We hear very little about globalisation these days – after its brief career as the decade long buzzword of public discourse, social science and new economy boosterism. Why is this? Christopher Sheil, writing at The Evatt Foundation offers some clues. Chris’ thinking on these matters is very close to mine – in 2002, I published a paper with the title Against Globalisation as a Social-Scientific Concept [link to .pdf file] where I argued that far from being a usefully analytic category with which to conceptualise what’s new and different about international interconnectedness over the last few decades, it’s in fact a weapon in political discourse. The prime function of globalisation talk has been to disable any sense that the Left has a viable project for our social and economic futures, and it’s no coincidence that its rise to fame followed shortly on the alleged end of history with the fall of Soviet Marxism in 1989. It’s also no coincidence that the politicians and thinkers on the Left most seduced by globalisation – Clinton, Blair, Latham and their academic epigones such as Giddens – moved to a position very close to neo-liberalism tempered with a communitarian tinge. Traditional social democratic ideals were largely junked as outdated and so last millennium.
As Chris notes, globalisation was a casualty of September 11 (though its death throes can be traced back to Seattle and Genoa):
September 11 was a circuit breaker on these politics. Globalisation was decisively pushed from the front pages of the world’s media, and has not recovered its former position as a topic of widespread interest. Measured in terms of the dominant ideas of our times, we have moved decisively from the era of globalisation into one of perpetual war, wherein the nation-state has not only failed to whither away, but is resurgent. Instead of a world regulated by markets, we have a world once more being increasingly regulated by force of arms. Instead of smaller government, we have the biggest governments in history. Instead of the uninspiring liberal utopia of nations fading away in favour of a universal consumerist globalism, we have something disturbingly close to the complete reverse: astonishingly resurgent unilateralism with fewer traditional restraints. International institutions, international norms, international law and the logic and dignity of multilateralism itself have suffered repeated blows since September 11, as the ideologies and interests of states, with all the attendant panoply of nationalism and patriotism, have once more been elevated to centre stage, displacing the borderless individual economic agent of the globalisation era. Far from one world coming ready or not, we now have nations calling their own shots; including one nation, the United States of America, declaring that all the others must either be “with us or against us.”
There’s also a certain irony in the renewal of praise for state power and state capacity, which is associated much more with the conservative tradition than the liberal. So neo-liberalism is in many ways eclipsed by neo-conservatism:
Whereas in the 1980s and 1990s the world was conditioned to accept that governments could not even manage an efficient cake-stall, let alone a national health service, today we are exhorted to accept that these same governments can manage the destruction and reconstruction of entire nations in distant and dramatically different parts of the world. Whereas in the 1990s we were constantly being told that we were on the threshold of a borderless world, today we have a world dominated by a few national powers, as we have had for hundreds of years. Whereas in the 1990s the largest demonstrations seen since the Vietnam War were against globalisation, these have since been eclipsed by demonstrations against the Iraq war. It surely is a tremendous irony that, far from them withering away, the era of globalisation has given way to a period wherein powerful states have re-imagined themselves so prophetic that they can make history itself. Where is the neoliberal doctrine of government failure when we need it?
Of course, historically, neoliberalism has always turned a blind eye to a strong state in the areas of defence and internal order. Margaret Thatcher’s UK famously hardly put a dent in the size of the state, but instead switched its emphasis to a punishing attempt to maintain great power status or a facsimile thereof and to the centralisation of power through law and order campaigns and allegations about the inefficiencies and ideological sins of local government. Thatcher also kicked the foundations out from under the independence of traditional institutions such as the civil service and the BBC. John Howard is no liberal at all but a pale imitation of the neo-conservative part of Thatcher’s project.
It’s well worth observing that a historical perspective is essential on these allegedly world-historical shifts. Much of the power of the talk about globalisation came from the same postmodern ignorance of history that conservatives decry, while in effect perpetuating it. To switch from globalisation talk to the era of perpetual war we find ourselves in today requires that citizens have a very short memory.
In his article, Chris identifies the distinguishing features that are new in the era of globalisation as:
the unprecedented growth and unruly power of financial capital; the unprecedented organisation, growth and concentration of productive capital; and the explosive growth of inequality
Yet even here there are historical resonances on a smaller scale. From the perspective of world systems theory, Giovanni Arrighi points out that the dying stages of any politico-economic hegemony involve a strategy of financialisation – whether we’re talking about the Dutch Republic in the 1700s, Great Britain in the Belle Epoque or the current hegemon, the USA now. Similarly, periods of expanded ‘free trade’ have usually involved broadening inequalities. Yet, Chris is surely right to point out that the sheer scale of these factors transcends previous periods, which some globalisation sceptics such as Hirst and Thompson have pointed to in order to deny the thesis that globalisation is new. What was ignored in the decade of globalisation was the continuing power of the state. Much of the debate over state power in the face of globalisation ignored the fact that some states gained state capacity while many throughout the world effectively imploded and threw up the pathologies that failed states result in. Just as the power of the state was a necessary condition for the marketisation of the British economy post Adam Smith, so too did the imposition of the Washington consensus on the South, and the effective retreat from development, require massive intervention in the rules of the world system by powerful states and the institutions they controlled – the IMF, the World Bank and arguably the UN. What’s different in the shift to neo-conservative perpetual war is that the state now dares to speak its name openly again. This can only be a good thing for those who believe that another world is possible, as it clarifies the battle lines.
Great post, but it needs more paragraphs. Even mine arent that long!
Great post, but it needs more paragraphs. Even mine arent that long!
They looked shorter in Word!
They looked shorter in Word!
They always do
They always do
Mark, there are two things I don’t buy.
First is the ‘influence’ of the protests in Seattle and Genoa. I don’t believe that these little incidences of anti-capitalist ‘street theatre’—Eric Hobsbawm’s words—had had any real influence whatsoever over the way international structures have developed, or not developed. That the ‘whole world was watching’ didn’t make the slightest bit of difference in the 1990s or in this decade.
Second is the idea that neo-liberal institutions of globalised power have suffered since September 11. It’s true as Chris writes that insitutions of international law and regulation have suffered, but the real sites of international power have become stronger. Shell still pumps oil from out of Nigeria, for instance, with fewer restraints than ever. Where the Right wants to globalise private capital and nationalise law and regulation, the Left should seek to do the opposite.
Other than those two things, a cracking piece of work, and don’t let Nic give you shit about paragraphy.
Mark, there are two things I don’t buy.
First is the ‘influence’ of the protests in Seattle and Genoa. I don’t believe that these little incidences of anti-capitalist ‘street theatre’—Eric Hobsbawm’s words—had had any real influence whatsoever over the way international structures have developed, or not developed. That the ‘whole world was watching’ didn’t make the slightest bit of difference in the 1990s or in this decade.
Second is the idea that neo-liberal institutions of globalised power have suffered since September 11. It’s true as Chris writes that insitutions of international law and regulation have suffered, but the real sites of international power have become stronger. Shell still pumps oil from out of Nigeria, for instance, with fewer restraints than ever. Where the Right wants to globalise private capital and nationalise law and regulation, the Left should seek to do the opposite.
Other than those two things, a cracking piece of work, and don’t let Nic give you shit about paragraphy.
It’s hard to think of a trend that has not been over-hyped (neo-conservatism and the religious right being the latest in politics), and globalisation certainly was. You correctly point out events that helped pop that bubble. But I don’t think it is correct to say that “Of course, historically, neoliberalism has always turned a blind eye to a strong state in the areas of defence and internal order.”, partly because many of the people you are talking about did not think of themselves as ‘neo-liberals’ (Mrs T for example), and partly because most of those who did believe something akin to what the left meant by neo-liberalism saw a role for the state in the production of public goods narrowly defined, including defence and internal order. There was no ‘blind eye’; it was a coherent part of their worldview.
It’s hard to think of a trend that has not been over-hyped (neo-conservatism and the religious right being the latest in politics), and globalisation certainly was. You correctly point out events that helped pop that bubble. But I don’t think it is correct to say that “Of course, historically, neoliberalism has always turned a blind eye to a strong state in the areas of defence and internal order.”, partly because many of the people you are talking about did not think of themselves as ‘neo-liberals’ (Mrs T for example), and partly because most of those who did believe something akin to what the left meant by neo-liberalism saw a role for the state in the production of public goods narrowly defined, including defence and internal order. There was no ‘blind eye’; it was a coherent part of their worldview.
globalisation was greater just prior to WW1 than now.
Will it stop?
Only in nations are silly enough to return to the poverty of protectionism otherwise living standards will continue to rise in countries that want a pice if it.
Latte drinking lefties who wish to despise criticise globalisation whilst at the same time getting all the benefits wil still be there maintianing the rage.
globalisation was greater just prior to WW1 than now.
Will it stop?
Only in nations are silly enough to return to the poverty of protectionism otherwise living standards will continue to rise in countries that want a pice if it.
Latte drinking lefties who wish to despise criticise globalisation whilst at the same time getting all the benefits wil still be there maintianing the rage.
…are not usually criticising globalisation, but criticising the globalisation of capital unaccompanied by globalisation of law and regulation.
…are not usually criticising globalisation, but criticising the globalisation of capital unaccompanied by globalisation of law and regulation.
“Instead of a world regulated by markets, we have a world once more being increasingly regulated by force of arms.”
I know Chris is talking here in terms of ideas, but I think the reality is that despite all the pro-market, neoliberal rhetoric that has been doing the rounds in recent years, the world has in recent centuries been and is still dominated by nation-state governments and their partisan interests. You can probably argue, of course, that the reactions of states like the U.S. and Australia in the aftermath of 9/11 brought out this reality into the light of day. But despite the posturing in recent decades I think it has always been this way.
There is a reason why practically every FTA signed in recent years is more of a trade deal in simple terms than a true “free trade agreement”. It is because while it is quite fashionable to talk in admiring terms of liberal economics, just about nobody wants to fully commit to it. With good reason. Committing wholly and unequivocally to the classic liberal economic ideology would effectively be state suicide for any government which dared to do pursue that path.
It’s not a bad thing for government to have some faith in market-oriented economics. That doesn’t mean that governments should throw themselves and all their constituents off the proverbial edge of the building, and pray that Adam Smith buffets their fall. Doing so would run absolutely counter to the very nature of government – whatever its political stripes – and I wouldn’t hold my breath waiting for it to happen.
Bush? Protectionist. Howard? Protectionist. Where are the real liberals? Do they hold sway in government anywhere?
“Instead of a world regulated by markets, we have a world once more being increasingly regulated by force of arms.”
I know Chris is talking here in terms of ideas, but I think the reality is that despite all the pro-market, neoliberal rhetoric that has been doing the rounds in recent years, the world has in recent centuries been and is still dominated by nation-state governments and their partisan interests. You can probably argue, of course, that the reactions of states like the U.S. and Australia in the aftermath of 9/11 brought out this reality into the light of day. But despite the posturing in recent decades I think it has always been this way.
There is a reason why practically every FTA signed in recent years is more of a trade deal in simple terms than a true “free trade agreement”. It is because while it is quite fashionable to talk in admiring terms of liberal economics, just about nobody wants to fully commit to it. With good reason. Committing wholly and unequivocally to the classic liberal economic ideology would effectively be state suicide for any government which dared to do pursue that path.
It’s not a bad thing for government to have some faith in market-oriented economics. That doesn’t mean that governments should throw themselves and all their constituents off the proverbial edge of the building, and pray that Adam Smith buffets their fall. Doing so would run absolutely counter to the very nature of government – whatever its political stripes – and I wouldn’t hold my breath waiting for it to happen.
Bush? Protectionist. Howard? Protectionist. Where are the real liberals? Do they hold sway in government anywhere?
Mark
A strong state that enforces the rule of law as opposed to a weak state open to capture is indeed a prerequisite of a liberal order. There is no contradiction there at all. Liberalism is not against the State – it is about treating the State as a necessary evil (note ‘necessary) and restricting its scope to those areas which are absolutely necessary.
Mark
A strong state that enforces the rule of law as opposed to a weak state open to capture is indeed a prerequisite of a liberal order. There is no contradiction there at all. Liberalism is not against the State – it is about treating the State as a necessary evil (note ‘necessary) and restricting its scope to those areas which are absolutely necessary.
PS ‘strong states’ by definition in the Weberian model do not exist in Africa (with a few exceptions). there are predatory states instead and states easily captured by sectional interests – this accounts for the problems there.
PS ‘strong states’ by definition in the Weberian model do not exist in Africa (with a few exceptions). there are predatory states instead and states easily captured by sectional interests – this accounts for the problems there.
What Andrew Norton and Homerkles said.
Contrary to Mark’s argument, IMO “globalisation” is not a weapon used against the Left, but by the Left as a strawman for those features of the liberal economic order they dislike. I use scare quotes around the term “globalisation” because I find the term ambiguous, and its meaning so vulnerable to (mis)intepretation, that I rarely understand what it is intended to represent in these sorts of discussions.
Mark gave no definition of the term, and CS’s rather evasive cop-out is to say it has no meaning, except when he defines it as comprised of three elements: 1) unprecedented growth of financial capital; 2) growth and concentration of productive capital; and 3) explosive growth of inequality. By construction, this definition encompasses a period roughly corresponding to the last three decades, specifically the takeoff of forex and derivative markets in the 1970s in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from the gold standard.
The problem with this definition is that it distinguishes between the recent acceleration of capital flows and alleged inequality, and the pre-existing trend increases in these flows. Although CS derides the “It’s nothing new” argument, the facts are that trade and technology have been increasing at a rapid rate, broken by periods of stagnation, for several centuries, and CS in no way refutes this history. IMO, so-called “globalization” is nothing more than a contemporary, myopically-applied buzzword for an inexorable process that has been at work for centuries.
Your last paragraph about the re-asertion of statist authority is worryingly triumphant, Mark, particularly as neostatism has brought us such pleasures as Bushite evangelism.
What Andrew Norton and Homerkles said.
Contrary to Mark’s argument, IMO “globalisation” is not a weapon used against the Left, but by the Left as a strawman for those features of the liberal economic order they dislike. I use scare quotes around the term “globalisation” because I find the term ambiguous, and its meaning so vulnerable to (mis)intepretation, that I rarely understand what it is intended to represent in these sorts of discussions.
Mark gave no definition of the term, and CS’s rather evasive cop-out is to say it has no meaning, except when he defines it as comprised of three elements: 1) unprecedented growth of financial capital; 2) growth and concentration of productive capital; and 3) explosive growth of inequality. By construction, this definition encompasses a period roughly corresponding to the last three decades, specifically the takeoff of forex and derivative markets in the 1970s in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from the gold standard.
The problem with this definition is that it distinguishes between the recent acceleration of capital flows and alleged inequality, and the pre-existing trend increases in these flows. Although CS derides the “It’s nothing new” argument, the facts are that trade and technology have been increasing at a rapid rate, broken by periods of stagnation, for several centuries, and CS in no way refutes this history. IMO, so-called “globalization” is nothing more than a contemporary, myopically-applied buzzword for an inexorable process that has been at work for centuries.
Your last paragraph about the re-asertion of statist authority is worryingly triumphant, Mark, particularly as neostatism has brought us such pleasures as Bushite evangelism.
Fyodor, Andrew, Homer. THE LEFT generally have no problem either with the globalisation of capital or the inexorable processes of increasing trade and technology. Both of those things make for a better world than one where such things are absent.
What THE LEFT generally want to see prevented, and preventable, are the all-too-common abuses of power by owners of capital and by individual States.
Fyodor, Andrew, Homer. THE LEFT generally have no problem either with the globalisation of capital or the inexorable processes of increasing trade and technology. Both of those things make for a better world than one where such things are absent.
What THE LEFT generally want to see prevented, and preventable, are the all-too-common abuses of power by owners of capital and by individual States.
“THE LEFT generally have no problem either with the globalisation of capital or the inexorable processes of increasing trade and technology. Both of those things make for a better world than one where such things are absent.”
Glad to hear it, though I doubt you speak for all of your comrades. BTW, bad governments don’t need the help of “globalisation” to murder their citizens.
“THE LEFT generally have no problem either with the globalisation of capital or the inexorable processes of increasing trade and technology. Both of those things make for a better world than one where such things are absent.”
Glad to hear it, though I doubt you speak for all of your comrades. BTW, bad governments don’t need the help of “globalisation” to murder their citizens.
And nor do bad companies need the help of “globalisation” to pay people pathetic wages or otherwise mistreat their employees.
And nor do bad companies need the help of “globalisation” to pay people pathetic wages or otherwise mistreat their employees.
Fyodor, I’m a democratic socialist. I’m in favour of the market up to the point at which it starts to interfere with the use of political power by communities, and begins to threaten social goals. So when, for instance, a mining company lends its trucks and planes to the Government of a State that can’t put down an uprising without them, I get concerned.
Fyodor, I’m a democratic socialist. I’m in favour of the market up to the point at which it starts to interfere with the use of political power by communities, and begins to threaten social goals. So when, for instance, a mining company lends its trucks and planes to the Government of a State that can’t put down an uprising without them, I get concerned.
In response:
Liam – I think there was some response to the (misnamed) anti-globalisation movement – at least at the level of rhetoric. When people at Davos started talking about the need to secure more popular support for the sort of projects they support, that’s some sort of gain for democracy, albeit a small one.
On the point of sites of power, yes, but the dependence of the viability of these on the state is highlighted more, and thus the realisation that they are not embodying laws of history or economics, but can be shaped through attempts to shift state policy. That’s why I’m interested in Venezuela under Chavez.
Andrew and Jason, first, perhaps Mrs Thatcher didn’t see herself as a neo-liberal but she was unique for a post ww2 British politician in having a relatively coherent ideological approach. Since this approach was heavily informed (via Sir Keith Joseph and the thinktanks) by the thought of people like Hayek and Friedman, I don’t have a problem with categorising her in this way no matter how she would label herself.
Support for defence and internal order is indeed integral to the liberal project and all I’m pointing out is that there’s an irony there – as the anti-statist rhetoric and indeed claims that the state will be reduced (size of GDP, volume of regulation, reach into people’s lives) sit very inconsistently with the truth that only through strong state capacity which in many ways interferes with individual freedom is it possible to bring this sort of order into being. However, in Thatcher’s case, the level of defence spending, the Falklands War, her distaste for institutions which traditionally provide checks and balances, and so on, not to mention her attack on local democracy, all mark her out as being more of a neo-conservative than any sort of liberal despite the rhetoric, and in particular despite her claims that she was some sort of liberal in the 19th century sense.
She is no J. S. Mill or William Ewart Gladstone.
Guy, I certainly accept that there is a place for market economics but I am opposed to the theology of the market.
Fyodor, the over-hyping Andrew speaks of and the point Homer makes about the Belle Epoque (essentially Hirst and Thompson’s argument) both go to the bifurcation in the phenomenon of globalisation talk. It’s eminently possible to posit any number of sociological definitions of globalisation which are rigorous. I hoped not to bore you with them, but am happy to supply them on request. What I’m getting at is that analysis of globalisation as a phenomenon (where it’s vulnerable to the Hirst & Thompson style critique as well as others – for instance from world systems theory and indeed from the fact that on historical evidence that if we go way back to Sumeria, there have never been autarkic economies and trade has always been an important factor) is allowed to eclipse globalisation as a political weapon. This is in the sense that globalisation is presented as something inevitable to which resistance is useless. And the caricature of those who, like Liam and me, would like to see a different form of globalisation as anti-globalist is clear evidence that the term is being harnessed for political reasons.
You only have to read anything on Clinton and Blair’s politics, or by Giddens, to see that I’m right. It was used as a stick to beat opponents (“old economy”, “old Labour” etc) and as a justification of the unavoidability of certain policy settings which were allegedly required by certain parameters within which the nation state had to operate, lest it be punished by financial capital and economic hardship be visited on its citizens.
Yes, if you look at economic globalisation, it’s reasonable to symbolically define it as having originated around 1973. And yes, it’s more a matter of scale than of entirely new forces in the world. Chris is pointing to the fact, that like all political concepts, its content is contestible and thus has no essence, which is also my point. Ipso facto, like anything else, it is neither inevitable, nor as Homer’s example of the Belle Epoque suggests, destined necessarily to last. One can imagine any number of scenarios where current world instability, pressure and contestation on and over resources, and so on, fray the threads of economic interconnectedness. What interests me is both analysing this and refuting the claim that all change is in one direction and necessarily progressive in the interest of opening up alternatives.
In response:
Liam – I think there was some response to the (misnamed) anti-globalisation movement – at least at the level of rhetoric. When people at Davos started talking about the need to secure more popular support for the sort of projects they support, that’s some sort of gain for democracy, albeit a small one.
On the point of sites of power, yes, but the dependence of the viability of these on the state is highlighted more, and thus the realisation that they are not embodying laws of history or economics, but can be shaped through attempts to shift state policy. That’s why I’m interested in Venezuela under Chavez.
Andrew and Jason, first, perhaps Mrs Thatcher didn’t see herself as a neo-liberal but she was unique for a post ww2 British politician in having a relatively coherent ideological approach. Since this approach was heavily informed (via Sir Keith Joseph and the thinktanks) by the thought of people like Hayek and Friedman, I don’t have a problem with categorising her in this way no matter how she would label herself.
Support for defence and internal order is indeed integral to the liberal project and all I’m pointing out is that there’s an irony there – as the anti-statist rhetoric and indeed claims that the state will be reduced (size of GDP, volume of regulation, reach into people’s lives) sit very inconsistently with the truth that only through strong state capacity which in many ways interferes with individual freedom is it possible to bring this sort of order into being. However, in Thatcher’s case, the level of defence spending, the Falklands War, her distaste for institutions which traditionally provide checks and balances, and so on, not to mention her attack on local democracy, all mark her out as being more of a neo-conservative than any sort of liberal despite the rhetoric, and in particular despite her claims that she was some sort of liberal in the 19th century sense.
She is no J. S. Mill or William Ewart Gladstone.
Guy, I certainly accept that there is a place for market economics but I am opposed to the theology of the market.
Fyodor, the over-hyping Andrew speaks of and the point Homer makes about the Belle Epoque (essentially Hirst and Thompson’s argument) both go to the bifurcation in the phenomenon of globalisation talk. It’s eminently possible to posit any number of sociological definitions of globalisation which are rigorous. I hoped not to bore you with them, but am happy to supply them on request. What I’m getting at is that analysis of globalisation as a phenomenon (where it’s vulnerable to the Hirst & Thompson style critique as well as others – for instance from world systems theory and indeed from the fact that on historical evidence that if we go way back to Sumeria, there have never been autarkic economies and trade has always been an important factor) is allowed to eclipse globalisation as a political weapon. This is in the sense that globalisation is presented as something inevitable to which resistance is useless. And the caricature of those who, like Liam and me, would like to see a different form of globalisation as anti-globalist is clear evidence that the term is being harnessed for political reasons.
You only have to read anything on Clinton and Blair’s politics, or by Giddens, to see that I’m right. It was used as a stick to beat opponents (“old economy”, “old Labour” etc) and as a justification of the unavoidability of certain policy settings which were allegedly required by certain parameters within which the nation state had to operate, lest it be punished by financial capital and economic hardship be visited on its citizens.
Yes, if you look at economic globalisation, it’s reasonable to symbolically define it as having originated around 1973. And yes, it’s more a matter of scale than of entirely new forces in the world. Chris is pointing to the fact, that like all political concepts, its content is contestible and thus has no essence, which is also my point. Ipso facto, like anything else, it is neither inevitable, nor as Homer’s example of the Belle Epoque suggests, destined necessarily to last. One can imagine any number of scenarios where current world instability, pressure and contestation on and over resources, and so on, fray the threads of economic interconnectedness. What interests me is both analysing this and refuting the claim that all change is in one direction and necessarily progressive in the interest of opening up alternatives.
Liam,
So if the government had simply taken the trucks and not given them back, would you have been satisfied with the situation? If you chose it as an example of globalisation turned bad, the lending out of trucks to the government by a company was one of the least-bad features of the scenario.
I can accept that you’re a democratic socialist, but the devil’s in the detail (i.e. where does the market get turfed in favour of “political power by communities”), and best not entered into here lest we derail the thread OT.
Liam,
So if the government had simply taken the trucks and not given them back, would you have been satisfied with the situation? If you chose it as an example of globalisation turned bad, the lending out of trucks to the government by a company was one of the least-bad features of the scenario.
I can accept that you’re a democratic socialist, but the devil’s in the detail (i.e. where does the market get turfed in favour of “political power by communities”), and best not entered into here lest we derail the thread OT.
A few more comments came in while I was writing. The claim by Fyodor that globalisation is some sort of undetermined inexorable process proves my point. And presumably Fyodor believes that it implies certain policy responses, to which Chris, Liam, Guy and I would be opposed. Therefore reinforcing again the point I am making about the claim that globalisation is some sort of social scientific fact effacing its political uses again being demonstrated.
A few more comments came in while I was writing. The claim by Fyodor that globalisation is some sort of undetermined inexorable process proves my point. And presumably Fyodor believes that it implies certain policy responses, to which Chris, Liam, Guy and I would be opposed. Therefore reinforcing again the point I am making about the claim that globalisation is some sort of social scientific fact effacing its political uses again being demonstrated.
Liam to referee: ‘It was him what started the stoush, I was just sticking up for myself!’
Agreed, Fyodor, back on topic.
I’d be less sceptical of economically globalist arguments in which freer trade also had a social component. The idea that a multinational company operating in a third-world country is better than nobody employing anybody there is beyond argument, of course. It’s always better for jobs to exist rather than not.
The problem is that multinational companies are drawn to third world countries not because they want to help or because they want to trade freely, but because they can get away with things they wouldn’t be able to in countries where there is a decent Rule of Law. So, by all means send Nike to Africa, but send the ILO in as well, to make sure workers are able to join free trade unions.
Liam to referee: ‘It was him what started the stoush, I was just sticking up for myself!’
Agreed, Fyodor, back on topic.
I’d be less sceptical of economically globalist arguments in which freer trade also had a social component. The idea that a multinational company operating in a third-world country is better than nobody employing anybody there is beyond argument, of course. It’s always better for jobs to exist rather than not.
The problem is that multinational companies are drawn to third world countries not because they want to help or because they want to trade freely, but because they can get away with things they wouldn’t be able to in countries where there is a decent Rule of Law. So, by all means send Nike to Africa, but send the ILO in as well, to make sure workers are able to join free trade unions.
Globalisation is not the enemy of social democrats or democratic socialists, it’s the abuse of ‘free’ trade at the expense of workers. That is the main point.
That I was about to make before I was so rudely cut off by the premature use of the ‘return’ key.
Globalisation is not the enemy of social democrats or democratic socialists, it’s the abuse of ‘free’ trade at the expense of workers. That is the main point.
