You might remember an LP thread some time ago about the details of our Afghanistan deployment – in essence, only our special forces have been involved in “offensive maneuvers”. It seems that may change, in part because our special forces have been deployed for a “long, long time now”. Worrying. Special forces are, by definition, our best infantry soldiers. While our regularly infantry are undoubtedly far better trained and better equipped than those they are fighting against – and still with the massive advantage of air support – as a layperson I’m concerned that the regular infantry will take even more casualties than special forces doing the same job.
Meanwhile, in the world of defence procurement, apparently Kevin Rudd seems to think we need more “high-end capabilities”, notably naval and air capabilities, to deal with the military risks posed by the buildup of arms throughout Asia. Paul Dibb agrees, and gets a plug in for the good old defence of Australia doctrine. How much this is going to cost is of course left open…
Finally, Liberal backbencher, former defence scientist, and noted global warming denialist Dennis Jensen has heard on the grapevine that a “highly classified” computer simulation of combat between the F-35 fighter – Australia’s likely new combat jet sometime in the next decade – and Russian-built Sukhois was conducted last month in Hawaii. According to Jensen, the (simulated) F-35′s got “clubbed like seals”. For what it’s worth, while I remain concerned about whether the F-35 is up to the job, without details of how the simulation was conducted this information is all but useless.
If it’s true, Robert, it shouldn’t be. The original idea behind special forces was that they should have specific training for small-unit specific tasks, not that they should have better training in infantry tactics per se. For light infantry missions, as I understand it, there shouldn’t be anything the SAS can do that a regular Regiment cannot.
As to the value of overwhelming air support in Afghanistan, all I can say is that it didn’t work for the Soviet Union.
Liam: but in practice, aren’t these guys the fittest/smartest/toughest/best shots etc. etc. etc that the Army has?
Aren’t the regular regiments with all their extra equipment – APCs, heavier machine guns, &c – by definition not light infantry?
[Disclaimer: layperson's understanding of military affairs]
I do understand that the special forces recruit by selection. Fair enough; but they’re selected for a specific task, which is the ability to accomplish specific, dangerous, limited missions in small units, self-sufficiently.
That’s not the core purpose of light infantry, and the Regiments have more extensive logistics which, frankly, is more useful in a conflict like Afghanistan.
Gilmae: 1RAR and 2RAR are regular light infantry (ie. unmechanised), 3RAR is parachute infantry. Only some of the Regiments are mechanised.
Yeah, fair enough.
Further: there’s an important difference between “line” infantry and “light” infantry which AFAIK the Australian regiments are at the moment dealing with by non-decision.
Further further: I don’t think there can be any argument against rotating. It’s bad for everyone for one arm of the ADF to shoulder more responsibility than others; by all means let’s spread the burden around and allow the troops currently in Afghanistan to come home.
Liam and Robert, you’re both right (sort of). My understanding is that, while the SASR is largely composed of ex-infantrymen, its members aren’t necessarily the best infantry as such. In the past, at least, their training was divided between urban anti-terrorism and patrolling (undetected) to gather intelligence. The members are selected more on the basis of mental toughness than anything else.
gilmae – the Battalion which has the APCs are actually mounted infantry / light horse. Unless things have changed in the five years since I was discharged, the modern infantry section now carried two light machine guns instead of one rather heavier one (although in each case it’s a one-man carry). Although there is a difference between light and heavy infantry, I’m not sure that it’s a distinction the Australian Army makes (although I’m prepared to be corrected if I’m mistaken).
It is really hard to see just what we are now achieving in Afghanistan. Fitzgibbon’s critique of last year stands – the mission is really ill-defined.
Guerillas simply don’t win wars unless they have the support of the locals, and the Taliban (if that is in fact who they are – they sound more like Pushtun tribal factions to me) are clearly winning. The obvious thing is to leave them to their goat-ridden scrub so long as they no longer tolerate Arab troublemakers. Of course the only reason these foreigners were tolerated in the first place is because they fought infidel invaders.
If I was a digger I wouldn’t be keen to shoot or be shot by peasants living a long way away, who present no obvious threat to my country and who don’t want us there. Rotating regular soldiers through is more likely to reduce than raise morale in the longer term.
