Hugh White, former adviser to Hawke and Beazley on defence matters and now an academic at ANU, has written his own analysis of Australia’s military requirements – a sort of alternative Defence White Paper, which unlike the official version has the benefit of actually being available to read rather than sitting on Joel Fitzgibbon’s in-tray. It’s a very interesting read.
In very broad strokes, White believes the rise of China radically changes Australia’s strategic environment – whatever China’s goals, no longer will the USA have unchallenged military dominance in the Asia-Pacific region, and this changes Australia’s defence priorities. Throw in a strongly growing India and Indonesia, and the neighbourhood is looking rather more crowded than it did through the last 30 years or so. In such a light, the force structure Australia has pursued, with an expensive (but, White argues, pretty strategically insignificant) capability for high-intensity amphibious warfare, spends a lot of money for not much purpose. White argues for a larger, but much lighter army equipped primarily to operate in regional stabilization operations, a navy whose high-end warfighting capabilities are almost entirely submarine-based and whose residual surface ships are for supporting the previously mentioned regional stabilization operations (and notably which doesn’t include air warfare destroyers, who White believes are sitting ducks for missiles), and a larger air force. None of this comes cheap, at around 2.5% of GDP compared to around 2% now.
Personally, White’s take at least has some internal coherence, even if you don’t accept all the premises behind it. Definitely worth a read.
Back to “Defending Australia” against three men and a dog. It wasn’t right the first time. It still isn’t right. We were lucky East Timor occurred when it did and not a couple of years later by which time Army would have been completely gutted.
When is this guy going to get the message that it is easier to fight down than it is to fight up?
And spending less than 3% of GDP is an ongoing joke. (eg – our Blackhawks can’t operate in Afghanistan or Iraq – WTF?)
A tragically misguided paper. The chances of a serious military threat to the Australian mainland by conventional forces in the next 30 years is almost non-existent.
The chances of dangerous climate change are almost 100%.
White envisages a big fleet of diesel submarines and jet fighters but does not mention peak oil or resource depletion once.
Until the Australian defence debate can begin to address issues of “natural security” then we are always going to see defence policy as a sand-table discussion about what widgets to buy.
“The chances of a serious military threat to the Australian mainland by conventional forces in the next 30 years is almost non-existent.”
They were saying the same thing 5 years before 1939.
A chap also waved a piece of paper in the air and declared “Peace in Our Time!”
Razor, if they were saying it, they weren’t reading the news, as by then Japan had already invaded China.
I’m also not sure what bringing Neville Chamberlain into the debate really has to do with it – except to point out that Australia went to war in 1939 over an issue that had very little to do with our mainland home security. By the way, France and Britain’s armed forces outnumbered Nazi Germany’s in both planes and tanks in 1939.
Chamberlain was also feverishly building the British war machine at the same time he waved that paper. The Hurricanes and Spitfires that saved Britain were built by Chamberlain, not Churchill.
If Razor believes that Chamberlain was sincere when he intoned those famous words, he is more naive than it is healthy for him to be in this cynical and rapacious world.
Katz, Niall Ferguson believes France and Britain should have called Hitler’s bluff over Czechoslovakia in 1938. France was actually far better mobilsed than Germany at this time. He points out that more than 10% of the tanks Germany used to invade France in 1940 were Czech.
Perhaps.
But at the same time Chamberlain was fearful that an outbreak of war in 1938 would have given the Soviet Union licence to intervene in Eastern European affairs.
Indeed, during the Munich Crisis, a squadron of Soviet military planes landed in Prague and at the same time the Soviet Ambassador to Prague offered Soviet military assistance should Benes refuse to accede to Hitler’s territorial demands.
Benes considered the offer and decided that it was better for Czechoslovakia to to dismembered by Hitler than to be defended by the Soviet Union.
Needless to say, the popular historical memory chooses not to consider the complexities faced by Chamberlain and the French over the issue of Czechoslovakia.
If Benes couldn’t be persuaded to defend his own country, what leverage did Chamberlain have in the affair?
