There are relatively few topics of interest to LP where I can actually claim relevant professional expertise but electronic voting is one of them. It’s a topic that keeps popping up for some reason. And this time around, it’s the Victorian Electoral Commission which is considering recommending to the Victorian parliament the introduction of electronic voting to reduce the number of informal votes, after a small trial for the vision-impaired. The electoral commissioner, Steve Tully, thinks much of the informal votes relates to language and literacy issues:
“I suspect that it’s not just a protest vote. I think that there are literacy and language issues in there that we need to explore with the Parliament to see whether there are some administrative changes we can make to the law to improve that,” he said.
“I think electronic voting, particularly if (voters) are not comfortable with English, is something that Parliament might want to consider.”
Reducing unintended informal votes, as well as making it easier for people like Rachel to vote in secret, are admirable goals. But badly designed electronic voting systems have huge consequences for the integrity of our elections; both in terms of their fairness, and, just as important, whether they are seen to be fair.
The American computer science community has been up in arms about electronic voting for some time; perhaps the best-known expert on the topic is Rebecca Mercuri, whose views on the topic are crystal clear. Pure electronic voting is a terrible idea. The key reason?
Fully electronic systems do not provide any way that the voter can truly verify that the ballot cast corresponds to that being recorded, transmitted, or tabulated. Any programmer can write code that displays one thing on a screen, records something else, and prints yet another result. There is no known way to ensure that this is not happening inside of a voting system.
I have a PhD in testing computer software for errors. Mercuri is 100% correct – there is no way to verify that the machine is recording votes correctly. And, even assuming some highly elaborate system of inspections, program proving, cryptography and other gobbedlygook was implemented to try and ensure the integrity of the voting system, it’s still not good enough, because that would place the verification of the voting system’s integrity into the hands of a tiny cadre of computer security experts.
And, no, disclosing the source code of the voting software – indeed, the whole design blueprint of the voting machine is not a sufficient guarantee of integrity. While the source code of the voting software might be in public, there is no way to guarantee that the software released to the public is actually being run by all the voting machines, and that the hardware has not been tampered with in any one of a dozen virtually impossible-to-detect ways. And, yes, I do mean to imply that the electronic voting system currently used in the Australian Capital Territory, which is disclosed to the public is unsatisfactory and vulnerable to failure or fraud.
However, there is an acceptable solution that should achieve the goal of improving access to voting while reducing the risk of stolen elections – voter-verified paper ballot printing. Popularised by Mercuri, the electronic voting system would be implemented as before, with a couple of additional steps. A paper ballot recording the votes would be printed by the machine, but would remain behind a glass or transparent plastic screen. The voter would then check that the vote reflects their wishes and press a button to indicate whether the vote is correct or not. If correct, the vote would drop into a ballot box. If not, the vote would be discarded and the voter could re-enter their preferences. The paper ballots in the ballot box would be the definitive record of the vote.
Now, such systems aren’t perfect. But no other electronic voting system I’ve seen is acceptably free from undetectable fraud, capable of being pulled off by a tiny team of insiders.
It’s not clear at this early stage what kind of electronic voting system the VEC has in mind, and whether Parliament will be interested. But it’s one to watch out for with a highly skeptical eye.
CLARIFICATION: On reflection and after reading comments, it looks like some people think that I’m advocating that we must shift from our present pencil-and-paper system. That wasn’t what I meant to say; I’m stating that if electronic voting is adopted to try to tackle the concerns raised by the VEC, voter-verified printed ballots must be included in the system.
Good post Robert, and I couldn’t agree more; electronic voting has to be one of the dodgiest things going vis electoral systems. The _manifold_ problems have been demonstrated time and time again.
I like your print-out suggestion.
But what if someone were to rig the machine such that the “accept vote” and the “discard vote buttons were switched aound?! People would be confirming votes they wanted to reject and vice versa!
*sigh*
Time for another 100 lines of “I will always proof-read my posts before I submit them”….
Rob: I didn’t claim the system was perfect.
