to war itself, with the exception of revolutionary war (eg America, france, Russia, China etc.,)war now has a lot more impact on civilians (and probably has had since WW2. The difference with WOT type warfare, is that the country where terrorist attacks occur does not necessarily have to be a battlefield. But then again, I suppose that’s part of the terrorist objective.
I’m not convinced… (though I haven’t read the full Sassen article)
It was the breakdown (or pre-existing failure) of the State of Pakistan that allowed the training and ready access to guns etc that allowed them to conceive and carry out such an attack. These conditions only exist in a very few parts of the world for very particular reasons. Somalia and the FATAs area about it.
We don’t see such learned discourse applying to the Somali pirates, simply because they’ve got simpler motivations (money). Somalia may reassemble a State at some time.
This is a particular matter, not a grand theme of the breakdown of State power. The FATAs will probably be a breeding ground for terrorism for a long long time to come, as long as they have a ready supply of guns (for which we must look to the main armaments suppliers). Cities that will be threatened will be in ready striking distance of this area.
BTW, this is tangentially related.
Paul @ 11 – I believe the crime rates over at least the last few decades have been dropping, and its partly media sensationalism and partly because we’re just more aware of crime that occurs that gives the illusion that the situation is getting worse. I don’t know how it compares to say the 18thC, but I would guess that it is a lot lower, though not only for enforcement reasons. I wonder if they had horse-rage back then?
I think what has really changed is we now have some terrorists who do not have one eye on their survival from the operation they are engaged in, they are not focused on living to fight another day. They actually expect to die and may even want too depending on their faith in the 72 virgins etc. That enables them to inflict far more harm until they are killed. That said as horrible as Mumbai has been I was surprised at how low the bodycount has been. If someone had asked me to guess how many deaths might result from unleashing a couple of dozen jihadist terrorists in a major city with AK 47’s and grenades I would have feared a death toll in excess of 1000.
Beyond that what is new about terrorism in cities? It’s as old as cities are. Nor has anyone in the history of civilisation been able to build a perfecly safe city and nor will they. The vast overwhelming number of urban populations today are about as safe or unsafe as they were 1, 10 or 50 years ago from these sorts of levels of violence.
I think that perhaps Sassen has failed to understand that the world has woken up to COIN strategies as exemplified by Petraeus, Kilcullen etc. It doesn’t prevent urban warfare/insurgency but we do have an effective remedy if it is resourced correctly.
I’m afraid saying this is evidence of some great shift in the balance of power is an over reaction
Chris (A different one) @ 14,
I’ve got so many books on crime in the 18th C I don’t know where to start. Probably the best place is simply to cite the impressions of the magistrate Patrick colquhoun, who was responsible for the founding of the Thames Water Police. He had a real down on the poor and the working class, so he has to be taken carefully. But according to his estimates, which were clearly inaccurate, if you tot up all his figures (and I can’t remember which book they’re in so I can give them exactly at the moment,) it would appear, according to him, something like three quarters of London’s immense population were involved in some sort of crime or other, ranging from property crimes, crimes of violence, and crimes of a non-violent sexual nature, such as prostitution.
Fielding’s Bow Street Runners were actually quite effective in chasing down criminals all over England from about 1750s (approximately) but they were primarily thief-takers, though he did briefly have a mounted police force to deal with highwaymen. Unfortunately, not all of them were incorruptable.
I could go on paragraph after paragraph, so I’ll stop now.
@Chris – A different one “I wonder if they had horse-rage back then?”
“Last week I had a row on the road (I came up to Venice from my casino, a few miles on the Paduan road, this blessed day, to bathe) with a fellow in a carriage, who was impudent to my horse. I gave him a swingeing box on the ear, which sent him to the police, who dismissed his complaint. Witnesses had seen the transaction. He first shouted, in an unseemly way, to frighten my palfry. I wheeled round, rode up to the window, and asked him what he meant. He grinned, and said some foolery, which produced him an immediate slap in the face, to his utter discomfiture. Much blasphemy ensued, and some menace, which I stopped by dismounting and opening the carriage door, and intimating an intention of mending the road with his immediate remains, if he did not hold his tongue. He held it.”