I’m not convinced Benes “couldn’t be persuaded to defend his own country.” The essence of the Munich deal was to double-cross the Czechs and give Germany the Sudentenland, which incidentally contained most of the Czechs’ border defences and military installations.
The much-hallowed example of 1939 is held up far too often as the killer argument in any foreign policy debate – when in fact there are plenty of historical examples where appeasement (generally called “engagement” these days) has proved productive: for instance US policy towards China in the 1970′s. And there are certainly some good examples where confrontation proved disastrous (see Austrian Empire, 1914).
In any case, back to the topic – would 18 submarines and 200 Joint Strike Fighters necessarily achieve White’s avowed aims of giving Australia strategic weight in the region? I’m not convinced.
I agree that the Right has appropriated the Munich Crisis as its universal talisman of bellicosity. The Right’s reading of the situation is usually ignorant, partial and crassly self-serving.
Ben – your throw away line about “not reading the newwpapers” shows a complete lack of knowledge about the strategic thinking in the 1930′s. Japan was not seen as a threat to SE Asia or Australia. Then, as now, no identifiable threat was used as the excuse for allowing our military forces to be woefully under-resourced.
Chamberlain is a fine example of those (genrally leftists and peaceniks) who think that getting assurances from despots is a worthwhile thing.
I don’t care… I want an aircraft carrier called the “Lady Flo”.
Maybe some submarines, but only if they have punny names and have coral viewing windows so we can use them for tourists in the high season.
Razor, firstly Australians need to remember that there’s no-one between here and China that could successfully invade Australia. Anyone who tried would be looking for what’s left of their army at the bottom of the sea, and wondering where their planes went. Shortly after that, they’d be wondering why their major military bases were uncomfortably warm and crumbly. It’d be a surprise if we even needed to break out the stupid American tanks we’ve bought.
In terms of military resources, I think that White has a point – to a particular type of person – that we’ve built up too much of an adventurous supply of America-helping gear. To stop an invasion, we need boats (notably subs) and planes to stop an enemy army landing. This, it seems, is trivially obvious to people who are paying attention. This isn’t WW2 any more – no army needs to go through PNG’s land to get to us. Troop carriers would make it to Australia from insert-enemy-country-here easily enough. Except that Ben Eltham’s point is much, much more relevant – we’re not going to be invaded. As I’ve noted above, the only country that could is China, and it’s immensely costly. Don’t see China as monolithic either – any invasion force frees up the ability for the locals to get active in opposing the regime. It’s an intellectual exercise to consider the possibility of a land invasion, rather than a practical one.
… in what sense is “Lady Flo” punny?
OMG, I think I see it!
Razor (and others), all of Australia’s defence thinking from the mid-nineteenth century until the mid-1960s assumed a hostile, overwhelming and alien power North of the Torres Strait. The fear of eventual invasion by either Chinese or Japanese forces was one of the founding forces of our nation. Read the debates on the Immigration Restriction Act 1901; they were terrified of an eventual Asian power, and very little changed until after the Japanese surrender.
It’s just that Australian thinking also assumed a friendly overwhelming power; the Royal Navy before the fall of Singapore and United States Navy (and nuclear umbrella) afterwards.
To the extent that Hugh White thinks that the development of a Chinese Navy is going to replace US hegemony in the Pacific I tend to agree with him. I also, unlike many lefties, wouldn’t mind seeing more Australian spending on Defence.
When Ben Eltham says that;
He’s right, but the security danger of climate change is in the effect of environmental change on other countries’ stability. Resource depletion, population growth and economic instability are a surefire recipe for organised political violence. When the effects of global warming start biting we’ll have many worse problems than heatstroke and sunburn.
And from the report’s p47 worth putting in letters of blinding lightning:
Yes, I’m all for increasing Defence funding too – provided they can establish they have the faintest friggin’ idea where all the existing money has gone.
I’m reliably informed our military will fail this test – in a spectacular swan dive formation.
I agree with Lefty E – until Defence can actually account for the money it gets now, it seems odd to suggest handing over any more.