The problem in Afghanistan is that not enough resources are committed to fighting the war properly – and that isn’t just military effort that is also Civil Affairs effort. Professional western forces shouldn’t lose any significant contact with the Taliban, but that doesn’t mean the war can be won. General Petraeus has set the grounds for victory in Iraq by finally fighting a proper counter-insurgency war effort. This involves not just the military operations but also the civil-political element of establishing the local forces and building the locals’ trust in the indigenous civil authoritis and military. Hopefully, now General Petraeus is becoming CENTCOM with responsibility over Afghanistan as welll as Iraq he will convince the US, NATO and others including Australia to put in the resources needed to fight and win a counter insurgency war.
SASR aren’t just an infantry unit, although most members come from that Corps. Any member of the ADF can attempt Special Forces Selection – this starts as a combined SAS/Commando thing and then is split up once they decide who is more suitable for the different units. An RAAF Figther Pilot has Commanded a Squadron. Navy Clearance Divers often cross over (and Navy CLearance Divers are hard nuts, too).
Special Forces are favoured by the Goverment because they are easily deployable, well equipped, well trained and provide excellent bang for the buck. The soldiers in them are smart, tough, and experienced – they are the best of the best. Infantry units comes with more political baggage, they need a lot of increased resourcing to get them deployable and have more political risk.
Much of the heavy fighting has been conducted by our Commandoes of the the 4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment. The SASR are meant to be a reconnaissance organisation but they have the firepower and skills to hit the enemy hard if they need, too. Commandoes are generally a heavy raiding force – designed to be very heavily armed, getr in for a short time, kick the hell out of whatever and then get out – not really designed for sustained Ops – ideal for acting on SASR recon info. That said they are flexible enough to sustain operations if required (good old Aussie can do attitude).
Given the amount of heavy contact our guys have been in, it continues to amae me that we have so few casualties – touch wood.
The Australian Infantry has Light Infantry (1 and 2 RAR), Parachute (3 RAR), Commandoes (4 RAR), Mechanized (APCs)(5/7 RAR), Motorised (8/9 RAR). Any of these units is suitable to conduct Counter Insurgency warfare tasks like the SASR and Commandos have been doing, but different, if you know what I mean.
Could you please expand on what you mean by “political baggage” and “political risk”?
When does blind faith become denial?
Al Maliki has vowed to disband the so-called “Awakening Councils” at the earliest opportunity (i.e., when sufficient US troops have decamped for other parts).
http://www.uruknet.info/?p=m45400&s1=h1
At which point the final phase of Shiite ethnic cleansing will be completed.
“Trust”? Bwahahahahahaha.
Petraeus’ “success” is to prevent this inevitable event from happening while Bush’s knuckles continue to drag across the Oval Office broadloom.
Robert
The political risk/baggage of a standard infantry battalion compared to a Special Forces Unit is to do with public perception – the politics. Special Forces are seen, correctly, by the public as being the best of the best and high risk taking units. The public perception when a normal infantry soldier is killed versus a special forces soldier is significant. I point to the unedifying spectacle of Kovco (ignoring the body mix up) it was still hugely wrought on the public conscience – compared to the loss of a Special forces soldier, which while unfortunate and dearly mourned doesn’t cut into the public psyche in the same manner.
Also, when push comes to shove, standard infantry units are more likely to suffer casualties than special forces units. I give you the recent example of the French unit that got ambushed and took heavy casualties – I doubt a SF unit would have been cut up so badly. Special Forces soldiers are more capable, better trained, equipped etc (that’s why they are special) compared to standard infantry. This theory is easily tested in a computer wargame.
The Government has also imposed a numbers cap. Why they continue to do this rather than have capability based requiurement is beyond me. Anyway, a numbers cap limits Infantry deployments. SF units are flexible an can be quite innovative because of the way they are resourced. They easily adapt to the cut and paste model tht numbers caps demand. Infantry units onthe other hand require a bigger logistic tail – if you deploy two companies – you need a mini Battalion headquarters over them. If you deploy a Battalion, then you need about one third of a Brigade Adminstrative Support Battalion (BASB) to support that. And deploying a Brigade, well, we learnt from Timor that to do so guts the Army and we don;t have the logistics to do it properly.