That I was about to make before I was so rudely cut off by the premature use of the ‘return’ key.
“Support for defence and internal order is indeed integral to the liberal project and all I?Äôm pointing out is that there?Äôs an irony there – as the anti-statist rhetoric and indeed claims that the state will be reduced (size of GDP, volume of regulation, reach into people?Äôs lives) sit very inconsistently with the truth that only through strong state capacity which in many ways interferes with individual freedom is it possible to bring this sort of order into being.”
Jeez Mark, how muddle headed can you get? How many times do I need to point out there’s no contradictions. You can have a weak and overextended State which does too many things and is good at none of them occupying a higher % of GDP than a strong State which focuses on a few core functions and does them well. Isn’t this clear to you as a matter of logic? Interference with individual freedom – unless you are an anarchist you accept that there will be some. What matters is a State which sticks to a few core functions which it is good at intereferes less than another State with its finger in every pie. There are also different kinds of individual freedom to interfere with – for instance a liberal might argue that half the money now spent on interfering with people having a snort of cocaine or a suck at the water bong should be funnelled into tackling real crimes with much better results. In that way you could have a State which spends less on law and order but more on actual law and order rather than social engineering.
“Support for defence and internal order is indeed integral to the liberal project and all I?Äôm pointing out is that there?Äôs an irony there – as the anti-statist rhetoric and indeed claims that the state will be reduced (size of GDP, volume of regulation, reach into people?Äôs lives) sit very inconsistently with the truth that only through strong state capacity which in many ways interferes with individual freedom is it possible to bring this sort of order into being.”
Jeez Mark, how muddle headed can you get? How many times do I need to point out there’s no contradictions. You can have a weak and overextended State which does too many things and is good at none of them occupying a higher % of GDP than a strong State which focuses on a few core functions and does them well. Isn’t this clear to you as a matter of logic? Interference with individual freedom – unless you are an anarchist you accept that there will be some. What matters is a State which sticks to a few core functions which it is good at intereferes less than another State with its finger in every pie. There are also different kinds of individual freedom to interfere with – for instance a liberal might argue that half the money now spent on interfering with people having a snort of cocaine or a suck at the water bong should be funnelled into tackling real crimes with much better results. In that way you could have a State which spends less on law and order but more on actual law and order rather than social engineering.
Jason, my point is that the reliance on the state by liberals leads inevitably to an over-extended state – effective or otherwise.
Jason, my point is that the reliance on the state by liberals leads inevitably to an over-extended state – effective or otherwise.
No Mark, there are difference in % of GDP occupied by public sector between relatively more liberal and less liberal States e.g. Switzerland vs some African country (sorry to pick on the Africans, nothing personal but you do have a perfect examples of weak but overextended States in these countries). Of course no Platonic ideals exist. It seems to me Mark that you’re not accustomed to thinking in relativities.
No Mark, there are difference in % of GDP occupied by public sector between relatively more liberal and less liberal States e.g. Switzerland vs some African country (sorry to pick on the Africans, nothing personal but you do have a perfect examples of weak but overextended States in these countries). Of course no Platonic ideals exist. It seems to me Mark that you’re not accustomed to thinking in relativities.
Relative to the ideals of liberalism, I’d say that the American and British states are very intrusive into people’s lives, Jason.
Relative to the ideals of liberalism, I’d say that the American and British states are very intrusive into people’s lives, Jason.
Needed a light edit; this par now cut from 362 words to 185:
September 11 proved a circuit breaker. Globalisation was pushed from the front pages and has not recovered prominence. We have moved from the era of globalisation [ed: if measured by media prominence, perhaps; is a less subjective measure available?] into one of perpetual war, wherein the nation-state has not only failed to whither [ed: wither] away, but is resurgent. Instead of a world regulated by markets, we have a world once more being increasingly regulated [ed: "once more increasingly"? Change to "world again being regulated"] by force of arms. Instead of smaller government[s], we have the biggest governments in history. Instead of the uninspiring liberal utopia [ed: a utopia is inspiring by definition, surely] of nations fading away in favour of [ed: change to "nations yielding to"; by the way, is it accurate to describe the concept of "nations" as liberal/utopian?] a universal consumerist globalism, we have something close to the reverse: resurgent unilateralism[,] with fewer traditional restraints [ed: than existed under previous models]. International institutions, international norms, international law and the logic and dignity of multilateralism [ed: !!!] itself have suffered since September 11, as the ideologies and interests of states have once more been elevated to centre stage [ed: cut repeated use of "once more"; replace "centre stage" with non-cliche], displacing the borderless individual economic agent of the globalisation era. Far from one world coming ready or not, we now have nations calling their own shots [ed: reads like Richard Neville. Please fix]; including one nation, the United States of America, declaring that all others must either be “with us or against us.”
Needed a light edit; this par now cut from 362 words to 185:
September 11 proved a circuit breaker. Globalisation was pushed from the front pages and has not recovered prominence. We have moved from the era of globalisation [ed: if measured by media prominence, perhaps; is a less subjective measure available?] into one of perpetual war, wherein the nation-state has not only failed to whither [ed: wither] away, but is resurgent. Instead of a world regulated by markets, we have a world once more being increasingly regulated [ed: "once more increasingly"? Change to "world again being regulated"] by force of arms. Instead of smaller government[s], we have the biggest governments in history. Instead of the uninspiring liberal utopia [ed: a utopia is inspiring by definition, surely] of nations fading away in favour of [ed: change to "nations yielding to"; by the way, is it accurate to describe the concept of "nations" as liberal/utopian?] a universal consumerist globalism, we have something close to the reverse: resurgent unilateralism[,] with fewer traditional restraints [ed: than existed under previous models]. International institutions, international norms, international law and the logic and dignity of multilateralism [ed: !!!] itself have suffered since September 11, as the ideologies and interests of states have once more been elevated to centre stage [ed: cut repeated use of "once more"; replace "centre stage" with non-cliche], displacing the borderless individual economic agent of the globalisation era. Far from one world coming ready or not, we now have nations calling their own shots [ed: reads like Richard Neville. Please fix]; including one nation, the United States of America, declaring that all others must either be “with us or against us.”
Cheers, Tim, want to proofread my thesis?
Cheers, Tim, want to proofread my thesis?
Apologies for taking the discussion back a few steps, but to respond to Mark:
“It?Äôs eminently possible to posit any number of sociological definitions of globalisation which are rigorous.”
Implied in my remark was a desire to hear YOUR definition. I’m only asking you to define your terms, lest we continue to argue across each other.
“This is in the sense that globalisation is presented as something inevitable to which resistance is useless. And the caricature of those who, like Liam and me, would like to see a different form of globalisation as anti-globalist is clear evidence that the term is being harnessed for political reasons. You only have to read anything on Clinton and Blair?Äôs politics, or by Giddens, to see that I?Äôm right.”
You imply that “globalisation” is a perspective to which THE RIGHT has appealed to as inevitable, whereas my recollection of the mid- to late-1990s is that liberal approaches to economics were proposed as superior in terms of outcomes. I do not recall “globalisation” being used as a tool of persuasion by THE RIGHT (if we can call Clinton and Blair as representatives of this side of politics), only as a strawman target for those opposed to an inconsistent grab-bag of ecnonomic policies you might describe as “neoliberal” (as opposed to simply “liberal”).
“Yes, if you look at economic globalisation, it?Äôs reasonable to symbolically define it as having originated around 1973. And yes, it?Äôs more a matter of scale than of entirely new forces in the world. Chris is pointing to the fact, that like all political concepts, its content is contestible and thus has no essence, which is also my point.”
Symbolically, but practically or effectively? This is why the definition of “globalisation” is so important. If we define it as the process of growing interdependence of trade, finance and information flows, then CS’ definition is arbitrary and ahistorical, precisely because it ignores the pre-existing trends. If “globalisation”, as defined above, is empirically observable then there is no political contestability; it is a fact.
“Ipso facto, like anything else, it is neither inevitable, nor as Homer?Äôs example of the Belle Epoque suggests, destined necessarily to last. What interests me is both analysing this and refuting the claim that all change is in one direction and necessarily progressive in the interest of opening up alternatives.”
We know from the experiences of the 1890s and 1930s that growing interconnectivity of trade and technology does not always continue in the same direction – there are periods of stagnation and even reversal. However, a sufficiently broad perspective on economic history suggests that the TREND is definitely moving in one direction, powered by the force of technological progress making trade in goods, services, capital and information ever more efficient. That’s not to say that a political cataclysm (e.g. a widespread nuclear war) might not derail progress for ever, but the technological jinn cannot be forced back into its bottle. You may deny that this progress is a fact, or argue that it is a social construct, but I believe the evolution of technology points us in only one direction: greater and more intrusive intermeshing of the world in an economic, and thus political, sense.
Apologies for taking the discussion back a few steps, but to respond to Mark:
“It?Äôs eminently possible to posit any number of sociological definitions of globalisation which are rigorous.”
Implied in my remark was a desire to hear YOUR definition. I’m only asking you to define your terms, lest we continue to argue across each other.
“This is in the sense that globalisation is presented as something inevitable to which resistance is useless. And the caricature of those who, like Liam and me, would like to see a different form of globalisation as anti-globalist is clear evidence that the term is being harnessed for political reasons. You only have to read anything on Clinton and Blair?Äôs politics, or by Giddens, to see that I?Äôm right.”
You imply that “globalisation” is a perspective to which THE RIGHT has appealed to as inevitable, whereas my recollection of the mid- to late-1990s is that liberal approaches to economics were proposed as superior in terms of outcomes. I do not recall “globalisation” being used as a tool of persuasion by THE RIGHT (if we can call Clinton and Blair as representatives of this side of politics), only as a strawman target for those opposed to an inconsistent grab-bag of ecnonomic policies you might describe as “neoliberal” (as opposed to simply “liberal”).
“Yes, if you look at economic globalisation, it?Äôs reasonable to symbolically define it as having originated around 1973. And yes, it?Äôs more a matter of scale than of entirely new forces in the world. Chris is pointing to the fact, that like all political concepts, its content is contestible and thus has no essence, which is also my point.”
Symbolically, but practically or effectively? This is why the definition of “globalisation” is so important. If we define it as the process of growing interdependence of trade, finance and information flows, then CS’ definition is arbitrary and ahistorical, precisely because it ignores the pre-existing trends. If “globalisation”, as defined above, is empirically observable then there is no political contestability; it is a fact.
“Ipso facto, like anything else, it is neither inevitable, nor as Homer?Äôs example of the Belle Epoque suggests, destined necessarily to last. What interests me is both analysing this and refuting the claim that all change is in one direction and necessarily progressive in the interest of opening up alternatives.”
We know from the experiences of the 1890s and 1930s that growing interconnectivity of trade and technology does not always continue in the same direction – there are periods of stagnation and even reversal. However, a sufficiently broad perspective on economic history suggests that the TREND is definitely moving in one direction, powered by the force of technological progress making trade in goods, services, capital and information ever more efficient. That’s not to say that a political cataclysm (e.g. a widespread nuclear war) might not derail progress for ever, but the technological jinn cannot be forced back into its bottle. You may deny that this progress is a fact, or argue that it is a social construct, but I believe the evolution of technology points us in only one direction: greater and more intrusive intermeshing of the world in an economic, and thus political, sense.
Fyodor, I’d be inclined to define it simply as “increasing interconnectedness across borders”, recognising that it’s not just an economic process.
On Blair and Clinton, here’s a bunch of links. I’m really surprised that you seem to have missed something that was uppermost in centre-left political discourse in the 90s, Fyodor. The alleged constraints of globalisation were at the heart of the acceptance of large slabs of neo-liberalism by “Third Way politics”.
Your claim about inevitable progress is open to far more counter-factuals than just nuclear war. If Stalin had sat out WW2, and Hitler not attacked him (a plausible future in 1939), what would have happened?
Your technological argument is one-sided and determinist, much as some Marxist arguments are. The point about technology is that decisions about its use and development are social ones. Interconnectivity in technology does not necessarily imply the sort of “free trade” regime that the Washington Consensus seeks to impose. The antinomies of the intellectual property debates ought to be illustrative of that.
Nor does economic intermeshing necessarily lead to political intermeshing. At this point in time it’s reinforcing political and power hierarchies.
And I’m not so much interested in an argument about whether economic globalisation is inevitable (which I deny) but rather in the political uses to which this argument is put. It’s there that Chris’ points about statism and inequality are very telling.
Fyodor, I’d be inclined to define it simply as “increasing interconnectedness across borders”, recognising that it’s not just an economic process.
On Blair and Clinton, here’s a bunch of links. I’m really surprised that you seem to have missed something that was uppermost in centre-left political discourse in the 90s, Fyodor. The alleged constraints of globalisation were at the heart of the acceptance of large slabs of neo-liberalism by “Third Way politics”.
Your claim about inevitable progress is open to far more counter-factuals than just nuclear war. If Stalin had sat out WW2, and Hitler not attacked him (a plausible future in 1939), what would have happened?
Your technological argument is one-sided and determinist, much as some Marxist arguments are. The point about technology is that decisions about its use and development are social ones. Interconnectivity in technology does not necessarily imply the sort of “free trade” regime that the Washington Consensus seeks to impose. The antinomies of the intellectual property debates ought to be illustrative of that.
Nor does economic intermeshing necessarily lead to political intermeshing. At this point in time it’s reinforcing political and power hierarchies.
And I’m not so much interested in an argument about whether economic globalisation is inevitable (which I deny) but rather in the political uses to which this argument is put. It’s there that Chris’ points about statism and inequality are very telling.
“The problem is that multinational companies are drawn to third world countries not because they want to help or because they want to trade freely, but because they can get away with things they wouldn?Äôt be able to in countries where there is a decent Rule of Law. So, by all means send Nike to Africa, but send the ILO in as well, to make sure workers are able to join free trade unions.”
To be brutal, Liam, MNCs are drawn to third world countries in order to make a buck. They hire workers in these countries because they can produce goods there more profitably than they can elsewhere, usually because of lower wages. If the ILO makes wages more expensive than they would otherwise be, MNCs hire fewer or no workers.
You talk about “decent Rule of Law” and invite Nike into Africa. It’s precisely the lack of Rule of Law that discourages most MNCs from investing in African countries, explaining why they have been left behind by East Asian economies in the past few decades. Bad and/or corrupt government creates a poor environment for trade, as Jason pointed out.
“The problem is that multinational companies are drawn to third world countries not because they want to help or because they want to trade freely, but because they can get away with things they wouldn?Äôt be able to in countries where there is a decent Rule of Law. So, by all means send Nike to Africa, but send the ILO in as well, to make sure workers are able to join free trade unions.”
To be brutal, Liam, MNCs are drawn to third world countries in order to make a buck. They hire workers in these countries because they can produce goods there more profitably than they can elsewhere, usually because of lower wages. If the ILO makes wages more expensive than they would otherwise be, MNCs hire fewer or no workers.
You talk about “decent Rule of Law” and invite Nike into Africa. It’s precisely the lack of Rule of Law that discourages most MNCs from investing in African countries, explaining why they have been left behind by East Asian economies in the past few decades. Bad and/or corrupt government creates a poor environment for trade, as Jason pointed out.
Mark,
I think your definition is robust. Now, do you believe it to be a contestable social construct with no essence, or do you believe that “increasing interconnectedness across borders” is a phenomenon that can be empirically observed?
“I?Äôm really surprised that you seem to have missed something that was uppermost in centre-left political discourse in the 90s, Fyodor.”
Don’t be surprised. I don’t know half as much as I pretend to. Thanks for the links, but I only found two references to “globalisation” amidst a welter of thirdway nospeak. However, I’m willing to defer to you on this point in order to avoid any future fact-checking on this score. Don’t make me go back there, Don Marco.
“Your claim about inevitable progress is open to far more counter-factuals than just nuclear war. If Stalin had sat out WW2, and Hitler not attacked him (a plausible future in 1939), what would have happened?”
I love hypotheticals. This one’s a bit strained, as Hitler’s objective all along was to seize Lebensraum from the Slavs to the East, so it’s unlikely that he would not have invaded the USSR. However, if we assume for the moment that WWII never happened and Nazi Germany and the USSR never fought, I think both states would eventually have succumbed to the lure of capitalist supremacy. Germany was never truly autarkic, and we know what happened to the Workers’ Paradise.
“Your technological argument is one-sided and determinist, much as some Marxist arguments are. The point about technology is that decisions about its use and development are social ones. Interconnectivity in technology does not necessarily imply the sort of “free trade” regime that the Washington Consensus seeks to impose. The antinomies of the intellectual property debates ought to be illustrative of that.”
My technological argument is determinist, but that doesn’t mean it’s wrong. I think that interconnectivity in technology DOES imply free trade: information wants to be free, Mark. Now, political power can be concentrated and imposed to block interconnectivity, but that hasn’t worked too well for the countries that tried it. North Korea’s not a great pinup for anti-globalisation. I don’t see any necessary contradictions in intellectual property rights, either.
“Nor does economic intermeshing necessarily lead to political intermeshing. At this point in time it?Äôs reinforcing political and power hierarchies.”
I mean intermeshing in the sense of interconnectivity. The erosion of sovereingty is not inevitable, but the instances of the EU and NAFTA should give pause to think about the political effects of economic integration. More importantly, the technological progress that gave us more trade in goods and capital also gave us improved travel and communications with other countries. IMO this is having a significant impact on social and political structures around the world.
“And I?Äôm not so much interested in an argument about whether economic globalisation is inevitable (which I deny) but rather in the political uses to which this argument is put.”
I’m more interested in whether economic globalisation is inevitable. Everything else is subsidiary.
Mark,
I think your definition is robust. Now, do you believe it to be a contestable social construct with no essence, or do you believe that “increasing interconnectedness across borders” is a phenomenon that can be empirically observed?
“I?Äôm really surprised that you seem to have missed something that was uppermost in centre-left political discourse in the 90s, Fyodor.”
Don’t be surprised. I don’t know half as much as I pretend to. Thanks for the links, but I only found two references to “globalisation” amidst a welter of thirdway nospeak. However, I’m willing to defer to you on this point in order to avoid any future fact-checking on this score. Don’t make me go back there, Don Marco.
“Your claim about inevitable progress is open to far more counter-factuals than just nuclear war. If Stalin had sat out WW2, and Hitler not attacked him (a plausible future in 1939), what would have happened?”
I love hypotheticals. This one’s a bit strained, as Hitler’s objective all along was to seize Lebensraum from the Slavs to the East, so it’s unlikely that he would not have invaded the USSR. However, if we assume for the moment that WWII never happened and Nazi Germany and the USSR never fought, I think both states would eventually have succumbed to the lure of capitalist supremacy. Germany was never truly autarkic, and we know what happened to the Workers’ Paradise.
“Your technological argument is one-sided and determinist, much as some Marxist arguments are. The point about technology is that decisions about its use and development are social ones. Interconnectivity in technology does not necessarily imply the sort of “free trade” regime that the Washington Consensus seeks to impose. The antinomies of the intellectual property debates ought to be illustrative of that.”
My technological argument is determinist, but that doesn’t mean it’s wrong. I think that interconnectivity in technology DOES imply free trade: information wants to be free, Mark. Now, political power can be concentrated and imposed to block interconnectivity, but that hasn’t worked too well for the countries that tried it. North Korea’s not a great pinup for anti-globalisation. I don’t see any necessary contradictions in intellectual property rights, either.
“Nor does economic intermeshing necessarily lead to political intermeshing. At this point in time it?Äôs reinforcing political and power hierarchies.”
I mean intermeshing in the sense of interconnectivity. The erosion of sovereingty is not inevitable, but the instances of the EU and NAFTA should give pause to think about the political effects of economic integration. More importantly, the technological progress that gave us more trade in goods and capital also gave us improved travel and communications with other countries. IMO this is having a significant impact on social and political structures around the world.
“And I?Äôm not so much interested in an argument about whether economic globalisation is inevitable (which I deny) but rather in the political uses to which this argument is put.”
I’m more interested in whether economic globalisation is inevitable. Everything else is subsidiary.
Well, I was going to sit down for a few hours and dig quotes out of books, Fyodor, but thanks for sparing me the task of reading Tony Blair for an extended period of time.
A few other (quick) points -
I think your definition is robust. Now, do you believe it to be a contestable social construct with no essence, or do you believe that “increasing interconnectedness across borders” is a phenomenon that can be empirically observed?
No, and yes. But I’m trying to distinguish between empirically measurable phenomena and political discourse about them. I also argue that the latter shifts how we perceive the world and also how these phenomena develop. It’s a dialectic.
Germany was certainly not autarkic – as I’ve suggested there is no actual pure form of this ideal type. However, what your point reveals is an unstated dependence on the notion that capitalism and democracy go together, which indeed underlies your whole argument. Hitler was very cozy with, and supported by big business, and capitalism found fascism very useful in both Germany and Italy in beating back the two most militant and organised working class movements in Europe between the Wars.
Information wants to be free.
How do you account for the increasing corporate cannibalisation of the net? How do you justify the pressure put on India to stop providing cheap retroviral drugs and sign up to the WTO intellectual property regime which will greatly reduce their availability to the poor. I’m not talking about China and North Korea at all, I’m talking about the shaping of interconnectivity through the paths and byways of capital and powerful states like the US.
More importantly, the technological progress that gave us more trade in goods and capital also gave us improved travel and communications with other countries. IMO this is having a significant impact on social and political structures around the world.
There’s no doubt about that, but for whom is it good? I reiterate that I’m not proposing some sort of autarkic solution or being some sort of Luddite. My interest lies in a fairer distribution of the surplus created by these economic developments and the only way to do that is political – which is what makes the political use of globalisation so important.
Well, I was going to sit down for a few hours and dig quotes out of books, Fyodor, but thanks for sparing me the task of reading Tony Blair for an extended period of time.
A few other (quick) points -
I think your definition is robust. Now, do you believe it to be a contestable social construct with no essence, or do you believe that “increasing interconnectedness across borders” is a phenomenon that can be empirically observed?
No, and yes. But I’m trying to distinguish between empirically measurable phenomena and political discourse about them. I also argue that the latter shifts how we perceive the world and also how these phenomena develop. It’s a dialectic.
Germany was certainly not autarkic – as I’ve suggested there is no actual pure form of this ideal type. However, what your point reveals is an unstated dependence on the notion that capitalism and democracy go together, which indeed underlies your whole argument. Hitler was very cozy with, and supported by big business, and capitalism found fascism very useful in both Germany and Italy in beating back the two most militant and organised working class movements in Europe between the Wars.
Information wants to be free.
How do you account for the increasing corporate cannibalisation of the net? How do you justify the pressure put on India to stop providing cheap retroviral drugs and sign up to the WTO intellectual property regime which will greatly reduce their availability to the poor. I’m not talking about China and North Korea at all, I’m talking about the shaping of interconnectivity through the paths and byways of capital and powerful states like the US.
More importantly, the technological progress that gave us more trade in goods and capital also gave us improved travel and communications with other countries. IMO this is having a significant impact on social and political structures around the world.
There’s no doubt about that, but for whom is it good? I reiterate that I’m not proposing some sort of autarkic solution or being some sort of Luddite. My interest lies in a fairer distribution of the surplus created by these economic developments and the only way to do that is political – which is what makes the political use of globalisation so important.
Now you’re getting to a question of interest, Fyodor, yes.
Consider it put another more complicated way: what is it about modern capitalism that makes it tend, or not tend, to economically globalise?
I suggest one reason might be the modern dominance of corporate wealth rather than private, co-operative, aristocratic or other kinds of wealth. Large corporations implicitly challenge national boundaries.
Now you’re getting to a question of interest, Fyodor, yes.
Consider it put another more complicated way: what is it about modern capitalism that makes it tend, or not tend, to economically globalise?
I suggest one reason might be the modern dominance of corporate wealth rather than private, co-operative, aristocratic or other kinds of wealth. Large corporations implicitly challenge national boundaries.
And national laws, regulations, and taboos, for that matter.
And national laws, regulations, and taboos, for that matter.
Lot of interesting comments, which I appreciate with thanks and hope to come back to at some stage, but can’t resist joining tim. First, I think it might be noted that this is the text of a talk, and a small part of the text. Regardless:
September 11 proved a circuit breaker. Globalisation was pushed from the front pages and has not recovered prominence. We have moved from the era of globalisation [ed: if measured by media prominence, perhaps; is a less subjective measure available? but the point is about the media and the dominant ideas of out times, some of the references to which you have deleted. Elsewhere in the talk less subjective measures are utilised] into one of perpetual war, wherein the nation-state has not only failed to whither [ed: wither tim is a good speller] away, but is resurgent. Instead of a world regulated by markets, we have a world once more being increasingly regulated [ed: "once more increasingly"? Change to "world again being regulated" no, as the admittedly awkward formulation refers to a tendency, not a finished state] by force of arms. Instead of smaller government[s no, 'small government' was the catchcry], we have the biggest governments in history. Instead of the uninspiring liberal utopia [ed: a utopia is inspiring by definition, surely one person's utopia is another's distopia. liberals posited it as a utopia - see earlier in speech - which doesn't mean everyone else must see it as inspiring. critics of the lack of inspiration in the 'comforts and gadgets' vision of the future range from left to right] of nations fading away in favour of [ed: change to "nations yielding to"; by the way, is it accurate to describe the concept of "nations" as liberal/utopian? reaons for ed's change and comments unclear - rewrite] a universal consumerist globalism, we have something close to the reverse: resurgent unilateralism[, current conventions are to avoid unnecessary punctuation where possible] with fewer traditional restraints [ed: than existed under previous models ed doesn't appear to understand the word 'traditional']. International institutions, international norms, international law and the logic and dignity of multilateralism [ed: !!! has ed been drinking?] itself have suffered since September 11, as the ideologies and interests of states have once more been elevated to centre stage [ed: cut repeated use of "once more"; replace "centre stage" with non-cliche "Faulty repetition results from want of care; faulty avoidance results from incapacity to tell good from bad, or servile submission a to rule of thumb - far graver defects than carelessness" as Fowler says; also see same for advice on cliche], displacing the borderless individual economic agent of the globalisation era. Far from one world coming ready or not, we now have nations calling their own shots [ed: reads like Richard Neville. Please fix get stuffed ]; including one nation, the United States of America, declaring that all others must either be “with us or against us.”
