The head of Victoria’s Country Fire Authority, Russell Rees, has been given a right bollocking by the counsel assisting the Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission over the past few weeks. Despite this, John Brumby has publicly come out in support of Rees and the CFA, as covered in this report on ABC Radio’s PM program.
While I am relying on what is possibly selective reporting here, the focus on Rees’ actions on the day to ignoring broader points when it comes to the effectiveness or otherwise of the Country Fire Authority, and indeed Victoria’s emergency response as a whole. In a plane crash investigation, if the initial cause is identified as “pilot error”, extensive investigation is then conducted to determine what inadequacies in pilot training, cockpit information, and suchlike led to the circumstances in which the pilot made the error. As far as Rees goes, it seems likely to me that his decisions on the day in large part reflected the culture and policy of the organization he led. So, like the air crash, the system as a whole needs to be looked at, not just the individual at the pointy end.
What have you all made of the Royal Commission process so far?
Perhaps the individual does need to be scrutinised!
I experienced the 2006 bushfires and was most impressed by the way the CFA managed the fire which progressed at a stately pace. When the Tathra Inn at Mt Buffalo burnt down the procedures were changed so that the appliances didn’t return to Bright to change crews, the crews swapped over on site and the appliances remained on station. Although we were alert for ember attacks they didn’t eventuate and the fellas watched the fire by night seated in their plastic BBQ chairs and I comforted the chained up dog whilst his owner went to buy a bulldozer.
The 2009 bushfire was a raging monster and permanent staff members reliance on procedure proved deadly for 171 Victorians. Coordinating staff need to be able to show initiative and be able to respond appropriately to the developing situation. Personnel who show initiative should not be reprimanded or disciplined especially when hindsight showed that their actions saved lives.
Its hopeless to rely on technology to spread the news of imminent fire, because computers only work when the power supply is operational and the website is not overloaded and up to date. Telephones only work when the telephone line is not cut and mobile phone towers aren’t burnt down.
Billie: I agree that the conduct of the CFA leadership should be examined. I’m just dubious as to the notion that it’s the key factor here.
As you noted, the response to the 2003 and 2006 bushfires was effective in that there was little or no loss of life, and relatively little property damage when you consider the scale of the fires. My guess is that the factors which changed in 2009 were a) the location of the fires mostly away from heavily populated areas, and b) the speed at which the fires moved, rather than the nature of the CFA response.
Which is part of the reason I find the emphasis being given to early warning a bit dubious. Evacuation may have worked in some places on Black Saturday, but relying on it carries considerable risks of its own.
What has concerned me has been the impression given by Jack Rush on the first morning of the hearings that his major focus was not any of the agencies as a whole, or their conjoint actions. His emphasis on Russell Rees from the outset and the media leaks regarding his performance on the day appear to me at least to provide some inference that his mind was to a large degree made up as to what the outcome may be.
Of greater concern has been the comments of his assisting Counsel on people’s actions under the stress of the day and more importantly his latest demand for the Government of the day to front the Commission on his interpretation of a Governmental “frolic”. For my part I’m happy for a Government to govern in the face of the quickly advancing fire season and attempt to have some plans in focus.
My impression has been that the Commisson came to the hearings having already made up their minds on some issues rather than coming to them with an open mind.
There seems to be a lawyer-like determination to find someone to blame, and to run a prosecution rather than an investigation.
As someone who lived through the 2003/06 fires (billie must live fairly close to me!) and had a lot of discussions with those on the ground and as someone raised in a very fire aware family (my grandfather was the sole survivor of one small community in 1927) I’ve been worried by the lack of understanding the Commission has demonstrated on the nature of the task confronting the CFA and other authorities on Black Saturday.
Firstly, fires like this are incredibly fast. By the time someone has reported a fire to the authorities, it can be spotting 10k or more away (and so on and so on). When there are multiple fires of this nature, tracking where they are going is a nightmare, let alone being able to warn people who might be impacted — because you simply don’t know where it might be in 30 minutes time.
Secondly, there’s no doubt people were either complacent or just didn’t understand what they were hearing. I’ve heard multiple stories of people who were inside with the curtains drawn and no radio or TV on, who didn’t know the fire was at their doorstep until someone knocked on the door to tell them. Many of those who didn’t survive were probably similarly oblivious. How you can warn people that a fire is coming when they’re not listening to the media reports, I don’t know.
