Today is the 60th anniversary of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s death, a death that came much too early, the President having worn his crippled frame out in service to his country and to the world. We still live in the world FDR made, with institutions such as the UN, and principles such as social and economic rights an enduring monument to his legacy. Roosevelt represented in many ways the height of both courage and political creativity, and was the crest of a wave of belief in government as the servant of the people that ushered in many social democratic reforms that even in this benighted age we take for granted. And his historical contribution in standing in the way of Fascism cannot be underestimated. Roosevelt was also the last US President to genuinely desire to do away with a world governed, then, as now again, by Imperialism. We would do well to emulate his example, and we still stand in his shadow. We haven’t seen his like since.
Elsewhere: Currency Lad takes issue with some absurd FDR revisionism.
A bit overly generous to FDR.
His successive administrations were tidily carrying on the American imperial edifice. He entered the War belatedly and for provincial reasons (as with the US entry into World War I). He wasn’t responsible for the UN, and the IMF and IBRD (admittedly by then he was at death’s door) were constructed to be vehicles for a new American imperium.
His successes are domestic, and are substantial when understood in terms of the peculiar power of reaction in that country.
A Capital C Conservative in practice, facilitated from his patrician background, he oversaw a reform project, immensely pragmatic, that saved American society and the American economy.
Much remained to clean up, not least the continued tyranny against the black community.
But the rise of the reactionary Republican-SOuthern Democrat coalition in Congress after 1936, the post-war domestic political and social repression associated with the anti-communist bogey, and the dramatic ascendancy to influence of ‘big business’ after 1945 put paid to the immediate furtherance of ‘social liberal’ principles.
A bit overly generous to FDR.
His successive administrations were tidily carrying on the American imperial edifice. He entered the War belatedly and for provincial reasons (as with the US entry into World War I). He wasn’t responsible for the UN, and the IMF and IBRD (admittedly by then he was at death’s door) were constructed to be vehicles for a new American imperium.
His successes are domestic, and are substantial when understood in terms of the peculiar power of reaction in that country.
A Capital C Conservative in practice, facilitated from his patrician background, he oversaw a reform project, immensely pragmatic, that saved American society and the American economy.
Much remained to clean up, not least the continued tyranny against the black community.
But the rise of the reactionary Republican-SOuthern Democrat coalition in Congress after 1936, the post-war domestic political and social repression associated with the anti-communist bogey, and the dramatic ascendancy to influence of ‘big business’ after 1945 put paid to the immediate furtherance of ‘social liberal’ principles.
Yes, a little too generous, but only a little. The United Nations was created by the allies in WWII, not by FDR. Farthington’s comments about US imperialism are a little harsh – the US imperial project predated his presidency by more than 100 years, and he was resolutely opposed to the more overt imperialism of the Old World. The IMF and IBRD are not imperialist vehicles, nor were they created as such when they came into existence after FDR’s death.
The USA did not participate in WWI or WWII for “provincial” reasons. Quite the contrary – the USA participated in both wars to protect its global interests. In FDR’s case, he was actively supportive of the allied cause until given the necessary casus belli (Pearl Harbour) to take the US to war. The USA then swung the war decisively in favour of the allies. For that we should be forever grateful.
Yes, a little too generous, but only a little. The United Nations was created by the allies in WWII, not by FDR. Farthington’s comments about US imperialism are a little harsh – the US imperial project predated his presidency by more than 100 years, and he was resolutely opposed to the more overt imperialism of the Old World. The IMF and IBRD are not imperialist vehicles, nor were they created as such when they came into existence after FDR’s death.
The USA did not participate in WWI or WWII for “provincial” reasons. Quite the contrary – the USA participated in both wars to protect its global interests. In FDR’s case, he was actively supportive of the allied cause until given the necessary casus belli (Pearl Harbour) to take the US to war. The USA then swung the war decisively in favour of the allies. For that we should be forever grateful.