That was Byron, though… Maybe not an average sample.
Anyone catch the story yesterday on Highland PNG women slaughtering their male offspring to premptively head off/protest ongoing tribal warfare?
(I can’t post links without getting caught in the spam can but it ran in most news channels)
Darin @ 17 – wow thats a great read!
People like John Robb at Global Geurrillas have got somewhat further down the track with this sort of stuff, going into a lot of detail concerning what we can look forward to in terms of technical ability and tactics from the practioners of assymetric warfare.
With huge urban populations and fracturing cultural consensus, the technically possible soon becomes the historically inevitable. It’s hardly necessary to look for causes as they are there aplenty. And’s never been easier or cheaper to bring a city to its knees!
I’m not sure I agree totally with Saskia Sassen as far as reasons for the Mumbai attackers focussing on foreign nationals. I’d suspect it has more to do with the publicity value than anything ideological.
wilful, Hobsbawm also looks at increased rates of violent crime, the arms trade, the rise of private armies and mercenaries and militias and the ability in the 70s of guerillas and terrorists to operate (reasonably) openly on the territory of European states. Consider ETA, the IRA, the terrorists in Germany and Italy in the 1970s and 1980s. None could really be defeated by either police measures or military means, and to differing degrees, a legal “state of emergency” became the norm rather than the exception. Or we could start thinking about the militias in America in the 90s. We’re not just talking about “failed states” – a broad trend obviously manifests itself differently under different conditions – universal and particular aren’t actually incompatible.
And Paul – if you look at crime stats historically, in countries like Britain, America and Australia (coming from different bases) – there’s a big fall through most of the twentieth century (reaching its nadir during WW2) and then a big jump in the 60s/70s – even with some decline in some forms of violent crime, the stabilisation is at a much higher point on the curve.
I think you’ve missed my meaning, Leon. By no means are territorialised identities gone from the picture – it’s the twin presence of high intensity deterritorialised identities and pathological national or ethnic identities. I wasn’t really thinking of cosmopolitan identification in the first place – and there’s an argument about – cf. countries like Brazil – that itself produces a violent reaction.
And thanks to those who appreciated the post!
This morning’s ABC news reports that 9 attackers are accounted for. Early reports had 16. Does that mean 7 slipped away? Are they still in Mumbai?
Lloyd Morcom: the targetting of Britons and Americans may have had a lot to do with publicity (!!) but why discount an ideological factor? Don’t you believe the assailants might have been trying to achieve two (or three) aims all at once? Looks like they thought about this for a long time. Why not have four aims? (Then if one isn’t achieved, the other 3 are).
Heck, let’s say 5 aims. Go for broke, make it 6!
1. Terrorism and people’s war, while related, are quite different in quality from each other. Terrorism is a tactic that may or may not be employed by groups that may or may not have other means of projecting their ability to act violently. People’s war is a broad strategy that may or may not involve acts deemed to be “terror”.
2. Petraeus and Kilcullen have simply served the interests of the dominant political groups in Iraq, whose interests are inimical to those of the US, and yet those interests, tied as they are to Iran, must be presented to the gullible American public as the final justification for Bush’s absurd war on Iraq.
The people’s war was fought and won by the Shiites against their enemies. Half the pre-war Sunni population is either dead or refugee in other countries. Very few of them were insurgents or “terrorists”. They were innocent bystanders overwhelmed by a genocidal campaign that was abetted by the US.
That is Bush’s idiotic legacy.
Elsewhere: At the Global Sociology Blog, there’s a complementary post from SocProf where she also takes a look at Sassen’s work in the context of Mumbai as a space of globalisation.
Mark, first off, great post.
Second, here’s an article on celebrity terrorism which is worth a quick read.
