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	<title>Comments on: Electoral reform green paper</title>
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	<description>Life, Culture and Politics from BrisVegas</description>
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		<title>By: Chris</title>
		<link>http://larvatusprodeo.net/2009/09/23/electoral-reform-green-paper/#comment-134237</link>
		<dc:creator>Chris</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2009 06:11:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://larvatusprodeo.net/?p=10037#comment-134237</guid>
		<description>alexinbangkok - I think some forms of automatic enrolling and update could work well. Eg getting people to tick a box if they would (subject to age) be eligible to vote when applying for a medicare card or drivers licence and then automatically adding them when they are old enough would reduce the number of young people not being enrolled. Similarly for updating it would be convenient if you could just tick a box to have your enrollment information updated when updating your medicare card address or drivers licence address.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>alexinbangkok &#8211; I think some forms of automatic enrolling and update could work well. Eg getting people to tick a box if they would (subject to age) be eligible to vote when applying for a medicare card or drivers licence and then automatically adding them when they are old enough would reduce the number of young people not being enrolled. Similarly for updating it would be convenient if you could just tick a box to have your enrollment information updated when updating your medicare card address or drivers licence address.</p>
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		<title>By: alexinbangkok</title>
		<link>http://larvatusprodeo.net/2009/09/23/electoral-reform-green-paper/#comment-134236</link>
		<dc:creator>alexinbangkok</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2009 03:29:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://larvatusprodeo.net/?p=10037#comment-134236</guid>
		<description>having just had a look at the paper i&#039;d like to know what people on this thread think of the ideas in chapter 7 - that provide for changes to the enrolment process to allow electronic enrolment and also the possibility of &#039;automatic enrolment&#039; something that would address the 500 000 or so under 25s who aren&#039;t currently on the rolls</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>having just had a look at the paper i&#8217;d like to know what people on this thread think of the ideas in chapter 7 &#8211; that provide for changes to the enrolment process to allow electronic enrolment and also the possibility of &#8216;automatic enrolment&#8217; something that would address the 500 000 or so under 25s who aren&#8217;t currently on the rolls</p>
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		<title>By: Melbcity</title>
		<link>http://larvatusprodeo.net/2009/09/23/electoral-reform-green-paper/#comment-134235</link>
		<dc:creator>Melbcity</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2009 00:18:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://larvatusprodeo.net/?p=10037#comment-134235</guid>
		<description>re Tally board.  Yes the board is a farce but the central tally room is more then just a media stunt. It allows access to a host of information and various commentators all from one location.  Sure if you want access to information the Internet is a better resource.

My main criticism in the 2007 Election was that the AEC failed to provide election night feeds showing polling booth returns for the Senate.  The only reason Senate data was not provided was because the ABC and Antony Green was not interested in Senate count data. There fore it was not available as part of the data feed. The AEC could have readily provided senate data as a separate feed.  Just because the ABC is not interested in the Senate Count does not mean that this information should not be published.  The AEC is not a media organisation.  Election ballot statistics plays an important roll in the scutiny of the ballot and the ability to effectively monitor the progress of the count.

I would also have liked a breakdown of the registered postal, pre-polling and absentee voting statistics so that the number of outstanding votes could have been ascertained and monitored more closely. IE no surprises and missing votes as occurred in the 2006 Victorian State election

This coupled with the publication of the senate preference data file as and when information is available would greatly assist in the scrutiny of the electronic count.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>re Tally board.  Yes the board is a farce but the central tally room is more then just a media stunt. It allows access to a host of information and various commentators all from one location.  Sure if you want access to information the Internet is a better resource.</p>
<p>My main criticism in the 2007 Election was that the AEC failed to provide election night feeds showing polling booth returns for the Senate.  The only reason Senate data was not provided was because the ABC and Antony Green was not interested in Senate count data. There fore it was not available as part of the data feed. The AEC could have readily provided senate data as a separate feed.  Just because the ABC is not interested in the Senate Count does not mean that this information should not be published.  The AEC is not a media organisation.  Election ballot statistics plays an important roll in the scutiny of the ballot and the ability to effectively monitor the progress of the count.</p>
<p>I would also have liked a breakdown of the registered postal, pre-polling and absentee voting statistics so that the number of outstanding votes could have been ascertained and monitored more closely. IE no surprises and missing votes as occurred in the 2006 Victorian State election</p>
<p>This coupled with the publication of the senate preference data file as and when information is available would greatly assist in the scrutiny of the electronic count.</p>
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		<title>By: Melbcity</title>
		<link>http://larvatusprodeo.net/2009/09/23/electoral-reform-green-paper/#comment-134234</link>
		<dc:creator>Melbcity</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 27 Sep 2009 23:18:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://larvatusprodeo.net/?p=10037#comment-134234</guid>
		<description>There are a number of serious concern related to electronic voting.  Not the least is the security and access to the recorded preference data files, voting statistics and election results.