White can witter on all he likes about 50 (or whatever) submarines, the big problem is recruitment and retention. (After all, we can’t even man the sub fleet we have now, let alone one three times the size.)
Until Defence can work out how to attract, then keep, the warm bodies they need, it doesn’t matter what they buy, it’ll rust without having been used.
Yup, more money for defense can only come with accounting for where the money currently goes, hear hear. I also like the idea of having a HMAS Flo, no doubt equipped with a constant supply of home-recipe cakes and scones. If we’re going to war we may as well be prim and proper about it.
I also maintain that any other country would have fat chance of properly invading Australia, i mean, we’ve been here over 200 years and we still haven’t quite finished the job. Get around to it next Thursday i reckon, she’ll be right mate.
Which would contribute most strongly to Australia’s national security come 2039: putting an extra $50 billion into shiny weapons systems, the even-shinier $50 billion broadband network, investing $50 billion in a fossil-energy-free economy, or $50 billion into addressing the salinity & damage to the Murray-Darling basin and beyond?
Ben: I agree that White should have explicitly considered the effects of climate change and resource depletion on the security situation. But, as Liam says, the consequences might well be more organized state-on-state violence.
That said, fuelling jet fighters and submarines isn’t an issue. While it’s an environmental disaster, synfuels from coal work well enough to churn out the comparatively tiny requirements of the armed forces’ combat vehicles.
When it comes down to it, until another navy starts gaining comparable naval aviation capabilities to the US Navy, Australia faces no risk of invasion as long as we maintain a minimal air combat and submarine capability. No other navy is going to possess those kind of capabilities for at least another 15 years, probably 20. I don’t see any reason why we would need to even start thinking about forces sufficient to deter a carrier navy until a hell of a lot closer to when such a threat emerges, at which point the military technology landscape may well have changed considerably. That’s another major weakness of White’s thesis, by the way – it’s like the architecture of military hardware is frozen in 1995; he doesn’t for instance consider that the crewed fighter plane is on its way out.
And when it really comes down to it, if we were really worried about invasion by superior conventional military forces, we’d do what Israel and South Africa did and build a nuclear weapon. Australia has built pilot plants which implement the easiest pathway to a nuclear weapon – uranium enrichment – way back in the 1970s, not to mention Silex Systems’ more recent laser enrichment technology.
Robert, sooner or later your real reason for the espousal of nuclear power had to emerge. You want to build the bomb!
Of all the half witted and stupid ideas I have ever heard this is the most retarded and stupid of all time.So Apartheid Israel and Apartheid era South Africa are the models for us eh? Next you will be advocating an alliance with Burma.
Australia builds the bomb, then what happens? Indonesia builds the bomb that’s what, all of south East Asia goes Dr Strangelove on us.
Huggy
“Which would contribute most strongly to Australia’s national security come 2039: putting an extra $50 billion into shiny weapons systems, the even-shinier $50 billion broadband network, investing $50 billion in a fossil-energy-free economy, or $50 billion into addressing the salinity & damage to the Murray-Darling basin and beyond?”
Or putting $50 billion into targeted aid in the immediate vicinity of what is known as the arc of instability, focussing on stabilising and building goodwill towards Australia?
The WW2 analogy is used to justify just about everything. Japan had not only invaded China but also Korea by that time. They also faced largely friendly nations who were keen to get rid of unwanted colonial incubus. Further, friendly or otherwise, those nations were almost entirely undeveloped by industrial standards and had no serious military capacity of their own.
Picture China rolling off on a jaunt. First stop Taiwan, which has a powerful military of its own. Then what, a light jaunt through Vietnam? Laos? Thailand? Malaysia and Indonesia welcoming occupation by the Chinese, they love Chinese people don’t they?
The point without being too flippant is that the landscape is drastically altered since preWW2. Now WW1 on the other hand, there’s a stark warning: I predict that the one serious risk of Australia being drawn into total war this century is through alliances and doing what we do best- blithely waltzing into other people’s wars.