In practice, the confirm/reject part of the system should be separated from the rest of the system, and be a simple electrical (or even mechanical) device with no other smarts.
Patrickg: it’s not my suggestion, Rebecca Mercuri is the one responsible for popularising it, and innumerable other computer scientists have endorsed it.
The VEC is making a BIG mistake introducing computerised voting after the horrible debacles in the recent american presidential elections – bradblog.com is a good place to start for anyone interested in the major mess over there.
If, as Mercuri argues, voter-verified paper printing is the only way to guarantee an e-voting system, then you might as well stick with what we have now – voter-verified paper ballots. What on earth is the point of all the machinery and money in between?
The electoral fraud argument for e-voting is a major furphy – and a favourite of right wing critics of the present system, who want you to believe that it is the voters who are evil, stealing elections, and not the political parties – see what the republicans get up to in the USA, and never forget Bush v Gore.
And if the VEC has a problem with informal voting, then it should get out and educate the voters, and stop dicking around with toys for the boys.
A simple “none of the above” button could also be included, for those wishing not to vote.
Grace, there is a real issue for disabled voters, who would understandably like to be able to cast secret votes like everybody else does.
Whether the needs of a relatively few voters should mean everybody gets to vote on electronic voting machines is another question, of course.
FDB: the ACT system allows deliberate informal votes; aside from its lack of a paper ballot, it’s actually reasonably well designed.
I am entirely confident of the bona fides of the VEC regarding this issue. I am happy to argue the issue on its merits, but believe there is little illustrative that can be drawn from the US systems – they are simply corrupt, while the VEC and AEC have shown to be unimpeachably clean.
That said, there are valid technical issues to be worked through. Just don’t try to link this to Diebold etc.
It seems to have stood up well considering that the ACT also has the Hare-Clarke system to contend with as well.
Info on the voting systeme can be found at http://www.elections.act.gov.au/Elecvote.html
Nice post on an issue that’s bugged me for a while.
Apologies if I’m being dense here, but with the example you give (generating print outs that get verified by the voter), if it is the paper ballots being counted, why not just use paper ballots? Why go to all the trouble of making these electronic voting machines when all you’re using them for is to print out a ballot that you could just mark yourself with a pen?
What am I missing? Am I just backward in remaining happy with last century’s technology?
I suppose in theory the advantage would be that you wouldn’t have to make sure there was an over-supply of paper ballots at each polling station – a less-paper issue, perhaps?
Each machine could be fitted with a roll of paper, which would (if not used) be able to be utilised the next election, rather than binned?
wilful: I’m not claiming that the VEC has nefarious motives. Boneheaded decisions can be made for the best of reasons. That said, I’m sure the representatives of Diebold and the other election machine vendors have come calling at the various Australian electoral commissions as well. My Dad was a copier salesman back in the day; there were more than a few businesses that ended up with bigger, more elaborate, and more expensive copiers than they needed or could use.
dr fish: The claim is that lots of people are incapable of filling out their ballot papers correctly, either through disability (certainly), poor English literacy, or whatever. The disability one is reasonably compelling, but it’s not clear to me that we need to implement electronic voting for everyone.
Laurie: Compared to the importance of verifiably clean and accurate election counts, the minor saving in paper is not a big issue, compared to the amount of newsprint we dispose of every day; presumably the ballot papers are eventually recycled anyway (I haven’t checked).
Matt: prove it.
Oh I agree RM. I was just putting it forward as a possible ‘good’.
Having recently been in a position where I had to count a large number of postal votes in a complicated voting system, I say bring on the day when a e-system can be found that has integrity.
Two problems I think it could assist with:
As you discuss Robert, it might stop people voting “against the rules” – e.g. voting 1 for more than one person. There no penalties for not voting in this ballot so I am sure they meant and wanted their vote to be counted. And I know it wasn’t language and literacy issues in this ballot.
It would be a much easier and quicker to count in a complicated system like Hare-Clark with optional preferential voting. Especially when stuff happens like someone drops out and you have to recalculate.