The electoral commissions have spent millions of dollars developing computerised counting systems, with each State and Federal Election commission duplicating resources and expenses. Public money wasted with no oversight as to the expenditure and security of the data.  Elections are no longer open and transparent.


Whilst there are some advantages in electronic voting, the use of a transcribed data-entry process for single member electorates can not be justified.  Without access to the recorded data-files and ballot statitistics you can not properly review or scrutinise an electronic count. The use of electronic counting has come at the expense of  open and transparency.


Access and publication of preference data and polling place statistics MUST be readily available to scrutineers and subject to public scrutiny and review.


It took the AEC over three months to provide copies of the preference data files pertaining to the 2007 senate election.


Analysis of the data provided had highlighted problems with the way in Senate votes are counted.  The Greens should have own the sixth senate spot in Queensland.


The AEC with millions of dollars and numerous resources at their disposal was unable to verify the facts. Preferring instead to turn a blind eye.  ask no question and you need not giver answers.


All that was required to demonstrate the flaw in the system was to recount the ballot excluding all candidates except the last final seven candidates (3 ALP, 3 Liberal/NO and 1 Green). No other change in the system is required.the greens Larisa Waters should have been elected. The system and method used in distributing the vote denied her the right of representation.  Other flaws in that way we count the vote had also been highlights.  Analysis of the Victorian Senate results showed that ALP David Feeney could have lost out to a distortion in the calculation of the Surplus transfer Value which would have given the Greens a 7,000 vote bonus allowing them to unfairly win the final Victorian Senate seat.



&lt;b&gt;Victorian Electoral Commission&lt;/b&gt;

The Victorian Electoral Commission refused to provide copies of the preference data-files and statistical voting information for the 2006 State elections.  The information was only partially provided following an FOI application and again a three months delay.


The Victorian Electoral Commission failed to provide information on number of postal and pre-poll votes issued prior to the 2006 State Election.


The VEC failed to provide copies of the preference data-files pertaining to the Western metropolitan primary count (Count A).


Votes went missing in Western metropolitan region between count A and Count B Where the total number of votes recorded on each count changed along with an unexplained change in the result.


The Victorian Chief Electoral Commissioner gave evidence to the Victorian Parliament that the data files had been destroyed and as such could no longer be subjected to Parliamentary review. They were also not provided to scrutineers. Access to this vital information would have allowed scrutineers to analysis the data and the quality of the data-entry process.


The Victorian Electoral Commissioner confirmed in hi evidence that the VEC had accessed recorded data-files pertaining to the electronic voting data without scrutineers being present.


The fact that information was not secure and data-files had been deleted raises a number of serious concerns about electronic counting and security of the electronic ballot.  It is extraordinary that the VEC had deleted copies of the data files pertaining to the primary cont of Western Metropolitican and that they failed to make backup copies  of this data.  It costs 100,000&#039;s of thousands of dollars to data-enter the preference vote data and the VEC does not make backups?  Either way you look at it the VEC appears to have been engaged in a cover-up exercise to avoid public review.  If they deleted the data as claimed the system is clearly at fault.  If they failed to make backups they are possible negligent. if backup files do exist then they have deliberately mislead the parliament.  either way the Chief Commissioner and his deputies are at fault and should resign.


Access to the primary data-file would have allowed proper analysis and review of the data-entry quality.