I hope that answers your question.
Katz – exactly who was fighting who in Basra and Sadr City recently?
Was it Sunni v Shia?
Why has Sadr chickened out?
Your source is obviously unbiased, fair and balanced? Yes?
You can believe what you want.
No. it was nationalist Shiiite versus Iranian surrogate Shiite. Maliki. the man sponosered by Bush, is Iran’s man! How stupid can Bush be?
Utterly irrelevant to the looming fate of the “American Militia”.
My citation is a paraphrase of Maliki’s own words.
Here’s over 1000 references to Maliki’s utterances and actions on the same topic.
http://news.google.com.au/news?hl=en&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&num=10&lr=&as_filetype=&ft=i&as_sitesearch=&as_qdr=all&as_rights=&as_occt=any&cr=&as_nlo=&as_nhi=&safe=off&q=maliki%20awakening&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=wn
Enjoy your denial. You can make it last a long time if you try hard.
Katz – part of running an effective counter-insurgency campaign is to co-opt the enemy. Often they are just unemployed young men who have no particular idealogical bent, but getting paid to fight and not having your family harrassed if not murdered makes them fight, initially for the bad guys. It is also legitimate for Maliki and the Iraqi people to want to firstly formalise the awakening militias and then disband them or absorb them into either the Police, National Guard or Army.
I suppose you believe Maliki also personally executed prisoners?
You can spin and deny as much as you want, but depsite your burning desire to see another Vietnam, it ain’t happening (unless Obama wins).
huh? I have no knowledge of, nor interest in, Maliki’s hobbies.
Nice trend.
Liam, the Napoleonic Era just called. They want their terminology back.
There is no more ‘line’ infantry any more, due to the slight change in tactical emphasis away from forming the army up in a line of battle and popping off muskets at the other guys from 100 paces.
Nowadays I think you’d refer to infantry as either ‘mechanised’ (unit has integrated infantry fighting vehicles) or ‘light’ (unit hasn’t). Light infantry would include motorised and airmobile units.
Quibbling about terminology aside, I agree with Liam’s substantive points.
This whole Special Forces mystique thing is getting out of hand. Back in WW2, when most of these units had their genesis, they weren’t necessarily regarded as elite units; rather, as small detachments of unconventional soldiers, who could live off their own resources for long periods, operating behind enemy lines. They placed little emphasis on formal discipline, heirarchy, salutin’ and marchin’ up and down the square. Their operations were sometimes amazingly successful, sometimes fiasco.
Razor calls them “the best of the best”, but if you had asked a British serviceman in WW2, I’ll bet he’d have nominated the Guards regiments as the Army’s best. (Or perhaps some distinguished regular formation like the 7th Armoured Division.)
Post WW2, the British and Aus SAS served successfully, but quietly, in various post-colonial conflicts, and few people outside the armed forces would have known of their existence.
But that changed on 5 May 1980 when the British SAS stormed the Iranian embassy in London, which had been taken over by terrorists. Their efficiency and lethality — combined with the awesome black ninja outfits they were wearing — was stunning.
Since then, there’s been a tsunami of books written about the supposedly secretive special forces units. Personally, I think the SF commanders have given a nod and a wink to all this publicity, in order to deliberately boost the profiles of their units. (Contrast with the treatment of ex-MI5 and MI6 officers who tried to publish their memoirs.)
The problem now seems to be that the SF are sucking in the best soldiers, the best junior officers, heaps of resources. They are the first to be tapped for dangerous operations, which means they build up experience and the other units don’t.
British Field Marshall Slim presciently warned of this a long time ago:
Nowadays it seems that all operations of war are perceived to be so difficult that only the SF can be allowed to undertake them. That is a bad thing.
Paulus, the shadow of the Jacobins falls [ahem] sharply on phrases like War on Terror. As it does, for that matter, in operation names like Enduring Freedom. And in the urge to protect the integrity of national borders, deciding who comes and the circumstances under which they come. Etcetera etcetera.
Paulus: so what you’re saying is we’ve taken the ‘firefighter’ strategy to a level Von Rundstet wouldn’t have imagined possible?