I reckon you could apply the same criticism of e-voting software as you could to a count. There is no way of knowing, for the average voter, if the people counting the votes got it correct and applied the electoral rules correctly. As I understand it, most electoral commissions in Australia do a hand count and then re-enter all the ballots into some sort of vote counting software. The same issues are there especially for upper houses. In NSW the electoral office computer fell over mid-way through the count of the Legislative Council in 2001 and couldn’t produce a result for ages. And who knows if the preference flow calculators work correctly? the balance of probability is that they do, and we trust they do.
Whilst the VEC and AEC are “unimpeachably clean”, there would be undoubted political pressure to “buy-in” technical expertise on this. And where do you think Little Johnny is going to go running to for answers? You bet, we’ll have Diebold in here in a flash (although I’d be very surprised if they aren’t behind the scene’s already pulling the strings).
Robert,
Why tamper with an AEC m.o. that works well overall? Let handicapped people be assisted if they so wish, at the point of balloting.
What irks me is your assumption that our system is inherently flawed and that your way is superior(“admirable goals”). Granted there would be a potential nice little earner in it for you if Oz govts gave your way the nod. At the end of the day we’re all businessmen, Robert. Unless, of course you are an altruist, in which case I shall withdraw, unreservedly. Wonder what, say, Joh Petersen would have done if he had control over who ran the point of voting election computers in Qld, if the State had them operaional in his last, desperate days in office? But perhaps I malign your suggestion unfairly because you implicitly trust politicians and governments to do the right thing. Like remain impartial when real power is at stake.
Whoever programs the computer determines the outcome. Rocket science it ain’t. Pencil on paper ballots are unhackable. Might be a bit slow, but if human on-the-spot scrutineers and election commissioners have a problem, they deal with hard copy(paper), not potentially malfeasant, or difficult to trace electrons. How many engineers, software or otherwise, think itâs smart to introduce extra âmoving partsâ? into a system that functions just fine for the vast majority of those for whom it was designed?
You state, Robert: âPopularised by Mercuri, the electronic voting system would be implemented as before, with a couple of additional stepsâ?. Iâm saying we donât require the these expensive and additional steps, let alone the electronic voting systems.
Stateside, Diebold and Sequoia and the other computer voting outfits have been the source of much voter angst because of the lack of accountability/scrutiny and trust. Let’s at least learn this lesson from our staunch American allies;
those who are coming,
and will not stop,
till our country is free.
Whatâs this I hear about the Diebold Dodgers down-under advance party, have you had discussions with them?
I believe education and patience in the process of voting are far more desirable than providing a method that could easily be tampered with, with stolen elections the result, so Iâm with grace pettigrew, dr. fish and Go Troppo on this topic.
Enemy combatant: what I was trying (and perhaps failing) to put across is not that we must adopt electronic voting, more that if we do, voter-verified paper ballots must remain part of the process. I’ve added a clarification to the post to make this clear.
For the record, I have no financial interest in any voting software vendors; I’m a postdoc supported by an ARC grant. My research does not specifically involve voting machines – it mostly involves abstract mathematical models of computer software.
I agree with your concerns about the potential failings of voting machines, that’s why I’m advocating voter-verified paper balloting as an essential part of any such system (and why I don’t think the ACT’s machines are acceptable). If, essentially, all the machine is doing is printing a paper ballot with the numbers filled in, which is then checked by the voter before getting dropped in the ballot box, we don’t have to trust Diebold to get it right.
Forgive my ignorance on the issue, but isn’t one of the main benefits of electronic voting that you could work out who wins an election as soon as the polls close? And isn’t that still beneficial, even if you have the paper copies as backup if a recount is needed (or even if they all have to be counted to verify the results in each seat)?
FDB – maybe we could have a ‘donkey vote’ button as well, which randomly allocates preferences, forever eliminating the bias in favour of the top-listed candidate?
