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Oh dear. Drivers in Pakistan are refusing to transport supplies across the Northwest Frontier to NATO and US troops in Afghanistan. 75% of US and NATO supplies go that way. Which means they’re either going to have to drive their own damn trucks, find a new supply route in a hurry, or learn to fight a war without food, fuel, ammunition and toilet paper.

This is a major setback for the US, and unless they resolve it quickly, it’s all over for them. Modern armies – particularly the US army, with its dependence on helicopters – are hungry and thirsty beasts. Cut off their supplies, and they wither and die.

Hang on, what trials? The only connection Dr Haneef had with the UK was that he gave his SIM Card to his cousin Sabeel Ahmed when he was about to leave the UK in 2006 to return to India. Sabeel’s brother Kafeel was involved in unsuccessful terror attacks in London and Glasgow in June last year, driving a Jeep Cherokee into the doors of Glasgow airport and setting himself alight. Kafeel later died from burns to 90% of his body, and Sabeel was charged and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment in April this year for refusing to disclose information about the Glasgow attack and another failed attack in London, and a month later deported to India.

The only ongoing trials from the attempted terror attacks are those of Bilal Abdullah and Mohammed Asha, who are charged with conspiracy to murder. Abdullah was arrested in the immediate aftermath of the Glasgow attack, reportedly jumping out of the burning Jeep to attack a police officer. Asha was arrested at a roadblock some time later. Both are scheduled for trial in October this year.

Now, I’m no lawyer, but it’s plausible that the AFP submission to the Clarke inquiry contains material that could potentially upset a judge hearing the cases against Abdullah and Asha were it to appear spread across the Daily Mail. But that assumes it would indeed be spread across the Daily Mail. Couldn’t the relevant judge in the UK order the suppression of the material coming out of the Clarke inquiry in the British media?

Furthermore, I still struggle to see why the material relating to the above cases is so closely interwined with the AFP’s submission to the Clarke Inquiry that not only can the AFP not release the entirety of the submission, it can’t even release an unclassified version with the potentially prejudicial bits blanked out. Maybe I’m missing something important, but it just reeks of political convenience. The connection would want to be pretty compelling if Keelty doesn’t want to, at some future time when it all comes out, look like a self-serving tool who abused secrecy to temporarily protect his, and his organization’s, own backside.

ASIO’s consistent advice to these meetings was that, based on available information, ASIO did not assess Dr Haneef as a threat to security and did not have grounds to issue an adverse security assessment. However, in the early days of the investigation, ASIO nevertheless considered that further investigation of Dr Haneef was warranted.

So even ASIO – who presumably had everything the AFP did – didn’t think Haneef was a threat. Given that, the hypothesis that the AFP has further damning, but classified, information on Haneef that justified the continued detention is looking extremely shaky.

But the most controversy, so far, has arisen due to the AFP’s refusal to release its submission to the inquiry – or even parts of it – publicly.

The purported reason why the AFP’s submission cannot be released relates to documents provided by the British police and prosecutors. As Justice Clarke puts it in a statement of a few days ago:

Some time after the Inquiry had embarked on its investigation we were apprised of serious objections which had been raised by the Metropolitan Police Service and Crown Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom. They objected to a significant proportion of the documents held by the Australian Federal Police, containing United Kingdom sourced and derived material, being provided to the Inquiry except under severely restricted conditions…It is clear that, without the agreement of the Metropolitan Police Service, publication of those Australian Federal Police documents that the Inquiry has been given would seriously damage the international relationship between the two countries.

Fair enough. But, as already noted, even ASIO was able to provide a public, unclassified submission to the inquiry, which may have been brief but still contains very useful (and rather damning to the AFP, by the looks) information. While those parts of the submission relating to the British information may genuinely need to remain secret, there seems no reason why the AFP can’t make the rest public. Robert McLelland seems to think so, and he’s publicly calling for the AFP to do so. However, the AFP is apparently refusing.

But hang on a minute. Who is this McLelland character again? That’s right, he’s the Federal Attorney-General. In other words, the Cabinet Minister responsible for the AFP (though it reports directly to junior minister Bob Debus). Mick Keelty works for him. And if McLelland thinks that Keelty, as head of the AFP, is failing to live up to its accountability duties by not issuing an unclassified submission to the Clarke Inquiry, he can do something about it.