Third, for a few reasons, the post-war Basque conflict was qualitatively different to any of the other Marxist-inspired Euro-terror groups (RAF, IRA, Red Brigades etc.)
The Spanish post-war State had not even the trappings of democracy and was only accepted as legitimate by NATO states as part of the anti-Communist Cold War settlement. Until the transition to democracy ETA did not have to spend a moment justifying their position against the central Government; that’s easy when your dictator is an out-and-out Fascist. The legal state of emergency pervading Spain in the 1960s and 1970s didn’t come from the bottom, it was directly caused by struggles for power at the elite level amongst potential heirs to General Franco—ETA weren’t much but a regional bunch of fantasists playing local government politics with guns.
With elections and time having removed that sense of crisis from the Spanish state, ETA more or less has been entirely defeated by policing.
I’d disagree, Liam – in two senses – the role of politics (in effect played out as diplomacy – not dissimilar to co-opting certain factions in a client state) was also very important, and if indeed ETA has been defeated, it’s been through an extraordinarily long and violent process.
But glad you liked the post!
Yes, certainly I agree there. And no thanks to the PSOE in the eighties.
I’d still draw a clear line between the paralegality of antiterrorism in post-war Spain and post-war West Germany, Italy, and Northern Ireland, through. Until the death of Franco there was little if any access to political maneouvre available to ETA—they certainly enjoyed nothing like the success of Sinn Fein.
I think the Spanish case (and to a degree also what was going on in Greece in the 70s and the extreme repression the Italian state put in place) demonstrates that state formation is an uneven process. It never worked quite as well in some Mediterranean states as it worked in some Northern European ones.
Katz – First and foremost my point in raising Petraeus and Kilcullens names had nothing to do with the merits of the Iraq invasion merely to demonstrate in the context of this thread that we do have tools to use to effectively combat insurgencies including in urban environments. Why that required a diatribe about them serving the interests of supposed Iranian friendly interests I’m not sure.
That said Kilcullen and truth beknown probably even Petraeus (”where does this end?”) were both opposed to the Iraq invasion or at least in the form it was carried out in. You seem keen to paint them as almost Bush’s dupes. I suspect this slur is out of frustration of these men proving you wrong in your gloomy predictions for Iraq and particularly the supposed Tehran takeover of Iraq. Rather than admit you underestimated COIN and these mens expertise you want to ridicule them as unwitting pawns of Bush
In reality they realised regardless of merits of invasion or lack of they had to work towards normalising Iraq. They have essentially achieved this. Its still fragile but its been achieved. Kilcullen particularly was under no obligation to assist. He chose to be involved with the Surge and repeatedly warned as did Petraeus, that it would be hard and not assured of victory. Yes indeed there are still significant Sunni refugees but they are returning and those that have stayed are enjoying a far better way of life than 2 years ago. It also is no worse or better for them because of their religious sect.
Further still you seem upset the Shiites have poliical control in Iraq? Was it better when the Sunni minority ruled the Shiite? If the Shiite are the majority and the US is intent on introducing majority rule then by default of course they come to power. To suggest the US have been somehow tricked into this is just plain silly conspiracy theory nonsense.
Likewise when are we going to truly see some material influence of Tehran over Baghdad as you keep alluding to much like the military genius and imminent success of Al Sadr you bandied about not so long ago? If it turns out the Shia in parliament and other powerful positions do uphold Iraqi soveriegnity you are left with nothing.
I’m afraid this very blinkered “if George Bush was involved it must have been wrong in every single instance” constantly leads you towards quite remarkable positions.
Mark,
I’m not surprised at the stats for WW2. Most of the young fellas were away fighting a war or working long hours in war industries on the home front, having been conscripted by the Manpower in the latter case. Neither opportunity nor time, I would suggest.
Nor does the increase in crime stats in the 60s and 70s surprise me. There were an awful lot of baby boomers. Though I wonder if the figures after 1969 in Australia , when our Drug Squads were first established, might perhaps indicate an increase in criminal substance abuse/supply – ie a new type of crime.
