The global financial crisis

The global financial crisis has dominated the headlines for months and has affected countries all around the world. Although national governments have stepped in to prevent the collapse of the financial system, the world is heading for a major recession. Australians nearing retirement have seen the value of their super fall dramatically while workers face the prospect of job losses and falling house prices as the financial crisis hits the rest of the economy. So, how did this happen and what can we do about it?

The most common reasons given for the current global financial crisis are:
1) US banks and mortgage brokers giving home loans to poor Americans who later defaulted on their debt;
2) the failure of the banks and investors to adequately assess the risk of investing in the financial assets that were based on these loans; and
3) these bad mortgages were sold to banks and investors around the world.

Although these factors are very important, there are deeper causes of the crisis. These include financial deregulation, and other ‘free-market’ policies, followed in Australia, and around the world, over the last three decades. Another factor is the over-consumption of people in rich countries on the back of a big increase in debt, and the exploitation of poor countries and the environment.

The economists, business lobby groups and politicians who pushed this ‘neo-liberal’ – or ‘economic rationalist’ – agenda argued that if governments ‘got out of the way’ and let the ‘free-market’ operate without interference, then we’d all be better off.

They called for ‘deregulation’, ‘privatisation’ and more ‘competition’. So, they removed protections for Australian industries, reduced regulation of banks and other finance companies, sold off public assets and attacked trade unions. They claimed that this would lead to a more efficient economy as well as higher economic growth.

The results have not lived up to the claims of those who pushed this agenda. Reducing regulation of banks has not led to more competition and a better deal for customers, but to fewer banks with bigger profits. It has also encouraged more financial speculation and less productive investment in the new infrastructure, social services and new industries we really need.

Removing protection for Australian industries and pursuing ‘free trade’ has not created new high-tech industries and quality jobs. Australians still pay far more for our imports and in interest payments on foreign debt than we receive for our exports. Rather than becoming a more diversified economy we have become even more dependent on mining and agriculture.

Privatisation has also reduced governments’ income without delivering the promised benefits to consumers. Governments and big business have also put a big effort into reducing the rights and conditions of Australian workers, most recently with the WorkChoices laws.

These policies have created more insecure jobs, greater inequality and lower rates of employment than during the 1950s and 1960s. Big corporations have earned massive profits while our healthcare, education, infrastructure and environment have been run down.

Financial deregulation led to both the ‘subprime crisis’ and the global financial crisis. In the US, badly regulated banks and mortgage brokers sold these ‘subprime’ loans to people with low incomes and poor credit histories. The loans were then packaged into derivatives that could be traded on markets. Private ratings agencies like Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s gave these financial assets high ratings and they were bought by banks and other investors all around the world.

When Americans started defaulting on their home loans in large numbers US house prices fell sharply. This caused the value of the financial assets based on these home loans to fall too, creating massive losses throughout the global financial system. These losses sent shockwaves of panic through global markets, made even worse by the complexity and lack of transparency of the financial system. Banks refused to lend to each other, huge companies went bust and governments around the world scrambled to stop the financial system from collapsing.

So, what should we do about it? The Rudd Government’s guarantee of all bank deposits, the cash payments targeted at low-income earners and his commitment to bring forward major infrastructure projects are welcome. However, it is clear that a lot more needs to be done to bring what the Prime Minister called ‘extreme capitalism’ under control. We need to think about how we can re-regulate the financial system to make sure it performs its proper role of financing productive investment and does not threaten the livelihoods of working Australians. To do this we need global cooperation, best achieved through the United Nations, to re-regulate global finance.

The free-market agenda of the last few decades has failed. The big financial firms failed to efficiently allocate financial resources and to adequately assess risk. When the financial sector imploded it fell to governments – and ultimately taxpayers – to bail out the banks and stop the whole system from collapsing.

What the current crisis makes clear is that the era of governments acting in the interests of big corporations and free-market economists must end. Australians must force their elected representatives to reject the failed policies of the last three decades and refocus on the basic needs of Australians. The need for a healthy environment, secure quality jobs and decent public health and education should be its top priorities.

This serious crisis is an opportunity for a shift in direction. Government has to lead now, and with popular support, it can make the urgent need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions the focus of its effort to protect jobs and rebuild our economy.

In The Guardian, Will Hutton explains why measures to halt the cascading crisis have been ineffectual to date. He might have made more explicit the implication that one of the basic structural problems is that action taken at the level of the nation state can be counter-productive given the disseminations and movements of capital, and that there are real domestic political barriers to coordinated action, as well as all the obvious problems of concertation through institutions such as the EU and the G20.