I think there’s also a bit of reluctance to be seen to be blaming the victims, as if to suggest that their own behaviours were a factor is disrespectful. On the contrary, we won’t learn from their deaths unless we understand the wisdom or otherwise of their decisions. Instead, we seem to be giving a lot of weight to people who went against all advice and survived, without understanding that, in all emergencies of this nature, luck plays a big part in outcomes (although fortune does always favour the well prepared!)
More Australians than ever before are living in bush settings. Many of these have little or no understanding of the bush or of the nature of bushfires (and their inevitability). The Commission (if it does its job properly, and I hope it will) needs to address the challenges that this reality creates.
Any society that puts QCs at the forefront of how to handle anything, other than a pissup at an all expenses paid Collins St restaurant, is fucked.
well said, mehitabel.
The aspect I find puzzling is this: we had 2 or 3 days of dire warnings (Premier, fire services) before Sat 7th Feb. So why didn’t CFA headquarters have extra people on duty – or did they? – and were all stops pulled out to have communication equipment and back-up systems ready?
After all, the Darlimurla/Boolarra fires had burnt for about 10 days, a few weeks earlier. Some recent “practice”. Then several days of scorching heat lifting he fire danger. On the Saturday morning, we noticed that the local traffic levels were WAY down. We guessed people were taking seriously the Premier’s advice to “stay inside, stay off the roads”. It was also shockingly hot: 39C by 11 am.
I get the impression John Brumby was
i) seriously worried, and
ii) concerned that if fires spread rapidly [Bunyip State Forest was still burning on the Friday] the CFA, DSE, MFB would not be able to save all the lives at risk.
I accept that they directly saved thousands of lives, BTW. I know some people who are in that category: some were knowledgable about fire behaviour and had thought they were well-prepared.
I agree with mediatracker that Mr Rush went over the top in describing recent Govt decisions as a “frolic”. Some are inclined to see the Royal Commission as a bit of a “picnic”, Mr Rush.
One pertinent question seems to be: can we have equipment, shelters, trained (extra) volunteers ready every summer, for what may be a “once-every-20-years” event??
A report on the ABC other than the one here,had a scientist talking about his little room in a building somewhere close to the decision making part of the Fire Authority, and there was some sort of muddle up or through.He was already indicating that a serious problem looked as that, rather than a potential of that.So something as stupid as building design may have been the major response culprit.It is a good thing you can see wether someone is in or not in these circumstances,and physically go and retrieve the failed or, understandings that became misunderstandings.If you have to pass through doors they would be a mental block as well.That may not mean however those research matters of his are entirely correct as matters of Forests in a physical sense,as the problem became unwieldly.Maybe the Fire Authority culture and the other Emergency support organizations,including Police,cannot be always alert in every circumstance,and, thus become problems in themselves.Can that be helped!?Possibly!?By having some sort of self-check on one’s attitudes to the distress of others,whilst,maybe having a delayed problem of that as officials.It isn’t like looking at a watch on ones’ wrist!
Ambi, the once-in-a-generation issue does seem to be a real problem. People get complacent and forget, other concerns (such as liability in the case of municipal shelters) come to the forefront, and so on.
mehitabel: it does seem, at least from the media reports, that Jack Rush is running a prosecution, which seems to me to be a fairly small part of the commission’s job.
My overall impression has been that it’s a witch-hunt.
What is not being stated but is the elephant in the room is that this fire was off the charts in terms of known experience for fire fighters, emergency analyists, risk managers etc.
That they failed to counter such an extreme force is self-evident; but crucifying them as the sole cause of this catastrophe when it’s plain that nature served up something unprecedented in Victoria, and only previewed in Canberra a few years ago, is pointless and vindictive. You can hear the sound of arses being covered.
What would actually be helpful right now is an evidence-based, calm examination of the fire and situation, and series of recommendations to prepare services and the public for another such event. Instead we have scape-goating and preempting- or at least it seems to be heading rapidly that way.
Of course no-one is allowed to mention climate change. ‘Once off, not a trend, no benchmark etc.’ – all valid.
In a previous life I was responsible for safety, training and emergency services for a mine that employed 600 people in a remote, cyclone prone area. The responsibilty included the investigation of serious accidents and preparation for the cyclone season. At other times I have managed concentors with workforces of over a hundred people and been in a position to observe the differences in what is required of a leader managing 100 people vs thousands of people. Comments on the basis of this experience:
1. The aim of the investigation should have been to determine what was done well, and what action needs to be taken to reduce future damage to people and property. Identifying what was done well is important if we are to avoid throwing out the baby with the bath water.