A request had been made prior to the close of the polls for this information yet the VEC failed to secure the data files and or make them available to the Victorian Parliament.


The total number of votes recorded between Count A and Count B had changed as did the result of the election.  Had the VEC provided polling place statistical details as to the number of ballot papers issued as requested it would have been possible to ascertain more accurately where these votes went. None of the data provided by the Victorian electoral commission tallied. The polling place results did not match the number of votes counted.  The number of votes  recorded for the lower house did not match the number recorded for the upper-house. The number of total votes between count A and Count B did not match. There was up to 500 vote discrepancy.


In the 2008 Victorian Local Government elections the VEC refused to undertake a preliminary sorting of the ballot papers into primary votes prior to the data-entry tabulation process making it virtually impossible to scrutinise the data entry and counting of the ballot paper.


Whilst the VEC provided access to the preference data files for the City of Melbourne they refused to do likewise for other municipalities. Many who had cause to complain about the lack of transparency in the computerised counting process.


The use of a data-entry computerised count for single member electorates provided no benefit and came at the expense of maintaining an open and transparent counting of the ballot.


We are spending Millions of dollars duplicating resources and system development. Money wasted.


The  Victorian Electoral Commission went as far as harassing individuals who had valid cause to raise concerns and complain about the conduct of the elections  intimidating witnesses who gave evidence to the parliamentary inquiry.