Lot of interesting comments, which I appreciate with thanks and hope to come back to at some stage, but can’t resist joining tim. First, I think it might be noted that this is the text of a talk, and a small part of the text. Regardless:
September 11 proved a circuit breaker. Globalisation was pushed from the front pages and has not recovered prominence. We have moved from the era of globalisation [ed: if measured by media prominence, perhaps; is a less subjective measure available? but the point is about the media and the dominant ideas of out times, some of the references to which you have deleted. Elsewhere in the talk less subjective measures are utilised] into one of perpetual war, wherein the nation-state has not only failed to whither [ed: wither tim is a good speller] away, but is resurgent. Instead of a world regulated by markets, we have a world once more being increasingly regulated [ed: "once more increasingly"? Change to "world again being regulated" no, as the admittedly awkward formulation refers to a tendency, not a finished state] by force of arms. Instead of smaller government[s no, 'small government' was the catchcry], we have the biggest governments in history. Instead of the uninspiring liberal utopia [ed: a utopia is inspiring by definition, surely one person's utopia is another's distopia. liberals posited it as a utopia - see earlier in speech - which doesn't mean everyone else must see it as inspiring. critics of the lack of inspiration in the 'comforts and gadgets' vision of the future range from left to right] of nations fading away in favour of [ed: change to "nations yielding to"; by the way, is it accurate to describe the concept of "nations" as liberal/utopian? reaons for ed's change and comments unclear - rewrite] a universal consumerist globalism, we have something close to the reverse: resurgent unilateralism[, current conventions are to avoid unnecessary punctuation where possible] with fewer traditional restraints [ed: than existed under previous models ed doesn't appear to understand the word 'traditional']. International institutions, international norms, international law and the logic and dignity of multilateralism [ed: !!! has ed been drinking?] itself have suffered since September 11, as the ideologies and interests of states have once more been elevated to centre stage [ed: cut repeated use of "once more"; replace "centre stage" with non-cliche "Faulty repetition results from want of care; faulty avoidance results from incapacity to tell good from bad, or servile submission a to rule of thumb - far graver defects than carelessness" as Fowler says; also see same for advice on cliche], displacing the borderless individual economic agent of the globalisation era. Far from one world coming ready or not, we now have nations calling their own shots [ed: reads like Richard Neville. Please fix get stuffed ]; including one nation, the United States of America, declaring that all others must either be “with us or against us.”
apologies for mixing up italics etc and typos – the preview function in wordpress is not as easy to use as a full preview, particularly in haste.
apologies for mixing up italics etc and typos – the preview function in wordpress is not as easy to use as a full preview, particularly in haste.
Fyodor, I’ll pose a similar question to the one I posed to Jason (which he never answered) to you:
Why is economic globalisation a primary good for you?
I’ll follow Liam in appropriating Marx from the Manifesto – economic dynamism creates wonders, but who wins and who loses?
Fyodor, I’ll pose a similar question to the one I posed to Jason (which he never answered) to you:
Why is economic globalisation a primary good for you?
I’ll follow Liam in appropriating Marx from the Manifesto – economic dynamism creates wonders, but who wins and who loses?
Presumably Fyodor thinks humanity wins in the long term.
Two quotes:
Keynes – In the long run, we’re all dead.
Schmitt – Whoever speaks of humanity, speaks of bestiality.
Presumably Fyodor thinks humanity wins in the long term.
Two quotes:
Keynes – In the long run, we’re all dead.
Schmitt – Whoever speaks of humanity, speaks of bestiality.
“However, what your point reveals is an unstated dependence on the notion that capitalism and democracy go together, which indeed underlies your whole argument. Hitler was very cozy with, and supported by big business, and capitalism found fascism very useful in both Germany and Italy in beating back the two most militant and organised working class movements in Europe between the Wars.”
The dependence was not stated because it was not thought. I said that I thought the conversion of Nazi Germany and the USSR to (more) capitalist economies was inevitable. I made no comment on their form of government. As it happens, however, I do think capitalism, i.e. free markets under the rule of law, and democracy go together, eventually if not immediately.
“How do you account for the increasing corporate cannibalisation of the net?”
Not sure what you mean by this. If you mean increased commercial presence, I should think it was obvious: companies follow consumers.
“How do you justify the pressure put on India to stop providing cheap retroviral drugs and sign up to the WTO intellectual property regime which will greatly reduce their availability to the poor.”
Protection of property rights over drugs developed by commercial enterprises. If governments want to give drugs away, they should either develop the drugs themselves or pay the royalties out of tax revenue.
“My interest lies in a fairer distribution of the surplus created by these economic developments and the only way to do that is political – which is what makes the political use of globalisation so important.”
Now we get to the nub of it: focus on redistribution, rather than generation, of wealth. This has nothing to do with interconnectivity and everything to do with political and ideological objectives. What do you mean by the “political use of globalisation”?
“However, what your point reveals is an unstated dependence on the notion that capitalism and democracy go together, which indeed underlies your whole argument. Hitler was very cozy with, and supported by big business, and capitalism found fascism very useful in both Germany and Italy in beating back the two most militant and organised working class movements in Europe between the Wars.”
The dependence was not stated because it was not thought. I said that I thought the conversion of Nazi Germany and the USSR to (more) capitalist economies was inevitable. I made no comment on their form of government. As it happens, however, I do think capitalism, i.e. free markets under the rule of law, and democracy go together, eventually if not immediately.
“How do you account for the increasing corporate cannibalisation of the net?”
Not sure what you mean by this. If you mean increased commercial presence, I should think it was obvious: companies follow consumers.
“How do you justify the pressure put on India to stop providing cheap retroviral drugs and sign up to the WTO intellectual property regime which will greatly reduce their availability to the poor.”
Protection of property rights over drugs developed by commercial enterprises. If governments want to give drugs away, they should either develop the drugs themselves or pay the royalties out of tax revenue.
“My interest lies in a fairer distribution of the surplus created by these economic developments and the only way to do that is political – which is what makes the political use of globalisation so important.”
Now we get to the nub of it: focus on redistribution, rather than generation, of wealth. This has nothing to do with interconnectivity and everything to do with political and ideological objectives. What do you mean by the “political use of globalisation”?
Blue pencils at twenty paces. Mark will count to five and drop a purple hankerchief.
Blue pencils at twenty paces. Mark will count to five and drop a purple hankerchief.
“Consider it put another more complicated way: what is it about modern capitalism that makes it tend, or not tend, to economically globalise?”
Why does water flow downhill? Liam, capital seeks out the best returns it can obtain. Technology and markets allow capital to roam the Earth looking for profit, and this is what it does. As technology has improved accessability, capital has flowed across borders with more ease. There’s nothing inherently sinister about this, or the individuals or companies investing their capital this way. It’s also not new. Europeans were investing in foreign enterprises centuries ago, for the same reasons as today: profit and wealth.
“Consider it put another more complicated way: what is it about modern capitalism that makes it tend, or not tend, to economically globalise?”
Why does water flow downhill? Liam, capital seeks out the best returns it can obtain. Technology and markets allow capital to roam the Earth looking for profit, and this is what it does. As technology has improved accessability, capital has flowed across borders with more ease. There’s nothing inherently sinister about this, or the individuals or companies investing their capital this way. It’s also not new. Europeans were investing in foreign enterprises centuries ago, for the same reasons as today: profit and wealth.
Protection of property rights over drugs developed by commercial enterprises.
Yay for commercial enterprises. Pity about dying Indians. So big pharma is admitted to be all about profits and nothing about healthcare? Ok, like I said, these debates clarify lines.
Now we get to the nub of it: focus on redistribution, rather than generation, of wealth. This has nothing to do with interconnectivity and everything to do with political and ideological objectives. What do you mean by the “political use of globalisation”?
So is taxation theft or something, Fyodor? Redistribution and the generation of wealth aren’t incompatible. The functions that you believe the state ought to fulfil require taxation. Are you arguing against any income transfers at all?
Meanwhile, in the real world of so called liberal democracy, Bush presides over a massive redistribution of wealth from the poorest to the richest.
Seriously, this goes to the question I posed – why is the creation of wealth a good in its own right? So that innovative capitalists can make a buck?
I mean by “the political use of globalisation” what I’ve been talking about in the post and this thread which I think I’ve adequately clarified repeatedly.
Protection of property rights over drugs developed by commercial enterprises.
Yay for commercial enterprises. Pity about dying Indians. So big pharma is admitted to be all about profits and nothing about healthcare? Ok, like I said, these debates clarify lines.
Now we get to the nub of it: focus on redistribution, rather than generation, of wealth. This has nothing to do with interconnectivity and everything to do with political and ideological objectives. What do you mean by the “political use of globalisation”?
So is taxation theft or something, Fyodor? Redistribution and the generation of wealth aren’t incompatible. The functions that you believe the state ought to fulfil require taxation. Are you arguing against any income transfers at all?
Meanwhile, in the real world of so called liberal democracy, Bush presides over a massive redistribution of wealth from the poorest to the richest.
Seriously, this goes to the question I posed – why is the creation of wealth a good in its own right? So that innovative capitalists can make a buck?
I mean by “the political use of globalisation” what I’ve been talking about in the post and this thread which I think I’ve adequately clarified repeatedly.
Kim
Keynes is always quoted out of context in that. Keynes was a strong proponent of globalisation. His quote about the long run is about using countercyclical fiscal policy if it can be used to minimise damage from business cycles.
As for Schmitt, the old nazi bastard would say that. of course he didn’t believe in humanity, he believed in germans and jews and poles. A descendant of Maistre. I don’t know what that is supposed to prove.
Kim
Keynes is always quoted out of context in that. Keynes was a strong proponent of globalisation. His quote about the long run is about using countercyclical fiscal policy if it can be used to minimise damage from business cycles.
As for Schmitt, the old nazi bastard would say that. of course he didn’t believe in humanity, he believed in germans and jews and poles. A descendant of Maistre. I don’t know what that is supposed to prove.
Is Globalisation Dead?
Is someone pulling our leg:…
“Why is economic globalisation a primary good for you?”
It isn’t. IMO, globalisation as we have agreed to define it is the inevitable outcome of technological progress, not a good in itself.
“I?Äôll follow Liam in appropriating Marx from the Manifesto – economic dynamism creates wonders, but who wins and who loses?”
Who cares? Let’s make the pie bigger instead of arguing over crumbs.
“Why is economic globalisation a primary good for you?”
It isn’t. IMO, globalisation as we have agreed to define it is the inevitable outcome of technological progress, not a good in itself.
“I?Äôll follow Liam in appropriating Marx from the Manifesto – economic dynamism creates wonders, but who wins and who loses?”
Who cares? Let’s make the pie bigger instead of arguing over crumbs.
Fyodor, I mentioned before that I tend to agree. I’ve got no specific beef with economic globalisation itself—in fact I’d quite like to see a lot more things globalised, like anti-child labour laws, freedom of association rules allowing trade unionism, environmental protection regulations, and so on.
Fyodor, I mentioned before that I tend to agree. I’ve got no specific beef with economic globalisation itself—in fact I’d quite like to see a lot more things globalised, like anti-child labour laws, freedom of association rules allowing trade unionism, environmental protection regulations, and so on.
Another quickie for Fydor, as most capital flows (over 80%) are limited to round trips in search of arbitrage. Even official economists (i.e. imf etc) now formally question the benefits of developing countries opening up their capital accounts, and almost none have free-floating currencies.
Careful of being swept up in the religion. One of the major differences between the Globalisation Era and the Age of Imperialism that Homer refers to is that the old empires did export capital to develop their colonies. Today most real foreign direct investment goes to developed economies, plus a handful of others, and in total there is a net outflow of capital from developing to developed economies.
Another quickie for Fydor, as most capital flows (over 80%) are limited to round trips in search of arbitrage. Even official economists (i.e. imf etc) now formally question the benefits of developing countries opening up their capital accounts, and almost none have free-floating currencies.
Careful of being swept up in the religion. One of the major differences between the Globalisation Era and the Age of Imperialism that Homer refers to is that the old empires did export capital to develop their colonies. Today most real foreign direct investment goes to developed economies, plus a handful of others, and in total there is a net outflow of capital from developing to developed economies.
Protection of property rights over drugs developed by commercial enterprises.
And that’s not a “political and ideological objective”, Fyodor? In the case of India, it’s being achieved by political means in the service of an ideological project. Liberals always claim they’re not political, but the fact that so called free trade doesn’t come without massive political intervention and indeed the throwing around of the weight of the US in what is really the use of force again backs up the argument of the post.
As to crumbs, I’ll repeat my statement on another thread that the Global South enjoys (if that’s the word) 4% of the world’s income. That’s pretty crummy.
Jason, you can update yourself on the Schmitt debate here. I won’t bother explaining the significance of the quote in response to an ad hominem dismissal of it.
Protection of property rights over drugs developed by commercial enterprises.
And that’s not a “political and ideological objective”, Fyodor? In the case of India, it’s being achieved by political means in the service of an ideological project. Liberals always claim they’re not political, but the fact that so called free trade doesn’t come without massive political intervention and indeed the throwing around of the weight of the US in what is really the use of force again backs up the argument of the post.
As to crumbs, I’ll repeat my statement on another thread that the Global South enjoys (if that’s the word) 4% of the world’s income. That’s pretty crummy.
Jason, you can update yourself on the Schmitt debate here. I won’t bother explaining the significance of the quote in response to an ad hominem dismissal of it.
“Keynes – In the long run, we?Äôre all dead. Schmitt – Whoever speaks of humanity, speaks of bestiality.”
The only conclusion is that the apes WILL inherit the Earth.
“YOU MANIACS. YOU BLEW IT UP. DAMN YOU. GOD DAMN YOU ALL TO HELL!”
“Keynes – In the long run, we?Äôre all dead. Schmitt – Whoever speaks of humanity, speaks of bestiality.”
The only conclusion is that the apes WILL inherit the Earth.
“YOU MANIACS. YOU BLEW IT UP. DAMN YOU. GOD DAMN YOU ALL TO HELL!”
I’ve always had a fondness for the Planet of the Apes movies.
I’ve always had a fondness for the Planet of the Apes movies.
Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960, 41)
Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960, 41)
“Yay for commercial enterprises. Pity about dying Indians. So big pharma is admitted to be all about profits and nothing about healthcare?”
Here’s a newsflash, Mark: people die all the time, and it’s not always the fault of pharmaceutical companies. Yes, they’re in it to make a buck. Sorry to disabuse you of the notion that they’re charities.
“So is taxation theft or something, Fyodor? Redistribution and the generation of wealth aren?Äôt incompatible. The functions that you believe the state ought to fulfil require taxation. Are you arguing against any income transfers at all?”
No and no. I’m just pointing out that you seem to think equality is more important than productivity. As you say, these debates clarify lines.
“Seriously, this goes to the question I posed – why is the creation of wealth a good in its own right? So that innovative capitalists can make a buck?”
I can only assume these are facetious questions, Mark. If you don’t know what wealth can achieve, you’ve obviously never been without it. Wealth has to be produced before it can be redistributed.
“I mean by “the political use of globalisation” what I?Äôve been talking about in the post and this thread which I think I?Äôve adequately clarified repeatedly.”
I may be slow, but I don’t think you have clarified what the political use of globalisation should be.
“Yay for commercial enterprises. Pity about dying Indians. So big pharma is admitted to be all about profits and nothing about healthcare?”
Here’s a newsflash, Mark: people die all the time, and it’s not always the fault of pharmaceutical companies. Yes, they’re in it to make a buck. Sorry to disabuse you of the notion that they’re charities.
“So is taxation theft or something, Fyodor? Redistribution and the generation of wealth aren?Äôt incompatible. The functions that you believe the state ought to fulfil require taxation. Are you arguing against any income transfers at all?”
No and no. I’m just pointing out that you seem to think equality is more important than productivity. As you say, these debates clarify lines.
“Seriously, this goes to the question I posed – why is the creation of wealth a good in its own right? So that innovative capitalists can make a buck?”
I can only assume these are facetious questions, Mark. If you don’t know what wealth can achieve, you’ve obviously never been without it. Wealth has to be produced before it can be redistributed.
“I mean by “the political use of globalisation” what I?Äôve been talking about in the post and this thread which I think I?Äôve adequately clarified repeatedly.”
I may be slow, but I don’t think you have clarified what the political use of globalisation should be.
Huh, ten points to you Kim. I was just looking for an appropriate quote against the supremacy of economics over the human aspects of our universe but you’ve gotten there before me and in far better style.
[puts down New Testament, unneeded]
Huh, ten points to you Kim. I was just looking for an appropriate quote against the supremacy of economics over the human aspects of our universe but you’ve gotten there before me and in far better style.
[puts down New Testament, unneeded]
Point of order: isn’t 50 posts a “Popper”? I thought you had to get to 100 before “Hayek” was called.
Point of order: isn’t 50 posts a “Popper”? I thought you had to get to 100 before “Hayek” was called.
The chair recognises Fyodor. Fyodor is correct in his interpretation of the standing orders.
The chair recognises Fyodor. Fyodor is correct in his interpretation of the standing orders.
My bad!
But as Liam points out, the quote is on topic.
My bad!
But as Liam points out, the quote is on topic.
Ok, Fyodor, but very clearly the Indian government thought that your free information might have stopped some people from dying.
I repeat that I don’t see the creation of wealth and its redistribution as incompatible. There are obviously limits, but it’s a false dichotomy when posed as starkly as you have posed it. It obliges you, really, to answer the question of whether in your book any restribution is justifiable.
As to the political uses of globalisation, what I’m talking about is the way pollies and the endless succession of globalisation prophets and gurus who proceed through the op/ed pages and the NY Times bestseller list claim that certain social and economic policies are necessarily entailed by globalisation. The origin of all this is usually the argument about Mitterand’s policy when he came to power. The subsequent capital flight is meant to prove that you can’t do anything socialist. We spent the 90s being lectured by the centre-left (including Mark Latham in his tedious tomes and Peter Botsman and the like) that now we can’t even do anything social democratic.
Chris also makes a good point. Far from bringing benefits to Africa by making the pie bigger, except in the scramble for diamonds and resources and in a few exceptional cases, there’s been net disinvestment in these economies at the same time as the IMF has purged them of any attempt to pursue a government-led development strategy (as, for instance, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia did). So I think Jason also has some explaining to do.
Ok, Fyodor, but very clearly the Indian government thought that your free information might have stopped some people from dying.
I repeat that I don’t see the creation of wealth and its redistribution as incompatible. There are obviously limits, but it’s a false dichotomy when posed as starkly as you have posed it. It obliges you, really, to answer the question of whether in your book any restribution is justifiable.
As to the political uses of globalisation, what I’m talking about is the way pollies and the endless succession of globalisation prophets and gurus who proceed through the op/ed pages and the NY Times bestseller list claim that certain social and economic policies are necessarily entailed by globalisation. The origin of all this is usually the argument about Mitterand’s policy when he came to power. The subsequent capital flight is meant to prove that you can’t do anything socialist. We spent the 90s being lectured by the centre-left (including Mark Latham in his tedious tomes and Peter Botsman and the like) that now we can’t even do anything social democratic.
Chris also makes a good point. Far from bringing benefits to Africa by making the pie bigger, except in the scramble for diamonds and resources and in a few exceptional cases, there’s been net disinvestment in these economies at the same time as the IMF has purged them of any attempt to pursue a government-led development strategy (as, for instance, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia did). So I think Jason also has some explaining to do.
CS,
You might do well to define what you mean by capital flows. The movement of speculative capital has been explosive, particularly in nominal terms, but foreign investment in harder (i.e. more long-lived) forms has also been impressive. The fact that this tends to be concentrated in developed economies and a minority of developing economies says a lot about the economic prospects of the countries that miss out.
I so agree, however, that totally free capital markets can be devastating to immature economies unable to manage these capital flows. The lessons of Mexico, Thailand, Argentina etc. make that pretty clear. That doesn’t, however, obviate the desirability of more sophisticated and flexible capital markets – quite the contrary.
CS,
You might do well to define what you mean by capital flows. The movement of speculative capital has been explosive, particularly in nominal terms, but foreign investment in harder (i.e. more long-lived) forms has also been impressive. The fact that this tends to be concentrated in developed economies and a minority of developing economies says a lot about the economic prospects of the countries that miss out.
I so agree, however, that totally free capital markets can be devastating to immature economies unable to manage these capital flows. The lessons of Mexico, Thailand, Argentina etc. make that pretty clear. That doesn’t, however, obviate the desirability of more sophisticated and flexible capital markets – quite the contrary.
And Hayek continues further down the page:
‘The enjoyment of personal success will be given to large numbers only n a society that, as a whole, progresses fairly rapidly …There can therefore be little doubt that Adam Smith was right when he said: ‘It is in the progressive state, while society is advancing to further acquisition, rather than when it has acquired its full complement of riches, that the condition of the labouring poor, of the great body of people, seems to be the happiest and the most comfortable ..’
So I take it we can stop calling the egalitarian left ‘progressives’now and start using the term where it belongs, to apply to pro-market radicals? The Left can have the New Testament and Carl Schmitt.
And Hayek continues further down the page:
‘The enjoyment of personal success will be given to large numbers only n a society that, as a whole, progresses fairly rapidly …There can therefore be little doubt that Adam Smith was right when he said: ‘It is in the progressive state, while society is advancing to further acquisition, rather than when it has acquired its full complement of riches, that the condition of the labouring poor, of the great body of people, seems to be the happiest and the most comfortable ..’
So I take it we can stop calling the egalitarian left ‘progressives’now and start using the term where it belongs, to apply to pro-market radicals? The Left can have the New Testament and Carl Schmitt.
I think you would find visiting the most recent literature salutary Fydor. Few economists will agree with you these days, including as I say official economists, who now heavily qualify what they once took as axiomatically good. Too busy to cite you chapter and verse at the mo, but may dig some nobel prizewinners out to contradict you later tonight. There is a summary of the current position in the second half of my speech, with references.
I think you would find visiting the most recent literature salutary Fydor. Few economists will agree with you these days, including as I say official economists, who now heavily qualify what they once took as axiomatically good. Too busy to cite you chapter and verse at the mo, but may dig some nobel prizewinners out to contradict you later tonight. There is a summary of the current position in the second half of my speech, with references.
Mark,
I am certain that Jason can explain in very clear terms why Singapore et al succeeded and African countries did not. You may not like what you hear, however. IMO it had SFA to do with the IMF.
“I repeat that I don?Äôt see the creation of wealth and its redistribution as incompatible. There are obviously limits, but it?Äôs a false dichotomy when posed as starkly as you have posed it. It obliges you, really, to answer the question of whether in your book any restribution is justifiable.”
I did not say that they were incompatible, and I don’t have a problem with redistribution, within limtis. My point was simply to note that you seem more concerned with the equality of wealth outcomes than the overall production of wealth. This defines you as much as it does me.
On globalisation and its political uses, I agree with you on its uses and abuses, but I’d also give THE LEFT a serve for reflexively damning “globalisation” out of its habitual want of articulation, rather than criticising a supposed “neoliberal” policy on its merits. As I think I have implied up to now, I don’t see globalisation as an end in itself, and I would much rather any policy was defended on the basis of its inherent worth rather than by appeal to the supposed authority of GLOBALISATION.
“The subsequent capital flight is meant to prove that you can?Äôt do anything socialist. We spent the 90s being lectured by the centre-left (including Mark Latham in his tedious tomes and Peter Botsman and the like) that now we can?Äôt even do anything social democratic.”
You can do whatever you like. You just can’t expect foreigners to fund you doing it. No such thing as a free lunch and all that.
Mark,
I am certain that Jason can explain in very clear terms why Singapore et al succeeded and African countries did not. You may not like what you hear, however. IMO it had SFA to do with the IMF.
“I repeat that I don?Äôt see the creation of wealth and its redistribution as incompatible. There are obviously limits, but it?Äôs a false dichotomy when posed as starkly as you have posed it. It obliges you, really, to answer the question of whether in your book any restribution is justifiable.”
I did not say that they were incompatible, and I don’t have a problem with redistribution, within limtis. My point was simply to note that you seem more concerned with the equality of wealth outcomes than the overall production of wealth. This defines you as much as it does me.
On globalisation and its political uses, I agree with you on its uses and abuses, but I’d also give THE LEFT a serve for reflexively damning “globalisation” out of its habitual want of articulation, rather than criticising a supposed “neoliberal” policy on its merits. As I think I have implied up to now, I don’t see globalisation as an end in itself, and I would much rather any policy was defended on the basis of its inherent worth rather than by appeal to the supposed authority of GLOBALISATION.
“The subsequent capital flight is meant to prove that you can?Äôt do anything socialist. We spent the 90s being lectured by the centre-left (including Mark Latham in his tedious tomes and Peter Botsman and the like) that now we can?Äôt even do anything social democratic.”
You can do whatever you like. You just can’t expect foreigners to fund you doing it. No such thing as a free lunch and all that.
“Few economists will agree with you these days, including as I say official economists, who now heavily qualify what they once took as axiomatically good.”
Agree with what, CS?
“Few economists will agree with you these days, including as I say official economists, who now heavily qualify what they once took as axiomatically good.”
Agree with what, CS?
That the benefits from the free flow of financial (as distinct from productive) capital outweigh the costs.
That the benefits from the free flow of financial (as distinct from productive) capital outweigh the costs.
Jason, get your history right.
After Tawney there weren’t any christians on the left who believed in the N/T.
They only believe in it on the right.
There is no contradiction between beieng pro-market and believing in the N/T or the O/T for that matter!
The first recorded current account deficit is in the O/T when Soloman had to cede 5 cities to pay for his huge deficit, Palace, Temple and build up of defence forces!!!
Jason, get your history right.
After Tawney there weren’t any christians on the left who believed in the N/T.
They only believe in it on the right.
There is no contradiction between beieng pro-market and believing in the N/T or the O/T for that matter!
The first recorded current account deficit is in the O/T when Soloman had to cede 5 cities to pay for his huge deficit, Palace, Temple and build up of defence forces!!!
CS,
Well I didn’t say that, did I? In fact, I stated that:
“I so [sic - should be "do"] agree, however, that totally free capital markets can be devastating to immature economies unable to manage these capital flows. The lessons of Mexico, Thailand, Argentina etc. make that pretty clear. That doesn?Äôt, however, obviate the desirability of more sophisticated and flexible capital markets – quite the contrary.”
CS,
Well I didn’t say that, did I? In fact, I stated that:
“I so [sic - should be "do"] agree, however, that totally free capital markets can be devastating to immature economies unable to manage these capital flows. The lessons of Mexico, Thailand, Argentina etc. make that pretty clear. That doesn?Äôt, however, obviate the desirability of more sophisticated and flexible capital markets – quite the contrary.”
Actually most economists do not believe in deregulating the financial markets until after it has been done in the product markets.
Actually most economists do not believe in deregulating the financial markets until after it has been done in the product markets.