On the the surge of big government under FDR, and so so-called push for welfare and social justice, check the mythology against the facts. FDR ran against Hoover on a platform of fiscal responsibility and less centralisation of power. In office he perfected the art of buying votes, maintained and extended the market-crippling policies that precipitated the economic collapse and kept the country in depression for the remainder of the decade. Or at least until the US became the major source of war materials for Britain.
On the the surge of big government under FDR, and so so-called push for welfare and social justice, check the mythology against the facts. FDR ran against Hoover on a platform of fiscal responsibility and less centralisation of power. In office he perfected the art of buying votes, maintained and extended the market-crippling policies that precipitated the economic collapse and kept the country in depression for the remainder of the decade. Or at least until the US became the major source of war materials for Britain.
Nonsense, Rafe. There was significant improvement in the economy post 1932 followed by another slump in 37. Military Keynesianism then got the thing kickstarted.
Nonsense, Rafe. There was significant improvement in the economy post 1932 followed by another slump in 37. Military Keynesianism then got the thing kickstarted.
Rafe’s made some good points on the economic front. The New Deal wasn’t such a good deal for the economy, and in particular the unemployed. Roosevelt actually AVOIDED deficit spending until well into his second term, much to Keynes’ chagrin. The circuitbreaker was massive military spending in WWII.
Rafe’s made some good points on the economic front. The New Deal wasn’t such a good deal for the economy, and in particular the unemployed. Roosevelt actually AVOIDED deficit spending until well into his second term, much to Keynes’ chagrin. The circuitbreaker was massive military spending in WWII.
Rafe’s grasp of American history seems to have been a casualty of his voluntary lurch into conceptual vacuity.
‘market-crippling policies’ indeed.
And ‘vote buying’ seems a peculiarly disdainful label for the trappings of democracy, however flawed, with an administration facing a country in paralysis, and more assertively inclusive than its predecessors.
It is true that FDR came to office with no idea, and began by picking up on Hoover’s pragmatic developments. ANd kept going.
The New Deal (and an evaluation of every other country in the 1930s) needs a larger canvas than ‘market yea or nay’ and Fyodor’s ‘deficit spending’ scenario.
There were desirable qualitative changes.
THe SEC and the Glass Steagall Act were important elements of financial reform (the repeal of Glass Steagall has seen the return of hte pigs at the trough, and the calamity of Worldcom as Exhibit A.)
The 1935 WAgner ACt finally weakened feudalism in the workplace (and was duly exported to feudalist Japan during the Occupation; too bad the Bush Administration would rather shoot Iraqi union leaders than foster them).
The 1935 Social Security Act was a conservative and overdue measure to ensure that people didn’t die off en masse post employment. It is still going strong, Bush’s remonstrations notwithstanding.
After 1936, in spite of a massive Presidential victory, the domestic scenario faltered. Roosevelt was increasingly focused on enhancing US leverage overseas (as Fydor notes, pursuing its ‘global interests’, that I have called provinciality) and faced a hostile Congress.
The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act was the last gasp, minimalist but important in imparting another element of civility to a feudal workplace.
The TVA, if somewhat stalinist in its concession to the technocracy, definitely had it positives.
The New Deal tarted up an American capitalism that was on the nose. And the 9 million or so still unemployed were saved by the War.
But then you can’t depend on war forever to feed mouths (although Cold War has filled in when imagination has sagged).
By contrast with a state apparatus engorged on war and quasi-wars, the New Deal pragmatism doesn’t look too bad.
Rafe’s grasp of American history seems to have been a casualty of his voluntary lurch into conceptual vacuity.
‘market-crippling policies’ indeed.
And ‘vote buying’ seems a peculiarly disdainful label for the trappings of democracy, however flawed, with an administration facing a country in paralysis, and more assertively inclusive than its predecessors.
It is true that FDR came to office with no idea, and began by picking up on Hoover’s pragmatic developments. ANd kept going.
The New Deal (and an evaluation of every other country in the 1930s) needs a larger canvas than ‘market yea or nay’ and Fyodor’s ‘deficit spending’ scenario.