As a result complaints have been made to the Victorian State Ombudsman who was prevented into looking into the veracity and details of the complaints.   The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the VEC and as such can not undertake any review of complaints. Why?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are a number of serious concern related to electronic voting.  Not the least is the security and access to the recorded preference data files, voting statistics and election results.</p>
<p>The electoral commissions have spent millions of dollars developing computerised counting systems, with each State and Federal Election commission duplicating resources and expenses. Public money wasted with no oversight as to the expenditure and security of the data.  Elections are no longer open and transparent.</p>
<p>Whilst there are some advantages in electronic voting, the use of a transcribed data-entry process for single member electorates can not be justified.  Without access to the recorded data-files and ballot statitistics you can not properly review or scrutinise an electronic count. The use of electronic counting has come at the expense of  open and transparency.</p>
<p>Access and publication of preference data and polling place statistics MUST be readily available to scrutineers and subject to public scrutiny and review.</p>
<p>It took the AEC over three months to provide copies of the preference data files pertaining to the 2007 senate election.</p>
<p>Analysis of the data provided had highlighted problems with the way in Senate votes are counted.  The Greens should have own the sixth senate spot in Queensland.</p>
<p>The AEC with millions of dollars and numerous resources at their disposal was unable to verify the facts. Preferring instead to turn a blind eye.  ask no question and you need not giver answers.</p>
<p>All that was required to demonstrate the flaw in the system was to recount the ballot excluding all candidates except the last final seven candidates (3 ALP, 3 Liberal/NO and 1 Green). No other change in the system is required.the greens Larisa Waters should have been elected. The system and method used in distributing the vote denied her the right of representation.  Other flaws in that way we count the vote had also been highlights.  Analysis of the Victorian Senate results showed that ALP David Feeney could have lost out to a distortion in the calculation of the Surplus transfer Value which would have given the Greens a 7,000 vote bonus allowing them to unfairly win the final Victorian Senate seat.</p>
<p><b>Victorian Electoral Commission</b></p>
<p>The Victorian Electoral Commission refused to provide copies of the preference data-files and statistical voting information for the 2006 State elections.  The information was only partially provided following an FOI application and again a three months delay.</p>
<p>The Victorian Electoral Commission failed to provide information on number of postal and pre-poll votes issued prior to the 2006 State Election.</p>
<p>The VEC failed to provide copies of the preference data-files pertaining to the Western metropolitan primary count (Count A).</p>
<p>Votes went missing in Western metropolitan region between count A and Count B Where the total number of votes recorded on each count changed along with an unexplained change in the result.</p>
<p>The Victorian Chief Electoral Commissioner gave evidence to the Victorian Parliament that the data files had been destroyed and as such could no longer be subjected to Parliamentary review. They were also not provided to scrutineers. Access to this vital information would have allowed scrutineers to analysis the data and the quality of the data-entry process.</p>
<p>The Victorian Electoral Commissioner confirmed in hi evidence that the VEC had accessed recorded data-files pertaining to the electronic voting data without scrutineers being present.</p>
<p>The fact that information was not secure and data-files had been deleted raises a number of serious concerns about electronic counting and security of the electronic ballot.  It is extraordinary that the VEC had deleted copies of the data files pertaining to the primary cont of Western Metropolitican and that they failed to make backup copies  of this data.  It costs 100,000&#8242;s of thousands of dollars to data-enter the preference vote data and the VEC does not make backups?  Either way you look at it the VEC appears to have been engaged in a cover-up exercise to avoid public review.  If they deleted the data as claimed the system is clearly at fault.  If they failed to make backups they are possible negligent. if backup files do exist then they have deliberately mislead the parliament.  either way the Chief Commissioner and his deputies are at fault and should resign.</p>
<p>Access to the primary data-file would have allowed proper analysis and review of the data-entry quality.</p>
<p>A request had been made prior to the close of the polls for this information yet the VEC failed to secure the data files and or make them available to the Victorian Parliament.</p>
<p>The total number of votes recorded between Count A and Count B had changed as did the result of the election.  Had the VEC provided polling place statistical details as to the number of ballot papers issued as requested it would have been possible to ascertain more accurately where these votes went. None of the data provided by the Victorian electoral commission tallied. The polling place results did not match the number of votes counted.  The number of votes  recorded for the lower house did not match the number recorded for the upper-house. The number of total votes between count A and Count B did not match. There was up to 500 vote discrepancy.</p>
<p>In the 2008 Victorian Local Government elections the VEC refused to undertake a preliminary sorting of the ballot papers into primary votes prior to the data-entry tabulation process making it virtually impossible to scrutinise the data entry and counting of the ballot paper.</p>
<p>Whilst the VEC provided access to the preference data files for the City of Melbourne they refused to do likewise for other municipalities. Many who had cause to complain about the lack of transparency in the computerised counting process.</p>
<p>The use of a data-entry computerised count for single member electorates provided no benefit and came at the expense of maintaining an open and transparent counting of the ballot.</p>
<p>We are spending Millions of dollars duplicating resources and system development. Money wasted.</p>
<p>The  Victorian Electoral Commission went as far as harassing individuals who had valid cause to raise concerns and complain about the conduct of the elections  intimidating witnesses who gave evidence to the parliamentary inquiry.</p>
<p>As a result complaints have been made to the Victorian State Ombudsman who was prevented into looking into the veracity and details of the complaints.   The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the VEC and as such can not undertake any review of complaints. Why?</p>
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		<title>By: grace pettigrew</title>
		<link>http://larvatusprodeo.net/2009/09/23/electoral-reform-green-paper/#comment-134233</link>
		<dc:creator>grace pettigrew</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2009 23:47:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://larvatusprodeo.net/?p=10037#comment-134233</guid>
		<description>Sorry for the double negative in my previous post, that should read &quot;...this is usually not fatal&quot;.

Chris@87: you are in agreement with the media parasites, who have their theatrical backdrop built for them at huge public expense, for one night, including the minions behind to put up the cardboard numbers just like 60-70 years ago, when nobody can read them at camera distance and they are way behind the computer feed anyway, and including several hundred miles of cabling and terminals so a bunch of overpaid media boys and girls can be flown in and all sit together reading the results as they come in on their terminals, not from the tally board, when this could be better done in their offices or at home.....and with the old boy pollies, who still can&#039;t use email (why do we have electorate officers and massive postage allowances, whoops that&#039;s just gone, fuck) and want to pretend that computerised information flows don&#039;t happen and that telephoning booth results in from Kalgoorlie is still more reliable than.....