Robert McLelland, you’re not in opposition any more. If Keelty’s not doing his job to your satisfaction, you can sack him. The power is yours, and if you’ve lost confidence in Keelty, it’s your duty to use it.

Suggest a topic for some time in the future: the nature and the future of the social contract, not the legal contract, involved in military service.

Newcomers should probably read MarkL’s and Katz’s comments for some background. I’m not going to offer anything and let those who want to discuss it frame the issue.

So have at it. And please do not comment on the Andy Olmsted post. All discussion concerning the topic of this post is to happen here.

All projects in the $30 billion program will be scrutinised “with fresh eyes”. That includes what aircraft are to be bought, how many, when and at what price. “Absolutely everything is on the table,” a Government source said.

Even if contracts have been signed, as is the case with the Super Hornets, the Government is prepared to break them if the case is compelling. This is a shift from previous Labor thinking.

There’s a number of posts about this issue on LP. Basically, in 2002 Australia joined the
development of the American F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, which was to replace Australia’s entire manned fighter fleet of F-18 Hornets and F-111 Pigs. However, there was substantial doubt that the F-35 would be ready on time, causing lots of questions about what Plan B was. Then, in 2007, Brendan Nelson suddenly announced that Australia would purchase 24 Super Hornet fighters from Boeing, at a cost of well over six billion dollars, to tide us over until the JSF was ready. This decision was enormously controversial, because there are doubts about whether it’s the right plane to buy, and the decision was apparently made without going through the usual scrutiny a project of this scale would entail.

As the quote from the newspaper story indicates, Labor promised before the election to keep all existing contracts, so this is a change of policy.

One of the problems such a review faces is that any decision to cancel the contract on the Super Hornets pretty much has to be made in the next few months, if indeed it’s not already too late. But the government won’t be able to complete its new defence White Paper, the first comprehensive review of Australia’s strategic situation and military requirements, until the end of the year. That people are even considering ditching the program at this stage seems to me to give some idea of how bad the process has been.

Of course, there is another dimension to reviewing fighter procurement plans. We’ll be able to find out whether the previous Defence Minister a) made the right decision, and b) whether he followed the proper procedure in doing so. That the previous Defence Minister is the current Opposition Leader makes such questions particularly fascinating…

NOTE: story edited slightly after posting.

Benazir Bhutto (21 June 1952 to 27 December 2007)

Since returning to Australia in May this year to serve the rest of the nine-month sentence imposed by the US military tribunal after a negotiated plea deal, Hicks has ventured out into the sunshine once, into the exercise yard at Yatala Labour Prison.

He could not cope, and preferred the enclosed prison and artificial lighting where he felt safer. “He tried to go out, but he just said everything closed in on him,” said his father, Terry Hicks.

On the bright side, it seems like the new government has decided to let Mohammed Haneef get on with providing medical services in Australia.

Just to remind us why getting the Coalition out of its Senate majority, and giving the balance of power back to progressive parties, is so important, here’s some that politician-bloggers from the minor parties contending for the Senate have raised recently:

Take Andrew Bartlett on ASIO abusing its powers:

Yet again, a case which received a blaze of publicity over two years ago, adding to unrealistic fear and alarm about Muslims in Australia, has failed when it finally comes to trail – and providing Australia’s Muslims yet another reason to feel less secure and less trusting of our government and law enforcement agencies.

Even more worryingly, the judge in the case condemned the conduct of ASIO officers as “grossly improperâ€?.

When was the last time you heard Labor stand up on human rights?

Or Christine Milne talking about energy efficient buildings. While I remain unconvinced about the prescriptiveness of their policies, at least they’re talking about the kinds of greenhouse reductions we actually need to make.

On bringing party bosses, and executive government to heel a bit, Andrew Bartlett, again, on requiring Parliamentary approval for war., while Bob Brown wants to allow us to number all the boxes above the line for the Senate, so voters can allocate preferences themselves without spending half an hour filling out the below-the-line Senate ballot paper.