But he does make this point – harmonising with the note I’ve been sounding repeatedly – very clearly indeed:

There was no effective opposition. The left and organised labour collapsed as intellectual, social and political forces; there was no conviction that any alternative to this shareholder value-driven, financial, ‘securitised’ capitalism existed, or any political muscle to support it even if there were. Mainstream culture moved away from public purpose and fairness; the new priorities were individual self-fulfilment, personal experience and loyalty to self.

Hutton is perhaps more sanguine than I am, though, about the capacity of state action to turn all this around. In essence, he’s making an argument he’s been making for some years – about the virtues of other forms of capitalism than that which has been hegemonic in the neo-liberal Anglosphere. He briefly had some success in influencing Tony Blair in the early days of New Labour – in opposition, to be precise – in pushing ideas about “Stakeholder capitalism”. Whether a reorientation to a capitalism focused on the medium rather than the short term and on the real rather than the financial economy would work now – or whether as John Quiggin seems to think the Gordon Browns of the world are predisposed to be pushed, however much they might kick and scream, in something like the correct direction, is perhaps anyone’s guess as events continue to move at breakneck pace.

Immanuel Wallerstein puts a contrary view. I’m not quite sure if I agree – though he’s right more often than most. It is certain that what is occurring is Schumpeterian “creative destruction”, but whether or not the capacity to begin the cycle of valorisation and capital accumulation anew exists is something I think it’s better to be agnostic about at this stage. While I dare say he’s right about the end of a Krondatieff cycle, beyond that, prognostication seems to have a very short shelf life in these times.

It’s also interesting to observe that some are suggesting that the Canadian Tories’ “steady as she goes” approach is precisely what is leading to their decline in support in the campaign which has reached its final stretches. It may well be that Stephen Harper has more problems than just perceived inaction in the face of the credit crisis, but it probably is significant that voters are demanding state action to propitiate fear. In the Australian context, I wouldn’t be at all surprised if Kevin Rudd and Labor are able to consolidate their support at a time when their momentum may have been sagging. The “cut through” of the opposition really diminishes at times of crisis, and it may be that Rudd has a chance to entrench himself with his response. To some degree that’s dependent on how far Australia is able to resist the global push towards recession, and again, I really would hesitate to place much value in any predictions at this stage.

Iceland right now is apparently in a state of shock and gives a snapshot of what a depression with the Great in it will look like everywhere – “cafes were half-empty, real estate agents sat idle, and retailers reported few sales” says the AP.

This after the government basically took over its banking sector, with Russian money, which as noted in the linked post, has real geopolitical implications.

Meanwhile, the British government is laying out 500 billion pounds to take equity in its banking sector, but basically proposing business as usual. Co-ordinated interest rate cuts are having very little impact on the stock market, and more worryingly, on the liquidity crisis. Paul Krugman writes:

We’re way past the point at which conventional monetary policy has much traction.

In America, in the eye of the economic storm, the Fed has basically become the financial system, but to little avail:

The time for a recession was 2005. At that time simple macroeconomic policy; simply raising interest rates, would have ended the bubbles in credit and housing at the cost of a standard if somewhat nasty recession. Trillions of dollars of intervention would not have been needed. Just standard macro policy. Even in 2006 it might still have worked. The Fed blew it, and they broke the system, and now with the system broken they may have to either buy it all out (and Paulson may be considering that after all) or just become the system. And even if they do that may not work, because, well, who wants to borrow and invest right now?

Bernanke and Greenspan are certainly in the “worst Fed chairman of all time” stakes in a big, big way.

So what does all this mean? It’s not “financial socialism” or the “end of capitalism”. While there are some truly absurd narratives circulating about how the meltdown is all the fault of… you guessed it, regulation, the Left and/or Bill Clinton, this nonsense is not unrelated to the coincidence between the financial meltdown and the American Presidential election, and it can be disposed of very easily:

Although financial institutions were evaluated for compliance with the act, it never required they lose money on mortgages or that they be given to people with slim prospects of repaying them. Even if, as some claim, the legislation ultimately played a part in encouraging excesses, such as the bundling of sub-prime loans into packages that hid their riskiness, that was a failure not of too much but of too little regulation.