Robert merkel, you said
Like Hell!
That is a common misunderstanding, by many military officers as well as by many civilians, of the purpose of speciaL forces. It is a misunderstanding that has led to special forces being inefficiently and inappropriately employed by those suffering from delusions that tireless bulletproof Supermen who are at their beck-and-call.
Graeme: Fair call.
I certainly wasn’t suffering under the delusion that our SAS or the commando unit are supermen.
However, it’s a myth that special forces (and I mean in the generic sense, not specifically the Aussie SAS) have been happy to peddle, isn’t it?
So this is what you think Maliki has in mind for the American Militias’ personnel?
Touching naivete.
This from the LA Times, 28 August 2008.
The genocide continues.
Robert Merkel [23], you said
Well, not quite. At least not with the SAS, Commando, Marine, Paratroop veterans of several countries I have come across, nor with former members of the French Foreign Legion nor with former members of a certain other “elite” force. All of them emphasised and were proud of the rigorous selection procedures, the specialized and thorough nature of their training, the dangers they faced, their successes [which were not always in battle!] and sometimes their cameraderie too.
All of them, to a man [and, unlike today, all of them were men] despised and hated the “superman” myth surrounding “elite” units. It was a myth that was ALWAYS promoted by politicians [some of whom were notorious gangplank-dodgers themselves] …. by ignorant scribblers [whether journalists or novel-writers] too lazy to talk to the troops themselves …. and, more importantly. by senior military officers more interested in advancing their own careers, shining up their own reputations and grabbing personal power than in doing anything that would actually benefit these special forces units ….
Oh, FFS, Graham. The original contention was that,
This is not the same as stating them to be “supermen” or that they should be employed in tasks better suited to others, e.g. regular “leg” infantry.
It is also not in the slightest bit contentious an assertion given the more rigorous selection processes, far more extensive training in every aspect of infantry skills (light & heavy weapons, small-unit tactics, communications, survival skills etc.), superior equipment and the fact they are kept at the highest readiness level.
OF COURSE special forces are our best infantry soldiers. This is no way denigrates regular infantrymen, but simply reflects the reality in a higher standard of selection, training and equipment. Razor at #12 got it exactly right.
P.S. Paulus, nice work on 1799 and Lolthulhu. Props, respect, yada yada.
Shako Zoolander [26]:
A return FFS to you with brass knobs on.
This special-forces-are-super-infantry mantra is rubbish.
Take the Australia Special Air Service Regiment for example. Given the tired old fuddy-duddies running the Army back in the ’50s, there may have been no practical choice but to have it start off as a specialized infantry company but once it got going, remaining part of Royal Australian Infantry certainly prevented it reaching its full potential …. it would have been better as part of Intelligence Corps or Survey Corps or even [shock! horror!] Armoured Corps. Why not? Armoured Corps were the inheritors of the cavalry tradition: long range reconnaisance, hindering enemy efforts to use the local populace, raiding, snatching and skirmishing …. and isn’t this what SAS does best? Using them as super-infantry is an inefficient application of their specific talents, resources and capability.
Graham Bell @ 27: good points. Amusingly, we had a bloke in the Survey Corps who had been in the SASR (who’d pissed him off when he broke an ankle on a parachute jump). Everyone called him Supes (for supersoldier), which he took in very good humour. Lovely bloke, very rarely got angry or upset about anything, and ferociously fit.
David [28}:
Survey Corps was one of the most valuable yet almost unknown components of the Army so, naturally, in line with standard Australian corporate, academic, governmental and military administrative doctrine .... it was disbanded [after all, this is The Clever Country]..
Paulus [19]:
Good points. Your quote from Field Marshal Sir William Slim was spot on; his own Chindits were ordinary soldiers [some would be unkind enough to say second-class soldiers] who did extraordinary things under appalling circumstances. And your comment on the hazards of the super-soldier special forces delusion deserves repeating
Everyone:
Further to my comment that Australian SAS should have been part of Intelligence Corps or Survey Corps or Armoured Corps …. how is this for a brawl-starter? Commando units are highly trained so as to travel far, fast and light; they have the ability to strike swiftly and savagely, to inflict terrible damage on the enemy in a few moments then vanish into thin air and in so doing, cause the enemy great anguish and send all their plans awry. Sounds like the sort of thing hussars would do …. and who are the inheritors of the hussar tradition? Armoured Corps, of course. Well then, what are Commando units doing stuck in Infantry Corps where they have no business being? Good night
[exits stage right].