Well, Jason’s yet to provide any explanation, Fyodor aside from a claim about the benefits of British colonialism as opposed to that of other European nations. There was significant state intervention in the economy, and significant departure from free trade orthodoxy in the rise of the Asian economies. They were in effect following the German historical economists’ route from the 19th century rather than the prescriptions of Millian free trade theory from Britain, so I doubt that the argument about the legacy of British colonialism (in any event irrelevant to Taiwan and Korea) has anything much to do with it. African countries experienced colonialisation much more heavily as it were, and had little of the cultural advantages in terms of orientation to business and profit present in the Asian ones. And the internment of 100,000 people in Kenya and associated massacres in the 1950s is hardly an advertisement for the wonders of the Anglosphere or whatever.
The West has only shown interest in most of Africa as a quarry. Continued protectionist barriers in the area of agriculture contribute to the lack of any sustainable basis for economic growth, as does the rentier attitude of Western MNCs. All this is compounded by the IMF’s governance regime.
Your much vaunted free trade largely relates to exchange among the trading blocs of NAFTA, the EU and East Asia. Outside these charmed circles, the story is war, exploitation and theft. If globalisation is making any difference, it must work very very slowly indeed as the real GDP of most African countries is below what it was in the late 1960s.
Well, Jason’s yet to provide any explanation, Fyodor aside from a claim about the benefits of British colonialism as opposed to that of other European nations. There was significant state intervention in the economy, and significant departure from free trade orthodoxy in the rise of the Asian economies. They were in effect following the German historical economists’ route from the 19th century rather than the prescriptions of Millian free trade theory from Britain, so I doubt that the argument about the legacy of British colonialism (in any event irrelevant to Taiwan and Korea) has anything much to do with it. African countries experienced colonialisation much more heavily as it were, and had little of the cultural advantages in terms of orientation to business and profit present in the Asian ones. And the internment of 100,000 people in Kenya and associated massacres in the 1950s is hardly an advertisement for the wonders of the Anglosphere or whatever.
The West has only shown interest in most of Africa as a quarry. Continued protectionist barriers in the area of agriculture contribute to the lack of any sustainable basis for economic growth, as does the rentier attitude of Western MNCs. All this is compounded by the IMF’s governance regime.
Your much vaunted free trade largely relates to exchange among the trading blocs of NAFTA, the EU and East Asia. Outside these charmed circles, the story is war, exploitation and theft. If globalisation is making any difference, it must work very very slowly indeed as the real GDP of most African countries is below what it was in the late 1960s.
You can do whatever you like. You just can?Äôt expect foreigners to fund you doing it. No such thing as a free lunch and all that.
But “foreigners” in this instance aren’t some amorphous rational financial markets but actually global institutions, the US and its compradores.
As demonstrated by the power politics involved in the ability of the US economy to extract imperial rent by compelling “foreigners” to fund its hypermilitarism and its massive subsidies to ineffient businesses and tax cuts bonanza for the rich.
You can do whatever you like. You just can?Äôt expect foreigners to fund you doing it. No such thing as a free lunch and all that.
But “foreigners” in this instance aren’t some amorphous rational financial markets but actually global institutions, the US and its compradores.
As demonstrated by the power politics involved in the ability of the US economy to extract imperial rent by compelling “foreigners” to fund its hypermilitarism and its massive subsidies to ineffient businesses and tax cuts bonanza for the rich.
Well I don’t know what you’re talking about Fydor, if you’re not spruiking for global financial markets in that statement. The truth is that, unlike the case for free trade, where serious if controversial attempts have been made to quantify the likely benefits, evidence for the benefits of full capital account convertibility is virtually non-existent, much more a matter of repeated assertions than careful analysis. See, for a conservative authority, Bhagwati, “The Capital Myth” Foreign Affairs, 1998, or for a contemporary (noble-winning) Keynesian, Stiglitz, Globalisation and its Discontents, 2002. That should get you started. In the meantime, I’m off, but hope to get back tonight.
Well I don’t know what you’re talking about Fydor, if you’re not spruiking for global financial markets in that statement. The truth is that, unlike the case for free trade, where serious if controversial attempts have been made to quantify the likely benefits, evidence for the benefits of full capital account convertibility is virtually non-existent, much more a matter of repeated assertions than careful analysis. See, for a conservative authority, Bhagwati, “The Capital Myth” Foreign Affairs, 1998, or for a contemporary (noble-winning) Keynesian, Stiglitz, Globalisation and its Discontents, 2002. That should get you started. In the meantime, I’m off, but hope to get back tonight.
“Well, Jason?Äôs yet to provide any explanation, Fyodor aside from a claim about the benefits of British colonialism as opposed to that of other European nations.”
OK then, here’s my take. Singapore, S.K. and Malaysia all unified their governments under centralised control and focused on building national infrastructure, including education. Rule of law prevailed in all three countries, and corruption has been relatively low. Economic development was focused on the export sector, particularly of manufactures, using (at least initially) cheap labour. Singapore got a free leg up from its strategic position and historic role as trading and financing entrepot. The bottom line is that each of the three countries have used trade to enrich themselves. There’s been a fair degree of statist intervention, but the goal has always been to exploit the global market’s ability to enrich businesses and individuals in these countries.
Africa remains riven by tribal loyalties, and effective centralised government is the exception, not the norm. Rule of law is consequently absent and corruption rife. As Jason pointed out, government are routinely vulnerable to capture by special interests and there is consequently excessive political risk for any business looking to invest in anything other than resource harvesting. This alone explains why these countries are so neglected by global capital, and goes a long way to explaining why even domestically-oriented sectors remain stunted economically. Bad government is the overwhelming cause of economic stagnation.
“Your much vaunted free trade largely relates to exchange among the trading blocs of NAFTA, the EU and East Asia.”
This is a redundant statement: of course most of the trade occurs between these countries, as they constitute the dominant share of world GDP.
“Outside these charmed circles, the story is war, exploitation and theft.”
It was always so where trade and the rule of law have not prevailed. The cause is bad government, not trade.
“If globalisation is making any difference, it must work very very slowly indeed as the real GDP of most African countries is below what it was in the late 1960s.”
As I imply above, most of the African countries operate at the margin of what we would call globalisation because they produce little of worth and they’re too risky to attract capital. Whose fault is this? Well it’s not the fault of technology or trade, but the actions – or, more appropriately, inactions – of the governments of these countries.
“But “foreigners” in this instance aren?Äôt some amorphous rational financial markets but actually global institutions, the US and its compradores.”
Yes, but so what? Why should they invest in Australia if they can make better money elsewhere?
“As demonstrated by the power politics involved in the ability of the US economy to extract imperial rent by compelling “foreigners” to fund its hypermilitarism and its massive subsidies to ineffient businesses and tax cuts bonanza for the rich.”
There’s no compulsion involved in foreigners investing in USD assets. The US is hardly “hypermilitary”, either, given it still spends a relatively small % of its GDP on defense/offense. I suspect the US will face a funding crisis in the medium-term anyway (because its current account deficit is persistently high), but it’s highly unlikely to lose its position as a good place to invest.
“Well, Jason?Äôs yet to provide any explanation, Fyodor aside from a claim about the benefits of British colonialism as opposed to that of other European nations.”
OK then, here’s my take. Singapore, S.K. and Malaysia all unified their governments under centralised control and focused on building national infrastructure, including education. Rule of law prevailed in all three countries, and corruption has been relatively low. Economic development was focused on the export sector, particularly of manufactures, using (at least initially) cheap labour. Singapore got a free leg up from its strategic position and historic role as trading and financing entrepot. The bottom line is that each of the three countries have used trade to enrich themselves. There’s been a fair degree of statist intervention, but the goal has always been to exploit the global market’s ability to enrich businesses and individuals in these countries.
Africa remains riven by tribal loyalties, and effective centralised government is the exception, not the norm. Rule of law is consequently absent and corruption rife. As Jason pointed out, government are routinely vulnerable to capture by special interests and there is consequently excessive political risk for any business looking to invest in anything other than resource harvesting. This alone explains why these countries are so neglected by global capital, and goes a long way to explaining why even domestically-oriented sectors remain stunted economically. Bad government is the overwhelming cause of economic stagnation.
“Your much vaunted free trade largely relates to exchange among the trading blocs of NAFTA, the EU and East Asia.”
This is a redundant statement: of course most of the trade occurs between these countries, as they constitute the dominant share of world GDP.
“Outside these charmed circles, the story is war, exploitation and theft.”
It was always so where trade and the rule of law have not prevailed. The cause is bad government, not trade.
“If globalisation is making any difference, it must work very very slowly indeed as the real GDP of most African countries is below what it was in the late 1960s.”
As I imply above, most of the African countries operate at the margin of what we would call globalisation because they produce little of worth and they’re too risky to attract capital. Whose fault is this? Well it’s not the fault of technology or trade, but the actions – or, more appropriately, inactions – of the governments of these countries.
“But “foreigners” in this instance aren?Äôt some amorphous rational financial markets but actually global institutions, the US and its compradores.”
Yes, but so what? Why should they invest in Australia if they can make better money elsewhere?
“As demonstrated by the power politics involved in the ability of the US economy to extract imperial rent by compelling “foreigners” to fund its hypermilitarism and its massive subsidies to ineffient businesses and tax cuts bonanza for the rich.”
There’s no compulsion involved in foreigners investing in USD assets. The US is hardly “hypermilitary”, either, given it still spends a relatively small % of its GDP on defense/offense. I suspect the US will face a funding crisis in the medium-term anyway (because its current account deficit is persistently high), but it’s highly unlikely to lose its position as a good place to invest.
CS,
You’re arguing with a strawman. I have not argued in favour of “full capital account convertibility”. In fact, I favoured the opposing argument for developing economies. I won’t bother requoting what I wrote as you obviously didn’t read the first and second times.
CS,
You’re arguing with a strawman. I have not argued in favour of “full capital account convertibility”. In fact, I favoured the opposing argument for developing economies. I won’t bother requoting what I wrote as you obviously didn’t read the first and second times.
Well, I hope for the sake of your argument, Fyodor, that the tribal loyalties of State government politicians in Malaysia wedded to Islam don’t succeed in wrecking cosmopolitanism under the rule of law by enforcing many of the laws currently on the statute books preventing Muslims from smoking, for instance. Or that the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia is wrong in his belief that there might be a long term possibility of introducing sharia law into Malaysia. The provisions on usury might do some interesting things to the economy.
I’m glad at any rate that you agree with me that economic success in these countries was largely a result of government intervention rather than some magical free market sleight of hidden hand.
On Africa, whose fault is it that they don’t have anything to produce? Well in part, that of the IMF which forbids “import substitution” – or in other words, developing a sustainable industrial base. Nothing that would injure the ability of Western MNCs to also exploit these countries as a consumer market.
How precisely do technology and trade prevent things like corruption? That wasn’t very noticeable in the lead up to the Indonesian economic collapse when it was widely admitted that Western companies budgetted specific sums for greasing wheels in the government and military.
As to the US, I could multiply the examples but the short answer is the implicit threat that if the Asian Central Banks which have huge holdings in dollars and treasury bonds sell them down, their economies will go belly up as well. Not to mention the sort of concertation that goes on with regard to fixing exchange rates. And if you want an example of more naked power politics, try Rumsfeld rattling his sabre in the direction of China – not at all unrelated to the fixed value of the yuan, I suppose.
I’m sorry – but there’s more to the world than the operation of economic laws. Politics, to be precise.
Well, I hope for the sake of your argument, Fyodor, that the tribal loyalties of State government politicians in Malaysia wedded to Islam don’t succeed in wrecking cosmopolitanism under the rule of law by enforcing many of the laws currently on the statute books preventing Muslims from smoking, for instance. Or that the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia is wrong in his belief that there might be a long term possibility of introducing sharia law into Malaysia. The provisions on usury might do some interesting things to the economy.
I’m glad at any rate that you agree with me that economic success in these countries was largely a result of government intervention rather than some magical free market sleight of hidden hand.
On Africa, whose fault is it that they don’t have anything to produce? Well in part, that of the IMF which forbids “import substitution” – or in other words, developing a sustainable industrial base. Nothing that would injure the ability of Western MNCs to also exploit these countries as a consumer market.
How precisely do technology and trade prevent things like corruption? That wasn’t very noticeable in the lead up to the Indonesian economic collapse when it was widely admitted that Western companies budgetted specific sums for greasing wheels in the government and military.
As to the US, I could multiply the examples but the short answer is the implicit threat that if the Asian Central Banks which have huge holdings in dollars and treasury bonds sell them down, their economies will go belly up as well. Not to mention the sort of concertation that goes on with regard to fixing exchange rates. And if you want an example of more naked power politics, try Rumsfeld rattling his sabre in the direction of China – not at all unrelated to the fixed value of the yuan, I suppose.
I’m sorry – but there’s more to the world than the operation of economic laws. Politics, to be precise.
Fydor, aplogies if i have misunderstood. But for dumbclucks like me, perhaps you might be so gracious as to unpack exactly what you mean by this:
That [i.e. inflicting so much damage so quickly that only civil wars compare] doesn?Äôt, however, obviate the desirability of more sophisticated and flexible capital markets – quite the contrary.
Fydor, aplogies if i have misunderstood. But for dumbclucks like me, perhaps you might be so gracious as to unpack exactly what you mean by this:
That [i.e. inflicting so much damage so quickly that only civil wars compare] doesn?Äôt, however, obviate the desirability of more sophisticated and flexible capital markets – quite the contrary.
“I?Äôm glad at any rate that you agree with me that economic success in these countries was largely a result of government intervention rather than some magical free market sleight of hidden hand”
No Mark, that is not exactly what Fyodor said, nor is it an appropriate characterisation of the pro-market position.
Fyodor:
“Singapore got a free leg up from its strategic position and historic role as trading and financing entrepot. The bottom line is that each of the three countries have used trade to enrich themselves. There?Äôs been a fair degree of statist intervention, but the goal has always been to exploit the global market?Äôs ability to enrich businesses and individuals in these countries.”
Statist intervention which does not distort relative prices is almost as good as no intervention at all. That is the best we can hope for in the non-Platonic world. You on the other hand seem to be prone to positing false dichotomies
“I?Äôm glad at any rate that you agree with me that economic success in these countries was largely a result of government intervention rather than some magical free market sleight of hidden hand”
No Mark, that is not exactly what Fyodor said, nor is it an appropriate characterisation of the pro-market position.
Fyodor:
“Singapore got a free leg up from its strategic position and historic role as trading and financing entrepot. The bottom line is that each of the three countries have used trade to enrich themselves. There?Äôs been a fair degree of statist intervention, but the goal has always been to exploit the global market?Äôs ability to enrich businesses and individuals in these countries.”
Statist intervention which does not distort relative prices is almost as good as no intervention at all. That is the best we can hope for in the non-Platonic world. You on the other hand seem to be prone to positing false dichotomies
Which false dichotomies, Jason? Also is it possible for once, that you might engage with a particular argument you see as false rather than making sweeping statements about your interlocutor’s alleged argumentative or intellectual failings in toto?
Which false dichotomies, Jason? Also is it possible for once, that you might engage with a particular argument you see as false rather than making sweeping statements about your interlocutor’s alleged argumentative or intellectual failings in toto?
Mark – the same can be said about you in the numerous muddle headed definitions of pro-market policies you have provided including the latest “largely a result of government intervention rather than some magical free market sleight of hidden hand”
There is no ‘rather than’ here. I’ve already argued liberals have no problems with public goods. you don’t come up with some non-sequitur about the provision of public goods leading to ‘overexpanded government’. I ignored that but now you bring up your silly characterisations again when you use any example of the use of government as an argument against liberalism, conflating liberalism with anarchism. When Fyodor tells you that some countries have grown by trading, you dichotomise this against a state of ‘magical free market sleight of hand’. What the hell do you think markets are for if not trading? And then there is your endless use of the dichotomy between ‘economic values’ and ‘other’ values. Economics is borne of utilitarianism and economic evaluation are evaluations about the effects of policies on total welfare. They are a toolbox for performing welfare analyses and therefore there are almost no ‘non-economic’ considerations that in principle transcend economic ones.
Mark – the same can be said about you in the numerous muddle headed definitions of pro-market policies you have provided including the latest “largely a result of government intervention rather than some magical free market sleight of hidden hand”
There is no ‘rather than’ here. I’ve already argued liberals have no problems with public goods. you don’t come up with some non-sequitur about the provision of public goods leading to ‘overexpanded government’. I ignored that but now you bring up your silly characterisations again when you use any example of the use of government as an argument against liberalism, conflating liberalism with anarchism. When Fyodor tells you that some countries have grown by trading, you dichotomise this against a state of ‘magical free market sleight of hand’. What the hell do you think markets are for if not trading? And then there is your endless use of the dichotomy between ‘economic values’ and ‘other’ values. Economics is borne of utilitarianism and economic evaluation are evaluations about the effects of policies on total welfare. They are a toolbox for performing welfare analyses and therefore there are almost no ‘non-economic’ considerations that in principle transcend economic ones.
Jason, I’m tempted to respond that the narrowness of your arguments is demonstrated by your apparent need to buttress them with rudeness (eg. “muddle-headed”. “silly characterisations” etc). It must show true character on your part to ignore my non-sequiturs. Congratulations. You’re worth every penny your economics degree has earned you.
Jason, I’m tempted to respond that the narrowness of your arguments is demonstrated by your apparent need to buttress them with rudeness (eg. “muddle-headed”. “silly characterisations” etc). It must show true character on your part to ignore my non-sequiturs. Congratulations. You’re worth every penny your economics degree has earned you.
Alright, I apologise for the snark, but I’m getting rapidly tired of the attitude of intellectual superiority that you adopt in purveying your theology of the market, Jason.
Let me see if I can argue the point calmly.
If the Australian government intervened massively in the economy in order to facilitate the growth of certain sectors which were export oriented, and pursued a strategy of limited protectionism while doing it, free market types would scream. Yet it’s alright for Singapore or Malaysia to have done it. You appear to be conflating an export orientation to world markets with the freedom to compete in internal domestic markets and doing so in such a way which does not expose the contradictions in your underlying argument.
In this sense, I’m unable to see how you defend this as non-interventionist liberalism (and similar examples I’ve cited of preference to domestic producers and distorting international markets in America and the EU) where by your own lights the State ought not to be trespassing.
I’m well aware that you don’t believe that there are any values other than economic ones, as demonstrated in your last two sentences. Evidently you are unable to see how others might differ from you on this.
Alright, I apologise for the snark, but I’m getting rapidly tired of the attitude of intellectual superiority that you adopt in purveying your theology of the market, Jason.
Let me see if I can argue the point calmly.
If the Australian government intervened massively in the economy in order to facilitate the growth of certain sectors which were export oriented, and pursued a strategy of limited protectionism while doing it, free market types would scream. Yet it’s alright for Singapore or Malaysia to have done it. You appear to be conflating an export orientation to world markets with the freedom to compete in internal domestic markets and doing so in such a way which does not expose the contradictions in your underlying argument.
In this sense, I’m unable to see how you defend this as non-interventionist liberalism (and similar examples I’ve cited of preference to domestic producers and distorting international markets in America and the EU) where by your own lights the State ought not to be trespassing.
I’m well aware that you don’t believe that there are any values other than economic ones, as demonstrated in your last two sentences. Evidently you are unable to see how others might differ from you on this.
Alright let’s go back to the ‘muddle-headedness’ debate:
Jason:You can have a weak and overextended State which does too many things and is good at none of them occupying a higher % of GDP than a strong State which focuses on a few core functions and does them well.
Mark: my point is that the reliance on the state by liberals leads inevitably to an over-extended state – effective or otherwise.
Jason: No Mark, there are difference in % of GDP occupied by public sector between relatively more liberal and less liberal States
Mark: Relative to the ideals of liberalism, I?Äôd say that the American and British states are very intrusive into people?Äôs lives, Jason.
Please explain the logic of your responses and how they conform to the ideals of engaging with the argument, Mark. Your responses to my first point that one can distinguish between a strong state performing core functions competently and a weak one performing lots of functions, all incompetently was
‘reliance on the state by liberals leads inevitably to an over-extended state – effective or otherwise’
(i) are you saying there are no examples of governments which perform a few core things competently? have you suddenly become a libertarian arguing that *all* States are too big? Are you agreeing with Hayek’s Road to Serfdom thesis? do you think the Australian government is overextended?
(ii) if not, where is the evidence that the distinction between the two is untenable? are you arguing there is no distinction between, say, Australia and Zimbabwe?
(iii) what is your benchmark for overextension?
Simiarly when I noted that of course imperfect examples of each had to be compared, your response was ‘Relative to the ideals of liberalism, I?Äôd say that the American and British states are very intrusive into people?Äôs lives, Jason. /
which raised the same questions above. And I still don’t understand what relevance your point has to my point that the distinction between the two is a useful one to make and can even be measured (hence the measures of state capacity, etc made by political scientists as much as economists).
Alright let’s go back to the ‘muddle-headedness’ debate:
Jason:You can have a weak and overextended State which does too many things and is good at none of them occupying a higher % of GDP than a strong State which focuses on a few core functions and does them well.
Mark: my point is that the reliance on the state by liberals leads inevitably to an over-extended state – effective or otherwise.
Jason: No Mark, there are difference in % of GDP occupied by public sector between relatively more liberal and less liberal States
Mark: Relative to the ideals of liberalism, I?Äôd say that the American and British states are very intrusive into people?Äôs lives, Jason.
Please explain the logic of your responses and how they conform to the ideals of engaging with the argument, Mark. Your responses to my first point that one can distinguish between a strong state performing core functions competently and a weak one performing lots of functions, all incompetently was
‘reliance on the state by liberals leads inevitably to an over-extended state – effective or otherwise’
(i) are you saying there are no examples of governments which perform a few core things competently? have you suddenly become a libertarian arguing that *all* States are too big? Are you agreeing with Hayek’s Road to Serfdom thesis? do you think the Australian government is overextended?
(ii) if not, where is the evidence that the distinction between the two is untenable? are you arguing there is no distinction between, say, Australia and Zimbabwe?
(iii) what is your benchmark for overextension?
Simiarly when I noted that of course imperfect examples of each had to be compared, your response was ‘Relative to the ideals of liberalism, I?Äôd say that the American and British states are very intrusive into people?Äôs lives, Jason. /
which raised the same questions above. And I still don’t understand what relevance your point has to my point that the distinction between the two is a useful one to make and can even be measured (hence the measures of state capacity, etc made by political scientists as much as economists).
“If the Australian government intervened massively in the economy in order to facilitate the growth of certain sectors which were export oriented, and pursued a strategy of limited protectionism while doing it, free market types would scream. Yet it?Äôs alright for Singapore or Malaysia to have done it. You appear to be conflating an export orientation to world markets with the freedom to compete in internal domestic markets and doing so in such a way which does not expose the contradictions in your underlying argument.”
Yes we would and ideally we would avoid this. But the issue here is not what could have been done better in malaysia and singapore but to what extent the inteventionist aspects of the policies they pursued aided their development vs the more non-interventionist aspects. Policies, including interventionist policies have multiple effects. I did not read Fyodor as claiming that it was the ‘picking winners’ aspect that was responsible for development. Do I have to parse his arguments for you again?
1) ‘Singapore, S.K. and Malaysia all unified their governments under centralised control and focused on building national infrastructure, including education.’
Public goods, available to all comers, ‘picking winners’ aspect unimportant
2)’Rule of law prevailed in all three countries, and corruption has been relatively low.’
Public goods, available to all comers, ‘picking winners’ aspect unimportant
3)’Economic development was focused on the export sector, particularly of manufactures, using (at least initially) cheap labour. ‘
Here we come to the first and perhaps ambiguous reading. But ‘cheap labour’ i.e. flexible labour markets benefit all aspects of the developing economy. The standard reading here is that policies such as those encouraging cheap labour that the government intended to utilise solely for targeting the development of the export sector had spillover effects for the rest of the economy. They could have easily been better achieved simply by ensuring a properly flexible labour market without picking winners. Nothing said here supports the reading that it is the picking of winners per se that did any good. The existence of dirigiste policies in a package with other policies that promote general reductions in the cost of doing business does not mean that the digiriste policies’ effects are the dominant ones.
4)’Singapore got a free leg up from its strategic position and historic role as trading and financing entrepot.’
This is called building on comparative advantage.
“If the Australian government intervened massively in the economy in order to facilitate the growth of certain sectors which were export oriented, and pursued a strategy of limited protectionism while doing it, free market types would scream. Yet it?Äôs alright for Singapore or Malaysia to have done it. You appear to be conflating an export orientation to world markets with the freedom to compete in internal domestic markets and doing so in such a way which does not expose the contradictions in your underlying argument.”
Yes we would and ideally we would avoid this. But the issue here is not what could have been done better in malaysia and singapore but to what extent the inteventionist aspects of the policies they pursued aided their development vs the more non-interventionist aspects. Policies, including interventionist policies have multiple effects. I did not read Fyodor as claiming that it was the ‘picking winners’ aspect that was responsible for development. Do I have to parse his arguments for you again?
1) ‘Singapore, S.K. and Malaysia all unified their governments under centralised control and focused on building national infrastructure, including education.’
Public goods, available to all comers, ‘picking winners’ aspect unimportant
2)’Rule of law prevailed in all three countries, and corruption has been relatively low.’
Public goods, available to all comers, ‘picking winners’ aspect unimportant
3)’Economic development was focused on the export sector, particularly of manufactures, using (at least initially) cheap labour. ‘
Here we come to the first and perhaps ambiguous reading. But ‘cheap labour’ i.e. flexible labour markets benefit all aspects of the developing economy. The standard reading here is that policies such as those encouraging cheap labour that the government intended to utilise solely for targeting the development of the export sector had spillover effects for the rest of the economy. They could have easily been better achieved simply by ensuring a properly flexible labour market without picking winners. Nothing said here supports the reading that it is the picking of winners per se that did any good. The existence of dirigiste policies in a package with other policies that promote general reductions in the cost of doing business does not mean that the digiriste policies’ effects are the dominant ones.
4)’Singapore got a free leg up from its strategic position and historic role as trading and financing entrepot.’
This is called building on comparative advantage.
What Jason said. Less jibing please, Mark.
CS, what’s wrong with sophisticated and flexible capital markets? It’s usually the lack of these that gets developing economies in trouble with capital flows.
What Jason said. Less jibing please, Mark.
CS, what’s wrong with sophisticated and flexible capital markets? It’s usually the lack of these that gets developing economies in trouble with capital flows.
Jason, I’m well aware of arguments about state capacity. I just think you’re wearing rosy-eyed glasses in believing that some states are markedly more virtuous than others. If we’re going to compare like with like, assuming that in developing countries for a number of reasons it’s historically likely that the public share of GDP will be higher, there isn’t too much difference in the quantum across the OECD. What’s perhaps noteworthy is how the spending is directed. In Australia in 2001, for instance, according to OECD figures, social expenditures by the state as a proportion of gdp were 18%. In Denmark, this category of expenditure was 29.22%. Your immediate assumption might be that this is a reflection of the difference between the EU and the so-called Anglosphere. Not true – the EU average is 21.2% and the US figure is 23.97%. It’s a rough indicator, but it might serve as a proxy for the efficiency of social transfers as well as for the degree of support to disadvantaged people. The Netherlands with 11.83% provides a high degree of income support at low cost, while the US provides less than Australia but less efficiently – as in the marketised health care system prevalent in the US. So it’s clear that there’s no necessary relation between the effectiveness of government and commitment to a liberal economic ideology.