It is all but impossible (and highly undesirable, given the experiences of the previous parliamentary term) for Labor to win an outright majority in the Senate. I live in a safe seat, and I imagine many of you do too. But what we can all do is our bit to push the Senate in a more desirable direction. Let’s make sure the Liberals lose their majority, and make sure Steve Fielding is reduced to the irrelevance he thoroughly deserves to be.

Cross-posted at LP in Exile where you can make comments while we wait for all the bugs to be ironed out of our new site.

Immigration Minister, Kevin Andrews, is simply not to be trusted on serious matters relating to human and legal rights. Indeed, the collective effort of politicians and public officers in the Haneef case was to deny Dr Haneef his rights as an Australian resident. And the Australian public has every right to be cynical about the performance of all the federal players in this case.

Attorney-General Ruddock said the government’s laws had “worked as intendedâ€?, and he defended the Australian Federal Police, yet The Bulletin in August reported ASIO had investigated Haneef’s activities, and concluded that there was no case to cancel his visa on security grounds. A security source told The Bulletin that if ASIO had concluded Haneef was a security threat then Ruddock would have been involved rather than Andrews. ASIO was also said to have been critical of the Australian Federal Police’s handling of the Haneef case and the government.

AFP head, Mick Keelty, has told The Bulletin, that he had warned the then Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions Damian Bugg that there was insufficient evidence to charge Haneef. However, Bugg’s account is at odds with Keelty’s. On 27 July the DPP stated:

This decision [to prosecute] was made following advice provided to the AFP by one of my officers that on the basis of the information available at that stage and what was said to be likely to be available and other potential sources of information, the police could have reasonable grounds for believing that Dr Haneef had committed that offence [emphasis added].

But, Mr Keelty released a statement to the media announcing the withdrawal of charges on the same day [27 July 2007] as the DPP said the decision to prosecute was based on AFP information. The official release stated as follows:

Commissioner Keelty said the AFP acted upon advice from the DPP when it charged Dr Haneef on 13 July and now accepts the DPP’s latest decision.

“The AFP acted on the advice of the DPP that there was sufficient evidence to charge Dr Haneef and now accepts the subsequent decision by the DPP to withdraw the charge,â€? Commissioner Keelty said [emphasis added].

So, the question is who is covering up?

A DPP review of the case has concluded that there had been mistakes in the AFP investigations and in the responses by the office and that there had not been “a prima facie case with reasonable prospects of convictionâ€?. Haneef’s lawyer, Peter Russo, put it to the ABC:

We’ve got a situation now where a person has had his visa cancelled, lost his job, had his reputation suffered based on information that the AFP provided to the director’s office,’ he said.

‘Now he’s come out and said that he told them that the case was weak. It doesn’t make any sense at all’.

As Russo pointed out, “…that is totally contrary to everything he [Commissioner Keelty] has said up to date.â€?

The former DPP, Damian Bugg, was at pains to deny any political influence in the case as far as his office is concerned. But the release today of some details of email correspondence between the AFP office, the Department of Immigration and Minster Andrews’s office suggests otherwise as far as the AFP is concerned.

At best these revelations reveal Mr Andrews dissembling. He always maintained – it was never credible – that his decision to revoke Haneef’s visa had nothing to do with the case and was based on information given to him by the Federal Police that his character was such that he should be deported. Andrews said this in response to a question when he announced his revocation of Haneef’s visa:

This is unrelated to the question of proceedings in the criminal court in Brisbane. This is a direct responsibility set out in the Migration Act. This is not the first person, indeed, whose visa has been cancelled. It happens on a regular basis where somebody is judged not to pass the character test.

Andrews was disingenuous in drawing the distinction between the case before the Court and his decision to kick Haneef out of Australia and the questioning by the reporters reflected their incredulity at the time. Yes, there is a distinction between the legal bases of the Court case and the Ministerial fiat, but that distictinction does not refute allegations of a political basis in Andrews’s intervention. There was no doubt that Andrews was relying on AFP advice:

Based on information and advice I’ve received from the Australian Federal Police, I reasonably suspect that Dr Haneef has had or has an association with persons involved in criminal conduct, namely terrorism.

In addition, I am satisfied that the cancellation is in the national interest.

The Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police has intimated to me that the AFP will issue a criminal justice certificate, the effect of which is that Dr Haneef will remain in immigration detention whilst the legal proceedings are on foot.