2. The CFA and the others involved in fighting this fire were people who gave their best. For this reason we don’t need a royal commission run by lawyers. That sort of thing is more appropriate if we are trying to sort out organized crime.
3. At one stage the US air force had a policy of not disciplining pilots as a result of a crash investigation. They reasoned that what was important was to find out that the crash was caused by a pilot trying some stupid stunt. All the threat of discipline was doing was encouraging the pilot to try and blame something else.
4. The investigation should have been conducted by a respected investigator of large events assisted by people with real operating experience in dealing with the risks of hazards such as cyclones and major fires. It is preferrable that the investigation be a lawyer free zone and that nothing revealed during the investigation can be used to sue individuals and organizations.
5. The commission should have concentrated on what changes are needed. It is the business of others to decide whether Russell Rees is the right person to manage any changes required to the CFA.
Having said all this there were obvious problems that will need to be addressed. I believe a lot fewer people would have died if some of the approaches we used during the seventies on Groote Eylandt to deal with cyclones had been used in fireprone areas in Victoria. For example:
1. Dealing with cyclones was part of the induction when people started work at Groote.
2. At the start of the cyclone season there was a general check of the town and lose material that would be a cyclone hazard was removed.
3. The cyclone plans were reviewed before the start of the cyclone season
4. There was a formal, staged procedure for action to be done as the cyclone got closer.
5. At the intitial alert people were notified, areas inspected and further clean-up done.
6. All houses were fitted with cyclone shelters as a result of the learning from cyclone Tracey.
Enough said, i could prattle on for hours on this subject.
Of course we need an inquiry to look for what worked well, what didn’t and identify some realistic options for future improvement.
What gets up my nose is the inquisitorial style run by the QCs. We had an extreme fire event that unfolded very quickly which put a system and individuals under extreme pressure to react quickly and as best they could under circumstances. However we have the legal profession in charge of the inquiry whose normal speed of operation makes a snail look fast. I hate to think how any of the QCs would cope with the time pressure of a major fire event (or any emergency for that matter).
The Bunyip fire came within 5 km of my place with several spot fires within a couple of hundred metres. Despite high level warnings on Friday we were totally unprepared (we went away for the weekend and rushed back on the Saturday!). Never did I think a bush fire would move some 25 kms out of the bush across relatively open farming land. We now have a fire plan, make sure the fire insurance is up to date every year, get all the irreplaceables out and piss off early!!
Well said, Robert M, myriad and JohnD.
habby: my feeling is that hundreds of thousands of Victorian families have now sat up, taken notice, and planned much more carefdully (and knowledgeably) for future fire seasons. We all learn from our mistakes and (tragically) sometimes need the misfortunes of others to learn from too.
Robert M: one example of a strong community reaction was the marking of beach evacuation/assembly points down around Lorne, Anglesea, Airey’s Inlet after the Ash Wednesday fires. It seemed to be well done in those districts directly affected in that fire. But all along the coast? I don’t think so.
Interesting article of some relevance in todays Age newspaper by John Schauble.
What should have happened is that the Royal Commissioner should have asked for written submissions, with a promise that he’d read them all (he’s a judge, he’s used to wading through voluminous submissions, and he could skim over the ones that started with: “Words cannot really express how I feel”).
Brumby should have deferred to the Royal Commission. If the findings are that Rees wasn’t good enough, Rees should go. He normally plays things with a straight bat, so pre-empting the Commission by making Rees a protected species is very, very dumb.
The Commission itself seems from this distance to be the worst option but for all the alternatives, which sadly seem crap:
1) Lots of focus on “the system”, followed by the conclusion: “yeah, the system really should do something about that”, but nothing gets done.
2) People like Russell Rees whose behaviour under pressure may or may not be what it could have been get off scot-free, while some low-level functionary and a well-meaning bystander get pilloried. If the wrong people were in the wrong jobs this needs to be pointed out, so that such people don’t get it in the way of the right people.
Andrew E,
they did ask for and receive written submissions. They also held a largen number of community consultations in fire-affected areas before the formal sittings: these were closed to the media (a good decision IMO).
Andrew E: Sacking Russell Rees is unlikely to make much difference.
It’s pretty unlikely we’ll see another fire as bad as Black Saturday for a while – in the past, I would have said a generation, with climate change, maybe a decade. In any case, by the time it happens again Rees, and anyone else that this inquiry nails, will be long retired.
@Robert- a decade? I’m not sure of that, with the role that major winds played in the Black Saturday fires. There’s an El Nino forecast for this year. I would expect another horror summer. What do others think?