The US arguably then, and this point has been made in the political science literature, is a weak state internally performing lots of functions incompetently. While being wedded to a free market ideology.
Therefore I don’t feel obliged to set a benchmark in terms of gdp share as some sort of measure. I do point out that the most “liberal” states don’t necessarily do public administration more competently. This could be demonstrated in Australia through the complex raft of policies relating to tax and welfare transfers, and also preferential support for various oligopolies and direct concessional treatment for business. All contrary to the liberal rhetoric – and the desire for social engineering inherent in the way certain groups are targetted arguably leads to a quantifiable decrease in personal freedom.
So I’m unconvinced that liberal states walk the walk as well as talk the talk.
Your assumption that the “picking winners” element of economic development in Malaysia and Singapore is unimportant seems inconsistent with your previous statement that policies were targetted towards developing export intensive sectors. I doubt that flexible labour market policies per se would have ensured the same pace of economic development as it would seem that the logical inference from this is that competition would have been solely on the price of labour. Indeed you recognise this – and I think your statement is a theological statement of faith and ideological belief rather than any reference to the real world – as evidenced by the fact that you don’t supply any analysis which would disaggregate the relative contribution of dirigiste policies and those encouraging cheap labour (which were decidedly not “free market” policies either).
There’s certainly a labour cost advantage in most sub-Saharan African countries and I’m still waiting for your explanation, given the degree of intervention on the part of the IMF and Western creditors generally either through the G-8 or the World Bank to deregulate these economies why they’re going backwards instead of forwards. It’s very clear that dirigiste policies in that Continent have been ruled out of court.
Having said all that, if you continue to make arrogant and rude statements such as “Do I have to parse his arguments for you again?” and leap to the automatic assumption that everyone who disagrees with you is ignorant, I am not going to respond further to your comments on this thread. I think you should reflect on what Nicholas was saying at Catallaxy about the benefits of listening to your interlocutor. Your beliefs about economics are not the sole way of interpreting the world, and in fact you supply far less historical or contemporary evidence in support of them than other contributors to this debate have been obliged to do. Which leads me to confirm my suspicion that the basis for your lauding of markets is ideological rather than scientific.
Jason, I’m well aware of arguments about state capacity. I just think you’re wearing rosy-eyed glasses in believing that some states are markedly more virtuous than others. If we’re going to compare like with like, assuming that in developing countries for a number of reasons it’s historically likely that the public share of GDP will be higher, there isn’t too much difference in the quantum across the OECD. What’s perhaps noteworthy is how the spending is directed. In Australia in 2001, for instance, according to OECD figures, social expenditures by the state as a proportion of gdp were 18%. In Denmark, this category of expenditure was 29.22%. Your immediate assumption might be that this is a reflection of the difference between the EU and the so-called Anglosphere. Not true – the EU average is 21.2% and the US figure is 23.97%. It’s a rough indicator, but it might serve as a proxy for the efficiency of social transfers as well as for the degree of support to disadvantaged people. The Netherlands with 11.83% provides a high degree of income support at low cost, while the US provides less than Australia but less efficiently – as in the marketised health care system prevalent in the US. So it’s clear that there’s no necessary relation between the effectiveness of government and commitment to a liberal economic ideology.
The US arguably then, and this point has been made in the political science literature, is a weak state internally performing lots of functions incompetently. While being wedded to a free market ideology.
Therefore I don’t feel obliged to set a benchmark in terms of gdp share as some sort of measure. I do point out that the most “liberal” states don’t necessarily do public administration more competently. This could be demonstrated in Australia through the complex raft of policies relating to tax and welfare transfers, and also preferential support for various oligopolies and direct concessional treatment for business. All contrary to the liberal rhetoric – and the desire for social engineering inherent in the way certain groups are targetted arguably leads to a quantifiable decrease in personal freedom.
So I’m unconvinced that liberal states walk the walk as well as talk the talk.
Your assumption that the “picking winners” element of economic development in Malaysia and Singapore is unimportant seems inconsistent with your previous statement that policies were targetted towards developing export intensive sectors. I doubt that flexible labour market policies per se would have ensured the same pace of economic development as it would seem that the logical inference from this is that competition would have been solely on the price of labour. Indeed you recognise this – and I think your statement is a theological statement of faith and ideological belief rather than any reference to the real world – as evidenced by the fact that you don’t supply any analysis which would disaggregate the relative contribution of dirigiste policies and those encouraging cheap labour (which were decidedly not “free market” policies either).
There’s certainly a labour cost advantage in most sub-Saharan African countries and I’m still waiting for your explanation, given the degree of intervention on the part of the IMF and Western creditors generally either through the G-8 or the World Bank to deregulate these economies why they’re going backwards instead of forwards. It’s very clear that dirigiste policies in that Continent have been ruled out of court.
Having said all that, if you continue to make arrogant and rude statements such as “Do I have to parse his arguments for you again?” and leap to the automatic assumption that everyone who disagrees with you is ignorant, I am not going to respond further to your comments on this thread. I think you should reflect on what Nicholas was saying at Catallaxy about the benefits of listening to your interlocutor. Your beliefs about economics are not the sole way of interpreting the world, and in fact you supply far less historical or contemporary evidence in support of them than other contributors to this debate have been obliged to do. Which leads me to confirm my suspicion that the basis for your lauding of markets is ideological rather than scientific.
I meant to provide the link for the OECD figures.
I meant to provide the link for the OECD figures.
Fydor, it’s meaningless. Who would want unsophisticated and inflexible financial markets? In short, what on earth are you talking about?
If I was to take you literally, it could be argued that there already are few things on earth as ‘sophisticated’ as the baroque recesses of international capital markets, and also few markets that are more ‘flexible’. Next thing you’ll be telling me you don’t want over-regulated markets (who wants an “overegulated” anything)?
Meanwhile, back in the world of plainspeak, I would opt for capital markets that produced welfare benefits that outweighed their costs.
Fydor, it’s meaningless. Who would want unsophisticated and inflexible financial markets? In short, what on earth are you talking about?
If I was to take you literally, it could be argued that there already are few things on earth as ‘sophisticated’ as the baroque recesses of international capital markets, and also few markets that are more ‘flexible’. Next thing you’ll be telling me you don’t want over-regulated markets (who wants an “overegulated” anything)?
Meanwhile, back in the world of plainspeak, I would opt for capital markets that produced welfare benefits that outweighed their costs.
“The existence of dirigiste policies in a package with other policies that promote general reductions in the cost of doing business does not mean that the digiriste policies?Äô effects are the dominant ones.”
Jason S as this applies to Singapore and SK in particular are you saying that (in the case of the former) LKY’s policy after the Brits left of going from 3rd world to first would have happened without him picking the winners both political and economic? Such as HDB housing, investing in SIA, Keppell Corp., persuading Caltex to set up the refinery, making a regional transport and communication hub? Forgive my lack of economic credentials, but I lived there for 2 years and next door for 8 more, and the mantra as I understand it, is that if Lee Quan Yew hadn’t been picking winners for 30 years they would now be a relatively poor state of Malaysia with sfa.
“The existence of dirigiste policies in a package with other policies that promote general reductions in the cost of doing business does not mean that the digiriste policies?Äô effects are the dominant ones.”
Jason S as this applies to Singapore and SK in particular are you saying that (in the case of the former) LKY’s policy after the Brits left of going from 3rd world to first would have happened without him picking the winners both political and economic? Such as HDB housing, investing in SIA, Keppell Corp., persuading Caltex to set up the refinery, making a regional transport and communication hub? Forgive my lack of economic credentials, but I lived there for 2 years and next door for 8 more, and the mantra as I understand it, is that if Lee Quan Yew hadn’t been picking winners for 30 years they would now be a relatively poor state of Malaysia with sfa.
Indeed, Peter.
A reflection on liberalism from the point of view of a sociological analysis of political philosophy: it’s a discourse of mastery. This is the key to the contradiction involved in the antinomy between autopoeitic and self-sustaining complex systems and an interventionist state (however bounded – realistically or in theory). Liberalism, as heir to the Enlightenment, celebrates among other things the triumph of the human will and it’s precisely the action of the liberal elite – working through the organs of the State – that creates the conditions for so called laws of the free market to operate, then disappears again behind the veil of science.
Indeed, Peter.
A reflection on liberalism from the point of view of a sociological analysis of political philosophy: it’s a discourse of mastery. This is the key to the contradiction involved in the antinomy between autopoeitic and self-sustaining complex systems and an interventionist state (however bounded – realistically or in theory). Liberalism, as heir to the Enlightenment, celebrates among other things the triumph of the human will and it’s precisely the action of the liberal elite – working through the organs of the State – that creates the conditions for so called laws of the free market to operate, then disappears again behind the veil of science.
Precisely.
Hence the need to abolish customary property rights in developing countries, introduce monoculture so people are forced to work in factories, even the monetisation needed by taxation which compels wage labour or selling products on the market and disrupts traditional mechanisms of exchange.
What Marx called primitive accumulation – violent and coercive imposition of market norms.
And on the local scene, if low waged work is so attractive, why the need for an elaborate set of sanctions and a massive bureaucracy to force people into it?
Precisely.
Hence the need to abolish customary property rights in developing countries, introduce monoculture so people are forced to work in factories, even the monetisation needed by taxation which compels wage labour or selling products on the market and disrupts traditional mechanisms of exchange.
What Marx called primitive accumulation – violent and coercive imposition of market norms.
And on the local scene, if low waged work is so attractive, why the need for an elaborate set of sanctions and a massive bureaucracy to force people into it?
Thanks Mark, and commenters. A few replies:
1. Liam, I’d like to see the comment by EJH in context. Do you have the reference?
2. Homer appears to be frozen in trade-versus-protection debate, when no-one opposes trade.
3. I basically agree with the comments by Andrew and Guy (although I wouldn’t describe the US-Oz FTA as either a ‘free trade’ or a ‘simple trade agreement’). Even at the height of the rhetoric, the main institutions where acting by leave of the US and a few other states. My main focus was on analysing the content of the ‘globalisation’ debate, how it has changed, and to what effects.
4. Much debate has turned around the state, the history of which during this period is central, imo. Remember, the claims by the hyperglobalists were very large (see start of my essay), and I don’t think it’s good enough to say, well no-one really believed that so it doesn’t matter any more.
My analysis of the state in this would start from the fact that, even governments rhetorically dedicated to cutting back the functions of the state have inevitably strengthened it, not only because the imposition of ‘smaller government’ requires the hiring of many people to do all the imposing on a recalcitrant reality, but more profoundly as a consequence of the way attempts to reduce the state require an intensification of policy by giving ever more precise instructions on what state funds may be spent on. This intensification of policy is obvious to anyone who has worked in government over recent decades. Policies that were perhaps only a half-a-dozen pages and could be operationalised by clerks when they began a couple of decades ago now run to hundreds of pages presided over by specialists with associated lawyers and appeal processes.
The consequence is a stronger state, even if it is smaller. Yet over time it invariably has not resulted in ‘smaller’. Moreover, as John Quiggin pointed out (in reviewing Mike Keating’s new book recently), to the extent that it is a more effective state (in line with all the managerial rhetoric) it is much ‘bigger’ again, to which we can add the reach of the new technologies and the contemporary government modus operandi of “total (media) spectrum dominance”. As Mark says, the implosion of weaker/smaller states has also added to the effective size of the powerful ones. More latterly, we have an effective junking of the rhetoric of smaller government altogether. This I suspect is a much bigger story than commenters have allowed, and is the major (but rhetorically ironic) constant that runs through the neoliberal/neoconservative period. Incidentally, perhaps this may also help explain the apparent stengthening of the traditional advantages of incumbency.
5. Foydor’s (first) comment is OK, minus attitude and his conclusions. There are at least three positions here. The first is to treat ‘globalisation’ in the way that economic historians have always treated the history of the world economy (social historians have also tended to generally start from this kind of economic analysis, and work upwards and outwards to larger historical accounts). In general, that’s what Fyodor and some others are saying, and its fine, although I don’t know why we just can’t call in world social and economic history, as we always have. This brings us to the second position, which is the ‘borderless world’ joined to the neoliberal Washington Consensus doctrine ah la the 1990s. My (third) position is to critique the latter with an analysis of what actually has occurred during the period of globalisation rhetoric, drawing on the theoretical and empirical traditions of the first position. This is, I think, where left critics accidentally diverge, with some schools quite happy to accept the term as a synonym for world economic history. Fine, but the question remains, what is new about the period, and I think there are at least the three attributes that I nominated, call the period what you will.
6. On Liam’s second point, endorsed by Foydor, there is a major division here, with many scholars, and certainly not only identified ‘left’ scholars, highly critical of the globalisation of financial (as distinct from productive, on the ground) capital.
7. Thanks to tim for correcting the spelling of ‘wither’. Otherwise I have done a light edit and reduced his 80 odd words of editorial comment to 2.
I think that’s more than enough for now.
Thanks Mark, and commenters. A few replies:
1. Liam, I’d like to see the comment by EJH in context. Do you have the reference?
2. Homer appears to be frozen in trade-versus-protection debate, when no-one opposes trade.
3. I basically agree with the comments by Andrew and Guy (although I wouldn’t describe the US-Oz FTA as either a ‘free trade’ or a ‘simple trade agreement’). Even at the height of the rhetoric, the main institutions where acting by leave of the US and a few other states. My main focus was on analysing the content of the ‘globalisation’ debate, how it has changed, and to what effects.
4. Much debate has turned around the state, the history of which during this period is central, imo. Remember, the claims by the hyperglobalists were very large (see start of my essay), and I don’t think it’s good enough to say, well no-one really believed that so it doesn’t matter any more.
My analysis of the state in this would start from the fact that, even governments rhetorically dedicated to cutting back the functions of the state have inevitably strengthened it, not only because the imposition of ‘smaller government’ requires the hiring of many people to do all the imposing on a recalcitrant reality, but more profoundly as a consequence of the way attempts to reduce the state require an intensification of policy by giving ever more precise instructions on what state funds may be spent on. This intensification of policy is obvious to anyone who has worked in government over recent decades. Policies that were perhaps only a half-a-dozen pages and could be operationalised by clerks when they began a couple of decades ago now run to hundreds of pages presided over by specialists with associated lawyers and appeal processes.
The consequence is a stronger state, even if it is smaller. Yet over time it invariably has not resulted in ‘smaller’. Moreover, as John Quiggin pointed out (in reviewing Mike Keating’s new book recently), to the extent that it is a more effective state (in line with all the managerial rhetoric) it is much ‘bigger’ again, to which we can add the reach of the new technologies and the contemporary government modus operandi of “total (media) spectrum dominance”. As Mark says, the implosion of weaker/smaller states has also added to the effective size of the powerful ones. More latterly, we have an effective junking of the rhetoric of smaller government altogether. This I suspect is a much bigger story than commenters have allowed, and is the major (but rhetorically ironic) constant that runs through the neoliberal/neoconservative period. Incidentally, perhaps this may also help explain the apparent stengthening of the traditional advantages of incumbency.
5. Foydor’s (first) comment is OK, minus attitude and his conclusions. There are at least three positions here. The first is to treat ‘globalisation’ in the way that economic historians have always treated the history of the world economy (social historians have also tended to generally start from this kind of economic analysis, and work upwards and outwards to larger historical accounts). In general, that’s what Fyodor and some others are saying, and its fine, although I don’t know why we just can’t call in world social and economic history, as we always have. This brings us to the second position, which is the ‘borderless world’ joined to the neoliberal Washington Consensus doctrine ah la the 1990s. My (third) position is to critique the latter with an analysis of what actually has occurred during the period of globalisation rhetoric, drawing on the theoretical and empirical traditions of the first position. This is, I think, where left critics accidentally diverge, with some schools quite happy to accept the term as a synonym for world economic history. Fine, but the question remains, what is new about the period, and I think there are at least the three attributes that I nominated, call the period what you will.
6. On Liam’s second point, endorsed by Foydor, there is a major division here, with many scholars, and certainly not only identified ‘left’ scholars, highly critical of the globalisation of financial (as distinct from productive, on the ground) capital.
7. Thanks to tim for correcting the spelling of ‘wither’. Otherwise I have done a light edit and reduced his 80 odd words of editorial comment to 2.
I think that’s more than enough for now.
As usual, I’m totally professionally incapable of bringing forward a reference. It was an article of some kind I read, most probably while avoiding doing something urgent.
You’ve got me interested—and I’ve got something urgent due—so I’ll find yout for you, cs.
As usual, I’m totally professionally incapable of bringing forward a reference. It was an article of some kind I read, most probably while avoiding doing something urgent.
You’ve got me interested—and I’ve got something urgent due—so I’ll find yout for you, cs.
CS,
Who wouldn’t want “capital markets that produced welfare benefits that outweighed their costs”? It’s meaningless.
I only restated the desirability of sophisticated and flexible capital markets because you wilfully, despite my correction, interpreted this to mean a preference on my part for perfectly open capital markets for all countries. If you think such markets are homogenous and uniformly “baroque”, you’d have tremendous difficulty explaining why Thailand had such problems with its capital account a decade ago. If its financial system had been more robust, it might not have suffered the calamity visited upon it.
CS,
Who wouldn’t want “capital markets that produced welfare benefits that outweighed their costs”? It’s meaningless.
I only restated the desirability of sophisticated and flexible capital markets because you wilfully, despite my correction, interpreted this to mean a preference on my part for perfectly open capital markets for all countries. If you think such markets are homogenous and uniformly “baroque”, you’d have tremendous difficulty explaining why Thailand had such problems with its capital account a decade ago. If its financial system had been more robust, it might not have suffered the calamity visited upon it.
OK, cs, from a little while’s pleasant going-through-notes and database searching, here’s what’s happened.
I’ve conflated this article, on May Day anti-capitalist protests, which marginally (and without reference) quotes Hobsbawm, with the rest of Hobsbawm’s books.
The article isn’t by Hobsbawm, of course, but by a Guardian hack. I’ve learned (again) my lesson on keeping better notes and not shooting my mouth off at the first sign of an interesting thread.
OK, cs, from a little while’s pleasant going-through-notes and database searching, here’s what’s happened.
I’ve conflated this article, on May Day anti-capitalist protests, which marginally (and without reference) quotes Hobsbawm, with the rest of Hobsbawm’s books.
The article isn’t by Hobsbawm, of course, but by a Guardian hack. I’ve learned (again) my lesson on keeping better notes and not shooting my mouth off at the first sign of an interesting thread.
“Your assumption that the “picking winners” element of economic development in Malaysia and Singapore is unimportant seems inconsistent with your previous statement that policies were targetted towards developing export intensive sectors.”
Jason did not say that dirigism was ineffective or unimportant, and neither do I for that matter. The point both of us emphasise is that the effectiveness of such dirigisme is difficult to assess independent of the positive business environment created under strong, centralised governments enforcing the rule of law with relatively little corruption and natural comparative advantages.
“There?Äôs certainly a labour cost advantage in most sub-Saharan African countries and I?Äôm still waiting for your explanation, given the degree of intervention on the part of the IMF and Western creditors generally either through the G-8 or the World Bank to deregulate these economies why they?Äôre going backwards instead of forwards. It?Äôs very clear that dirigiste policies in that Continent have been ruled out of court.”
I’m more than a littel surprised that you could have read my previous posts and still argue that no explanation has been provided. Dirigisme has been tried in Africa, with woeful results. What hasn’t been tried is strong, transparent and clean government and the rule of law. Get those things right and you can start to work on other problems.
“Having said all that, if you continue to make arrogant and rude statements such as “Do I have to parse his arguments for you again?” and leap to the automatic assumption that everyone who disagrees with you is ignorant, I am not going to respond further to your comments on this thread.”
That statement was precipitated by your misreading of previous comments, Mark, and Jason did not say that you were ignorant. The implication that I read is that you were twisting his words, and mine for that matter.
“Your beliefs about economics are not the sole way of interpreting the world, and in fact you supply far less historical or contemporary evidence in support of them than other contributors to this debate have been obliged to do. Which leads me to confirm my suspicion that the basis for your lauding of markets is ideological rather than scientific.”
Jason has provided plenty of evidence to support his case, and your position is as much ideologically driven as his or mine. I find your response to be as high-handed as his (or mine), if not more so. As for the lauding of markets, the evidence speaks for itself.
“Your assumption that the “picking winners” element of economic development in Malaysia and Singapore is unimportant seems inconsistent with your previous statement that policies were targetted towards developing export intensive sectors.”
Jason did not say that dirigism was ineffective or unimportant, and neither do I for that matter. The point both of us emphasise is that the effectiveness of such dirigisme is difficult to assess independent of the positive business environment created under strong, centralised governments enforcing the rule of law with relatively little corruption and natural comparative advantages.
“There?Äôs certainly a labour cost advantage in most sub-Saharan African countries and I?Äôm still waiting for your explanation, given the degree of intervention on the part of the IMF and Western creditors generally either through the G-8 or the World Bank to deregulate these economies why they?Äôre going backwards instead of forwards. It?Äôs very clear that dirigiste policies in that Continent have been ruled out of court.”
I’m more than a littel surprised that you could have read my previous posts and still argue that no explanation has been provided. Dirigisme has been tried in Africa, with woeful results. What hasn’t been tried is strong, transparent and clean government and the rule of law. Get those things right and you can start to work on other problems.
“Having said all that, if you continue to make arrogant and rude statements such as “Do I have to parse his arguments for you again?” and leap to the automatic assumption that everyone who disagrees with you is ignorant, I am not going to respond further to your comments on this thread.”
That statement was precipitated by your misreading of previous comments, Mark, and Jason did not say that you were ignorant. The implication that I read is that you were twisting his words, and mine for that matter.
“Your beliefs about economics are not the sole way of interpreting the world, and in fact you supply far less historical or contemporary evidence in support of them than other contributors to this debate have been obliged to do. Which leads me to confirm my suspicion that the basis for your lauding of markets is ideological rather than scientific.”
Jason has provided plenty of evidence to support his case, and your position is as much ideologically driven as his or mine. I find your response to be as high-handed as his (or mine), if not more so. As for the lauding of markets, the evidence speaks for itself.
Indeed the evidence does speak for itself, Fyodor. Refer to Chris’ article on global inequality.
Jason did say that he suspected that the outcome in Malaysia and Singapore may have been the same without dirigisme and based just on a low wage policy, and that it was impossible to disentangle the degree to which this was so. He also argued that ‘picking winners’ was not part of the success of these nations, to which I thought Peter Kemp responded well.
The question that you thought I was addressing to you was in fact addressed to Jason.
Indeed the evidence does speak for itself, Fyodor. Refer to Chris’ article on global inequality.
Jason did say that he suspected that the outcome in Malaysia and Singapore may have been the same without dirigisme and based just on a low wage policy, and that it was impossible to disentangle the degree to which this was so. He also argued that ‘picking winners’ was not part of the success of these nations, to which I thought Peter Kemp responded well.
The question that you thought I was addressing to you was in fact addressed to Jason.
What hasn?Äôt been tried is strong, transparent and clean government and the rule of law. Get those things right and you can start to work on other problems.
Such as the restrictive trade regime imposed by the West which seeks to prevent African nations from being competitive agriculturally or industrially? I’d love to see that worked on consistent with the rule of law.
What hasn?Äôt been tried is strong, transparent and clean government and the rule of law. Get those things right and you can start to work on other problems.
Such as the restrictive trade regime imposed by the West which seeks to prevent African nations from being competitive agriculturally or industrially? I’d love to see that worked on consistent with the rule of law.
See my comment above, Fyodor. You’ve made it clear that you and Jason don’t share precisely the same views, so I’m interested in his response.
See my comment above, Fyodor. You’ve made it clear that you and Jason don’t share precisely the same views, so I’m interested in his response.
Mark,
I couldn’t let the following pass without comment:
“A reflection on liberalism from the point of view of a sociological analysis of political philosophy: it?Äôs a discourse of mastery. This is the key to the contradiction involved in the antinomy between autopoeitic and self-sustaining complex systems and an interventionist state (however bounded – realistically or in theory). Liberalism, as heir to the Enlightenment, celebrates among other things the triumph of the human will and it?Äôs precisely the action of the liberal elite – working through the organs of the State – that creates the conditions for so called laws of the free market to operate, then disappears again behind the veil of science.”
I must admit I had to reach for the virtual dictionary when you described “complex systems” as autopoeitic. Was “self-organising” too much of a stretch for you, and isn’t it redundant to find contradiction in antinomy?
But enough snark. The irritating aspect to this lecturing paragraph is that you proceed from PoMo obfuscation to a bold, unsupported assertion, when you could have expressed it much more simply as: rich blokes like liberalism because it serves them. But that would have been too crude, wouldn’t it? Much better to hide YOUR ideology behind academespeak.
Mark,
I couldn’t let the following pass without comment:
“A reflection on liberalism from the point of view of a sociological analysis of political philosophy: it?Äôs a discourse of mastery. This is the key to the contradiction involved in the antinomy between autopoeitic and self-sustaining complex systems and an interventionist state (however bounded – realistically or in theory). Liberalism, as heir to the Enlightenment, celebrates among other things the triumph of the human will and it?Äôs precisely the action of the liberal elite – working through the organs of the State – that creates the conditions for so called laws of the free market to operate, then disappears again behind the veil of science.”
I must admit I had to reach for the virtual dictionary when you described “complex systems” as autopoeitic. Was “self-organising” too much of a stretch for you, and isn’t it redundant to find contradiction in antinomy?
But enough snark. The irritating aspect to this lecturing paragraph is that you proceed from PoMo obfuscation to a bold, unsupported assertion, when you could have expressed it much more simply as: rich blokes like liberalism because it serves them. But that would have been too crude, wouldn’t it? Much better to hide YOUR ideology behind academespeak.
Well, you can identify the point of contradiction around which an antinomy comes into being. They’re not quite the same thing.
I was spending my evening reading political theory for my work, so yeah, that’s obviously influenced my expression.
I do agree that rich blokes like liberalism because it serves them. But I also want to make the point that this leads to the sort of highly intrusive interventionist and intrusive state that Chris talked about in his long and valuable comment above.
Well, you can identify the point of contradiction around which an antinomy comes into being. They’re not quite the same thing.
I was spending my evening reading political theory for my work, so yeah, that’s obviously influenced my expression.