Or, of course, not taxing that $50 billion (plus any interest) from us in the first place and letting us choose for ourselves where we want that money spent? Those of us who want a greener planet could then use the money to spend a bit more on power from whatever solution we believe will work the best. Those who want more social responsibility could donate it to charities we believe will have an impact. Those who want to improve the Murray-Darling could then form a charity to buy water rights and donate them to the river.
The defence option is about the only one we cannot do ourselves.
No, silly idea. The government knows much better what is best for us and we should always allow them to make all of our decisions for us as we are so stupid.
Huggybunny: no I don’t want the bomb. I want the world to have far fewer nuclear weapons – though I think the idea of eliminating them entirely is a pipedream. It would be a very bad thing for Australia and the world if we were to acquire them.
But the fact is that if we thought ourselves genuinely threatened and we couldn’t count on the US for support, we’d build them, which is precisely what most other technologically advanced countries with hostile neighbours who can’t count on superpower support have done.
Armagny’s last para nails it. Having the capacity to join in imperial adventures with a Great and Powerful Friend has always led to our politicians succumbing to temptation, and has always caused us nothing but grief. Money aside, we should remove that temptation.
But of course Ben Eltham is also right. If you see defence as a risk management exercise (and you should) then you have to acknowledge that there are other large risks that most of the money would be better spent on.
Picture China rolling off on a jaunt. First stop Taiwan, which has a powerful military of its own. Then what, a light jaunt through Vietnam? Laos? Thailand? Malaysia and Indonesia welcoming occupation by the Chinese, they love Chinese people don’t they?
Or they could try to cruise through the Paracel islands (also claimed by Taiwan and Vi?t Nam) and then enter the Spratly islands (claimed by China and five other countries). Until China is able to sort out its claims in its own backyard and make them stick, I’m not too worried by incursions into Australia.
Robert,
The options are these;
1. Stay with our present imperial master the US; continue the China encirclement and join with the US in a nuclear first strike on China
2. Make it clear that we don’t really care if our new imperial master is to be China and change sides
3. Try to become the Switzerland of the South Pacific
The third option will be the most dificult but is probably the safest.
It is the way of all Imperial regimes to go down in a blaze of death and destruction. The US will take much of the globe with it when it goes. The trick is to be not where the action is.
Siding with the US will guarantee the destruction of more than one Australian Capital city. Siding with China likewise, except the US would probably extend the bombing to provincial centres-if history is any guide.
Huggy
The key to the switzerland model, of course, being a huge reserves base where most of the able bodied population has some basic training and can be easily called up if threatened.
As noted above there’s an odd history of issues with reserves. I would add the following- reserves should be given a clear undertaking that they are only signing up for the immediate defence of Australian soil, and only as ‘reserves’, not a first option. This would improve recruitment.
A more radical option would be to make training all-hazard emergency response, with some basic military thrown in. The ‘call up obligation’ could then extend to responding to major emergencies, making them a far more useful investment for the polity. And again, probably widening the net of people who would consider joining.
The other thing that everyone forgets about the Switzerland model is that their neutrality was built on hundreds of years of citizen-Swiss slaughtering each other over ethnicity and language and land and the Reformation and fun and profit. And being hired to do every other European inbred Duke or Count’s slaughter for fun and profit, too. The Swiss might be neutral, but their history’s as blood-soaked as any of their neighbours.
Now the Sandline International solution, there’s something for Australian defence planning. Could we, like so many other smaller countries, arrange for our military capability to be self-funding? Condottieri, nationalised (or at least privatised-and-regulated in the same old way)?
Amazing what a sustained period of high unemployment does for ADF recruitment.
Incidentally, there is one country in the region that already earns a nice amount of foreign exchange providing armies=for-hire for the UN.
Fiji, come on down!
And there’s nobody around who does military “fundraising” better than the entrepreneurs of the TNI.
Jeeze you guys are so literal.
I simply used Switzeraland as an example of a successful netral in the last few major conflicts. Sure the swiss had to learn the hard way as did Europe. China too has learned a thing or two about the folly of war. Not enough perhaps.