Perhaps it has escaped your attention that all US troops will be out of Iraq by 2011. In the meantime, their activities in Iraq have been severely curtailed.
What is two years when it will be possible for Iran to cement its influence in Iraq at its leisure any time after the departure of US troops? This has proven to be the cheapest victory of all for Iran.
How on earth did you justify that conclusion to yourself before betraying yourself in print?
I have no objection at all to majority rule so long as it does not accompany genocide. Why are you unwilling to acknowledge the tragedy that has befallen Iraqi Sunni, most of whom had no association whatsoever with either Saddam or Sunni jihadists?
Are you saying that the Bush Clique were and continue to be unaware of the plight of the Sunni population of Iraq?
If they wereaware (i.e., not bone ignorant), then they were complicit in the destruction of Sunni Iraq, because the weapons used to destroy the Sunni population were provided by the Bush Clique and paid for by the US taxpayer.
Where did I say what you alleged I said about Sadr?
I’m not sure that the monopoly of the State on violence necessarily means disarming the population. Americans are still bound by laws governing the use of firearms etc. The State distinguishes between legitimate and non-legitimate uses of private force. That’s all very debatable of course.
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The use of mercenary armies is one of my biggest worries. Backwater USA appear to have the entire apparatus of a military-industrial complex at their disposal. How democracies are supposed to control a company that can go to war with them is a puzzlement.
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But one of the legacies of the Vietnam War is that the citizen-soldier concept is dead. Another is that the American elite have abandoned the military as a career option. The result is a professional army of less-than-professional soldiers augmented increasingly by corporate mercenaries from wherever. Add to this the increasing lack of respect between military and government and you’re getting an atomization that history shows to be dangerous.
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Can anyone say: Cross the Rubicon?
Blackwater? is the Tigris a “back water”?
“But one of the legacies of the Vietnam War is that the citizen-soldier concept is dead”
Hmmm, would General Vo Nguyen Giap agree?
“Giap mimicked the Chinese by creating different types of units: a regular army, regional forces, and popular or local troops. Each had parallel political organizations on every level of military command and emphasized troop indoctrination or political work in the army by party functionaries.” Michael A. Sheehan, forweord to George Tanham, “Communist Revoltionary Warfare. From the Vietminh to the Viet Cong”, Praeger Security International; 1961, 1968, 2006
Adrien, yes, in the literature the professionalisation of the military and the end of the citizen-soldier is identified as another big factor in the mutation of war.
Paul – the Durkheimian explanation for the low crime rate in WW2 is similar to the reason for why it was also the nadir for suicide – total war brings about very strong social integration.
It’s a bit of a tangent to this post, and it might be interesting to return to it, but there’s some fascinating research on the changes in the crime rate over time.
Ambi – Hmmm, would General Vo Nguyen Giap agree?
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I was talking American soldiers not Vietnamese. Since Vietnam the idea of compelling US citizens into military service has become unthinkable. The notion that one has a duty to fight for one’s country has likewise withered. There’s a lot of patriotic hubris about but the support for the troopers always translates into the support for someone else’s kids.
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Blackwater USA is a mercenary corporation run by a born-again bonehead with ties to Fundamentalist Central Republicana. These people are dangerous.
Sometimes a picture says a thousand words.
Here’s two thousand words.
http://strangemaps.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/1942world1600.jpg
http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/images/pentagons_new_map.jpg
Isn’t Saskia Sassen sorta just catching up with what Martin Van Creveld wrote back in 1991 in his: The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz.
I’ve only read bit and pieces online & reviews of etc, and also only bits and pieces of his Rise & Decline of the State – so can’t really comment with any great depth – others will probably know more. You don’t have to agree on the diagnosis to note the same symptoms (nor on the prescription and even prognosis).
A “global city” is def. enemy HQ to everyone with a gripe or plan – jihadists, religionists, nationalists, bandits, and spivs and con-men – a long list.
Being an Israeli may have given Van Creveld a heads up in the great game caper.