I do agree that rich blokes like liberalism because it serves them. But I also want to make the point that this leads to the sort of highly intrusive interventionist and intrusive state that Chris talked about in his long and valuable comment above.
Here’s the support for the assertion.
Here’s the support for the assertion.
And what’s with the charges of obfuscation, Fyodor? I don’t see them levelled against Jason when he writes in welfare economics-ese with little concession for his non-economist readers.
I have never hid my ideology, Fyodor. The difference is that rather than professing the market theologically as some do, I feel obliged to justify the claims I make with historical evidence. That’s probably because my ideology is not the dominant one. Claims about the virtues of free markets are regarded as self-evidently true, and rarely are their proponents required to descend into the empirical realm and look at how markets actually influence people and how they come to be constructed. Just sayin’…
And what’s with the charges of obfuscation, Fyodor? I don’t see them levelled against Jason when he writes in welfare economics-ese with little concession for his non-economist readers.
I have never hid my ideology, Fyodor. The difference is that rather than professing the market theologically as some do, I feel obliged to justify the claims I make with historical evidence. That’s probably because my ideology is not the dominant one. Claims about the virtues of free markets are regarded as self-evidently true, and rarely are their proponents required to descend into the empirical realm and look at how markets actually influence people and how they come to be constructed. Just sayin’…
Mark,
Given that you stated,
“Having said all that, if you continue to make arrogant and rude statements such as “Do I have to parse his arguments for you again?” and leap to the automatic assumption that everyone who disagrees with you is ignorant, I am not going to respond further to your comments on this thread.”
I assumed that Jason made up his own mind on whether it was worthwhile answering your questions. I had a stab at it in his absence. I’ll apologise to him, but somehow I don’t think he’ll mind all that much.
As to our discourse:
“Refer to Chris?Äô article on global inequality.”
I’ve alread read it. CS does little more than repeat the familiar whinge about inequality without proposing how to lift the poor out of their situation. In the meantime, people of enterprise are accumulating wealth via trade in markets. CS himself is totally in favour of trade. Why aren’t you?
“Jason did say that he suspected that the outcome in Malaysia and Singapore may have been the same without dirigisme and based just on a low wage policy, and that it was impossible to disentangle the degree to which this was so. He also argued that ‘picking winners?Äô was not part of the success of these nations, to which I thought Peter Kemp responded well.”
I’ll repeat Jason’s (and my) point again: it is very difficult, if not impossible to separate out the beneficial effect of dirigisme in a market where government and the economy are generally run well. No offence to Peter, but his contribution was equivalent to “I’ve been to Bali, too”. Singapore WAS part of Malaysia until it gained its independence in 1965, and always benefited from the previously stated comparative advantage of its geopolitical position.
“Such as the restrictive trade regime imposed by the West which seeks to prevent African nations from being competitive agriculturally or industrially? I?Äôd love to see that worked on consistent with the rule of law.”
What is the restrictive trade regime you’re talking about? The GATT/WTO system that covers 148 countries, including Australia and most of Africa?
Mark,
Given that you stated,
“Having said all that, if you continue to make arrogant and rude statements such as “Do I have to parse his arguments for you again?” and leap to the automatic assumption that everyone who disagrees with you is ignorant, I am not going to respond further to your comments on this thread.”
I assumed that Jason made up his own mind on whether it was worthwhile answering your questions. I had a stab at it in his absence. I’ll apologise to him, but somehow I don’t think he’ll mind all that much.
As to our discourse:
“Refer to Chris?Äô article on global inequality.”
I’ve alread read it. CS does little more than repeat the familiar whinge about inequality without proposing how to lift the poor out of their situation. In the meantime, people of enterprise are accumulating wealth via trade in markets. CS himself is totally in favour of trade. Why aren’t you?
“Jason did say that he suspected that the outcome in Malaysia and Singapore may have been the same without dirigisme and based just on a low wage policy, and that it was impossible to disentangle the degree to which this was so. He also argued that ‘picking winners?Äô was not part of the success of these nations, to which I thought Peter Kemp responded well.”
I’ll repeat Jason’s (and my) point again: it is very difficult, if not impossible to separate out the beneficial effect of dirigisme in a market where government and the economy are generally run well. No offence to Peter, but his contribution was equivalent to “I’ve been to Bali, too”. Singapore WAS part of Malaysia until it gained its independence in 1965, and always benefited from the previously stated comparative advantage of its geopolitical position.
“Such as the restrictive trade regime imposed by the West which seeks to prevent African nations from being competitive agriculturally or industrially? I?Äôd love to see that worked on consistent with the rule of law.”
What is the restrictive trade regime you’re talking about? The GATT/WTO system that covers 148 countries, including Australia and most of Africa?
Amen to that, cs. I can think of one—the very much pro-market and pro-free trade Professor Tobin. I’m still in two minds about a Tobin Tax, but I’m glad somebody from the OTHER SIDE is a little bit critical of international currency trade and speculation.
Amen to that, cs. I can think of one—the very much pro-market and pro-free trade Professor Tobin. I’m still in two minds about a Tobin Tax, but I’m glad somebody from the OTHER SIDE is a little bit critical of international currency trade and speculation.
Congratulations everyone, this is now officially a Hayek thread.
Congratulations everyone, this is now officially a Hayek thread.
Ok, last comment on this particular question. I don’t think it’s helpful to personalise these debates. I have observed that in general – and I’m not trying to take a potshot at anyone here – that those who defend the neo-liberal position don’t actually argue the case except by restating the dogmas of free markets. For instance, I really had to try hard in this debate to get anyone to explain and back up the claims about markets and Asian success stories, and even then most of what was written was assertion rather than careful historical examination of the facts. At least that’s how it feels to me. I still don’t feel that the question of how and when African countries will take off due to globalisation has been addressed with any reference to the reality there, and points raised about the restrictive practices of the West and the predatory behaviour of multinationals go unanswered, as they don’t fit the narrative. No-one has mentioned Latin America, but you can look at the failure of IMF inspired reforms in countries such as Argentina to do anything other than transfer wealth to foreigners and a small compradore elite. I suppose if this were raised, the answer would be corruption or something. But again, if you look at the rigorous research conducted by the OECD on comparative levels of corruption – some Western countries are way up there. It’s also puzzling from this point of view as to why people in Latin America are so unhappy with their globalised utopia, and why the Left has done so well there on the basis of popular support.
So my broader point is that what frustrates me about these discussions is that the position argued by those who happily accept the dominant ideology is treated as if the “laws” of economics are self-evident and anyone who questions them is a knave or a fool. This is itself part of the ideological phenomenon I’m talking about when I refer to the Washington consensus and the orthodoxies involved. It’s also rare that anyone admits that this position might involve a degree of self-interest.
I really do think that there are elements of belief and theological assertion – as there are in any ideology that doesn’t get down and dirty with the empirical.
Ok, last comment on this particular question. I don’t think it’s helpful to personalise these debates. I have observed that in general – and I’m not trying to take a potshot at anyone here – that those who defend the neo-liberal position don’t actually argue the case except by restating the dogmas of free markets. For instance, I really had to try hard in this debate to get anyone to explain and back up the claims about markets and Asian success stories, and even then most of what was written was assertion rather than careful historical examination of the facts. At least that’s how it feels to me. I still don’t feel that the question of how and when African countries will take off due to globalisation has been addressed with any reference to the reality there, and points raised about the restrictive practices of the West and the predatory behaviour of multinationals go unanswered, as they don’t fit the narrative. No-one has mentioned Latin America, but you can look at the failure of IMF inspired reforms in countries such as Argentina to do anything other than transfer wealth to foreigners and a small compradore elite. I suppose if this were raised, the answer would be corruption or something. But again, if you look at the rigorous research conducted by the OECD on comparative levels of corruption – some Western countries are way up there. It’s also puzzling from this point of view as to why people in Latin America are so unhappy with their globalised utopia, and why the Left has done so well there on the basis of popular support.
So my broader point is that what frustrates me about these discussions is that the position argued by those who happily accept the dominant ideology is treated as if the “laws” of economics are self-evident and anyone who questions them is a knave or a fool. This is itself part of the ideological phenomenon I’m talking about when I refer to the Washington consensus and the orthodoxies involved. It’s also rare that anyone admits that this position might involve a degree of self-interest.
I really do think that there are elements of belief and theological assertion – as there are in any ideology that doesn’t get down and dirty with the empirical.
Fyodor, in answer to your question, the WTO fails to address the agricultural protectionism that blocks developing countries from selling to the West and condones dumping in their markets. I’m sick of repeating myself – the IMF acts against “import substitution” as part of its policy prescriptions and thus prevents indigenous industrial development in African countries which might compete with MNCs. I’ve done some reading on the realities of development in Africa.
As to trade, what Liam said.
Fyodor, in answer to your question, the WTO fails to address the agricultural protectionism that blocks developing countries from selling to the West and condones dumping in their markets. I’m sick of repeating myself – the IMF acts against “import substitution” as part of its policy prescriptions and thus prevents indigenous industrial development in African countries which might compete with MNCs. I’ve done some reading on the realities of development in Africa.
As to trade, what Liam said.
Mark,
First off, you’re the one personalising debate on this issue. Referring to points of view espoused by Jason and me as “dogmatic” and ideologically driven is more than a little rich. It’s also more than a little comical for you to declare from the lofty heights that “I really do think that there are elements of belief and theological assertion – as there are in any ideology that doesn?Äôt get down and dirty with the empirical.” How much empirical economic data have you produced so far supporting your assertions? If you want to play that game, please begin and we’ll see how far you get.
Asia’s been discussed. So has Africa. You seem to be blind to what I’m telling you on the latter. I’ll sum up Africa’s economic backwardness in two words: BAD GOVERNMENT.
“the WTO fails to address the agricultural protectionism that blocks developing countries from selling to the West and condones dumping in their markets.”
No, it does neither. In case you didn’t notice recently, I’m against agricultural protectionism, as are more people in favour of free trade.
“I?Äôm sick of repeating myself – the IMF acts against “import substitution” as part of its policy prescriptions and thus prevents indigenous industrial development in African countries which might compete with MNCs.”
That’s the first time you’ve said that, and you’re wrong. Heaven forbid I should be defending that statist, dirigiste body, the IMF, but yes, it provides financial assistance with strings attached, but countries don’t have to take the money. Furthermore, what the IMF is concerned about is GOVERNMENT-sponsored import competition. The IMF is in no way opposed to private industry competing with imports. Quite the contrary.
Mark,
First off, you’re the one personalising debate on this issue. Referring to points of view espoused by Jason and me as “dogmatic” and ideologically driven is more than a little rich. It’s also more than a little comical for you to declare from the lofty heights that “I really do think that there are elements of belief and theological assertion – as there are in any ideology that doesn?Äôt get down and dirty with the empirical.” How much empirical economic data have you produced so far supporting your assertions? If you want to play that game, please begin and we’ll see how far you get.
Asia’s been discussed. So has Africa. You seem to be blind to what I’m telling you on the latter. I’ll sum up Africa’s economic backwardness in two words: BAD GOVERNMENT.
“the WTO fails to address the agricultural protectionism that blocks developing countries from selling to the West and condones dumping in their markets.”
No, it does neither. In case you didn’t notice recently, I’m against agricultural protectionism, as are more people in favour of free trade.
“I?Äôm sick of repeating myself – the IMF acts against “import substitution” as part of its policy prescriptions and thus prevents indigenous industrial development in African countries which might compete with MNCs.”
That’s the first time you’ve said that, and you’re wrong. Heaven forbid I should be defending that statist, dirigiste body, the IMF, but yes, it provides financial assistance with strings attached, but countries don’t have to take the money. Furthermore, what the IMF is concerned about is GOVERNMENT-sponsored import competition. The IMF is in no way opposed to private industry competing with imports. Quite the contrary.
Fyodor, for a start the figures from the OECD on the size of government in response to Jason’s point – to which there was no response.
You’ve also moved from admitting that your position is ideological as mine is to castigating me for pointing out that (in general) defenders of a dominant ideological position feel less pressure to justify it. The evidence for this is in every newspaper, where the assumptions behind free market ideology are never questioned and those that do are regularly accused of being antideluvian lefty throwbacks.
It sincerely is not meant to be a personal but a sociological observation, and I apologise if I’ve given offence.
I wonder – if there’s no problem with European or American agricultural subsidies and dumping – what all the fuss at Cancun was about, and indeed why the Australian government felt moved to spend a decade and a half trying to change this.
As to the IMF, yes, there’s strong pressure to privatise government owned enterprises. Which are usually snapped up by MNCs for a song and often shut down. And I don’t know how the necessary infrastructure for an industrial base would come into being without government investment. I’m not aware of private capital rushing into Africa to fund schools, health care and transport – except where they’ve got a mine and thus a stake. So the effect of IMF practice is what I’ve stated. It seems to me to be unrealistic to think that most of these governments, given the debt trap, have any alternative other than to accept IMF funds.
I’m still puzzled as to how good government will suddenly cause economic growth to take off. The results haven’t been spectacular in the African countries where the West has given the governance tick.
Fyodor, for a start the figures from the OECD on the size of government in response to Jason’s point – to which there was no response.
You’ve also moved from admitting that your position is ideological as mine is to castigating me for pointing out that (in general) defenders of a dominant ideological position feel less pressure to justify it. The evidence for this is in every newspaper, where the assumptions behind free market ideology are never questioned and those that do are regularly accused of being antideluvian lefty throwbacks.
It sincerely is not meant to be a personal but a sociological observation, and I apologise if I’ve given offence.
I wonder – if there’s no problem with European or American agricultural subsidies and dumping – what all the fuss at Cancun was about, and indeed why the Australian government felt moved to spend a decade and a half trying to change this.
As to the IMF, yes, there’s strong pressure to privatise government owned enterprises. Which are usually snapped up by MNCs for a song and often shut down. And I don’t know how the necessary infrastructure for an industrial base would come into being without government investment. I’m not aware of private capital rushing into Africa to fund schools, health care and transport – except where they’ve got a mine and thus a stake. So the effect of IMF practice is what I’ve stated. It seems to me to be unrealistic to think that most of these governments, given the debt trap, have any alternative other than to accept IMF funds.
I’m still puzzled as to how good government will suddenly cause economic growth to take off. The results haven’t been spectacular in the African countries where the West has given the governance tick.
Liam, thanks for that. EJH would be very unlikely to pooh pooh the demonstrations, even at, or perhaps even particularly at, the level of symbolism. More substantially, these kinds of protests are of longstanding in developing economies. What was novel was the way toward the end of the century they were starting to flood developed economies. The storey was, alas, interrupted by s11. Muslim terrorists have a shocking sense of timing.
Fyodor, if you have a point to make re capital markets, i’d be glad to hear it.
And re:
CS does little more than repeat the familiar whinge about inequality without proposing how to lift the poor out of their situation. In the meantime, people of enterprise are accumulating wealth via trade in markets. CS himself is totally in favour of trade. Why aren?Äôt you?
The important point here is that, for all the increase in international trade over recent decades, thew rate of economic growth has fallen dramatically. The article was about defioning ‘globalisation’, not offerring solutions to poverty and inequality. Nonetheless, two observations were made; (1) “A coherent concept of globalisation would integrate multilateral exchange rate management with objectives for global economic growth, and there is no shortage of ideas on how this might be done”; and (2)”at the least, a coherent concept of globalisation would include an international antitrust authority, if competition was genuinely (as distinct from rhetorically) integral to the concept.”
Liam, thanks for that. EJH would be very unlikely to pooh pooh the demonstrations, even at, or perhaps even particularly at, the level of symbolism. More substantially, these kinds of protests are of longstanding in developing economies. What was novel was the way toward the end of the century they were starting to flood developed economies. The storey was, alas, interrupted by s11. Muslim terrorists have a shocking sense of timing.
Fyodor, if you have a point to make re capital markets, i’d be glad to hear it.
And re:
CS does little more than repeat the familiar whinge about inequality without proposing how to lift the poor out of their situation. In the meantime, people of enterprise are accumulating wealth via trade in markets. CS himself is totally in favour of trade. Why aren?Äôt you?
The important point here is that, for all the increase in international trade over recent decades, thew rate of economic growth has fallen dramatically. The article was about defioning ‘globalisation’, not offerring solutions to poverty and inequality. Nonetheless, two observations were made; (1) “A coherent concept of globalisation would integrate multilateral exchange rate management with objectives for global economic growth, and there is no shortage of ideas on how this might be done”; and (2)”at the least, a coherent concept of globalisation would include an international antitrust authority, if competition was genuinely (as distinct from rhetorically) integral to the concept.”
That?Äôs the first time you?Äôve said that
No it’s not.
That?Äôs the first time you?Äôve said that
No it’s not.
Lordy, lordy! What’s wrong with criticising inequality anyway? Why is this a lefty thoughtcrime?
The usual response from liberals goes:
(a) There is no inequality
(b) Ok if there is, you’ve got no solution
(c) My solution is markets, “free trade under the rule of law” etc.
Problem with this -
(a) Supposedly according to the globalists we’ve already got “free trade under the rule of law”, markets etc.
I don’t know that the usual next (Hayekian) step has been articulated – inequality is a good, because it promotes competition and provides incentive. Take that, THE LEFT!
So competition is a good. Chris rightly points out that we don’t get that. But anyway, this goes to the heart of the issue – Liberals really – despite trickle down, all boats rising, blah – don’t care about it. They think that it’s a nasty Darwinist world and to the (innovative, productive) winner go the spoils.
Also not mentioned is the legacy of colonialism that causes this BAD GOVERNMENT in Africa.
Lordy, lordy! What’s wrong with criticising inequality anyway? Why is this a lefty thoughtcrime?
The usual response from liberals goes:
(a) There is no inequality
(b) Ok if there is, you’ve got no solution
(c) My solution is markets, “free trade under the rule of law” etc.
Problem with this -
(a) Supposedly according to the globalists we’ve already got “free trade under the rule of law”, markets etc.
I don’t know that the usual next (Hayekian) step has been articulated – inequality is a good, because it promotes competition and provides incentive. Take that, THE LEFT!
So competition is a good. Chris rightly points out that we don’t get that. But anyway, this goes to the heart of the issue – Liberals really – despite trickle down, all boats rising, blah – don’t care about it. They think that it’s a nasty Darwinist world and to the (innovative, productive) winner go the spoils.
Also not mentioned is the legacy of colonialism that causes this BAD GOVERNMENT in Africa.
And the theological assertion comes in because liberals totally leave out power relations structuring and operating in “free” markets.
And the theological assertion comes in because liberals totally leave out power relations structuring and operating in “free” markets.
“Fyodor, for a start the figures from the OECD on the size of government in response to Jason?Äôs point – to which there was no response.”
No offence, but there was no point of relevance or significance to Jason’s to address.
“You?Äôve also moved from admitting that your position is ideological as mine is to castigating me for pointing out that (in general) defenders of a dominant ideological position feel less pressure to justify it.”
No, I was castigating your assumption of moral superiority, and the implication that you are free of bias in discussing the issue. And if you don’t think Jason and I aren’t defending liberalism what ARE we doing?
“I wonder – if there?Äôs no problem with European or American agricultural subsidies and dumping – what all the fuss at Cancun was about, and indeed why the Australian government felt moved to spend a decade and a half trying to change this.”
Yep, agricultural trade is distorted, and this is bad. That does not mean developing countries are shut out of developed markets, but it does make it harder for them.
“As to the IMF, yes, there?Äôs strong pressure to privatise government owned enterprises. Which are usually snapped up by MNCs for a song and often shut down.”
I think you’ll find this hard to prove as a systemic problem. I don’t know many MNCs that willingly piss money up against a wall. Well, at least not deliberately…
“And I don?Äôt know how the necessary infrastructure for an industrial base would come into being without government investment. I?Äôm not aware of private capital rushing into Africa to fund schools, health care and transport – except where they?Äôve got a mine and thus a stake.”
Well, you would say that, wouldn’t you? Good government should provide public goods that the private sector can’t provide. You don’t see this a lot in Africa because the dictator in charge is usually more interested in his Swiss bank acccount.
“I?Äôm still puzzled as to how good government will suddenly cause economic growth to take off. The results haven?Äôt been spectacular in the African countries where the West has given the governance tick.”
Care to name the African countries that have sustained clean government and rule of law for an extended period of time, say, 10 years?
“That?Äôs the first time you?Äôve said that.”
My bad. Apologies.
“Fyodor, for a start the figures from the OECD on the size of government in response to Jason?Äôs point – to which there was no response.”
No offence, but there was no point of relevance or significance to Jason’s to address.
“You?Äôve also moved from admitting that your position is ideological as mine is to castigating me for pointing out that (in general) defenders of a dominant ideological position feel less pressure to justify it.”
No, I was castigating your assumption of moral superiority, and the implication that you are free of bias in discussing the issue. And if you don’t think Jason and I aren’t defending liberalism what ARE we doing?
“I wonder – if there?Äôs no problem with European or American agricultural subsidies and dumping – what all the fuss at Cancun was about, and indeed why the Australian government felt moved to spend a decade and a half trying to change this.”
Yep, agricultural trade is distorted, and this is bad. That does not mean developing countries are shut out of developed markets, but it does make it harder for them.
“As to the IMF, yes, there?Äôs strong pressure to privatise government owned enterprises. Which are usually snapped up by MNCs for a song and often shut down.”
I think you’ll find this hard to prove as a systemic problem. I don’t know many MNCs that willingly piss money up against a wall. Well, at least not deliberately…
“And I don?Äôt know how the necessary infrastructure for an industrial base would come into being without government investment. I?Äôm not aware of private capital rushing into Africa to fund schools, health care and transport – except where they?Äôve got a mine and thus a stake.”
Well, you would say that, wouldn’t you? Good government should provide public goods that the private sector can’t provide. You don’t see this a lot in Africa because the dictator in charge is usually more interested in his Swiss bank acccount.
“I?Äôm still puzzled as to how good government will suddenly cause economic growth to take off. The results haven?Äôt been spectacular in the African countries where the West has given the governance tick.”
Care to name the African countries that have sustained clean government and rule of law for an extended period of time, say, 10 years?
“That?Äôs the first time you?Äôve said that.”
My bad. Apologies.
I’ll get back to you on African countries, Fyodor, when I’m at home and able to refer to my bible on these matters – The Economist.
The relevance of my figures to Jason’s point was his discussion of efficiency and state capability in government. I was attempting to demonstrate that liberal states are not necessarily the most efficient, and also don’t necessarily top the list for social spending. Jason had challenged me to provide benchmarks which would demonstrate my argument about the tendency of liberal states to multiply bureaucracy and intervention in people’s lives. Perhaps I didn’t explain myself well. In any event, I think Chris put it very well in his long comment above.
I’ll get back to you on African countries, Fyodor, when I’m at home and able to refer to my bible on these matters – The Economist.
The relevance of my figures to Jason’s point was his discussion of efficiency and state capability in government. I was attempting to demonstrate that liberal states are not necessarily the most efficient, and also don’t necessarily top the list for social spending. Jason had challenged me to provide benchmarks which would demonstrate my argument about the tendency of liberal states to multiply bureaucracy and intervention in people’s lives. Perhaps I didn’t explain myself well. In any event, I think Chris put it very well in his long comment above.
No, I was castigating your assumption of moral superiority, and the implication that you are free of bias in discussing the issue. And if you don?Äôt think Jason and I aren?Äôt defending liberalism what ARE we doing?
I don’t believe that I’ve displayed any attitude of moral superiority. I’ve been upfront with my belief that economics ought to be a means to an end, and that equality is as important a value than liberty. Clearly there are ethical or moral commitments in liberalism, but I don’t know that they’ve been articulated clearly. Liberals in general don’t prize equality, and I think it’s necessary to articulate what the consequences of this choice are for those who aren’t advantaged by their global or class location. Hayek does this. I think contemporary liberals also should.
No doubt you and Jason are defending liberalism. That doesn’t prevent me from referring to the power of liberal discourse and ideas generally in our society and therefore the dissonance between the demand that social democrats justify their assumptions and the usual lack of justification for liberal ones which are advanced as self-evident (a major concern of mine in the original post). There is no need for anyone to take this personally.
I will again apologise if I’ve personalised the debate. I do think we can discuss these matters civilly but it helps in doing that if all participants are willing to subject their position to scrutiny and also to reflect on the reasons why they hold that position. I think I am having a Ken Parish moment where I despair of the ability of these conversations to produce any concession or meeting of minds, so I think accordingly I’ll take a break from comments threads.
No, I was castigating your assumption of moral superiority, and the implication that you are free of bias in discussing the issue. And if you don?Äôt think Jason and I aren?Äôt defending liberalism what ARE we doing?
I don’t believe that I’ve displayed any attitude of moral superiority. I’ve been upfront with my belief that economics ought to be a means to an end, and that equality is as important a value than liberty. Clearly there are ethical or moral commitments in liberalism, but I don’t know that they’ve been articulated clearly. Liberals in general don’t prize equality, and I think it’s necessary to articulate what the consequences of this choice are for those who aren’t advantaged by their global or class location. Hayek does this. I think contemporary liberals also should.
No doubt you and Jason are defending liberalism. That doesn’t prevent me from referring to the power of liberal discourse and ideas generally in our society and therefore the dissonance between the demand that social democrats justify their assumptions and the usual lack of justification for liberal ones which are advanced as self-evident (a major concern of mine in the original post). There is no need for anyone to take this personally.
I will again apologise if I’ve personalised the debate. I do think we can discuss these matters civilly but it helps in doing that if all participants are willing to subject their position to scrutiny and also to reflect on the reasons why they hold that position. I think I am having a Ken Parish moment where I despair of the ability of these conversations to produce any concession or meeting of minds, so I think accordingly I’ll take a break from comments threads.
CS,
What was the global rate of economic growth before globalisation?
CS,
What was the global rate of economic growth before globalisation?
“I think I am having a Ken Parish moment where I despair of the ability of these conversations to produce any concession or meeting of minds, so I think accordingly I?Äôll take a break from comments threads.”
Pish-tosh, Don Marco. You should be proud that you’ve comprehensively shed that “echo chamber” tag. Sometimes you gotta fight for your right to partay.
Where’s Jen when you need her?
“I think I am having a Ken Parish moment where I despair of the ability of these conversations to produce any concession or meeting of minds, so I think accordingly I?Äôll take a break from comments threads.”
Pish-tosh, Don Marco. You should be proud that you’ve comprehensively shed that “echo chamber” tag. Sometimes you gotta fight for your right to partay.
Where’s Jen when you need her?
Where’s Sophie Masson when you need her? Bring on the stoush, I say.
Where’s Sophie Masson when you need her? Bring on the stoush, I say.