The real worry is the US.
Huggy
The issue of whether climate change and resource instability will make conflict more likely is certainly an interesting one. It’s very well explored in Climate Wars by Gwynne Davis, and to a lesser degree by Homer-Dixon in The Upside of Down.
Indeed, some people think we are already seeing climate change conflict: in Darfur, where desertification in the Sahel was a major contributor to the tension leading to the Darfur conflict.
Darfur and Somalia are good data points for what conflict generated by climate change will likely resemble. It will almost certainly be low-intensity, internal to countries as much as between states, and “fourth-generation” in nature. It is far less likely to be conventional and high-intensity. All of which suggests that the kind of force structure that White thinks Australia should be investing in is exactly the opposite of the type we will need.
Robert, you’re absolutely correct when you say White seems to have stopped thinking about force structure in about 1995. Manned jet fighters are already highly vulnerable to next-generation Surface-to-Air Missile systems like the Soviet S300/S400. So too are surface vessels vulnerable to anti-shipping missiles.
But how likely is the RAN to face high-intensity conflict? The RAN is far more likely to face a spectrum of threats with the bulk of them towards the low end – piracy, maritime incursion, fishing disputes and naval support for RAMSI-style civil reconstruction missions. Frigates, patrol boats, catamarans and hospital ships are going to be the most valuable assets, not highly lethal diesel submarines. Likewise, White concentrates on jet fighters but completely ignores airlift capabilities (despite the fact that the Army’s Caribou’s are on their last legs). It’s a curious paper riddled with oversights.
Well, to be fair, Huggy, there is a Switzerland of the Pacific: it’s Japan. It’s constitutionally peaceful and pacifist now, but which other nation in the ocean has a more frightening history of ruthless fanatical militarism and implacable commitment to violence? Which Pacific Rim country would you less like to get involved with in an ongoing conflict? The Sea Shepherd people bait the whalers at their own peril, I tell ya. When they run out of patience that “research vessel” could turn to gigantic sword-wielding short-skirted schoolgirl robot in about ten seconds flat, the sky flashing fluorescent colours, everybody rushing through the air grimacing and throwing cats at each other. Aaaaaaah!
I prefer the Spanish Solution. Looking back on a great and glorious Imperial history, in the twentieth century the Spaniards tried involvement with Great And Powerful Friends and after both failed, they’ve now decided to follow their true national destiny. Red wine, garlic prawns, late nights out, after-lunch sleeping, and selling their frigates to Australians.
Minister Fitzgibbon, you’ll receive my proposal in the mail.
Not to mention the ability to say to senior members of pretty much every government in the world “Touch us and we’ll burn all your money”.
liam, I too support the Spanish option. Well, parts of Spain, Italy and even France.
Trouble is I have to work at programs to fix the networks in OZ. They don’t want my sort of stuff in that tiny Andalusian village, hope they never do.
Huggy
Incidentally, the Japanese military is much bigger and more formidable on its home turf than is widely appreciated. They have zero power projection capability, but they have a very well-equipped air force and navy.
Or Sweden but with better beaches.
And more iron ore.
Some of you don’t actually appear to have read what Hugh White wrote. He says we need a large light army for regional stability missions (RAMSI, Timor, etc) and basically no surface combat navy. Some of you seem to be arguing for exactly what he is already suggesting.
While we can argue the toss about manned versus unmanned air warfare, his point there is basically is that we get the best we can afford. It’s not that complicated really.
OK, another point of comparison: the Japanese also have a great and glorious tradition of bloody, relatively pointless early modern fratricide. The Switzerland-Japan analogy’s fitting like a Duplo block hammered by a cranky toddler, well… except for the cheese.
I still maintain that the Swiss solution is fantastic if you can put up with the f*&king Swiss. When the global downturn comes, you know, and all of those foreign bank accounts stop adding GDP, each canton authority’s going to muster its reserves and start pushing red map arrows outward into each other’s turf with their troops well-trained bourgeoisie; those respectable peaceful folk SIG SG 550 rifles and ammunition boxes in their wine cellars. Partying, as they say, like it’s 1659.