That&#039;s OK in the end, its just public money for a meaningless circus, but what about the Big Lie that is being fed to voterland, who still squint at the screen trying to read those numbers on the Tally Board. Who is going to tell them that those cardboard numbers are way behind the running electronic tally along the bottom of their TV screens or the bobble heads telling us about the latest swing in woop woop...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sorry for the double negative in my previous post, that should read &#8220;&#8230;this is usually not fatal&#8221;.</p>
<p>Chris@87: you are in agreement with the media parasites, who have their theatrical backdrop built for them at huge public expense, for one night, including the minions behind to put up the cardboard numbers just like 60-70 years ago, when nobody can read them at camera distance and they are way behind the computer feed anyway, and including several hundred miles of cabling and terminals so a bunch of overpaid media boys and girls can be flown in and all sit together reading the results as they come in on their terminals, not from the tally board, when this could be better done in their offices or at home&#8230;..and with the old boy pollies, who still can&#8217;t use email (why do we have electorate officers and massive postage allowances, whoops that&#8217;s just gone, fuck) and want to pretend that computerised information flows don&#8217;t happen and that telephoning booth results in from Kalgoorlie is still more reliable than&#8230;..</p>
<p>That&#8217;s OK in the end, its just public money for a meaningless circus, but what about the Big Lie that is being fed to voterland, who still squint at the screen trying to read those numbers on the Tally Board. Who is going to tell them that those cardboard numbers are way behind the running electronic tally along the bottom of their TV screens or the bobble heads telling us about the latest swing in woop woop&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Chris</title>
		<link>http://larvatusprodeo.net/2009/09/23/electoral-reform-green-paper/#comment-134232</link>
		<dc:creator>Chris</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2009 23:03:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://larvatusprodeo.net/?p=10037#comment-134232</guid>
		<description>&lt;blockquote&gt;The National Tally Room is, these days, an expensive farce. &lt;/blockquote&gt;

I think its one of those things that needs to be kept around so things can be seen to be done even if its not really relevant anymore  - a bit of public confidence PR.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>The National Tally Room is, these days, an expensive farce. </p></blockquote>
<p>I think its one of those things that needs to be kept around so things can be seen to be done even if its not really relevant anymore  &#8211; a bit of public confidence PR.</p>
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		<title>By: grace pettigrew</title>
		<link>http://larvatusprodeo.net/2009/09/23/electoral-reform-green-paper/#comment-134231</link>
		<dc:creator>grace pettigrew</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2009 21:26:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://larvatusprodeo.net/?p=10037#comment-134231</guid>
		<description>Jacques Chester@77: &quot;Both. Depending on the election, votes get counted once at the booths on the night (which is how we get to know who will form government), then transported to the headquarters and counted again twice.&quot;

If I can just add to this: The indicative throw of preferences on the night, immediately after the booths close at 6 pm, is indeed the means by which we know almost within the hour which side is likely to form government.

(The ballots are then counted again later over the next few days, to confirm the indicative count, and adding in the declaration votes, which may or may not change the result, and perhaps again, if a recount is required. Yes, there are occasionally small changes to the totals on successive recounts, sometimes by the Court of Disputed Returns, but this is not usually not fatal.)

Electronic voting will not substantially improve on this, so what is the point? I look forward every election to that hour or two when the booth results are coming into the AEC central tally and the whole nation is sitting on the edge of its seat waiting for the call. Its better than the Melbourne Cup.

And on a related issue, there is no need these days for the National Tally Room, with centralised, computerised tallying of the results by the AEC in its own facilities. Direct tally feeds to interested parties, like the media and the political HQs, happen almost instantaneously from the AEC. The National Tally Room is, these days, an expensive farce.

Greenhorns in the media will tell you that the &quot;atmosphere&quot; at the Tally Room is unparalleled. Rubbish. That was in the &quot;old days&quot;. These days, only a few hundred members of the public can get inside, to stand behind ropes on naked concrete in a drafty hall, doing what? Actually, craning their necks to look at a the few TV screens mounted up high to watch Kerry O&#039;Brien et al call the result.

There are hundreds of reporters sitting in front of their computer terminals, with the backdrop an old fashioned tally board where serfs behind put up cardboard numbers that are way behind the computer feeds, and a large enclosed temporary construction to house the media stars like Kerry O&#039;Brien &quot;broadcasting from the National Tally Room&quot;. They could just as easily be sitting in their studios at work.

One more observation on the first count on the night. The two major political parties are getting close to killing the goose that laid the golden egg - the indicative throw of preferences that gives us the early result on the night.