There were desirable qualitative changes.
THe SEC and the Glass Steagall Act were important elements of financial reform (the repeal of Glass Steagall has seen the return of hte pigs at the trough, and the calamity of Worldcom as Exhibit A.)
The 1935 WAgner ACt finally weakened feudalism in the workplace (and was duly exported to feudalist Japan during the Occupation; too bad the Bush Administration would rather shoot Iraqi union leaders than foster them).
The 1935 Social Security Act was a conservative and overdue measure to ensure that people didn’t die off en masse post employment. It is still going strong, Bush’s remonstrations notwithstanding.
After 1936, in spite of a massive Presidential victory, the domestic scenario faltered. Roosevelt was increasingly focused on enhancing US leverage overseas (as Fydor notes, pursuing its ‘global interests’, that I have called provinciality) and faced a hostile Congress.
The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act was the last gasp, minimalist but important in imparting another element of civility to a feudal workplace.
The TVA, if somewhat stalinist in its concession to the technocracy, definitely had it positives.
The New Deal tarted up an American capitalism that was on the nose. And the 9 million or so still unemployed were saved by the War.
But then you can’t depend on war forever to feed mouths (although Cold War has filled in when imagination has sagged).
By contrast with a state apparatus engorged on war and quasi-wars, the New Deal pragmatism doesn’t look too bad.
I am afraid that Rafe is overly influenced by a certain cultish brand of Austrian economics perpetrated by the zealots at the Mises Institute that even Hayek would have disdained.
There were goods and bads to the New Deal. It’s debatable how much of the goods outweighed the bads but certainly institutions like the SEC and Glass Steagal Act are arguably important institutiuons for a competitive capitalism. Social Security was a response to the problem of risk management thrown up by a dynamic capitalism. Arguably some aspects of the welfare state by allowing the individual to manage risk can facilitate better the policy of benign neglect of allowing Schumpeterian competition to do its work to reallocate resources when tradeoffs regarding the best use of resources change. For the sake of greater flexibility I think most intelligent advocates of a market economy would be prepared to accept a role for collective risk management. In real economies there are also real time disequilibriums between saving and subsequent investment, complicated by the mediation of intertemporal preferences through a monetary system – this is Keynes’ central insight and I don’t think it is rendered obsolete. Thus even I would not rule out a case for activist fiscal policy under extreme enough circumstances and the Great Depression was certainly extreme!
I am afraid that Rafe is overly influenced by a certain cultish brand of Austrian economics perpetrated by the zealots at the Mises Institute that even Hayek would have disdained.
There were goods and bads to the New Deal. It’s debatable how much of the goods outweighed the bads but certainly institutions like the SEC and Glass Steagal Act are arguably important institutiuons for a competitive capitalism. Social Security was a response to the problem of risk management thrown up by a dynamic capitalism. Arguably some aspects of the welfare state by allowing the individual to manage risk can facilitate better the policy of benign neglect of allowing Schumpeterian competition to do its work to reallocate resources when tradeoffs regarding the best use of resources change. For the sake of greater flexibility I think most intelligent advocates of a market economy would be prepared to accept a role for collective risk management. In real economies there are also real time disequilibriums between saving and subsequent investment, complicated by the mediation of intertemporal preferences through a monetary system – this is Keynes’ central insight and I don’t think it is rendered obsolete. Thus even I would not rule out a case for activist fiscal policy under extreme enough circumstances and the Great Depression was certainly extreme!
Jason, perhaps Rafe is straying into public choice theory. Another name for popular policy is of course democracy. I wonder why Roosevelt was re-elected by a record margin in 1936 if he was such a bad President…
Jason, perhaps Rafe is straying into public choice theory. Another name for popular policy is of course democracy. I wonder why Roosevelt was re-elected by a record margin in 1936 if he was such a bad President…
Probably all those votes he bought. Just kidding.
Probably all those votes he bought. Just kidding.