[Mike Steketee]

What conservatives can’t point to, ultimately, is any form of regulation that actually caused the crisis. No one put a gun to the head of US bank executives and made them lend to people without the means to repay loans. No one threatened dire retribution to investment bankers unless they packaged sub-prime securities. And no one compelled Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s to inexplicably and wholly irresponsibly rate those securities at AAA levels even when they didn’t understand the packaging mechanisms being used.

[Bernard Keane]

As Keane points out, this sort of thing is a classic example of the moveable feast that is the right wing opinionating machine – an “ownership society” and aspirational citizens were the mark of the success of right wing governments yesterday, and today evil lefties encouraged passive banks to lend money to all sorts of unsuitable poor people.

While it may be difficult at the moment for the Right to point to capitalism as a roaring success story, what’s occurring in response is very far from being socialism, or even nationalisation.

John Quiggin writes:

This kind of instalment-plan nationalisation seems to offer the worst of all worlds. At some point, a more systematic approach will have to be adopted, and given the rate at which markets are plummeting, the sooner that point comes the better. This isn’t the return of socialism, but it certainly looks like the end of the kind of financial capitalism that has prevailed for the last few decades.

And his opinion is echoed by a socialist blogging sociologist:

And what about the future of capitalism itself? No one is saying the system itself has collapsed, rather what has gone down the tubes is a particular way of organising capitalism. It is too early to tell what could replace it, though a number of participants flagged up the possibility of a more regulated capitalism, albeit without the welfare and full employment commitments of post-war Keynesian capitalism. It’s also likely that Neoliberalism will continue to cast its shadow.

And in a rather pithy article from Andrew Crook of Business Spectator:

Western economies, with their manufacturing industries gutted and the entrails shipped abroad, are struggling to actually produce anything beyond amorphous “services” and intellectual property. This has mirrored the spread of cancerous and impossible-to-decipher debt instruments, producing the biggest financial bubble in world history. That bubble has just burst.

Sub-prime mortgages may have been the bitter pill, but it’s the yawning distance between these debt vehicles and the bricks-and-mortar of our everyday lives that could prove fatal.

Assuming the current crisis doesn’t result in the second coming of socialism, we’re left with the familiar remedy of ever more-regulated domestic markets. But the genuine policy levers of an earlier era remain out of reach.

Over the last 30 years, the Keynesian social fabric has being steadily eroded by the slavish adherence of Western governments to global market forces (“external harmonisation”) as a non-negotiable pre-cursor to domestic policymaking. Despite the tinkering of Rudd and co, this remains broadly the case. Not that they’d have you believe it.

As I’ve been arguing, the political logics behind neo-liberalism remain well entrenched, despite the recourse had by panicked “free markets” to the “nanny state”. Mark Davis agrees neo-liberalism isn’t finished:

It’s a nice idea, but underestimates just how deeply embedded neoliberal ideas are in the global finance system. My sense is that the bail-out, now passed by the US senate and to be revoted on in Congress tomorrow, will happen, even if it won’t necessarily work because there’s more to this than simply lancing a boil. Regulatory noises are being made and some tightening will take place. But the system will stay relatively unchanged because too much depends on it and because money and power have little respect, in the end, for principle.

We have essentially two problems at the moment from the point of view of the conjuncture of political economy and the alignment of social and economic forces. The first is that social democratic parties have bought into the logic of the dominant paradigm to such an extent that there are very few alternatives on offer. The second is that neo-classical orthodoxy has led to such a mismanagement of the global economy that states appear bamboozled in the face of a liquidity crisis, and few orthodox solutions appear to offer any hope of turning the situation around in the short term. We will probably see some sort of stabilisation, though perhaps not for a while, and we will also see the emergence of a new orthodoxy not too dissimilar to the old one as the superficial lessons of the crisis are absorbed and the wagons of the powers that be circle the camp.

So, if the policy cupboard is bare, and ideologues are trying desparately to readjust themselves to some version of “culture wars as usual”, what is to be done? Andrew Crook, once again, is absolutely on the money:

The broader challenge for the Left, and for politics, is to imagine a radically-different regulatory framework with actual meaning for alienated individuals struggling, in a world of tumult, to carve out a viable identity and a cohesive personal narrative. This won’t come from centre-left policy elites—it requires a new breed of social movements to organise around these faultlines and assert their right to economic and cultural autonomy.

But the outline of such a movement is only just being sketched and echoing Paulson’s doubters on Wall St (the Dow has lost 13 per cent of its value in the last five sessions), there’s little reason to believe conditions on Main St, or anywhere else, will begin to improve any time soon.

Update: New post here. Comments are now closed on this one.