By insisting on intervening in the distribution of postal vote applications in the weeks leading up to polling day, which should be done by the AEC but which has been infiltrated by the parties through legislative change, and blanketing marginal electorates with official postal vote applications (funnelled back through party electorate offices before being onforwarded to the AEC), there is a gradual shift happening towards postal voting over voting on the day.

This will eventually mean more and more declaration votes, more time to count, less reliable indicative throws at the close of polling, and less confidence in the call on the night.

Why do the parties want to take over the distribution of postal votes applications from the AEC? In order to find out how you are likely to vote (whether you send your application back to the ALP or the Lib electorate office), giving them the edge in targetting you for persuasion through direct mail. Another brilliant american invention....</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Jacques Chester@77: &#8220;Both. Depending on the election, votes get counted once at the booths on the night (which is how we get to know who will form government), then transported to the headquarters and counted again twice.&#8221;</p>
<p>If I can just add to this: The indicative throw of preferences on the night, immediately after the booths close at 6 pm, is indeed the means by which we know almost within the hour which side is likely to form government.</p>
<p>(The ballots are then counted again later over the next few days, to confirm the indicative count, and adding in the declaration votes, which may or may not change the result, and perhaps again, if a recount is required. Yes, there are occasionally small changes to the totals on successive recounts, sometimes by the Court of Disputed Returns, but this is not usually not fatal.)</p>
<p>Electronic voting will not substantially improve on this, so what is the point? I look forward every election to that hour or two when the booth results are coming into the AEC central tally and the whole nation is sitting on the edge of its seat waiting for the call. Its better than the Melbourne Cup.</p>
<p>And on a related issue, there is no need these days for the National Tally Room, with centralised, computerised tallying of the results by the AEC in its own facilities. Direct tally feeds to interested parties, like the media and the political HQs, happen almost instantaneously from the AEC. The National Tally Room is, these days, an expensive farce.</p>
<p>Greenhorns in the media will tell you that the &#8220;atmosphere&#8221; at the Tally Room is unparalleled. Rubbish. That was in the &#8220;old days&#8221;. These days, only a few hundred members of the public can get inside, to stand behind ropes on naked concrete in a drafty hall, doing what? Actually, craning their necks to look at a the few TV screens mounted up high to watch Kerry O&#8217;Brien et al call the result.</p>
<p>There are hundreds of reporters sitting in front of their computer terminals, with the backdrop an old fashioned tally board where serfs behind put up cardboard numbers that are way behind the computer feeds, and a large enclosed temporary construction to house the media stars like Kerry O&#8217;Brien &#8220;broadcasting from the National Tally Room&#8221;. They could just as easily be sitting in their studios at work.</p>
<p>One more observation on the first count on the night. The two major political parties are getting close to killing the goose that laid the golden egg &#8211; the indicative throw of preferences that gives us the early result on the night.</p>
<p>By insisting on intervening in the distribution of postal vote applications in the weeks leading up to polling day, which should be done by the AEC but which has been infiltrated by the parties through legislative change, and blanketing marginal electorates with official postal vote applications (funnelled back through party electorate offices before being onforwarded to the AEC), there is a gradual shift happening towards postal voting over voting on the day.</p>
<p>This will eventually mean more and more declaration votes, more time to count, less reliable indicative throws at the close of polling, and less confidence in the call on the night.</p>
<p>Why do the parties want to take over the distribution of postal votes applications from the AEC? In order to find out how you are likely to vote (whether you send your application back to the ALP or the Lib electorate office), giving them the edge in targetting you for persuasion through direct mail. Another brilliant american invention&#8230;.</p>
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		<title>By: Robert Merkel</title>
		<link>http://larvatusprodeo.net/2009/09/23/electoral-reform-green-paper/#comment-134230</link>
		<dc:creator>Robert Merkel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2009 21:04:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://larvatusprodeo.net/?p=10037#comment-134230</guid>
		<description>Kevin, election systems have fairly unique requirements that limit the amount of auditing you can do.  Furthermore, you have to assume &lt;EM&gt;very&lt;/EM&gt; well-resourced and motivated attackers.  It&#039;s practically tradition for the CIA to interfere in elections, and they also have a long tradition of electronic sabotage.