Foydor, depends what you mean by “globalisation”. Assuming you have abandoned your earlier religious stance (“an inexorable process that has been at work for centuries” bruaha, voodoo, where’s my funny hat, and pass me the ghost in the machine), then see footnote 11:
The per capita world GDP growth (mean per decade) for the 1960s was approx 3.5 per cent, for the 1970s approx 2 per cent, for the 1980s approx 1.3 per cent, for the 1990s 1 per cent, and for the 2000s less still, so far.
It is now generally conceded that the growth benefits of more trade were wildly exaggerated.
Foydor, depends what you mean by “globalisation”. Assuming you have abandoned your earlier religious stance (“an inexorable process that has been at work for centuries” bruaha, voodoo, where’s my funny hat, and pass me the ghost in the machine), then see footnote 11:
The per capita world GDP growth (mean per decade) for the 1960s was approx 3.5 per cent, for the 1970s approx 2 per cent, for the 1980s approx 1.3 per cent, for the 1990s 1 per cent, and for the 2000s less still, so far.
It is now generally conceded that the growth benefits of more trade were wildly exaggerated.
CS,
I’ve already provided my definition of globalisation. Now show me the corresponding data.
“It is now generally conceded that the growth benefits of more trade were wildly exaggerated.”
Compared to what? Less trade? Are you really arguing that because economic growth was less in the 1990s than in the 1960s that increased trade didn’t help? Did you consider maybe that factors other than trade were at work? Or was that a little too close to voodoo for your most rational, scientific eminence?
CS,
I’ve already provided my definition of globalisation. Now show me the corresponding data.
“It is now generally conceded that the growth benefits of more trade were wildly exaggerated.”
Compared to what? Less trade? Are you really arguing that because economic growth was less in the 1990s than in the 1960s that increased trade didn’t help? Did you consider maybe that factors other than trade were at work? Or was that a little too close to voodoo for your most rational, scientific eminence?
I’ve published five articles on globalisation. How dare you question anything I say? I thought this blogging thing was meant to be respectful and civil. You’re making it all about me, boys! And where’s my fan club? Nobody’s commented on my ethereal beauty yet. Gotta go – negotiating a book contract, surveilling an English syllabus, meeting Paddy McGuiness to talk about my Quadrant articles.
I’ve published five articles on globalisation. How dare you question anything I say? I thought this blogging thing was meant to be respectful and civil. You’re making it all about me, boys! And where’s my fan club? Nobody’s commented on my ethereal beauty yet. Gotta go – negotiating a book contract, surveilling an English syllabus, meeting Paddy McGuiness to talk about my Quadrant articles.
Is Kim channelling someone? I don’t get it.
Fyodor, the African success story is Botswana. A lot to do with diamonds and a World Bank approved small government sector.
However, not all Botswanans are sharing the global love.
Is Kim channelling someone? I don’t get it.
Fyodor, the African success story is Botswana. A lot to do with diamonds and a World Bank approved small government sector.
However, not all Botswanans are sharing the global love.
Yep. Botswana’s on my list too.
You’ll know Kimberella’s lost it when she starts commenting on Bevis’ budding literary career.
Yep. Botswana’s on my list too.
You’ll know Kimberella’s lost it when she starts commenting on Bevis’ budding literary career.
Right. I’m self publishing a book on globalisation tomorrow with a fantasy publisher. And watch for my co-authored Online Opinion piece with Daniel Donahoo. Why hasn’t Ken stepped in and pulled these nasty boys off poor little me?
Right. I’m self publishing a book on globalisation tomorrow with a fantasy publisher. And watch for my co-authored Online Opinion piece with Daniel Donahoo. Why hasn’t Ken stepped in and pulled these nasty boys off poor little me?
Fyodor, you have nearly lapsed into incoherence as far as I can tell. I thought your definition of globalisation, as per your comment near the top of the thread, was the mists of time version that I quoted. Perhaps you will identify where you changed your stance in the 100 or so subsequent comments.
And I just gave you the data. The exaggeration refers to the claims made at the time, which did not materialise, as we can now see. If you want to find out more, there are learned papers linked to the relevant footnotes that review the voluminous body of modeling studies, country studies and regression analysis that reported a strong link between increased trade and economic welfare.
It is, of course, all a bit of a puzzle to my mind, at least to my more feeble mind. The theory of growth through trade is so venerable, most find it hard to give up, and obviously at one level it is commonsensical. Still, it is striking that the explosion of world trade has been accompanied by a continuous decline in the rate of world growth. Go figure it Fyodor – the nobel awaits you.
Fyodor, you have nearly lapsed into incoherence as far as I can tell. I thought your definition of globalisation, as per your comment near the top of the thread, was the mists of time version that I quoted. Perhaps you will identify where you changed your stance in the 100 or so subsequent comments.
And I just gave you the data. The exaggeration refers to the claims made at the time, which did not materialise, as we can now see. If you want to find out more, there are learned papers linked to the relevant footnotes that review the voluminous body of modeling studies, country studies and regression analysis that reported a strong link between increased trade and economic welfare.
It is, of course, all a bit of a puzzle to my mind, at least to my more feeble mind. The theory of growth through trade is so venerable, most find it hard to give up, and obviously at one level it is commonsensical. Still, it is striking that the explosion of world trade has been accompanied by a continuous decline in the rate of world growth. Go figure it Fyodor – the nobel awaits you.
Trade between similar sized and complimentary economies is a good thing, both parties benefit. However, trade today means cherry picking a smaller nation (re: the “FTA” with the US) whilst protecting domestic inefficiences. Every bugger loses.
Trade between similar sized and complimentary economies is a good thing, both parties benefit. However, trade today means cherry picking a smaller nation (re: the “FTA” with the US) whilst protecting domestic inefficiences. Every bugger loses.
Where have you been, Flutey?
Where have you been, Flutey?
Fyodor, looks like from Lateline that you’re in the same camp as Bush and Wolfie on African policy. Hope you enjoy the company!
Fyodor, looks like from Lateline that you’re in the same camp as Bush and Wolfie on African policy. Hope you enjoy the company!
Didn’t see Lateline, but the other Wolfie, James Wolfensohn, was always with us. Afterall he hired Stiglitz and only got rid of him when he was given a ‘don’y argue’ from the US Treasury, who, because of their veto, effectively run the joint.
Longer comment coming up.
Didn’t see Lateline, but the other Wolfie, James Wolfensohn, was always with us. Afterall he hired Stiglitz and only got rid of him when he was given a ‘don’y argue’ from the US Treasury, who, because of their veto, effectively run the joint.
Longer comment coming up.
Still, it is striking that the explosion of world trade has been accompanied by a continuous decline in the rate of world growth.
I thought that striking too, Chris. And I agree your sentiments, flute, but not completely. In the Botswana example, it has always seemed to me that you’d favour free trade as a leading strategy if you were a small country and had a big mine. But only if the arrangements for exploitation of the resource meant you’d benefit.
In Bolivia, it seems the majority of people don’t, with over 60% in poverty. It seems the people have had enough and have forced the president to resign. They want the country’s wealth to benefit the people, not just the elites and foreign companies.
The BBC’s background article says that from 1985 the country was quite stable and “broadly followed free-market economic policies to try and pull Bolivia out of its poverty.” It didn’t work and the coutry in terms of per capita GDP is one of the poorest in SAmerica. I suppose that it was still just BAD GOVERNMENT.
I think the safest statement is that as an economy grows it trades more. Such a statement does not assign cause and effect. It’s not original, I think I got it from Dani Rodrik (who hangs out at Harvard) about 5 years ago.
Kim, on inequality, the liberals often deal in poverty in absolute terms rather than comparatively. The usual standard is $1.08 (PPP or purchasing power parity) per day. So it is OK for some to become filthy rich as long as millions around the world are being lifted from $1.05 to $1.10 per day. This is hardly an ascension to riches, but if the economist Sanjay Reddy and the philosopher Thomas Pogge are right, the World Bank doesn’t have a clue how many poor there are or which way the trend is going. George Monbiot reported on their work in 2003. At the time there was no response that I detected from the World Bank. The claims of millions being lifted from poverty continued regardless. At the time it made me think perhaps they were knaves rather than fools, but I’m not an economist, so I probably shouldn’t have an opinion. I do hope it has all been sorted by now.
When I read Monboit’s article I was already wondering whether the World Bank was fair dinkum, because I’d seen cogent criticisms of their work from half-decent economists. I’d also read Oxfam’s major study Rigged Rules and Double Standards: trade, globalisation and the fight against poverty. The whole thing is interesting, but Chapter 5 especially so for the trade/development/poverty argument. They took a World Bank study, found the definition of ‘openness’ faulty, developed a more appropriate one and re-cut the data. The World Bank claims about trade liberalisation fell apart.
Then there was an article by Chakravarthi Raghavan, writing for the Third World Network. He reported on a new study by Halit Yanikkaya, an academic at the College of Business and Administrative Services in Turkey. This study found “a positive and significant relationship between trade barriers and growth”. After that clear statement it all became complicated – it all depends, it seems, which countries you were looking at and what exactly your definitions are. The article ends with the statement:
“Such a relationship [between trade restrictions and growth] depends mostly on the characteristics of a country. Restrictions can benefit a country depending on whether it is developed or developing (a developed one seems to lose), whether it is a big or a small country, and whether it has comparative advantage in sectors receiving protection.”
Personally, I think trade and protection are both strategies among others that a country might use in economic development. It is just that protection is verboten and trade is seen as a leading strategy, if not a panacea. I agree with Peter Brain who takes the position that every country has to find it’s own way, it’s own mix of strategies, according to its own circumstances. The real objection, though is the one-size-fits-all solutions of the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO.
This afterall was the real objection Josepf Stiglitz found when he went to work for the World Bank. He found that the Bank and the IMF were imposing solutions on governments that had developed plans for their own circumstances and were honestly trying. Some of these were African.
Some of these were loaded up with debt from previous regimes. They can’t repay and the need more money to pay the interest and whatever else they hope to do. The IMF, say, will give them the money only if they eliminate tariffs on imports and open their economies. But if they don’t retain tariffs they can’t pay for social and physical infrastructure, like education, health and transport. But they have no choice, they need the money.
On the way to Cancun Britain’s trade minister, Patricia Hewitt, called in to Honduras. Her Guardian article Make Trade Fairer reports that when the IMF insisted on Honduras opening its rice industry in 1991 local production crashed from meeting 100% of domestic needs, plus exports, to 1% of domestic needs. The industry was wiped out by subsidised US rice. By 2003 this had recovered to about 16% of domestic needs, but only by using local preference arrangements that would be illegal in the WTO’s final vision of world trade.
This pattern of subsidised product from the EU and US decimating third world markets has been repeated in staple commodities such as wheat, rice, corn, soybean, sugar beet and cotton.
The effects of these events typically include suicides, families unable to afford school or health services, migration to urban slums, an increase in crime, adults seeking work in mines and sweat-shops, women going abroad to work as domestics or in the sex industry.
There may be other sources on how the WTO conducts its business, but if you want to appreciate the ruthlessness, brutality, deception etc (words truly fail me) with which the majors prosecute trade policy I’d recommend Aileen Kwa’s Power Politics in the WTO (largish pdf file).
Finally for now, Fyodor, you said:
Yep, agricultural trade is distorted, and this is bad. That does not mean developing countries are shut out of developed markets, but it does make it harder for them.
I’d say, yep, but entirely misleading. The major powers have many strategies for protecting their own industries, but the most direct is quotas.
Still, it is striking that the explosion of world trade has been accompanied by a continuous decline in the rate of world growth.
I thought that striking too, Chris. And I agree your sentiments, flute, but not completely. In the Botswana example, it has always seemed to me that you’d favour free trade as a leading strategy if you were a small country and had a big mine. But only if the arrangements for exploitation of the resource meant you’d benefit.
In Bolivia, it seems the majority of people don’t, with over 60% in poverty. It seems the people have had enough and have forced the president to resign. They want the country’s wealth to benefit the people, not just the elites and foreign companies.
The BBC’s background article says that from 1985 the country was quite stable and “broadly followed free-market economic policies to try and pull Bolivia out of its poverty.” It didn’t work and the coutry in terms of per capita GDP is one of the poorest in SAmerica. I suppose that it was still just BAD GOVERNMENT.
I think the safest statement is that as an economy grows it trades more. Such a statement does not assign cause and effect. It’s not original, I think I got it from Dani Rodrik (who hangs out at Harvard) about 5 years ago.
Kim, on inequality, the liberals often deal in poverty in absolute terms rather than comparatively. The usual standard is $1.08 (PPP or purchasing power parity) per day. So it is OK for some to become filthy rich as long as millions around the world are being lifted from $1.05 to $1.10 per day. This is hardly an ascension to riches, but if the economist Sanjay Reddy and the philosopher Thomas Pogge are right, the World Bank doesn’t have a clue how many poor there are or which way the trend is going. George Monbiot reported on their work in 2003. At the time there was no response that I detected from the World Bank. The claims of millions being lifted from poverty continued regardless. At the time it made me think perhaps they were knaves rather than fools, but I’m not an economist, so I probably shouldn’t have an opinion. I do hope it has all been sorted by now.
When I read Monboit’s article I was already wondering whether the World Bank was fair dinkum, because I’d seen cogent criticisms of their work from half-decent economists. I’d also read Oxfam’s major study Rigged Rules and Double Standards: trade, globalisation and the fight against poverty. The whole thing is interesting, but Chapter 5 especially so for the trade/development/poverty argument. They took a World Bank study, found the definition of ‘openness’ faulty, developed a more appropriate one and re-cut the data. The World Bank claims about trade liberalisation fell apart.
Then there was an article by Chakravarthi Raghavan, writing for the Third World Network. He reported on a new study by Halit Yanikkaya, an academic at the College of Business and Administrative Services in Turkey. This study found “a positive and significant relationship between trade barriers and growth”. After that clear statement it all became complicated – it all depends, it seems, which countries you were looking at and what exactly your definitions are. The article ends with the statement:
“Such a relationship [between trade restrictions and growth] depends mostly on the characteristics of a country. Restrictions can benefit a country depending on whether it is developed or developing (a developed one seems to lose), whether it is a big or a small country, and whether it has comparative advantage in sectors receiving protection.”
Personally, I think trade and protection are both strategies among others that a country might use in economic development. It is just that protection is verboten and trade is seen as a leading strategy, if not a panacea. I agree with Peter Brain who takes the position that every country has to find it’s own way, it’s own mix of strategies, according to its own circumstances. The real objection, though is the one-size-fits-all solutions of the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO.
This afterall was the real objection Josepf Stiglitz found when he went to work for the World Bank. He found that the Bank and the IMF were imposing solutions on governments that had developed plans for their own circumstances and were honestly trying. Some of these were African.
Some of these were loaded up with debt from previous regimes. They can’t repay and the need more money to pay the interest and whatever else they hope to do. The IMF, say, will give them the money only if they eliminate tariffs on imports and open their economies. But if they don’t retain tariffs they can’t pay for social and physical infrastructure, like education, health and transport. But they have no choice, they need the money.
On the way to Cancun Britain’s trade minister, Patricia Hewitt, called in to Honduras. Her Guardian article Make Trade Fairer reports that when the IMF insisted on Honduras opening its rice industry in 1991 local production crashed from meeting 100% of domestic needs, plus exports, to 1% of domestic needs. The industry was wiped out by subsidised US rice. By 2003 this had recovered to about 16% of domestic needs, but only by using local preference arrangements that would be illegal in the WTO’s final vision of world trade.
This pattern of subsidised product from the EU and US decimating third world markets has been repeated in staple commodities such as wheat, rice, corn, soybean, sugar beet and cotton.
The effects of these events typically include suicides, families unable to afford school or health services, migration to urban slums, an increase in crime, adults seeking work in mines and sweat-shops, women going abroad to work as domestics or in the sex industry.
There may be other sources on how the WTO conducts its business, but if you want to appreciate the ruthlessness, brutality, deception etc (words truly fail me) with which the majors prosecute trade policy I’d recommend Aileen Kwa’s Power Politics in the WTO (largish pdf file).
Finally for now, Fyodor, you said:
Yep, agricultural trade is distorted, and this is bad. That does not mean developing countries are shut out of developed markets, but it does make it harder for them.
I’d say, yep, but entirely misleading. The major powers have many strategies for protecting their own industries, but the most direct is quotas.
Thanks Brian.
I return to my earlier point about force being disavowed by the defenders of free trade while it seems that that’s what it takes to establish “free trade under the rule of law”.
Thanks Brian.
I return to my earlier point about force being disavowed by the defenders of free trade while it seems that that’s what it takes to establish “free trade under the rule of law”.
Nice, useful comment Brian.
I will leave most of it, except to support you in that my reading also has Dani Rodrik covering large parts of the field. If anyone out there happens to know any telling critiques (not polemic) of Rodrik’s work, I for one would be pleased to know about it.
But I want to pick up a little on the World Bank. If I can explain my way into it this way, when I was asked to give this talk, I agreed because it was a hook around which I could revisit my globalisation book after a good three year break. I thought it would make me reflect on what might have changed, been proved, discarded, whatever. Plus I like visiting Adelaide now and again.
First thing, of course, you pay attention to the media, where I noticed globalisation had been despatched to the backblocks of the AFR, if anywhere. OK, I thought, so that’s my lead, ‘globalisation has disappeared’. Next step, now let’s see if this can stack up against the leading research etc since my book.
Anyway, expecting to run a basic if not exciting and as usual fragile world economy success story, to be discounted by social and political impacts etc, as overshadowed by war, the more I looked the more a pack of pooh I seemed to find.
Dig this one. In 2000 the World Bank revised downwards the rate of world poulation growth for 1980-90 and for 1990-99 (read that again – for almost all of two decades, up to 2000), by 40 percent. Apparently this has invalidated every World Bank income distribution figure prior to 2000 by a great but unknown extent. Peter Svedberg has judged it “the most radical statistical revision ever completed for an indicator as important as population growth.”
There are many other such stories. As I was pulling it together, it did occur to me that if terrorism hadn’t come along, something else might have had to have been invented. This dog’s havin’ trouble huntin’.
Nice, useful comment Brian.
I will leave most of it, except to support you in that my reading also has Dani Rodrik covering large parts of the field. If anyone out there happens to know any telling critiques (not polemic) of Rodrik’s work, I for one would be pleased to know about it.
But I want to pick up a little on the World Bank. If I can explain my way into it this way, when I was asked to give this talk, I agreed because it was a hook around which I could revisit my globalisation book after a good three year break. I thought it would make me reflect on what might have changed, been proved, discarded, whatever. Plus I like visiting Adelaide now and again.
First thing, of course, you pay attention to the media, where I noticed globalisation had been despatched to the backblocks of the AFR, if anywhere. OK, I thought, so that’s my lead, ‘globalisation has disappeared’. Next step, now let’s see if this can stack up against the leading research etc since my book.
Anyway, expecting to run a basic if not exciting and as usual fragile world economy success story, to be discounted by social and political impacts etc, as overshadowed by war, the more I looked the more a pack of pooh I seemed to find.
Dig this one. In 2000 the World Bank revised downwards the rate of world poulation growth for 1980-90 and for 1990-99 (read that again – for almost all of two decades, up to 2000), by 40 percent. Apparently this has invalidated every World Bank income distribution figure prior to 2000 by a great but unknown extent. Peter Svedberg has judged it “the most radical statistical revision ever completed for an indicator as important as population growth.”
There are many other such stories. As I was pulling it together, it did occur to me that if terrorism hadn’t come along, something else might have had to have been invented. This dog’s havin’ trouble huntin’.
Different story, the War on Terror, Chris, same hegemon, same relations of force.
Different story, the War on Terror, Chris, same hegemon, same relations of force.
Mark, the WTO has been overtly anti-democratic at times and has spoken about disciplining governments.
Also the WTO is ostensibly constituted as a consensus organisation, where any small country could ostensibly pull the plug by voting no. Effectively they can’t unless they all stick together, which they did at Seattle and at Cancun. But the agenda is set and the official text is approved outside the formal structures in a small cabal of major players. It used to be the “quad” – the US, the EU, Japan and Canada. Then things went to the “Green Room” of 25 or so selected (by whom?). In Doha they talked through the night until India eventually caved in and reluctantly abstained against its own interests and the poorer countries it was informally representing, because it could not sustain the damage from the revenge that surely would have followed. The rest of the ministers were hanging around the hotel waiting to hear what they had ‘decided’ before heading for the airport.
There were many procedural techniques for suppressing dissent, but the Ministerial was always the final decision-maker.
At Cancun the Ministerial passed the baton to the General Council comprising trade ambassadors. Last July the GC made the essential decisions to get the Doha agenda back on the road. The ambassadors are very vulnerable to really foul play and unconscionable pressure, as Aileen Kwa’s work reveals.
It is thought that Hong Kong this November, as a Ministerial meeting, will be reduced to a briefing of progress and just a talk-shop. Thus the monster changes shape, but the show goes on.
It didn’t go on of course after Seattle and quite likely would have stayed off the rails, except that Doha was two months after S11 (you’re with us or against us and we need to show that the system works!). Much was promised at Doha and soon reneged on. An outcome of this was Cancun and a frenzy of bilateral and regional deals. Thus, Liam, Seattle did have an effect. It also gave impetus to the World Social Forum, which spawned the Feb 15 anti-war march in 2003 inter alia. But that’s unfinished business and perhaps for another day.
To get back to force, plenty of bullying in the trade business and actual bullets too, recently, for example, in Columbia/Venezuela in trying to destabilise Chavez.
Mark, the WTO has been overtly anti-democratic at times and has spoken about disciplining governments.
Also the WTO is ostensibly constituted as a consensus organisation, where any small country could ostensibly pull the plug by voting no. Effectively they can’t unless they all stick together, which they did at Seattle and at Cancun. But the agenda is set and the official text is approved outside the formal structures in a small cabal of major players. It used to be the “quad” – the US, the EU, Japan and Canada. Then things went to the “Green Room” of 25 or so selected (by whom?). In Doha they talked through the night until India eventually caved in and reluctantly abstained against its own interests and the poorer countries it was informally representing, because it could not sustain the damage from the revenge that surely would have followed. The rest of the ministers were hanging around the hotel waiting to hear what they had ‘decided’ before heading for the airport.
There were many procedural techniques for suppressing dissent, but the Ministerial was always the final decision-maker.
At Cancun the Ministerial passed the baton to the General Council comprising trade ambassadors. Last July the GC made the essential decisions to get the Doha agenda back on the road. The ambassadors are very vulnerable to really foul play and unconscionable pressure, as Aileen Kwa’s work reveals.
It is thought that Hong Kong this November, as a Ministerial meeting, will be reduced to a briefing of progress and just a talk-shop. Thus the monster changes shape, but the show goes on.
It didn’t go on of course after Seattle and quite likely would have stayed off the rails, except that Doha was two months after S11 (you’re with us or against us and we need to show that the system works!). Much was promised at Doha and soon reneged on. An outcome of this was Cancun and a frenzy of bilateral and regional deals. Thus, Liam, Seattle did have an effect. It also gave impetus to the World Social Forum, which spawned the Feb 15 anti-war march in 2003 inter alia. But that’s unfinished business and perhaps for another day.
To get back to force, plenty of bullying in the trade business and actual bullets too, recently, for example, in Columbia/Venezuela in trying to destabilise Chavez.
Chris, I was typing when your comment went up. Thanks for that. I’ll really look forward to what you find, but I agree that trade has been relegated in the AFR. Around Cancun and the FTA you could get 10 or so articles. The China thing hardly creates a ripple and I’ve only seen one anywhere on the study showing the usual billions of benefits (taken apart quite nicely by Bassanse(?)
Way past my bedtime.
Chris, I was typing when your comment went up. Thanks for that. I’ll really look forward to what you find, but I agree that trade has been relegated in the AFR. Around Cancun and the FTA you could get 10 or so articles. The China thing hardly creates a ripple and I’ve only seen one anywhere on the study showing the usual billions of benefits (taken apart quite nicely by Bassanse(?)
Way past my bedtime.
“Fyodor, looks like from Lateline that you?Äôre in the same camp as Bush and Wolfie on African policy. Hope you enjoy the company!”
Noyce. If I used your logic, Mark, you’d be Mugabe’s Mate. It’s a tough call, but I’ll take Dubya and Wolfie over “your” fruitloop.
“Fyodor, looks like from Lateline that you?Äôre in the same camp as Bush and Wolfie on African policy. Hope you enjoy the company!”
Noyce. If I used your logic, Mark, you’d be Mugabe’s Mate. It’s a tough call, but I’ll take Dubya and Wolfie over “your” fruitloop.
“Why hasn?Äôt Ken stepped in and pulled these nasty boys off poor little me?”
!
“Why hasn?Äôt Ken stepped in and pulled these nasty boys off poor little me?”
!
Just to clarify, I have no idea whether Mark ‘owns’ Wolfensohn, which I think you are implying, Fyodor, and Mark and I are certainly not joined at the skull.
Wolfensohn always seems to me a complex character, and certainly places a high priority on his own welfare, a point which his biographer (forget his name) attempts to explain, according to an extended interview I heard recently. He does seem to have been sympathetic to democratic locally inspired and imagined development aspirations in his talk, but it hasn’t always shown up in his walk. He is generally held in low esteem by the ‘global south’ as far as I can see, appearing to them as self-interested careerist. However, I suspect the south will comparatively upgrade their assessment of him when Wolfie 2 gets going.
Last time I saw Wolfensohn (a week or two ago) he was emphasising that bad government was not the universal reason for poor performance of poor countries. He seemed to be inferring, gently and diplomatically, that the policies of the dominant OECD states were not responsive enough to legitimate aspirations.
Just to clarify, I have no idea whether Mark ‘owns’ Wolfensohn, which I think you are implying, Fyodor, and Mark and I are certainly not joined at the skull.
Wolfensohn always seems to me a complex character, and certainly places a high priority on his own welfare, a point which his biographer (forget his name) attempts to explain, according to an extended interview I heard recently. He does seem to have been sympathetic to democratic locally inspired and imagined development aspirations in his talk, but it hasn’t always shown up in his walk. He is generally held in low esteem by the ‘global south’ as far as I can see, appearing to them as self-interested careerist. However, I suspect the south will comparatively upgrade their assessment of him when Wolfie 2 gets going.
Last time I saw Wolfensohn (a week or two ago) he was emphasising that bad government was not the universal reason for poor performance of poor countries. He seemed to be inferring, gently and diplomatically, that the policies of the dominant OECD states were not responsive enough to legitimate aspirations.
Brian,
My remark was in response to Mark’s, not yours.
On Wolfensohn, he’s far from a careerist, and does not need to work – he certainly didn’t take the job for the money. He’s been largely ineffectual, as has the World Bank, for the reason that charity is rarely effective in lifting people out of poverty.
Brian,
My remark was in response to Mark’s, not yours.