In his own words, the decision was about terrorism and Haneef’s alleged and unfounded associations with terrorists [distant cousins in the UK], the very matters relating to his detention, the eventual charges, and the Court case. Mr Andrews was not being truthful about the politics.

The release of emails between the AFP and the Department of Immigration have revealed that contingencies for retaining Haneef in custody in the event of the Court granting him bail had been arranged by 14 July before the Magistrate’s decision:

Contingencies for containing Mr HANEEF and detaining him under the Migration Act, if it is the case he is granted bail on Monday, are in place as per arrangements today.

Mr Andrews has always maintained that his decision had nothing to do with the court case. Yesterday, Andrews’s office was still denying the obvious:

…the spokeswoman for Mr Andrews said there was ‘absolutely no deal or arrangement or contingency instigated, approved, or discussed by the minister or any of his staff at all, ever’.

It is not credible that Andrews or his office were unaware of these arrangement.

Even if staff had kept the details from the Minister, the Minister is responsible and the action required his approval and decision. This was a high profile case with much political controversy. There is no doubt that Andrews was involved in the plans as well as the decision. It is a safe enough assumption to assume that if the Head of Department knew of it, so did Andrews’s office. Indeed, there is no doubt about it. Commissioner Keelty made it clear on 31 July 2007 that Minister Andrews was directly involved:

‘The AFP has worked in close partnership with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, as well as Minister Andrews, throughout this matter.

‘The AFP assisted DIAC in the review of Dr Haneef’s visa by providing information upon which the Minister acted.

‘The AFP stands by that information,’ the Commissioner said.

Andrews told 3AW’s Neil Mitchell in a radio interview on 17 July that:

I’d been provided information prior to the start of the bail hearing and I was provided further information on Monday. Given the information that I was provided on Monday, I would have still came to the same decision that I did [emphasis added].

So, out of his own mouth, Minister Andrews had participated in the development of a contingency to keep Haneef in detention. In the end, Haneef understandably took the option to leave the country.

In an interview with David Speers at Sky News on 16 July, Andrews – when asked whether the his decision to revoke Haneef’s visa was political – tried to deny this fiasco had nothing to do with the election:

This is very much about the national security of Australian and what’s in Australia’s interest, and what I’ve considered is the issues that go to the character of this visa holder, and I’ve considered issues that go to the national interest of Australia, and it’s on that basis and that basis alone that I’ve come to this decision.

He claimed the decision was based on secret information from the AFP. Throughout the case, Andrews’s mantra was that he was acting in the interests of national security. However, announcing the arrest of Haneef on 2 July, Attorney-General Ruddock said that “There is no additional evidence at this point in time that would suggest that the threat level to Australia should be raised above medium.â€? From the outset there was not judged to be any increase in threats to national security reflected by the arrest of Haneef. And, as the investigation proceeded, there was nothing further to warrent Andrews’s conclusion.

Nothing except politics, that is. Since Andrews adopted the Immigration portfolio, he has adopted a hamfisted approach to immigration issues. The Sudanese issue is a case in point. Andrews knows that there is a body of support in the community for tough sanctions against non-European migration and he attempted to milk this for political gain.

Even The Australian in an editorial on 4 October 2007 about the immigration program began, â€? Kevin Andrews is undermining Australia’s good name. The editorial expressed a deep concern:

that Mr Andrews’s comments seem calculated to provoke community outrage and undermine support for migrants and refugees. If Mr Andrews does not have empirical data to support his comments, he would be well-advised not to make them. It is all too easy to inflame hatred by trying to play the race card. Mr Andrews already raised the ire of many Australians and Indians with his inept handling of the Mohamed Haneef case. His latest efforts may well have the highly undesirable effect of undermining support for our offshore humanitarian resettlement program.

The Australian, an open supporter of the Howard Government and the Coalition in this election, is critical of Andrews for playing politics with the race card in the case of African migrants generally and Sudanese migrants in particular.

The conclusion from the evidence publicly available is that Andrews, the dissembling Minister for Immigration, was undoubtedly motivated by politics in the Haneef case, on the eve of an election, and had an eye on the public concern about terrorism and its vote-winning potential. In the process the Minister collaborated in undermining every principle of human rights in the State’s treatment of Haneef.