Finally, you have to take into account  the public confidence issues.  You not only have to convince yourself or your dev team it&#039;s fair, you have to convince my mother, who still thinks computers are some kind of scary voodoo.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Kevin, election systems have fairly unique requirements that limit the amount of auditing you can do.  Furthermore, you have to assume <em>very</em> well-resourced and motivated attackers.  It&#8217;s practically tradition for the CIA to interfere in elections, and they also have a long tradition of electronic sabotage.</p>
<p>Finally, you have to take into account  the public confidence issues.  You not only have to convince yourself or your dev team it&#8217;s fair, you have to convince my mother, who still thinks computers are some kind of scary voodoo.</p>
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		<title>By: Kevin Cox</title>
		<link>http://larvatusprodeo.net/2009/09/23/electoral-reform-green-paper/#comment-134229</link>
		<dc:creator>Kevin Cox</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2009 20:24:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://larvatusprodeo.net/?p=10037#comment-134229</guid>
		<description>While it is theoretically possible to tamper with electronic systems it is remarkably difficult to perpetrate a crime and not be detected. I once worked on a gambling IT project and we programmers were required to try to think of ways we could cheat the system and get away with it. The problem was always &quot;getting away with it&quot;. This is the same with electronic voting. It may appear to be easy but making a difference is actually hard. In the end we decided that the best way was to beat the system was to follow the bets of a person with inside knowledge - so we made sure that telephone operators didn&#039;t actually know who they were talking to.

I see no reason why we shouldn&#039;t be given the choice. If I trust an electronic system why shouldn&#039;t I be allowed to use electronic voting. If I don&#039;t then let me use a paper form.

We would find that if we allowed electronic voting then we would get probably about 40% of the people using it in the first year and each election it would get more as people became more familiar with it and found that they could trust it.

The greatest failing with the current system are things like people voting for the wrong person because they have not changed their address or people not voting because they did not fill in all the paper work on time or properly or people misunderstanding and voting for a person they did not intend to vote for.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>While it is theoretically possible to tamper with electronic systems it is remarkably difficult to perpetrate a crime and not be detected. I once worked on a gambling IT project and we programmers were required to try to think of ways we could cheat the system and get away with it. The problem was always &#8220;getting away with it&#8221;. This is the same with electronic voting. It may appear to be easy but making a difference is actually hard. In the end we decided that the best way was to beat the system was to follow the bets of a person with inside knowledge &#8211; so we made sure that telephone operators didn&#8217;t actually know who they were talking to.</p>
<p>I see no reason why we shouldn&#8217;t be given the choice. If I trust an electronic system why shouldn&#8217;t I be allowed to use electronic voting. If I don&#8217;t then let me use a paper form.</p>
<p>We would find that if we allowed electronic voting then we would get probably about 40% of the people using it in the first year and each election it would get more as people became more familiar with it and found that they could trust it.</p>
<p>The greatest failing with the current system are things like people voting for the wrong person because they have not changed their address or people not voting because they did not fill in all the paper work on time or properly or people misunderstanding and voting for a person they did not intend to vote for.</p>
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		<title>By: Nabakov</title>
		<link>http://larvatusprodeo.net/2009/09/23/electoral-reform-green-paper/#comment-134228</link>
		<dc:creator>Nabakov</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2009 16:35:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://larvatusprodeo.net/?p=10037#comment-134228</guid>
		<description>Also, can anyone name a major IT project that came in under budget and on time while delivering total data security? I spent an hour on the phone today with NAB Visa over a fucked up online purchase. Care to put your exercise of the voting franchise through such hoops?

&quot;Bring back the pebbles!&quot;

At least you can fling &#039;em at the scrutinisers.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Also, can anyone name a major IT project that came in under budget and on time while delivering total data security? I spent an hour on the phone today with NAB Visa over a fucked up online purchase. Care to put your exercise of the voting franchise through such hoops?</p>
<p>&#8220;Bring back the pebbles!&#8221;</p>
<p>At least you can fling &#8216;em at the scrutinisers.</p>
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