On Wolfensohn, he’s far from a careerist, and does not need to work – he certainly didn’t take the job for the money. He’s been largely ineffectual, as has the World Bank, for the reason that charity is rarely effective in lifting people out of poverty.
Fyodor, I trust that last platitude gives you comfort on cold nights.
Brian, the growth pattern is so pronounced over the past 40 years that the odds of around zero world growth (or worse) this decade seem very short. On the one hand, this is producing demand side responses in the UK and the US (and, after the recent French result, shortly in euroland I suspect). On the other, Robert Brenner’s competing capitals thesis looks better and better to me as time goes on.
Fyodor, I trust that last platitude gives you comfort on cold nights.
Brian, the growth pattern is so pronounced over the past 40 years that the odds of around zero world growth (or worse) this decade seem very short. On the one hand, this is producing demand side responses in the UK and the US (and, after the recent French result, shortly in euroland I suspect). On the other, Robert Brenner’s competing capitals thesis looks better and better to me as time goes on.
“Fyodor, I trust that last platitude gives you comfort on cold nights.”
Nah, I burn peasant children to warm my black heart. Your bleeding heart no doubt warms you from within. That, or onanistic friction. Whatever rings your bell.
“Fyodor, I trust that last platitude gives you comfort on cold nights.”
Nah, I burn peasant children to warm my black heart. Your bleeding heart no doubt warms you from within. That, or onanistic friction. Whatever rings your bell.
To clarify, I wasn’t talking about Wolfensohn, but his successor, the dashing and compassionate Mr Wolfowitz. I’m sure Fyodor’s glad that the World Bank is in safe hands now. I’m sure Wolfie will redefine its mission as “spreading freedom and democracy” or something.
I’m also glad that Fyodor supports a robust state funded welfare system rather than voluntary charity. That’ll help me sleep better at night.
To clarify, I wasn’t talking about Wolfensohn, but his successor, the dashing and compassionate Mr Wolfowitz. I’m sure Fyodor’s glad that the World Bank is in safe hands now. I’m sure Wolfie will redefine its mission as “spreading freedom and democracy” or something.
I’m also glad that Fyodor supports a robust state funded welfare system rather than voluntary charity. That’ll help me sleep better at night.
Ambition and power can also be motivations for building a career, Fyodor. Believe it or not – it’s not just about money. Forgot – rational utility-maximising actor and all that. Economists are right about everything. Everything is about money.
Ambition and power can also be motivations for building a career, Fyodor. Believe it or not – it’s not just about money. Forgot – rational utility-maximising actor and all that. Economists are right about everything. Everything is about money.
I knew who you were talking about, Mark. Wolfensohn is rarely referred to as “Wolfie”. His successor is a clown.
“I?Äôm also glad that Fyodor supports a robust state funded welfare system rather than voluntary charity.”
As long as you’re happy, Marky.
I knew who you were talking about, Mark. Wolfensohn is rarely referred to as “Wolfie”. His successor is a clown.
“I?Äôm also glad that Fyodor supports a robust state funded welfare system rather than voluntary charity.”
As long as you’re happy, Marky.
Fyodor, I’d agree about Wolfensohn’s effectiveness in general, and of course I knew he didn’t have to work for income/wealth reasons. But he always wanted to be the best and mix with the rich and famous. Also there seems to be a genuine streak of idealism in his make-up.
But as to his effectiveness, you might reflect on the agenda coming from his masters, the US treasury. I don’t recall the exact details, but he had had prepared a watershed report for the turn of the century, placing much more emphasis on the autonomous aspirations of states, and based on extensive consultations with the client states. My take is that it was intended to turn the whole institution around. But the US Treasury sent it back for some rewriting. Arrogant, ideologically driven sods.
Chris, on Robert Brenner, do you mean as reflected in this paper or has he done something more recent?
Gotta go now. See y’all tonight.
Fyodor, I’d agree about Wolfensohn’s effectiveness in general, and of course I knew he didn’t have to work for income/wealth reasons. But he always wanted to be the best and mix with the rich and famous. Also there seems to be a genuine streak of idealism in his make-up.
But as to his effectiveness, you might reflect on the agenda coming from his masters, the US treasury. I don’t recall the exact details, but he had had prepared a watershed report for the turn of the century, placing much more emphasis on the autonomous aspirations of states, and based on extensive consultations with the client states. My take is that it was intended to turn the whole institution around. But the US Treasury sent it back for some rewriting. Arrogant, ideologically driven sods.
Chris, on Robert Brenner, do you mean as reflected in this paper or has he done something more recent?
Gotta go now. See y’all tonight.
“Ambition and power can also be motivations for building a career, Fyodor.”
He made squillions at Schroders and Salomons, then squillions more running his own investment bank. Working for the World Bank for a [relative] pittance was effective philanthropy for a guy at retirement age. But, no, he’s a “careerist” because he works for a despised institution.
“Economists are right about everything. Everything is about money.”
Economists may or may not be right about everything, but one sociologist obviously needs more economic training: everything is about value and utility. Money is just a store of value.
“Ambition and power can also be motivations for building a career, Fyodor.”
He made squillions at Schroders and Salomons, then squillions more running his own investment bank. Working for the World Bank for a [relative] pittance was effective philanthropy for a guy at retirement age. But, no, he’s a “careerist” because he works for a despised institution.
“Economists are right about everything. Everything is about money.”
Economists may or may not be right about everything, but one sociologist obviously needs more economic training: everything is about value and utility. Money is just a store of value.
I dreamed I saw a utility last night Fyodor. They look nothing like what you might imagine.
Brian, consistent with that article, but the wider thesis is in his Economics of Global Turbulence and The Boom and Bust Bubble. Basically, he suggests the long downturn from the mid-70s has been due to the competitive pressures of late industrial rivals on older blocs of fixed capital, leading to over-supply, over-competition, reduced profit rates, declining investment, and inevitable downturns. It’s an open-ended, fiercely empirical, and suggestive thesis.
I dreamed I saw a utility last night Fyodor. They look nothing like what you might imagine.
Brian, consistent with that article, but the wider thesis is in his Economics of Global Turbulence and The Boom and Bust Bubble. Basically, he suggests the long downturn from the mid-70s has been due to the competitive pressures of late industrial rivals on older blocs of fixed capital, leading to over-supply, over-competition, reduced profit rates, declining investment, and inevitable downturns. It’s an open-ended, fiercely empirical, and suggestive thesis.
I dreamed I saw Joe Hill last night.
Fyodor, two quotes from two economists. See if you can pick them:
I dreamed I saw Joe Hill last night.
Fyodor, two quotes from two economists. See if you can pick them:
“I dreamed I saw a utility last night Fyodor. They look nothing like what you might imagine.”
Do you want me to interpret your dreams, CS? That’s a whole world of pain right there, Jack Bruce.
“I dreamed I saw a utility last night Fyodor. They look nothing like what you might imagine.”
Do you want me to interpret your dreams, CS? That’s a whole world of pain right there, Jack Bruce.
Mark,
Dazzle me with your enlightenment. I’m quivering in fevered anticipation.
Mark,
Dazzle me with your enlightenment. I’m quivering in fevered anticipation.
More fun to watch you quiver, Fyodor.
More fun to watch you quiver, Fyodor.
What happens when a thread gets to 150 comments?
What happens when a thread gets to 150 comments?
Kim, I think there is a loud dinging noise and everyone gets a kewpie doll.
Kim, I think there is a loud dinging noise and everyone gets a kewpie doll.
Mark
Fyodor is correct. There is a branch of economics which focuses on money but economics per se is not about money nor does rational utility maximisation equate to maximising money. Money is just a medium of exchange and a store of value
Mark
Fyodor is correct. There is a branch of economics which focuses on money but economics per se is not about money nor does rational utility maximisation equate to maximising money. Money is just a medium of exchange and a store of value
Clearly, if 50+ earns a mention of Popper, and 100+ earns a mention of Hayek, 150+ sends us all to the library to look up Proust’s La Recherche du Temps Perdu.
Welcome to the first Proust thread everyone. We’re pushing the envelope here.
Clearly, if 50+ earns a mention of Popper, and 100+ earns a mention of Hayek, 150+ sends us all to the library to look up Proust’s La Recherche du Temps Perdu.
Welcome to the first Proust thread everyone. We’re pushing the envelope here.
“More fun to watch you quiver, Fyodor.”
I’m here to please, Don Marco.
On a more serious note, I propose we name a Sesquicentennial thread a “Sheil”, in honour of BP, R.I.P. Or “Sheila”, whatever’s more gender-identity neutral.
“More fun to watch you quiver, Fyodor.”
I’m here to please, Don Marco.
On a more serious note, I propose we name a Sesquicentennial thread a “Sheil”, in honour of BP, R.I.P. Or “Sheila”, whatever’s more gender-identity neutral.
Jason, as Marx argued.
Jason, as Marx argued.
When it comes to money, I think we’re better off locating it in capital theory, where the important duality to keep in mind is, to run a long riff, the distinction between: capital as investment ‘money’, and capital as produced goods; capital as a measure (or, ‘store’ if you like) of value, and capital as a producer of value; capital as a flow of income, and capital as a stock of things; capital as a homogeneous mass of productive potential, and capital as an infinite variety of actual productive forms; capital as circulating financial capital, and capital as fixed productive capital; capital in the ‘monetary’ economy, and capital in the ‘real’ economy.
Fyodor’s OK. He has his 101 down, and could go far, provided he keeps away from pesky facts, and doesn’t walk into a crazed utility in a dark alley.
When it comes to money, I think we’re better off locating it in capital theory, where the important duality to keep in mind is, to run a long riff, the distinction between: capital as investment ‘money’, and capital as produced goods; capital as a measure (or, ‘store’ if you like) of value, and capital as a producer of value; capital as a flow of income, and capital as a stock of things; capital as a homogeneous mass of productive potential, and capital as an infinite variety of actual productive forms; capital as circulating financial capital, and capital as fixed productive capital; capital in the ‘monetary’ economy, and capital in the ‘real’ economy.
Fyodor’s OK. He has his 101 down, and could go far, provided he keeps away from pesky facts, and doesn’t walk into a crazed utility in a dark alley.
“Fyodor?Äôs OK. He has his 101 down, and could go far, provided he keeps away from pesky facts, and doesn?Äôt walk into a crazed utility in a dark alley.”
Sometimes you find utility in the darnedest places, CS. I might even have found it in your contributions to this “discourse”, but then there’s plenty of things that I value that are worth zip to most people. It’s all economic, emeritus, and you need to redo your Capital Theory 101.
“Fyodor?Äôs OK. He has his 101 down, and could go far, provided he keeps away from pesky facts, and doesn?Äôt walk into a crazed utility in a dark alley.”
Sometimes you find utility in the darnedest places, CS. I might even have found it in your contributions to this “discourse”, but then there’s plenty of things that I value that are worth zip to most people. It’s all economic, emeritus, and you need to redo your Capital Theory 101.
Fyodor, you don’t know nothin’ til you’ve read the Grundrisse.
Fyodor, you don’t know nothin’ til you’ve read the Grundrisse.
Perhaps you will be so kind as to enlighten me on my shortcomings Prof Fyodor.
Must rush. Off utility hunting.
Perhaps you will be so kind as to enlighten me on my shortcomings Prof Fyodor.
Must rush. Off utility hunting.
“Perhaps you will be so kind as to enlighten me on my shortcomings Prof Fyodor.”
What, all of them? That may take a while, and I have my own utility to hunt, you know.
“Perhaps you will be so kind as to enlighten me on my shortcomings Prof Fyodor.”
What, all of them? That may take a while, and I have my own utility to hunt, you know.
In light his evasion of frequent invitations to put up, I conclude Fyodor is a wanker, albeit of the sprightly and entertaining variety.
In light his evasion of frequent invitations to put up, I conclude Fyodor is a wanker, albeit of the sprightly and entertaining variety.
Retired hurt, CS? And just when it was getting interesting, too.
Takes one to know one.
Retired hurt, CS? And just when it was getting interesting, too.
Takes one to know one.
Retired undefeated, out of kind consideration for bowlers such as your exhausted self.
So true – you can’t bullshit a bullshitter son.
Retired undefeated, out of kind consideration for bowlers such as your exhausted self.
So true – you can’t bullshit a bullshitter son.
More of a dumb duck, I thought. Oh well.
“So true – you can?Äôt bullshit a bullshitter son.”
Ain’t that the truth, pop.
More of a dumb duck, I thought. Oh well.
“So true – you can?Äôt bullshit a bullshitter son.”
Ain’t that the truth, pop.
You ‘thought’ Fyodor? When? Evidence please.
You ‘thought’ Fyodor? When? Evidence please.
Seriousness may be seriously out of order on this thread by now, but OTOH it may help to press on to the 200 mark.
Thanks, Chris for the Brenner note. It is seriously ringing bells in this aged brain now which I think go beyond what we were discussing last year at Back Pages about world systems theory, Wallerstein and all. Somewhere I recall a serious challenge to Brenner’s thesis, but it is lost in the mists. As you say Brenner does seem to be ferociously empirical, but I remember wondering whether his focus was a bit too narrowly concentrated on the USA. If that’s nonsensical, please ignore.
It has struck me that no-one has mentioned Europe and the EU. Some have commented that the people don’t seem to understand what is good for them and there is a need, as Mike Moore (after Brecht) said in the AFR yesterday, to “dissolve the people and elect another.”
OTOH some commenters are saying that the French and the Dutch understand very well that their model of a decent society may be under threat. It seems that every-one wants reform and progress, but there is a divide developing about where they want to go and what their foundational values are, or should be. Reform for one group is towards the so-called anglo-Saxon model of capitalism, others want to retain the European version.
I’ll just paste in here an outline of how Will Hutton saw the differences in the underlying values in his “The World We’re In” (2002):
Hutton sees dominant American values as differing from European “around the three clusters of values that define European civilisation – the stakeholder view of property, the belief in the social contract and the commitment to a vital public realm”.
Briefly, the story is this. In Europe, the ownership of property (or ownership of the means of production) carries inherent social obligations, traditionally from feudal times and today exemplified in the German constitution. In America property belongs unequivocally to the individual. The only obligation is to do something useful/productive with it. Hence the native Americans could be relieved of their property, as they were doing nothing useful with it.
In terms of the social contract, Europe believes that everyone deserves to live decently and productively, not just survive. In America if you are poor it is because you choose to be. Welfare is morally corrosive.
The role of the public realm in America is to protect your property rights and stay out of the hair of the individual. In Europe the Public realm is for collective action in the general good, which includes installing and maintaining the notion of an infrastructure of justice. This includes the provisions of education and health so that no matter who your parents are society and opportunities are essentially open.
Hutton’s killer statistic is that the latest research shows that if you are born on the wrong side of the line in the US, that is where you stay. Europe is actually a more open and socially mobile.
(I won’t give you the source of the quote, but it was from me as I existed two years ago.)
I thought that in view of the universalising tendencies of liberalism, there being one empirical world, one form of rationality and hence the inevitability of agreement of all people who are sane and properly mentally equipped, it may be interesting to consider that there is a real contest of values and visions of possible political economies within the democracy/capitalist frame.
In fact there are other versions being imagined as we speak. This one emanated from the folk who foregather in Porto Alegre every year under the banner of the World Social Forum (another world is possible) and elsewhere in other regional and topical forums, the most globalised of the ‘anti-globalists’ as they are falsely termed.
Seriousness may be seriously out of order on this thread by now, but OTOH it may help to press on to the 200 mark.
Thanks, Chris for the Brenner note. It is seriously ringing bells in this aged brain now which I think go beyond what we were discussing last year at Back Pages about world systems theory, Wallerstein and all. Somewhere I recall a serious challenge to Brenner’s thesis, but it is lost in the mists. As you say Brenner does seem to be ferociously empirical, but I remember wondering whether his focus was a bit too narrowly concentrated on the USA. If that’s nonsensical, please ignore.
It has struck me that no-one has mentioned Europe and the EU. Some have commented that the people don’t seem to understand what is good for them and there is a need, as Mike Moore (after Brecht) said in the AFR yesterday, to “dissolve the people and elect another.”
OTOH some commenters are saying that the French and the Dutch understand very well that their model of a decent society may be under threat. It seems that every-one wants reform and progress, but there is a divide developing about where they want to go and what their foundational values are, or should be. Reform for one group is towards the so-called anglo-Saxon model of capitalism, others want to retain the European version.
I’ll just paste in here an outline of how Will Hutton saw the differences in the underlying values in his “The World We’re In” (2002):
Hutton sees dominant American values as differing from European “around the three clusters of values that define European civilisation – the stakeholder view of property, the belief in the social contract and the commitment to a vital public realm”.
Briefly, the story is this. In Europe, the ownership of property (or ownership of the means of production) carries inherent social obligations, traditionally from feudal times and today exemplified in the German constitution. In America property belongs unequivocally to the individual. The only obligation is to do something useful/productive with it. Hence the native Americans could be relieved of their property, as they were doing nothing useful with it.
In terms of the social contract, Europe believes that everyone deserves to live decently and productively, not just survive. In America if you are poor it is because you choose to be. Welfare is morally corrosive.
The role of the public realm in America is to protect your property rights and stay out of the hair of the individual. In Europe the Public realm is for collective action in the general good, which includes installing and maintaining the notion of an infrastructure of justice. This includes the provisions of education and health so that no matter who your parents are society and opportunities are essentially open.
Hutton’s killer statistic is that the latest research shows that if you are born on the wrong side of the line in the US, that is where you stay. Europe is actually a more open and socially mobile.
(I won’t give you the source of the quote, but it was from me as I existed two years ago.)
I thought that in view of the universalising tendencies of liberalism, there being one empirical world, one form of rationality and hence the inevitability of agreement of all people who are sane and properly mentally equipped, it may be interesting to consider that there is a real contest of values and visions of possible political economies within the democracy/capitalist frame.
In fact there are other versions being imagined as we speak. This one emanated from the folk who foregather in Porto Alegre every year under the banner of the World Social Forum (another world is possible) and elsewhere in other regional and topical forums, the most globalised of the ‘anti-globalists’ as they are falsely termed.
Serious comments are always in order, Brian. I have a feeling that the cs/Fyodor stoush is reaching its limits. But I may be wrong.
Serious comments are always in order, Brian. I have a feeling that the cs/Fyodor stoush is reaching its limits. But I may be wrong.
Chris, re Brenner, I was thinking of Giovanni Arrighi, The Social and Political Economy of Global Turbulence (67pp in a pdf file). I think it may be the same as his Tracking Global Turbulence in New Left Review. You’d need a subsciption, but let me know if you have a problem.
Don’t ask me to summarise it!
Chris, re Brenner, I was thinking of Giovanni Arrighi, The Social and Political Economy of Global Turbulence (67pp in a pdf file). I think it may be the same as his Tracking Global Turbulence in New Left Review. You’d need a subsciption, but let me know if you have a problem.
Don’t ask me to summarise it!
Brian, I think I remember emailing Chris a copy of Arrighi’s latest (first instalment of a two part article) from the new NLR. That’s the one I was referring to in the post. Let me know if you want a copy – I have a subscription to NLR and I’ve been meaning to check their policy on fair use of their articles on non-profit websites.
Brian, I think I remember emailing Chris a copy of Arrighi’s latest (first instalment of a two part article) from the new NLR. That’s the one I was referring to in the post. Let me know if you want a copy – I have a subscription to NLR and I’ve been meaning to check their policy on fair use of their articles on non-profit websites.
Brian,
I have Arrighi, but am yet to find him on the top of my pile.
Re Brenner, yes he is (also) US focused, but it is justified in the sense that his work is premised on the assumption that the US economy cannot be understood separate from the world economy. Moreover, the US is the key in that it is unique in the size of its internal market and the role of its currency.
To dramatically simplify, he argues in a sense that a fallacy of composition (what may be true for a part isn’t for the whole) is operating, i.e. if everyone sets out to export everything, everyone loses – and this can happen in world manufacturing today, where factors (apart from labour) and competitive advantages are all mobile. The US, Europe, and East Asia all have massive overcapacity in manufacturing, and the division of labour is not complementary. Manipulated currency depreciations between the major blocs keeps shifting the problem around but can’t solve it.
What’s politically novel is that neoliberalism is a distinctly secondary actor in this scenario, invented to stave off scrapping lines of fixed capital before the end of its life, albeit only temporarily, till the periodic downturns force the issue. The subsidiary role of this ideology/program is further underlined, I suggest, by the new turn toward demand management (in the US and UK), along with the junking of globalisation rhetoric and the enlisting of neocon-speak. The fickleness on this front is telling.
In other words, Brenner takes competition (between blocs of fixed capital) at its word.
This is very simplified, but to my mind his account has the virtues of a long historical (and deeply empirical) view and being entirely consistent with the observable fact that increasing world economic stagnation has accompanied increasing world trade growth. His other virtues are his analytical open-endedness and capacity to incorporate the major counter-arguments (without sledging them – always a mark of a good scholar to my mind).
The source of Hutton’s quote is a speech on his latest book, published in thsi country by the Evatt Foundation.
Brian,
I have Arrighi, but am yet to find him on the top of my pile.
Re Brenner, yes he is (also) US focused, but it is justified in the sense that his work is premised on the assumption that the US economy cannot be understood separate from the world economy. Moreover, the US is the key in that it is unique in the size of its internal market and the role of its currency.
To dramatically simplify, he argues in a sense that a fallacy of composition (what may be true for a part isn’t for the whole) is operating, i.e. if everyone sets out to export everything, everyone loses – and this can happen in world manufacturing today, where factors (apart from labour) and competitive advantages are all mobile. The US, Europe, and East Asia all have massive overcapacity in manufacturing, and the division of labour is not complementary. Manipulated currency depreciations between the major blocs keeps shifting the problem around but can’t solve it.
What’s politically novel is that neoliberalism is a distinctly secondary actor in this scenario, invented to stave off scrapping lines of fixed capital before the end of its life, albeit only temporarily, till the periodic downturns force the issue. The subsidiary role of this ideology/program is further underlined, I suggest, by the new turn toward demand management (in the US and UK), along with the junking of globalisation rhetoric and the enlisting of neocon-speak. The fickleness on this front is telling.
In other words, Brenner takes competition (between blocs of fixed capital) at its word.
This is very simplified, but to my mind his account has the virtues of a long historical (and deeply empirical) view and being entirely consistent with the observable fact that increasing world economic stagnation has accompanied increasing world trade growth. His other virtues are his analytical open-endedness and capacity to incorporate the major counter-arguments (without sledging them – always a mark of a good scholar to my mind).
The source of Hutton’s quote is a speech on his latest book, published in thsi country by the Evatt Foundation.
“You ‘thought?Äô Fyodor? When? Evidence please.”
Evidence of thought, eh? As it happens, CS, I?Äôm thinking some really DEEP THOUGHTS right at this very moment. I?Äôm having an imaginary debate with you on economics. Natch, I?Äôm providing my imaginary interlocutor with a rudimentary knowledge of economics to give the old duffer a chance. You?Äôll be glad to know you?Äôre doing really well so far – you haven?Äôt committed any of your usual SNAFUs. I?Äôll give you the result when we?Äôre done. I am accepting wagers if you?Äôre interested – all proceeds to go to over-privileged youth in Sydney?Äôs Eastern suburbs. They sorely need your assistance at this time of year.
“You ‘thought?Äô Fyodor? When? Evidence please.”
Evidence of thought, eh? As it happens, CS, I?Äôm thinking some really DEEP THOUGHTS right at this very moment. I?Äôm having an imaginary debate with you on economics. Natch, I?Äôm providing my imaginary interlocutor with a rudimentary knowledge of economics to give the old duffer a chance. You?Äôll be glad to know you?Äôre doing really well so far – you haven?Äôt committed any of your usual SNAFUs. I?Äôll give you the result when we?Äôre done. I am accepting wagers if you?Äôre interested – all proceeds to go to over-privileged youth in Sydney?Äôs Eastern suburbs. They sorely need your assistance at this time of year.
Knock yourself out Fydders.
Knock yourself out Fydders.
This thread risks being overtaken by Against Biological Determinism II. Just sayin…
This thread risks being overtaken by Against Biological Determinism II. Just sayin…
Chris, thanks for your trouble. Such summaries can work as useful advance organisers for poeple like me, who find some of the originals quite demanding.
Hutton by contrast is easy reading. The paper you put up on the Evatt Foundation was on the ABCs Background Briefing. I got my info mainly from his book, which, on the evidence, wasn’t read by most of the people who reviewed it.
Brenner makes you wonder what could turn the whole thing around. New technology is the answer we are usually given.
Chris, thanks for your trouble. Such summaries can work as useful advance organisers for poeple like me, who find some of the originals quite demanding.
Hutton by contrast is easy reading. The paper you put up on the Evatt Foundation was on the ABCs Background Briefing. I got my info mainly from his book, which, on the evidence, wasn’t read by most of the people who reviewed it.
Brenner makes you wonder what could turn the whole thing around. New technology is the answer we are usually given.
Mark, I’d imagine there’s some-one in every university library who is a full bottle on copyright. In my former life we had a copyright officer. I put my head into the subject at one stage, but soon learned to delegate or die.
But in principle what goes should be what enhances or detracts from sales/royalties. So if you send an article for Chris to read, it is not preventing a sale. In fact it is promoting the NLR. Ditto for me, because if I were a rich man I’d certainly subscribe.
Of course the law isn’t always sensible.
Mark, I’d imagine there’s some-one in every university library who is a full bottle on copyright. In my former life we had a copyright officer. I put my head into the subject at one stage, but soon learned to delegate or die.
But in principle what goes should be what enhances or detracts from sales/royalties. So if you send an article for Chris to read, it is not preventing a sale. In fact it is promoting the NLR. Ditto for me, because if I were a rich man I’d certainly subscribe.
Of course the law isn’t always sensible.
Opps, didn’t mean to be presumptuous Brian. Didn’t know the ABC had also snaffeled the thing.
Brenner doesn’t address the question of how to turn things. He writes as a historian, aiming to understand, recount and attempt to explain, not to foretell, less rectify. Implictly, I guess the picture would call for some conscious rationalisation, toward more global complementarity. Yet the main task of the historian, imo, is to understand. If the job is well done, at the conclusion, the historian will not necessarily have any greater claim to prophecy than anyone else who also reads the account.
Opps, didn’t mean to be presumptuous Brian. Didn’t know the ABC had also snaffeled the thing.
Brenner doesn’t address the question of how to turn things. He writes as a historian, aiming to understand, recount and attempt to explain, not to foretell, less rectify. Implictly, I guess the picture would call for some conscious rationalisation, toward more global complementarity. Yet the main task of the historian, imo, is to understand. If the job is well done, at the conclusion, the historian will not necessarily have any greater claim to prophecy than anyone else who also reads the account.