Well, Graham, in that case the SAS would have to obtain their new uniforms here:
http://en.empirecostume.com/uniform-for-chasseur-a-cheval-de-la-garde-and-also-a1177.htm
Fyodor: thanks, although I should acknowledge that lolthulhu.com is just a cool site I found on the intertubes, not something I had a hand in myself. I simply publicise it as a service for anyone who has ever pondered a Venn diagram featuring on one side, a lolcat, and on the other side, Cthulhu, and wondered what might exist in the intersection. (For anyone who has ever pondered this, please report immediately to your nearest community mental health service.)
What’s with your website link, by the way? alizaybak.net leads to ‘The page cannot be displayed’ — not what I was eagerly anticipating: laughs and lashings of the old ultraviolence.
Again, missing the point entirely. You’ve yet to demonstrate that superior selection, training, equipment and everything-that-fucking-counts doesn’t result in your average SAS trooper being a better infrantryman, as anyone would expect. AGAIN, that doesn’t mean the SAS should be used for tasks better suited to leg infantry.
As for membership of the Armoured Corps, I should have thought it difficult to lug a armoured fighting vehicle ’round in your rucksack while parachuting, boating, diving, storming hostage situations and otherwise engaging in essentially UNMOUNTED activities. Plus, I reckon the spurs would make an awful racket on LRRP.
Please don’t be offended when I state that I had assumed you weren’t behind it. I was still amused by the URL-play. Mine is a rather tired in-joke, more Ultravox than ultraviolent, but thanks for the kind words.
Graham @ 29: Many of us were very disappointed at the disbanding of the Corps in 1996. Its responsibilities have been (nominally) subsumed by the Engineers, but I don’t think they take them all that seriously – they’re more interested in building bridges and blowing shit up. Still, I spent a (mostly) happy 19 years there, contributing to Australia’s national mapping program.
David [32]:
Indeed ….[from a very, very satisfied former customer
]
Paulus [30]:
No way! The red pants would clash with the sandy beret. How about sandy ochre in place of vermillion red …. and black piping instead of gold? Besides, wouldn’t all that frogging get caught up with grenade striker levers, magazine lips, return handles, caribiners and the ring-pulls on beer-cans?
Ach, Wienetta [31]:
That’s linear thinking on your part. Horses for courses.
And speaking of horses, what is called Armoured Corps now is the inheritor of the mounted warrior tradition. Strictly speaking, heavily-armoured fighting vehicles such as tanks are really mobile gunnery and should belong to Artillery Corps.
Robert Merkel:
You seem to be seeking a wider range of comments about our armed forces that just whether infantry units should be deployed to Afghanistan …. so here goes.
[1] There is no sense in having our ADF personnel risk their lives in conflicts that could have been either prevented or minimized by early and beneficial action.
DFAT personnel capable of holding a simple conversation with locals and of reading political graffiti on walls should be stationed in every important locality in our region. “Forewarned is forearmed” and “prevention is better than cure” and all that. Of course that would mean an increase in DFAT’s budget – but only a tiny fraction of the cost of buying one flying rubbish-bin. Of course that would mean an increase in DFAT’s staff and a [wtf??] “lowering of standards” – good!! – that should have happened years ago!!
[Good heavens. I never thought the day would come when I suggested giving more money to the Fatheads.
]
[2] Let’s revive the Remittance Man tradition from our colonial past …. for those responsible for defence procurement blunders [such as the JSF] and for failing to pick up outstanding Australian local innovations and adaptions [such as MetalStorm(TM) and Scramjet]. Pay those boofheads good money to get out of Australia and stay out and to pester somebody else …. either that of hang them in public …. so as to [as Voltaire put it] “encourage the others”.
Doing so would cost less than one percent of a single defence procurement folly and greatly increase our chances of surviving current and future conflicts. [Besides, if the nong-nongs went to work for our potential enemies that would increase our chances of prevailing too ].