I reckon it would make it easier for people in my situation to make an anonymous vote, but then again if it is a electronic I would surmise that it wouldn’t really be anonymous anyway if someone wanted to look something up they could. I guess I’m cynical that way
Rachy, it’s easy enough to arrange a situation where the machine doesn’t have any opportunity to record who’s pressing its buttons. The only problem with this is whether the machine is recording the exact time a particular vote was recorded, and whether the time you’re ticked off the electoral roll is also recorded.
With regards to your secret ballot, I suppose it’s an important issue who it’s anonymous from. Do disabled people have to rely on friends or family members to help them vote, or do they provide “helpers” who don’t know you?
Intersting post Mr Merkel. To answer Dr Fish and Mr Enemy, going electronic would allow instant vote analysis, graphs, stats, patterns as electronic data is conveniently malleable and does not have to be re-entered into computer for analysis, study or statistics. It’s ideal for those who are unable to delay their gratification and want it now! I’m one of those people and for this reason electronic voting has merit.
Mr Combatant is correct in saying that you wouldn’t want to stand between a politician and power/influence/money and hence anything less than tamperproof than pencil and paper is in principle a bad idea.
I have thought about this myself and have come to the conclusion that we already have an electronic system that is entirely foolproof, with an absolutely pervasive infrastructure already rolled out and in place everywhere and a system that has been tested for many years and is being used efficiently by Australians in all walks of life, of all educational backgrounds and even with disabilities. It works fantastically well. I am talking about the TAB.
As someone who is not unfamiliar with the inside of a TAB operation, I am of the view that it could be adapted for voting with extreme ease.
Instead of horses, politicians. The only problem would be the fact that we vote on Saturday and that would clash with racing. Obviously, voting would have to be moved to Sundays. (Weird sect godbotherers could use the postal vote).
HOW IT WOULD WORK: Politicians names would have a number. A punter, sorry, voter, would run a pencil across the numbers they wanted to come first, second, third, and so on. All that remains is to put the ticket in the slot. They would then get a voting printout with a carbon copy original to drop into a ballotbox, carbon to keep as a record in case of a shitfight.
The hard copy ballot papers would not normally be counted unless there was a dispute, in which case normal scrutineering would take place, as happens now.
Incidentally, unfamiliarity with the TAB equipment would be grounds for suspicion of unAustralianness and possible reason for deportation.
So if there’s a Government Fall, Sir Henry, what’s the point of being told about it later, if punters like your good self insist on knowing immediately? This would inevitably lead to multiple protests being lodged, stewards agonising over reports deep into the night, so we’re better off with things the way they are.
London to a brick-on, son.
“Better off with things as they are.” Well, aren’t we a closet conservative, Enemy. Perhaps we could have a man with a flag walking in front of a voting machine so it wouldn’t frighten the horses by way of a compromise?
As an American in America right now, I can tell you that there is great resistance to allowing a machine to record our vote in such a secretive way.
Voting is very different from any other transaction we accomplish through computers simply because in voting, we remain anonymous. Would you bank anonymously?
The stakes are unbelievably high. A small cadre of power greedy individuals can gain control of our money and our children (war) if they succeed in stealing our elections through the glitzy apparatus of electronic voting.
We are fools to let them do it.
Remember that in the perfect con, the victim never knows he was conned.
“We are fools to let them do it.
Remember that in the perfect con, the victim never knows he was conned.”
Absolutely, Arlene Montemarano.
Sir Henry, how are you going to mollify the wowsers? Are the Hillsongers and delicate folk going to queue willingly in/outside a TAB, their evolutionary primitive senses of olfaction insulted by the all pervading, indelible odour of the sweat of desperate punters?
“Hey Martha! Something in here smells bad, real bad.” Unless, of course, a libertine like yourself would like to make TAB voting compulsory. What next, separate voting stations for “olfactorily challenged” voters? All a bit too hard isn’t it, my good man? And any govt. considering implementing your suggestion of TallyTAB, would have the ugly spectre of Wowser Wrath to contend with. People who put family first can turn any election.