“Partying, as they say, like it’s 1659.”
On the other hand the Swiss and Swedes came out rather nicely after the 30 Years War.
Unlike the Holy Roman Empire (“neither holy, Roman or an empire”) which emerged from that fracas with an economic crisis, an abysmal job market, a budget mess, a failing financial industry, a collapsing auto industry, an absurd health care system, an equally absurd national energy framework, a pessimistic electorate (or at least Electors), and as an geo-politic entity that blew much of its global prestige.*
* Any resemblance with current empires is purely coincidental.
Heh.
Peaceful arms traders to the world, in the case of the Swedes. That’s one thing Evil Pundit and I agreed on: they were a clear and present danger to humanity. Sverige deleda est.
To continue the analogy: it’s clear that we’re seeing in Obama the last of the Hapsburgs—hell he’s got the chin for it—but who’ll be the first of the New World Order’s Bourbons?
“He says we need a large light army for regional stability missions (RAMSI, Timor, etc)”
Yup, I’d go along with that.
” and basically no surface combat navy.”
Maybe not. We still need to move personnel and material around if we’re moving more towards peacekeeping duties.
Plus as the Yanks have been recently exploring (and revisiting what the RN used to do) a solidly equipped surface navy can project and work power beyond the obvious ways and means.
Basically navies carry a lot more essential and self-contained task force infrastructure around with them compared to armies or airforces. Also they tend to be staffed by rather more worldly people than other armed forces branches.
Also also we’re a big fucking island surrounded by water with our five key centres thousands of vulnerable supply chain miles from any old-style aggressors. If we’re gonna get into beinga good global citizen neighborhood watch kinda place, we do need a strong navy, above and below.
Here’s a hypothetical. Imagine Fiji spins into bloody civil war and all Western citizens need to be evacuated, along with the contents of vaults of the ANZ head office on Victoria Parade.
Would you rather have a few groaning RAAF C-130s trying to make sense out of Nausori Airport control tower held at gunpoint or HMAS Kanimbla, Manoora and Tobruk sitting in Suva harbour, full of combat and medical personnel and helos and yet plenty of extra room, and with enough technology to blow the entire RFMF out of the water and get the Colonial War Memorial Hospital working again?
David Axe! Hooray, another compulsive reader. The other option is to militarise the World Bank and IMF, Nabakov. Let them cover their losses and protect their human assets. Think Frank Herbert and CHOAM, but with men in skirts.
Also, to replace the C130 I’ve suggested (ahem) before the A400M, the sexiest plane I’ve seen for a while.
Yeah well, never mind its Dowty props and sleek lines, trying landing and taking off a A400M or any other plane for that matter on Suva’s biggest flat central open space, Albert Park, in a hurry. Even Kingsford-Smith needed some trees chopped down before he could take from there. It’d be a lot fucking harder if the RFMF left a few old cars parked strategically here and there about the greensward.
Nope, in this scenerio, you need a few haze gray mounds of metal brooding in the harbour with choppers flying overhead.
And another argument for a strong Navy in the Pacific. They’re no strangers to moisture. Try getting a F-35 combat ready in a jury-rigged forward base during a tropical monsoon.
Hate to widdle in the pool – but IMHO, regional stability missions could actually use a whole lot less ADF, and a whole lot more coppers – Feds preferably (though state coppers there are doing a bang-up job).
INTERFET was different – that was a proxy war with TNI – and dont let anyone tell you otherwise.
But RAMSI, ISF – here’s the deal: ADF is great to calm things down at first, if there’s armed civil unrest a la Dili 2006. But then what? Its a policing mission. There’s been all sort of problems with ADF doing that, not least cos they’re not trained in it. A soldier pretty much goes zero to hero: stop that or I’ll shoot. Not appropriate for civilians.
Coppers are trained for everything in between. I think its an insult to both forces to mix those things up.