You might be right, Helen. The rainfall maps are still bloody scary.
That said, it’s not just about climate. The 2003 and 2006 fires were comparable in size, but didn’t cause mass casualties because we didn’t get that furnace northerly and the fires were away from heavily populated areas.
To some exent I’m indulging in the gambler’s fallacy, but I reckon the odds of a repeat of Black Saturday next year are pretty low.
Oh well, call the whole thing off then – until next summer.
Maybe it can become another Melbourne ritual – a horrible set of fires, followed by a winter of drizzle, cold wind, Aussie Rules, and a system-not-individual Royal Commission. The Commissioner can choose when to release the report on that year’s fires: in September (if the news is bad, it gets buried by the AFL finals; if good, everyone’s happy and the Commissioner goes into the birdcage at the Melbourne Cup).
It’s OK for people to be burned physically, but as long as nobody’s burnt career-wise then that’s OK, eh Robert? You can’t know what difference Rees will or won’t make until the findings are clearer than they are today.
Ambigulous: it’s one thing to put an ad in the paper, but on the day the Commission was announced the Commissioner should have said explicitly that he will read any and all submissions his own self. The Brumby government has form on “community consultation”.
Andrew: My take on Rees is that he very much reflects the culture and values of the organization he heads.
If the CFA was a purely professional organization, sacking the CEO and giving him carte blanche to sack anyone he needs to, to achieve the cultural change he wants, stands some chance of success. But only some – how has replacing the coach worked for the Richmond footy club over the past 20 years?
The CFA is a largely volunteer-run organization. If you try and impose an alien culture and values from the top down, all you will achieve is that the volunteers will piss off and do something else.
Go ahead. Demand Rees’ head from a pedestal, for all I care. Robert Manne certainly is. But unless greater appreciation is paid to why the CFA are like they are, any attempt to change the way they do things is doomed to failure.
Oh, and I recommend the Schauble article mentioned earlier.
If I was doing a serious investigation of the death of a man who died in a house in Kingslake I might start with trying to complete the statement: “This person wouldn’t have died if…” The direct, first level answers might thave included things such as “he had not been in the danger zone”, “the house had been properly prepared”, “the people in the house knew what to do”, “fire fighters had arrived in time”, etc.
At the next level I would go to most of these first level answers and then, for example, try to complete the statement: “This person wouldn’t have been in the danger zone if…” etc. For some of the first level answers I may have decided NOT to proceed any further on the grounds that this was unlikely to lead to logical action recomendations. For example, there is probably not much point pursuing the “extreme temperature” line even though it was a key contributing factor.
Ideally, the process should proceed down through level to level until a point has been reached where further investigation would appear to be unproductive. If it is done properly this process not only identifies specific, localized action it also deals with underlying problems such as the failure to follow up on recomendations from the last big fire and inadequacies in emergency management systems.
What I have described above is a standard approach, variations of which we should expect any modern, professional investigator would use to investigate any major accident. I may be missing something and may be being sucked in by the media’s addiction to drama. However, what I think I am seeing is an investigation by a lawyer dominated Royal Commission that has been sidetracked into the search for high profile scapegoatsinstead of getting on with the systematic, professional process required produce a sound set of recommendations.
I can understand your scepticism, Andrew E; but these consultations were held months ago when emotions were still raw. One held in Traralgon was reported on the local TV. Others were reported on Melb TV news. I’m sure they were well-attended and frank.
They were NOT Brumby Govt consultations, they were run by the Royal Commission. Not all who sent in a submission appeared as witnesses, but I’m confident all submissions have been read.
I’m not in a position to do that, Robert, and neither are you. My concern is for the process: to jump ahead and declare the whole investigation a farce, a kangaroo court or whatever is as rash as claiming (or implying) that I’m gunning for Russell Rees.
Royal Commissions are mighty things, but also quite fragile in the early stages. It’s too early to say that this one is a witch-hunt, just as it’s too early to say that it has everything that anyone could want. Commentators – with pedestal or not – have no business jumping in and trying to jerk the direction of investigations toward this or away from that.
Just testing some new sites…
One of the critical issues here is the endorsement that John Brumby has provided to the head of the CFA. Announcing reappointment!
This is a familiar political and business play to limit any suggestion of mismanagement or systematic inadequacy. Failure to reappoint the leader is an implicit admission of liability, it is evidence used in civil proceedings.
I’d suggest that the government is taking this decision to limit exposure to liability rather than to maintain the effectiveness of the CFA.