Robert, thanks for the clarification and disclosure, but I’m not persuaded. The downside, as articulated by Arlene et al. far outweighs the arguments of instant gratificationalists. I don’t give a hoot if we have to wait for a day or two if the voting is close. As long as the process is untamperable, democracy rules ok. You are yet to address my redundancy point of extra “moving parts”.
As that well known barbershop(often adjacent to TABs)philosopher, Eddy The Expert, once waxed:
If it works, don’t fix it.
Boy, oh boy, Enemy, if you’re worried about the voting machines what do you say about what your little mate Johnny has in store (pun intended) for you?!
See? He says there’s nothing to worry about.
Yep, Sir H,
People should not be afraid of their governments, governments should be afraid of the people. Even in Terra Nullius Rodentia. It’s only a matter of time,however, before all citizens of Oz are compulsorily DNA profiled at birth. Time to see “Gattaca” and “V for Vendetta” again. Maybe even “Children of Men”. Another 9/11 or two will catalysize the implementation of Special Powers, Sino-style censorship of the blogosphere and eventually Martial Law. Wonder what David Hicks had for breakfast?
In the interim, let’s all enjoy being clever and classless and free, shall we; please overlook my paranoia. It couldn’t possibly happen here, could it? Totalitarian governments are merely minor historical aberrations.
I have to have someone help me, and it’s my choice who that person is. So unfortunately, no matter what, my vote will never be private. I hate that. Basically, I just get a postal vote and someone helps me fill it out. I don’t know, I just don’t trust electronic voting for so many reasons. I know it’s different, but Florida anyone?
Robert Merkel:
Good post/topic.
I’m no Luddite but I would be very very suspicious of whatever the purveyors of voting machines were flogging. The opportunities for massive electoral fraud using such machines would be just too tempting ….. and then there is the American experience!!!!!!
Besides, all the anomolies in the present system of paper voting need to be sorted out first …… and I myself would not be happy to see voting machines introduced before there was a Royal Commission into the 1996 Federal Election ……..
I feel the way to go with electronic voting is to have as a back up, a printed out slip where you can confirm your vote by marking various boxes appropriately. Then to be extra sure, the slip of paper should be folded up and placed in a sealed box where it and others can be counted later by electoral officials and party scrutineers. I reckon that’d be a pretty safe way of doublechecking the black boxes.
As for the “confirm/reject part of the system”, I understand Dr Philip Nitschke has some pretty good software dealing with these kinda serious binary choices that is currently being underulitilised.
Silliness aside, Sir Hank does have a good point about the TAB. Their system has been subjected to far more pressure testing by a much larger and far more committed user base than Australian franchise holders and it ain’t buckled yet.
Personally though, I would prefer to stick with the current system, not just on the grounds that if it ain’t broke don’t fix it, but also and especially because it is slightly archaic – a bit of continuity with, and a subtle reminder of, a past where many sacrificed much to give us the least worse form of Government. Remember the secret ballot was originally called the Australian Ballot.
Plus without a pencil and ballot paper, how you can draw the rude pictures that clearly illustrate you’ve delibrately cast an informal vote?
A little video of a how Diebold machines can be tweaked to ask you questions so that the “proper vote” is made.
http://politicalhumor.about.com/od/election2004multimedia/v/floridavoting.htm
Click on “Florida Voting Machine Parody”
Nabakov:
I tend to go with you on this one. And the Australian secret ballot has been picked up by a lot of countries.
However, before we go to electronic voting, our electoral system does need to have a dose of ‘ salts put right through it ….. I, for one, am fed up with the Be-A-Mug-And-Put-”1″-Above-The-Line rip-off in Senate elections and also with its alternative, filling all 99 squares on the paper. Why not a single mark on the ballot paper and may the ones who get the best scores be elected to the Senate (perhaps the resulting absence of Liberals and Labor from the Senate might be too horrifying to contemplate
).
Electoral fraud is still possible with the pencil-and-paper system, even with vililant official and enthusiastic scrutineers …… but, in its present form, electronic voting makes massive electoral fraud a dead-easy cert.