The Air Warfare Destroyers are a gigantic bit of pork barrelling to keep the SA economy afloat.
Two words for you Lefty E.
“Shore Patrol”
Oops, heres the missing link to the AWD snark.
In fact Australia’s defence procurment agencies appear to have been captured by incompetent bureaucratics easily led around by the nose be the iniquitous military-industrial complex. This episode of Four Corners has the goods on our Masters of War.
Its bad enough that these bureaucrats get power and fat-cats make money out of other peoples blood. Whats worse is that the DMO and contractors cant pick or make weapons systems that work properly for missions focused on our national interest.
The L/NP seems to be particularly vulnerable to sweet talking by the US aspects of the M-I complex. Perhaps because Andrew Peacock was Chairman of Boeing?
But both parties seem to be suckers for Boys Toys with Bang for Buck. Remember Bomber Beazley?
Lefty E, I can see where you’re coming from, but I’ve thought for a while we need something about half-way in between cops and infantry.
The problem with AFP is that they’ve just got their sidearm, at best, and if a bunch of bad-ass guerrilleros turn up with AKs, well, you’d better hope the AFP guys have got ace negotiating skills, because they’ve got precious few other options.
The problem with standard infantry, is the attitude exemplified by Razor above: that “it is easier to fight down than it is to fight up”. Yeah, take out the enemy army, and all the subsequent stuff — peacekeeping, counter-insurgency, civil affairs, whatever you call it — is easy and trivial. Oh, if only.
We need, as much as the military will scream about it, some dedicated battalions of gendarmerie-type peacekeeping/COIN specialists. They’d have the automatic weapons and light AFVs to dissuade most banditos, and enough cultural skills to be able to talk to the peasantry other than down the barrel of a gun.
I hasten to add that I wouldn’t want these to replace any part of the current regular Army — they should be in addition to it. Seems a better use of resources than expanding the JSF fleet from 100 to 200, as Hugh White proposes.
Too much small-time, short-term thinking here.
Australia should build a Maginot Line.
In the unlikely event that we are invaded, we are as capable as the French of making documentary masterpieces like “The sorrow and the Pity”. This would add immeassuarbly to Australia’s cultural richness.
And whether or not we are invaded, think of the tourism potential of Australia’s own Maginot Line.
French strategic thinking of the 1930s has paid for itself many times over. What benefit has Australia ever received from Australian strategic thinking?
“I’ve thought for a while we need something about half-way in between cops and infantry.”
That’s pretty much why the Portuguese Republican Guard (GNR) are so effective in Dili, Paulus. They’re a midway paramilitary police force – of the sort we dont tend to have in the Anglo world.
Not that I MIND that we dont, I hasten to add! But it turns out to be a good force for the mission in Timor.
At risk of bringing down a Fyodor visitation…
CONDOTTIERI!!!
Liam: bugger the A400M – Nabakov’s right; we need ‘copters. But regular ones won’t do the trick. What we need is these.
Nabakov, again, this isn’t quite what Hugh White said, re surface navy. He says we don’t need/can’t afford a navy designed for blue water supremacy, the only thing we can add there are subs. What we can and do need are things like the kanimbla, Tobruk, Westralia etc, the two new LHDs – so pretty much exactly what you said. In other words, you, me and Hugh White all seem to agree there. What I disagree with is that he says the two planned LHDs are too big, and we need more small ones. i think he’s wrong – in the sort of scenario you’ve outlined, I would think that the capacity to pick up lots of civilians, ahve lots of helicopters, and an advanced hospital sitting jsut offshore would be jsut the thing – and if we need them in more than two places at once the pac rim really is fucked.
Jack, I don’t think anyone could possibly disagree with you re the AWDs. How many SA ministers were sitting around the cabinet table?
Why do submarines, artillery and tanks have to be so labour-intensive?
I think Ben is being wise after the event – just because events were in the papers doesn’t mean that one-off attacks like Pearl Harbour or 9/11 don’t come as surprises, or that they’re easy to plan for.